All India Wokey'S Hockey ... vs Indian Olympic Association And ...
1994 Latest Caselaw 513 Del

JUDGMENT

R.C. Lahoti, J.

(1) Females having adopted hockey sticks in their hands are face to face in a court of law. Their centre of activities has shifted from hockey field to court room and they expect the Judge to be a referee; the momentary object being not to have the number of goals counted and find who has won the match, but to have a judicial verdict on who has won at the election and who should occupy the coveted seats of office bearers in the Federation who is named as the plaintiff. But they cannot be obliged.

(2) Members of a voluntary sports organisation bound by the commands of the creator constitution must settle their scores not in a court of law, but before the Judge of their own choosing, i.e. an Arbitrator. Disputes arising among the persons who have associated themselves to form a club. Committee or federation are not ordinarily open to judicial interference. Their disputes must be settled not with legal subtleties but in a homely atmosphere before ii domestic tribunal, if there be one provided and available. The Court may interfere if the Association or the members thereof may act illegally in a manner not authorised by their constitution or in violation of principles of natural justice. Even in such a case, if the constitution governing them provides them a forum for adjudication of disputes, the court of law would ordinarily stay its hands, drive the parties to their own chosen forum and compel them to abide by its decision.

(3) The plaintiff has entered the court naming itself as All India Women's Hockey Federation, suing through Mrs. Nirmal Milkha Singh stating herself to be the General Secretary. The contesting defendants have come out with the plea that the plaintiff to be more accurate should have been described as Indian Women's Hockey Federation. It is not disputed that the plaintiff Federation, whatever be its exact descriptive name, is affiliated with Indian Olympic Association, a parent body, without which affiliation, the plaintiff Federation would not even exist.

(4) The constitution of the Indian Olympic Association known as Memorandum of Association thereof and the Rules and Regulations framed there under contained in a printed booklet have been made available for the perusal of the court. What is relevant for the purpose of the present order is clause Xix, which is extracted and reproduced hereunder : XIX. Settlement of Disputes/conflicts in the National Sports Federations State Olympic Associations (i) All National Sports Federations/Associations/ State Olympic Associations affiliated to Ioa shall include in their constitution provision that the Federations/Associations would have all unresolved disputes settled by the Ioa and their Members shall voluntarily surrender their right of seeking redress in any court of law. (ii) Every member shall be deemed to continue its membership of the Ioa on the specific condition that it voluntarily surrenders its right of seeking redress in any Court of Law. (iii) All unresolved disputes arising within the National Sports Federations/ Association/State Olympic Associations affiliated to the Ioa shall be referred by the Federations/Associations to Ioa for settlement by the IOA. For this purpose, the Ioa Executive Council on the recommendation of the President Ioa shall recommend 9 names to the disputing parties to select one name, in consultation with the President Ioa which is acceptable to both the parties. The Arbitration proceedings shall be completed within the period specified by the Ioa Executive Council. President Ioa based on the circumstances of the case has the authority to extend or vary the period. (iv) In the event of an unresolved dispute within an affiliated Unit of the Ioa which is referred to the Ioa by a Member and which affects normal working of the Unit or prevents preparation and training of the sport/team under the charge of the Unit for purposes of International representation/competition, the Ioa Executive Council will constitute an adhoc body from within the Members of the General Assembly as may be necessary until the dispute within the Unit is resolved. (v) All disputes between National Sports Federations/Associations and the Ioa, or within the Ioa itself will be dealt with in the same manner as laid down in (iii) above.

(5) It appears that elections to the post of various office bearers scheduled to be held in 1994, were so held in the month of February, 1994. There was some confusion and disturbance at the meeting on the right to vote exercisable by some of the members. The elections were held. Strangely enough, there are two sets of minutes produced by the contesting parties. According to the minutes relied upon by the plaintiff, there is one set of office bearers while according to the minutes relied upon by the contesting defendants there is another set of officer bearers which was declared elected. On 11.4.94, an agreement was arrived at and executed between Mrs Amavaz Damania and Mrs Vidya Stokes representing the two groups, whereby they had agreed to resolve their disputes in accordance with the constitution of Iwhf and/or Ioa by reference to Arbitration. Defendant No.2, who is also the General Secretary of Ioa, entered upon the reference as an arbitrator. On 15th June,1994 he made an award. Mrs Amavaz Damania did not appear before the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator having perused the material available before him gave an award in favor of Mrs Vidya Stokes upholding the proceedings of election relied upon by her and finding her the duly elected President of IWHF.

(6) On 22.6.1994, the present petition under Section 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act has been filed as a suit challenging the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement and also the consequent award. An ad interim injunction has been sought for restraining the effect and operation of the award dated 15.6.94 passed by defendant No.2, the result whereof though not so stated in the application would necessarily be to restrain the elected officer bearers from functioning as such.

(7) The learned counsel for the plaintiff faced with the award given by the Arbitrator, defendant No.2 has submitted that the factum of very existence of the arbitration agreement and consequently the arbitration award is disputed by the plaintiff and so the plaintiff cannot be held bound by the award. The learned counsel submitted :- (i) that Clause 19 above said does not come into operation unless and until there be a clause for arbitration included in the constitution of the plaintiff Federation and there being no such arbitration clause in the constitution of the plaintiff Federation, there was no question of the dispute being referred to arbitration and an award being pronounced; (ii) that the agreement dated 11.4.1994 is stated to have been entered into by Mrs Amavaz Damania alone which would not bind other contestants at the election and also not the General Secretary filing the present suit; (iii) that the award is not said to be stamped, nor has it been made a rule of the Court and hence is incapable of being acted upon.

