N.N. Seth vs Union Of India & Ors.
1999 Latest Caselaw 110 Del

ORDER

DR. M.K. Sharma, J.

1. The present suit was instituted by the plaintiff against the defendants praying for a decree for damages. The plaintiff has sought for a decree for payment of Rs. 7 lac as damages for causing mental torture, harassment, loss of reputation and loss of promotion.

2. A departmental enquiry was conducted against the plaintiff and in pursuance thereof the plaintiff was dismissed from service and the order of dismissal was passed by the then DIG, Delhi Police vide order dated 18.9.1964. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid impugned order the plaintiff preferred an appeal to the then Inspector General of Police, who by order dated 27.9.1965 set aside the impugned order and remanded the case for conducting de novo enquiry. Pursuant to the de novo enquiry conducted against the plaintiff he was dismissed from service by the Inspector General of Police under Order dated 16.11.1965. Being aggrieved by the said dismissal order the plaintiff preferred a representation to the then Chief Commissioner of Delhi which was dismissed. Accordingly, the plaintiff preferred a writ petition in this court which was disposed of by this court setting aside the impugned order of dismissal on the ground that there was violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the said enquiry. Thereafter the defendants conducted a second de novo enquiry against the plaintiff on completion of which the plaintiff was dismissed from service, against which he again preferred an appeal to the Inspector General of Police which was dismissed. The plaintiff preferred a review petition which was also dismissed by the then Inspector General of Police vide order dated 28.3.1998. The plaintiff, thereafter preferred a representation to the Inspector General of Police, Delhi, who accepted the said representation and set aside the order of dismissal on the technical ground that the plaintiff attained the age of superannuation in the year 1969 and his dismissal after the age of superannuation cannot be upheld. The said order was passed by the Lt. Governor of Delhi on 3.10.1985. Hence the plaintiff instituted the present suit seeking for the aforesaid reliefs. In paragraph 14 of the plaint the plaintiff has stated that on account of illegal, invalid and ab initio void orders of the then Inspector General of Police and the Lt. Governor of Delhi, plaintiff suffered humiliation, mental torture, loss of reputation and loss of promotion and therefore, he is entitled to damages as sought for in the suit.

3. The defendants No.1 to 3 filed a written statement refuting the allegations made in the plaint and contending inter alia that the claim is time barred and that there is no cause of action to file the suit. The said defendants also filed an application in this court under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying for rejection of the plaint on the ground that the suit is barred by limitation. The said application was registered as I.A. 600/1996. In the said application it is stated that the final order in respect of the plaintiff was passed on 30.10.1985 by the Lt. Governor of Delhi accepting the representation of the plaintiff and setting aside the order of dismissal on technical ground that the plaintiff retired from service prior to the date of dismissal. The defendants have also stated that on the own showing of the plaintiff the cause of action for filing the present suit arose on 18.9.1964 and thereafter on 15.11.1965 and thereafter on 10.12.1976 and that the plaintiff has not given any other date as the basis which gives him the cause of action to file the suit. It is also stated in the said application that the cause of action for filing the suit at the most and could be said to have last arisen on 30.10.1985 and thereafter since the suit was instituted in 1990 the same is ex facie barred by limitation.

4. The said application was placed before me for arguments, on which I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff as also the learned counsel for the defendants.

5. Counsel for the plaintiff, during the course of his arguments submitted that right to sue arose when the right is asserted through the present suit by filing the plaint which is denied by the defendants and therefore, for the present suit the period of limitation for filing the suit could be said to have arisen when the plaintiff has filed the present suit asserting his right for payment of damages. Counsel also submitted that cause of action in the present matter is of continuous nature and existed even on the date of filing of the present suit. In support of his submissions the learned counsel relied upon the decisions in Indumati Markandray Trivedi Vs. Jhala Umedsinh ji Merubhabhai, and Hansraj Koverji Rathor Vs. State of Orissa, .

6. The aforesaid submission made on behalf of the plaintiff was refuted by the learned counsel appearing for the defendants who submitted that the suit is ex facie barred by limitation as the suit was filed only in the year 1990 when the last cause of action for filing the suit arose in the year 1985.

7. The plaintiff has filed the suit seeking for a decree for payment of Rs.7 lac as damages for causing mental torture, harassment, loss of reputation and promotion to the plaintiff. The order of dismissal passed against the plaintiff was set aside by the Inspector General of Police, Delhi on 3.10.1985, by accepting the representation filed by the plaintiff. Subsequent to the aforesaid order the plaintiff was paid all his back wages and there is no claim of the plaintiff raised in the present suit in respect of the same. Thus the present suit is a pure and simple suit seeking for damages which is governed by the provisions of Article 113 of the Limitation Act which is a residuary provision. Under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for filing a suit has been prescribed as 3 years from the date the right to sue accrues and the said provision applies to suits to which no other article in the schedule applies. Thus Article 113 is a residuary article for suits not covered by any other article. The starting point of limitation under Article 113 runs from the date when the right to sue accrues. The words 'right to sue' mean a right to seek relief i.e. a right to prosecute by law, to seek relief by means of legal procedure. The plaintiff has sought for a decree for payment of damages for causing mental torture, harassment, loss of reputation and loss of promotion, which according to him was caused by the illegal, invalid and ab initio void orders issued by the Inspector General of Police and the Lt. Governor, Delhi. The said orders as stated by the plaintiff himself in paragraph 16 were issued on 18.9.1964, 15.12.1965 and 10.12.1976. During the course of his submission the learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the cause of action although initially arose on 18.9.1964, in the present suit the same was a continuing one. The said submission of the learned counsel appears to have some force for, so long the orders of dismissal passed against him were not set aside by a competent authority the order of dismissal could not have been said to be illegal, invalid and void ab initio. The cause of action therefore, was a continuous one till the final order was passed by the Lt. Governor accepting his representation whereby he set aside the order of dismissed passed against the plaintiff. Thus the continuing cause of action came to a closure with the passing of the order dated 30.10.1985 when the limitation started to run for seeking relief by legal means claiming the damages. The cause of action, therefore, cannot continue after 30.10.1985 and computing the period of limitation from that date the suit, if any, for the relief aforesaid should have been filed by the plaintiff on or before 30.10.1988. The present suit however, came to be filed by the plaintiff only on 24.7.1990 which ex facie was instituted beyond the period of limitation prescribed for the purpose. The suit, therefore, is barred by limitation, having been instituted beyond the period of 3 years from 31.10.1985.

8. In that view of the matter the plaint filed by the plaintiff is liable to be rejected being barred by limitation. The application stands allowed and the suit is held to be barred by limitation. Consequently, the plaint filed by the plaintiff stands rejected. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.