Kamal Nayan And Anr. vs Hem Parkash
2000 Latest Caselaw 314 Del

JUDGMENT

Madan B. Lokur, J.

1. The Appellants are aggrieved by an order dated 29th March, 1997 whereby their first appeal was dismissed by the learned Additional Rent Control Tribunal.

2. The Respondent had filed a petition for eviction of the Appellants on the ground that Appellant No.1 had sub-let the suit premises to Appellant No.2. It was contended that in view of this, the Appellants were liable to be evicted under the provisions of Clause (b) of the proviso to Section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).

3. Both the Courts below found that a case of sub-letting had been made out against the Appellants and, therefore, an eviction decree was passed against the Appellants.

4. The suit premises were taken on rent by Appellant No.1 (since deceased) sometime in December, 1978. According to the Respondent, in January 1979 Appellant No.1 informed him that he was the sole proprietor of Sigma Electronics. He requested that the rent receipts be issued in the name of Sigma Electronics.

5. Sometime towards the end of 1982 the Respondent saw some other persons conducting business in the suit premises and came to know that Appellant No.1 had nothing to do with Sigma Electronics, which was allegedly his sub-tenant. Accordingly, he filed an eviction petition against the Appellants.

6. It was the contention of the Appellants that Sigma Electronics was the tenant in the suit premises and in the alternative, both the Appellants were tenants. It was alleged that Sigma Electronics was owned by the wife of Appellant No.1 and that Appellant No.1 was working in Sigma Electronics as its Manager.

7. Both the Courts below disbelieved the Appellants. It was held that Appellant No.1 was in fact carrying on his business at some other place in the name and style of M/s Spectrum Electronics.

8. Learned counsel for the parties made their submissions on 8th November, 2000 when judgment was reserved.

9. Learned counsel for the Appellants contended that for almost 3 years Appellant No.1 issued cheques drawn from the account of Sigma Electronics and the Respondent issued rent receipts in favor of Sigma Electronics. It was contended that now the Respondent cannot turn around and say that Sigma Electronics is not his tenant.

10. It does appear that the Respondent was extremely naive in believing Appellant No.1 that he was the sole proprietor of Sigma Electronics and, therefore, on the request of Appellant No.1 issued rent receipts in favor of Sigma Electronics. Later on, however, he came to know that someone else was carrying on business in the suit premises and that Appellant No.1 had nothing to do with Sigma Electronics. He, therefore, stopped issuing rent receipts in favor of Sigma Electronics and began issuing rent receipts in favor of Appellant No.1. It appears from the record that Appellant No.1 did not object to the rent receipts being drawn out in his favor from 1983 onwards. This being so, Appellant No.1 acknowledged the fact that he alone was the tenant of the suit premises. Indeed, Appellant No.1 cannot get out of the fact that only he was the tenant in the suit premises because he had entered into a written agreement with the Respondent on 17th December, 1978 to this effect.

11. Consequently, I am of the view that in the facts of this case, merely because for some time, rent receipts were made out in the name of Sigma Electronics on the request of Appellant No.1, it does not mean that Sigma Electronics was the tenant.

12. Learned counsel for the Appellants submitted that the Respondent had admitted in his statement that Appellant No.1 used to sit in the suit premises. This fact by itself does not establish that Appellant No.1 had any control over the suit premises. There is nothing on the record to indicate the constitution of Sigma Electronics. No document was produced by Appellant No.1 or his wife to show how they were concerned with Sigma Electronics. In fact, the wife of Appellant No.1 who was said to be the owner of Sigma Electronics did not even enter the witness box. Appellant No.1 who claimed to be working as a Manager in Sigma Electronics did not produce any document in support of his contention.

13. Even if Appellant No.1 was a Manager in Sigma Electronics, it really means nothing - it does not show that he exercised control over the suit premises. Control over the suit premises was in the hands of Sigma Electronics, his alleged employer.

14. It was then contended that after all Sigma Electronics was owned by the wife of Appellant No.1 and, therefore, there can be no case of subletting by him to his wife. Reliance in this regard was placed on Smt. Krishnawanti Vs. Hans Raj, 1979 ALL India Rent Control Journal 164. In that case, the facts were the reverse, namely that the tenant therein was the wife and her husband was carrying on the business of a chemist in the shop with occasional help from his wife. The Supreme Court was of the view that the factual commonsense inference in such a case would be that the wife had not sublet the suit premises to her husband.

15. Unfortunately, however, there is nothing on record in this case to suggest that the business in the suit premises was being carried out by the wife of Appellant No.1. It was the case of the Appellants that business was being carried on in the suit premises by Sigma Electronics. The constitution of the Sigma Electronics was not disclosed. The wife of Appellant No.1 did not enter the witness box to say that she was the sole proprietor of Sigma Electronics and that she was carrying on business with the help of Appellant No.1 as Manager of Sigma Electronics. Necessary evidence in this case is lacking. Therefore, Smt.Krishnawanti does not apply to the facts of this case.

16. Learned counsel for the Appellants contended that since the Courts below have ignored important evidence on record, this Court can always set aside a concurrent finding of fact. Reliance in this regard was placed on Smt. Sonawati and Ors. Vs. Sri Ram and Anr., .

17. With respect, it is not correct to say that the Courts below have ignored any material evidence on record. Two important facts that learned counsel for the Appellants relied upon and which, according to him, were ignored are that the Respondent issued rent receipts to the Appellants in the name of Sigma Electronics and that payments were made to the Respondent by cheques drawn in the name of Sigma Electronics. Both these aspects have been considered by the learned Additional Rent Controller as well as by the learned Additional Rent Control Tribunal.

18. It was also contended that the statement of the Respondent that he used to see Appellant No.1 sitting in the suit premises was not given due importance. It is not for this Court to weigh the evidence. The assessment of the evidence has already been done by the Courts below and they have come to the conclusion that the mere presence of Appellant No.1 in the suit premises establishes, at best, his claim that he was the Manager of Sigma Electronics. The mere presence of Appellant No.1 in the suit premises does not establish that Sigma Electronics was not the sub-tenant of Appellant No.1 or that Appellant No.1 had not parted with possession of the suit premises in favor of Sigma Electronics.

19. In view of the above, I am of the opinion that both the Courts below have rightly held that Appellant No.1 had sublet the suit premises to Sigma Electronics and had parted with possession of the suit premises in favor of Sigma Electronics. The ingredients of provisions of Clause

(b) of the proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act have been fully met.

20. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. No costs.