(8) The first contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiff must fail for the obvious reasons. The plaintiff has not brought on record its own constitution so as to form an opinion whether it contains an arbitration clause contemplated by sub clause (1) of clause Xix above quoted. Learned counsel for the contesting defendants has rightly pointed out that clause XIX(i) above said mandatorily obliges the plaintiff Federation to include in its constitution the provision for arbitration and had there been no such provision in the constitution of the plaintiff Federation, it would not have been granted affiliation by IOA. In the absence of the constitution of the plaintiff Federation having been brought on record, this Court can presume the existence of an arbitration clause in the constitution of the plaintiff Federation. The delay in initiating the present proceedings speaks volumes against the plaintiff. Mrs Amavaz Damania entered into an agreement referring the matter to arbitration on 11.4.1994. Mrs Amavaz Damnia was the President of the Federation at the relevant time. The award made by the Arbitrator states the Arbitrator having entered upon the reference on 6.6.1994 and having sent notices to both the contesting parties immediately. It appears that all those whom the decision by the Arbitrator did not suit suddenly sprang up in action and initiated the present proceedings on 22.6.1994. They were certainly aware of the contents of the award made by the Arbitrator. The learned counsel for the contesting defendants has stated at the bar that proceedings for making the award a rule of the court have already been initiated.Though the plaintiff is laying challenge to the efficacy of the award on the ground of its being unstamped, the Arbitrator is yet to be noticed and original award yet to be produced in the court and it cannot be said positively whether it is stamped or not. Even if not scribed on a stamp paper, the stamp duty can be supplied and unstamped award validated by payment of duty and penalty. If not made a rule of the court, it does not become a waste piece of paper inasmuch as it can certainly be relied on in defense. Moreover, the proceedings for its being made a rule of the court have been initiated.

(9) It is not alleged that Ioa with whom the plaintiff Federation stands affiliated is not capable of resolving the controversy raised by the plaintiff before the court.

(10) Even if it be the case of the plaintiff that the award is not valid or is not capable of being enforced because there was no valid reference, the remedy of the plaintiff lies in seeking a reference to arbitration and not by disputing the existence and validity of the alleged arbitration agreement and consequently the award. It has already been stated in the earlier part of this order that the case of the plaintiff that its constitution does not have an arbitration clause does not inspire confidence prima facie.

(11) There is yet another infirmity in the case of the plaintiff. Ms Nirmal Milkha Singh through whom the plaintiff is suing had circulated the minutes of Annual General Meeting of the plaintiff Federations held on 13.2.94 to the Ioa, which was received by the latter on 3.3.94. On 7.3.94, the same Nirmal Milkha Singh circulated another set of minutes of the same Agm with a covering letter that the earlier circular had contained certain omissions and typing mistakes, which stands superseded by the minutes of the meeting being now des patched along with the letter. The list of elected office bearers contains a few names not to be found in the earlier one, as incorporated in the minutes. This throws a doubt on the genuineness of the record which is being relied on by the plaintiff.

(12) Batokristo Nandy Vs. Ranadeb Chowdhury. 2nd (1972) 2 Calcutta 480 is a leading authority on the point. On a review of the available case law the learned Judge has summed up the law in the following terms :-

"ELECTION of officials is an internal affair of every association and it is well-settled that normally the Courts have no jurisdiction to interfere with the internal affairs and management of any association. The right to institute legal proceedings on behalf of any association is ordinarily vested in the persons who are in control and management of the association. In the internal affairs and management of any association the rule of majority prevails and under this doctrine, subject to the provisions of the articles and memorandum as general body of the members can always validly ratify the acts of the managers if the managers have exceeded their powers in performing their duties or have done any act in exercise of their powers which they were capable of doing regularly but have done irregularly due to bona fide mistakes, no action lies. Individual members or a group of members cannot bring a representative action in the name of the association for challenging the mere irregular acts of the managers when those acts are capable of being ratified by the majority of the members and the majority of the members are willing to do so. If the rules of the association provide for doing a particular act and the power to do that act is conferred on the managers by the rules of the association and if that act is done irregularly or invalidly (not in the sense of culpa nor in a sense of illegality) no member of the association can make any complaint in a court of law. These elementary principles have long been well established by a long catena of decisions too well known to be cited."

"If the impugned act is tainted with fraud and the evil doers are themselves in a majority so that the wrong done to the association cannot be brought to the Court at the instance of the association or the breach of rule is not a mere irregularity but is of substance and cuts at the very root of the impugned act and vitiates the act itself or if the impugned act is done in a colourable exercise of power with dishonest and capricious motive so as to invade the personal or the corporate rights of the members or the act complained of amounts to a breach of a fundamental obligation or amounts to an oppression on the minority or stratification of the act complained of will be ultra vires the powers of the association, the bar imposed on the jurisdiction of the court is automatically removed and the court at the instance of any member is entitled to enter into the arena of the association to strike down the impugned acts. The jurisdiction of the Court to interfere with the internal affairs and management of the association is based on the well settled principle of doing justice and whenever the facts are such that the intervention by the court is the only remedy open to the members, it is within the exception to the general rule and the Court retains its jurisdiction."

(13) I find myself in entire agreement with the view so taken. The present one is not shown or demonstrated to be a case falling within an exception.

(14) Injunction is discretionary jurisdiction of the Court. The Court is not bound to grant an injunction merely because it is lawful to do so. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court is satisfied that the plaintiff is not entitled to an indulgence. To redeem its grievance the plaintiff must find a way within the framework of the Constitution governing the Federation.

(15) For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff is held not entitled to the grant of ad interim injunction prayed for. The application under Order 39 Rules 1-2 Cpc filed by the plaintiff seeking grant of ad interim injunction is rejected.