H.C. Raghubir vs Union Of India And Ors.
1991 Latest Caselaw 270 Del

JUDGMENT

B.N. Kirpal, J.

(1) The Challenge in this writ petition is to a bill of Rs. 2,50,000.00 issued by Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. on account of telephone charges in respect of the period 31st May, 1988 to 31st March, 1989. There is also a challenge to the validity of Rule 443 of the Rules framed under the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885.

(2) The petitioner was allotted a temporary connection in July, 1986 of a Telephone bearing No. 604420. Between 1986 and 1988 the bills which were sent were paid but the petitioner, in June 1988, made a representation to the respondents against excessive bill. For the period from 1.4.1988 to 15th May, 1988 a bill for Rs. 28.166.00 had been received by the petitioner and in the representation dated 17th June, 1988 it was contended by the petitioner that the said bill was excessive and unreasonable. Payment was, however, made of the bill under protest. The petitioner thereafter also sought for and obtained meter readings. Ultimately, the petitioner received a bill, in June, 1990 for a sum of Rs. 2,50,000.00 . It was stated in this bill that the said amount was for calls which had been "less charged during the period from 31.5.88 to 31.3.89". It was further stated that what was charged, originally, from the petitioner was in respect of 48385 calls instead of 2,48,385.00 calls. This bill for Rs. 2,50,000.00 was in respect of 2,00,000 calls which had been under-charged. Though in the bill it was stated that the payment should be made by 28th May, 1990 in order to avoid disconnection, the bill was, however, sent to the petitioner only on 5th June, 1990.

(3) The petitioner represented against the said bill but, according to him, he did not receive any reply. The petitioner also requested that his Std be disconnected. It is there after that the present writ petition has been filed challenging the validity of the said bill as well as rule 443, under which rule power is alleged to have been given to the respondent to disconnect the telephone in the event of non-payment of any bill.

(4) In answer to the petition, it is, inter alia, contended by the respondent that there is an alternative remedy available to the petitioner by way of arbitration as provided by Section 7B of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885. It is further the case of the respondents that even though a complaint was received from the petitioner, the respondents did not find that the meter was in any way defective. The case of the respondents really is that a fraud was sought to be played on the respondents which was resulted in under billing. It is sought to be explained that whereas the petitioner should have in fact been charged in respect of 2,48,325 calls for the period from 31st May, 1988 to 31st March, 1989, in actual fact the petitioner was charged only for 48385 calls. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the respondent that its Vigilance Department had an occasion to investigate another complaint. During the course of that investigation, it was discovered by the Vigilance Department that in respect of the petitioner's telephone No. 604420 there had been under-billing. According to the respondents this under-billing was detected by them when they compared the figures in two registers, namely, the Calling Pattern Telephone Revenue Register (CPTR) and the Meter Testing Register. Particulars of the relevant entries from these two registers have been placed on record by the respondents. In the case of 5 digit meters when one round is completed after the figure 99999. the meter would start from '0'. once again. When compared with the Meter Testing Register, the respondents found that the figures entered ill the Cptr register did not tally. It has been explained that in Cptr register figures are entered which are stated to be there on the meter itself. It is from the figures entered in the Cptr register that bills are sent. The Vigilance Department, however, found that in the case of the petitioner the figures entered in the Meter Testing Register did not tally with the Cptr register. Whereas the entries in the Cptr register would pertain to each telephone number separately, the Meter Testing register pertains to the whole Exchange. It has been contended before us by the learned Counsel for the respondents that the entries made in the Meter Testing Register have to be accepted as correct as the same pertain to all the telephone lines in the Exchange and it is inconceivable that it is only in respect of isolated cases like the petitioner's that wrong entries would be made by the Technical staff. Entries are made in the Meter Testing Register only to ascertain whether the meter is functioning properly or not. It is accepted by the learned Counsel for the respondents that there has been a collusion with the respondents own staff which has resulted in wrong entries being recorded in the Cptr register which has resulted in under-billing.

