Popular Jewellers vs Union Of India And Ors.
1990 Latest Caselaw 499 Del

JUDGMENT

S.B. Wad, J.

(1) We have 10 expedited writ petitions listed before us and they are on board for considerable time. Since 11.30a.m. none of the advocates have appeared. After lunch only two advocates for the respondents are present. No request was made on behalf of any of the counsel for the petitioners for adjournment. We are, therefore, proceeding to hear the writ petition on merits on hearing the counsel for the respondent. This experience is repeating everyday.

(2) One of us (Wad. J.) in Civil Revision No. 470 of 1983 voiced these difficulties in his order dated January 29, 1985. It was held : "IT has now become almost a routine experience, both before the Division Benches and before the Single Bench that the counsel do not present themselves in regular hearing matters even after repeated indulgence is shown by the Courts. Most of the Benches of this Court are regularly required to dismiss the matters in default for the appearance of the counsel. But the experience is that the lesson does not go home for improving punctuality of attendance in the court. It only adds to the work of the court, which is already heavily over-worked. Restoration applications are moved to explain the absence. As a courtesy, the court does not normally probe these explanations and the matters are restored. This fact not only results in the duplication of work but the entire scheme of the disposal of cases is set at naught. The figures of arrears in the trial courts, the High Courts and the Supreme Court, are annually announced. They are so staggering that it would be a herculean task to clear them in the near future. Bar and Bench are described as the two wheels of the chariot of justice. Unfortunately, the experience is that the Bar does not carry the responsibility in the equal measure as that of the Court. The Supreme Court has said that negligence of an Advocate is not the negligence of the litigant and, therefore, he should not be punished by the Court dismissing the matters. There is no method to ascertain whether the litigants instruct their counsel to absent from the Court. Even if that is so, this practice would be injurious to administration of justice, as some litigants are always interested in delaying the matters. What is further shocking is that even the normal courtesies which were part of the judicial tradition are now completely forgotten. If counsel are in difficulty they would earlier mention their difficulty in time to the Court, so that the daily board is not disturbed. But even these elementary courtesies are becoming too rare. In 1976 the Civil Procedure Code was amended and it is provided in Order Xvii Rule l(c) that the fact that the pleader of a party is engaged in another Court, shall not be a ground for adjournment. Sub-rule (d) further states that where the illness of a pleader or his inability to conduct the case for any reason, other than his being engaged in another Court, is put forward as a ground for adjournment the Court shall not grant the adjournment unless it is satisfied ' that the party applying for adjournment could not have engaged another pleader in time. The thrust of these amendments is very clear, namely that the matter shall not be adjourned on flimsy grounds. But what does the Court do where not even a request for adjournment is made and the Advocate has simply absented himself. The Court would be fully justified in dismissing such matters on merits or decide them on merits on the basis of the material disclosed on the record of the case. The counsel appearing in the Court sometimes complain of not being heard fully to their satisfaction. They should ponder as to whether a right to be heard can survive in future if they would not shed their apathy to Court work. I must mention here that silting in D.B. we had called the President and Secretary of the Bar Association and asked them to explain these disturbing situations to their members. But, it appears that the Bar has not yet taken the matter in right earnest."

(3) The petitioners in this writ petition were running a shop at 37 Galiparanthe Wall, Chandni Chowk, Delhi, in the name and style of M/s popular Jewellers. They had insured the shop with respondent No.4 M/s. New India Assurance Company Limited, their insurance policy being No. 1518202969. It is claimed in the writ petition that during the 1984 riots, after the assassination of the then Prime Minister, the petitioners shop was gutted in fire, resulting into loss of jewellery, diamonds, furniture, fittings, air- conditioners, etc. of the value of about Rs. 2,61,300.00 . In this writ petition the petitioners have claimed the said amount from the Union of India and the Insurance Company.

(4) At the stage of admission, the counsel for the Insurance Company pointed out that the Union of India has prepared a scheme for settlement of similar claims on 8.3.1985 and furnished a copy of the said letter to the petitioners. Under the said scheme the Delhi Administration is supposed to make the payment up to 50 per cent of the estimated loss or Rs. 50,000.00 whichever is less, if the loss is not covered by the Insurance Policy. Accordingly, the petitioner added Delhi Administration as a party and the petition was amended.

(5) The petitioners have not produced the Insurance Policy. But, in the counter affidavit on behalf of the Insurance Company it has been denied that the policy covered loss due to riots. It is, thus, a case where the loss is not covered by the Insurance Policy and would, thus, squarely fall under the Scheme of the Union of India, as mentioned in the letter dated 8.3.85. The proper course for the writ petitioners was, therefore, to file their claim with the Delhi Administration who alone could grant the relief under the Scheme. Even after the amendment of the Petition no direct claim is made against the Delhi Administration by the petitioners and there is only a vague plea for payment of compensation, The Delhi Administration in its counter affidavit has stated that the petitioners, claim could not be considered as the claim was preferred beyond the prescribed period.

(6) In these circumstances no relief is possible in the writ petition and the writ petition is, therefore, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.