(5) We do not propose to go into the merits of the controversy as to whether the petitioner is involved in the fraud which is alleged by the respondents or not. Whether the allegations of the respondents that the petitioner is involved and has colluded with . the respondents officers are correct or not 0would request investigation into facts and may even require oral testimony to be recorded and, in our opinion, this is not a proper forum for this purpose. As we shall presently observe, these questions can only be decided in proceedings under Section 7B of the Act. We, therefore, do propose to consider and decide the legal contentions which have been raised by the learned Counsel for the parties.

(6) It was contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that in case the respondents wanted to disconnect the telephone on account of under-billing, then the appropriate rule under which action could have been taken was Rule 421 and not Rule 443. It was submitted that Rule 443 is applicable to the cases of normal billing and not to a case where there has been an under-charge.

(7) In order to consider this contention, it is necessary to refer to the provisions of the said Rules. These Rules read as follows :-

"421.Disconnection of telephones. Where the Divisional Engineer is satisfied for reasons to be recorded in writing that it is necessary to do so, he may, after giving the subscriber a notice in writing for a period which shall not except in emergent cases be less than 7 days disconnect the telephone, and in such case, the subscriber shall be entitled to refund of rent for the unexpired portion of the period for which the connection or service was given.

443.Default of payment. If, on or before the due date, the rent or other charges in respect of the telephone service provided are not paid by the subscriber in accordance with these rules, or bills for charges in respect of calls (local and trunk) or phonograms or other dues from the subscriber are not duly paid by him, any telephone or telephones rented by him may be disconnected without notice. The telephone or telephones may, if the Telegraph Authority thinks fit be restored, if the defaulting subscriber pays the outstanding dues and the reconnection fee together with the rental for such portion of the intervening period (during which the telephone remains disconnected) as may be prescribed by the Telegraph Authority from time to time. The subscriber shall pay all the above charges within such period as may be prescribed by the Telegraphs Authority from time to time."

(8) Rule 421 is in Part V, sub-chapter "Telephone connections and other services". Rule 443 is in the same Part V of the Rules but is under a sub-chapter "Fees and other charges". The perusal of rule 421 clearly shows that it is concerned with the disconnection of telephones. It provides for a notice in writing to be given if disconnection of the telephone is contemplated. The rule is silent as to the circumstances under which power under that rule can be exercised. The rule only states that the power will be exercised for reasons to be recorded in writing to the effect that it is necessary to disconnect the telephones. It is obvious that the reasons must be relevant and cannot be arbitrary. The said rule, as we read it provides for permanent disconnection of the telephone. It is for this reason that the rule contemplates the refund of rent for the unexpired portion of the period for which the connection or service was given. Secondly, the rule does not provide for re-connection. Rule 443, on the other hand, specifically deals with action to be taken in the case of default of payment. Even if it is assumed that rule 421 could possibly have covered the case of disconnection on account of non-payment of telephone charges, nevertheless in view of the specific provision for disconnection on account of non-payment of bills having been provided in rule 443 it is that provision which would apply and not rule 421. The said rule 443 cannot be given a restricted meaning. It not only refers to telephone charges not being paid in accordance with the rules but it also contemplates a case where there is non-payment of "bills for charges in respect of calls (local and trunk)". We find it difficult to agree with the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that this rule deals only with normal bills. It may be that the first part of rule 443 may be dealing with a case of monthly or bi-monthly bills which are sent by the respondents at regular intervals but even in cases where there has been an under-charge, bills have to be sent arid rule 443 would take within its ambit such bills. In connection, reference may be made to rule 439 which provides that charges for calls shall be payable "on presentation of a bill therefor". Of course, the said provision further states that the period for which bills may be prepared and the dates by which they shall be payable shall be fixed by the Telegraph Authority but it is clear that in order to realise its dues, the respondent is obliged to present a bill Rule 439 is the only rule which requires the presentation of a bill but the said rule is very widely worded and would require a bill to be presented even in cases where the subscriber had been under-charged. Rule 443 refers to the bills which are sent under rule 439 and in cases like the present where it is found by the Department that there has been under-billing the respondents would be entitled to send a bill as contemplated by rule 439 and if payment is not made, the consequences contained in rule 443 would ensue. There is another important difference between rule 421 and rule 443. As we have already observed, rule 421 does not make any provision for re-connection. On the other hand rule 443 clearly provides that if the defaulting subscriber pays the outstanding dues and the reconnection fees together with other charges, then the telephone, which may have been disconnected, can be restored. To accept the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that it is only rule 421 and not rule 443 which would apply would be clearly placing the defaulting subscribers at a disadvantage. The opportunity which is granted to a defaulting subscribers by rule 443 would be lost if we were to hold that in the case of a default of payment of bills disconnection can only be effected under rule 421. We see no warrant for our taking such a view. Rule 443 is clear and unambiguous and cases of default of payment would be covered only under rule 443 and not rule 421.

(9) It was then sought to be contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that rule 443 is ultra vires the Act. We find it difficult to agree with this submission. It was stated that rule 443 provides for disconnection of the telephone without any notice. According to the learned Counsel, this clearly means that the principles of natural justice were violated and it could never have been contemplated by the Act that such drastic measures could be resorted to without giving the subscriber any opportunity to being heard.

(10) The Rules are framed in exercise of the powers conferred on the Central Government by Section 7 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885. Sub section (1) enables the Central Government to make rules which are consistent with the Act for the conduct of all or any telegraphs established, maintained or worked by the Government or by persons licensed under the Act. Sub-section (2) provides for specific matters for which the rules may be framed. Clause (a) provides for the rates and other conditions subject to which messages shall be transmitted within India and Clause (e), which is the other relevant clause, provides for rules to be framed specifying the conditions and restrictions subject to which any telegraph line "shall be established, maintained, worked, repaired, transferred, shifted, withdrawn or disconnected". It is clear, therefore, that under Section 7(2)(e) rules can be framed, infer alia, providing for the withdrawal or disconnection of telegraph line. Such rule have been framed in the present case, namely, rules 421 and 443. It cannot, therefore, be said that rule 443 is beyond the scope of the Act and is ultra vires.

(11) We may, at this stage, also notice that a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Indravadan Pranlal Shah v. General Manager, Ahmedabad Telephones, had an occasion to deal with such a contention and it came to the conclusion that rule 443 was not ultra vires Section 7 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885. To the same effect is the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Raghubar Dayal Kanodia v. Union of India and Others, .

(12) It is true that in rule 443 it is specifically provided that the telephone may be disconnected without notice, nevertheless in our jurisprudence it is recognised that similar statutory provisions may exist. It was observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Col. J.N. Sinha and Another (1871) I Sec 791 that the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules nor can they be elevated to the position of fundamental rights. It was further held that these rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. It was further held that "But if on the other hand a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of any or all the principles of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the man date of the legislature or the statutory authority and read with the concerned provision the principles of natural justice. Whether the exercise of a power conferred should be made in accordance with any of the principles of natural justice or not depends upon the express words of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power conferred, the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of the exercise of the power". It is clear from the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court that if, by exercising statutory power, rules are framed which specifically exclude the principle of natural justice then the Court cannot read into the said provision the principles of natural justice. In the present case, it has been specifically provided that if payment of dues is not made then the telephone may be disconnected without notice. The implication is that it is not mandatory on the respondents to issue a show cause notice prior to disconnection of the telephone.

(13) Even though rule 443 does not require a notice to be given prior to disconnection nevertheless, in actual fact and in effect, a notice is given. It is not in dispute that when a bill is sent in respect of telephone charges, it is specifically provided as to by which date the bill should be paid. The bill further indicates that payment should be made by a specified date "in order to avoid disconnection". The subscriber, therefore, is put to notice that if payment is not made by the prescribed time, the respondents will be at liberty to disconnect the telephone. In our opinion, this by itself is a notice which would be in conformity with the principles of natural justice. The only reason for exercising the power of disconnection under rule 443 is the non-payment of the bill. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that rule 443 did not state that telephone could be disconnected without notice, and further assuming that the principles of natural justice have to be read into rule 443, the question which immediately arises is, what would be the nature of opportunity which would be required to be given before disconnecting a telephone. Principles of natural justice would require that the subscriber should be informed that he has not paid the charges as per the bill and, secondly, on account of non-payment of the charges, the respondents will be disconnecting the telephone. If this is the type of show case notice which will be required to be given, in compliance with the principles of natural justice, then that in fact is done in all cases by the respondents when, as we have, already indicated, bills are sent to a subscriber indicating the date by which the payment should be made and, further, indicating that if payment is not made then the telephone is liable to be disconnected. In other words, though the principles of natural justice are excluded by the provisions of rule 443 nevertheless, in actual fact, adequate opportunity is .granted to the subscriber who is put to notice that if payment is not made by a particular date, the telephone is liable to be disconnected.

(14) Learned Counsel for the petitioner has referred to the decision of a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Amreek Singh v .District Manager, Indore Telephones and Others Air 1987 MP 278. In that case the telephone of the subscriber had been disconnected. The subscriber had asked for the reasons of the disconnection and also for the reasons as to why the telephone was not being restored. It was in this connection that the Court observed that elementary rules of natural justice cannot be ignored in the exercise of discretionary power and that no reasons were assigned and nor was the subscriber informed as to why telephone connection could not be restored. That was not a case where there was a disconnection under rule 443 on account of non-payment of bill. Furthermore, it was not known as to why the disconnection had been effected. Even though it may not be necessary to give a notice before disconnection, under rule 443, nevertheless, in our opinion, whenever it becomes necessary and is required by the subscriber the respondents have to give the reasons for disconnection. Whereas in Amreek Singh's case (supra) the reasons for disconnection were not known, in the present case there is no doubt as to why the telephone was sought to be disconnected. The reason is the non-payment of the bill for Rs. 2,50,000.00 which had been raised by the respondents. The reason for disconnection was the one specifically provided for by rule 443, namely non-payment of telephone charges. In our opinion, Amreeksingh's case can be of no assistance to the petitioner.

(15) As we have already noticed, it has been contended by the learned Counsel for the respondents that there is an alternative namely open to the petitioner by way of arbitration under Section 7B of the Indian Telegraph Act. The submission of Mr. Sikri was that this Court should not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and the proper remedy for the petitioner, if he has any grievance, is to take recourse to the proceedings under Section 7B.

(16) Mr. Luthra, however, vehemently contended that to a case like the present, the provisions of Section 7B are not attracted. Accordingly to the learned Counsel, Section 7B would not cover a case where there is any dispute with regard to a bill which is raised by the respondents. In support of this contention, reliance is placed by the learned Counsel on the aforesaid decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Raghubar Dayal Kanodia (supra). Section 7B reads as under :- "7B.Arbitration of disputes. (1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, applicance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under Sub-section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court."

As is evident from the language of the aforesaid provision, any dispute concerning any telegraph line can be referred to arbitration of an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government. The question which arises is as to what is the scope and effect of the words "any dispute concerning any telegraph line". Would it include, within its ambit, cases pertaining to inflated or deflated telephone bills or will the application of this section be restricted only to cases of disconnection.

(17) In our opinion, Section 7B is very clear and unambiguous. The words "any dispute concerning any telegraph line" have to be liberally construed. A telegraph line is the line which is given to the subscriber and in the present case that line is of telephone No. 604420. The words "any dispute" must necessarily have reference to any dispute in connection with telephone No. 604420. The dispute may be with regard to the telephone bill or repair of any telephone line or even with regard to the disconnection thereof. The important word, to our mind, is "concerning". The dispute must concern the telegraph line. When a bill is raised by the respondent and that is not accepted as correct by the subscriber, then a dispute would arise concerning the telephone No. 604420.

(18) The aforesaid provision may be looked from another angle. What really is the grievance of the petitioner ? The grievance of the petitioner is that the respondent is seeking to disconnect the petitioner's telephone. The reason for disconnection is the non-payment of the bill which has been raised by the respondent. According to the petitioner this reason is incorrect or not valid because the bill is inflated. What adversely affects the petitioner is the proposed action of the respondents in disconnecting the telephone. It cannot be disputed that any action taken or proposed to be taken with regard to the connection or disconnection of a telephone line would be squarely covered by the provisions of Section 7B. When a question arises whether the reason for taking such action is valid or not that would be a case which would also fell within the ambut of Section 7B. Therefore, even if a restricted interpretation is to be given to Section 7B, though in our opinion there is no warrant for doing so, nevertheless when on account of non-payment of bill action is proposed to be taken to disconnect the telephone then any dispute arising in respect thereto would be covered by Section 7B.

(19) It is no doubt true that in Raghubar Dayal Kanodia's case (supra) the learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court did observe that the dispute with regard to the excess billing would not be covered by Section 7B of the Telegraph Act. To the same effect is the judgment of a Division Bench of Gauhati High Court in the case of Santokh Singh v. Divisional Engineer, Telephones, Shillong and Others Air 1990 Gau 17 where at page 64 it was observed by the Gauhati High Court that Section 7B would not be attracted to a dispute regarding excess billing. For the reasons stated by us hereinabove, we find it difficult to agree with the learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court and the Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court. We are fortified in our conclusion by a decision of this Court in the case of Union of India and Another v. Mis. Usha Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. Air 1982 Delhi III. There also the question arose with regard to the correctness of a telephone bill on the ground of mal-functioning and/or misuse of telephone line and it was held that the words of the said section were of wide amplitude and would take within its sweep all kinds of disputes including the dispute with regard to the correctness of the telephone bills. We are in respectful agreement with the said decision. We are firmly of the opinion that a dispute with regard to the bills raised by the Telephone Department, whether for rental or for calls would be clearly covered by the provisions of Section 7B as such disputes would be "concerning any telegraph line".

(20) Learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, contended that even if it be assumed that an alternative remedy under Section 7B is available, nevertheless that alternative remedy is not efficacious. It was in this connection that the learned Counsel referred to a decision of this Court in the case of Mis. 0m Oil and Oilseeds Exchange Limited, Delhi v. Union of India and Ors., . In that case, a Single Judge of this Court came to the conclusion that though the arbitration clause contained in Section 7B was applicable, nevertheless that remedy could not be regarded as being as efficacious as the one provided by Article 226 of the Constitution. It is settled law that the existence of an alternative remedy cannot oust the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, nevertheless if the alternative remedy is equally or more efficacious then, by way of self-restraint, the Courts do not exercise their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was on the peculiar facts of that case that jurisdiction under Article 226 was exercised in 0m Oil's case (supra). In the present case, however, the petitioner could have availed of the alternative, remedy under Section 7B because disputed question of a fact were involved, namely, whether the petitioner is being overcharged or not. Whether the bill which is now raised for Rs. 2,50,000.00 is correct or justified must depend upon the investigation of facts. Such investigation cannot take place in these proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution.

(21) It was submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the alternative remedy under Section 7B cannot be regarded as equally efficacious because pending the arbitration proceedings the telephone may be disconnected. We see no merit in this submission, when a subscriber receives a bill which, according to him, is inflated and is not justified then apart from making a representation to the respondent, it is open to the subscriber to seek recourse to the arbitration under Section 7B of the Act. He can do so either by making a request to the respondent to appoint an arbitrator or by filing an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act. In either of the two cases, if stay of disconnection is desired, the subscriber would have a remedy by invoking the provisions of Order 39 rules I and 2 Civil Procedure Code read with Section 41 of the Arbitration Act. An application for injunction can be filed seeking stay of disconnection of the telephone pending disposal of the arbitration proceedings. It is in this connection that reference to the decision in the case of P.S. Anthappan v. The District Manager, Telephones, becomes relevant because it was held in that case, where telephone was sought to be disconnected under rule 421, that arbitration under Section 7B should precede disconnection. We, however, notice that Anthappan's case related to disconnection under rule 421 where the learned Judge held that telephone should not be disconnected before the completion of the arbitration proceedings but where action under rule 443 is sought to be taken the subscriber will have to make out a case for the grant of a temporary injunction as contemplated by the principles laid down in various cases relating to the provisions of Order 39 rules I and 2. We do feel that in cases of serious contest if the Court finds that there is a prima fade case made out then, pending disposal of arbitration proceedings under Section 7B, the Court may deem it appropriate to grant a temporary injunction. But whether such an injunction should be granted or not must, necessarily, depend upon the facts of each case. It is not necessary for us to add, and it is obvious, that if a Court decides to grant injunction the subscriber can always be put to such terms as the Court deems fit and proper. It is, not correct to contend that proceedings under Article 226 are more efficacious than taking recourse to the provisions of Section 7B of the Telegraph Act.

(22) Before concluding, we would like to refer to the decision of the Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court, on which decision considerable reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. In Santokh Singh's case (supra) the Gauhati High Court had an occasion to deal with a case where bills were sent which were termed as excessive or inflated in respect of local and Std calls. Complaint against the said bills was rejected. This action of disconnection of telephone was challenged by filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Department had contended that there was no fault in the meter or its reading and that the petitioner could not prove that he did not make any Std calls. Dealing with this contention, the High Court observed that it did not find any basis or justification to shift the onus of proving that no Std calls to the extent shown in the bills were made on the subscriber. It further observed that "In our opinion, unless the Department has got same material with it to show that the petitioner made excessive use of the telephone which might justify the exhorbitant bill, it could not just reject his claim on the ground that the recording of the reading from the meter was correct when it is an admitted position that the meter can record exorbitantly high number of calls even without the subscriber making any such calls". In our opinion, the aforesaid observations tend to put an impossible burden of proof on the department. It is no doubt true that bills may be inflated because of a defect in the meter. If the meter is not defective and a telephone enjoys the Std facility then it is not for the Department to prove that the subscriber actually made the telephone calls which are recorded in the meter. It may be that because of the connivance of the staff of the respondent there may be a misuse of the telephone line so that even though the meter may record the calls correctly but due to manipulations at the telephone junction beyond the meter, some other unscrupulous telephone users may be misusing the telephone line but just because such a possibility can occur would be no reason for putting the onus of proof on the Department. Onus of proof can shift from party to party at different points of time. Therefore, if the Department shows that the bills are based on the meter readings and that the meter readings were correctly recorded and that the meter was not mal-functioning then the onus would be on the subscriber to prove or show that the line has been misused. It is possible that the subscriber may have no direct evidence for proving that his telephone line has been misused but he may be able to show circumstances which may lead a Court or an arbitrator to come to the conclusion that the preponderance of probabilities is such that there has been, say, a misuse of the telephone lines. For example, if it can be proved that for the period for which inflated bills were issued, the telephone instrument had been out of order or that the subscriber was not in town and the house was locked or that, for any other reason, it could not have been possible for any one to have legitimately made the telephone calls then, notwithstanding there being no defect in the meter and notwithstanding that the initial onus of proof may have been shifted to the subscriber, he may, on the basis of the aforesaid probabilities or circumstances or evidence, be again able to prove or show that the bills qua him are still inflated. Therefore, the onus of proof may be shifted from one party another, from time to time, but we find it difficult to agree with the Gauhati High Court that even when the meter is shown as not being defective and the readings are correctly recorded it is still for the department to prove that the subscriber used the telephone excessively.

(23) To summarise, we hold that in the present case there was material before the respondent which shows that bills had been sent to the petitioner, originally, which were not correct and that there had been under-billing in the present case. The material to show that there was under-billing which was available with the respondent was the entries made in the Meter Testing Register as compared with the entries made in the Cptr Register. Furthermore, the respondent could, legitimately, take action under rule 443 and it was not necessary to give a formal show cause notice before disconnecting the telephone. In any case, in the present case the petitioner did make a representation against the excessive billing and till the decision of the representation, no action was taken by the respondent to disconnect the telephone and in fact the present petition was filed before disconnection was effected. We further hold that the provisions of rule 443 are intra vires the Act. Furthermore, the petitioner has an equally efficacious alternative remedy open to him under Section 7B of the Telegraph Act.

(24) No other contention has been raised before us.

(25) For the aforesaid reasons, this writ petition is dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.