Indian Shikar Outfitters ... vs Union Of India And Ors.
1971 Latest Caselaw 46 Del

JUDGMENT

H.R. Khanna, C.J.

(1) Validity of the absolute ban on the export of skins of tigers, leopards and panthers has been called in question in writ petitions Nos. 1220 of 1970 and 1282 of 1970. Arguments have been addressed in petition No. 1282 and it is the common case of the parties that the decision in that petition would govern also the other petition. This judgment would consequently dispose of both the petitions.

(2) The petitioners in petition No. 1282 are (1) Indian Shikar Outfitters Association, New Delhi, through its President, Shri Giri Raj Singh, New Delhi, (2) Indian Shikar & Tours (Private) Ltd., New Delhi, through its Managing Director, Shri Giri Raj Singh, New 'Delhi, (3) Allwyn Mercury Northern India Private Limited, New Delhi, through its Managing Director, Shri G. K. Khanna, New Delhi, (4) Jungle ways Partnership Firm of Pachmarhi, Madhya Pradesh, through its partner, Shri Dharampal, New Delhi, and (5) Professional Hunters, Proprietary Concern, Shri M. Asaf Ali, of Porlia having head office at Nagpur. The respondents in the petition are (1) Union of India, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Commerce, (2) Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, (3) Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports and (4) Director General of Tourism. Petitioner No. 1 is an Association registered under the Indian Societies Registration Act. Its members are recognised shikar outfitters throughout India as also those who have been recognised by the Department of Tourism as shikar agents. The Association is interested in its members particularly with a view to securing for the shikar outfitters the right and opportunity of arranging the export of shikar trophies as have been obtained in shikar expeditions arranged by the members of the Association for foreign tourists visiting India for the hunts. Petitioner No. 5 is personally carrying on the profession of providing shikar facilities to the foreign tourists and is recognised as a shikar agent by the Government of India. The petitioners have been and even now are recognised as shikar outfitters by the Government of India under the recognition rules which came into effect in 1955. Such recognition entitlesthe petitioners to seek and obtain the necessary amenities and facilities from various Government Agencies as would enable them to make all arrangements for the foreign tourists to undertake shikars of wild animals in India. The petitioners are thus engaged in the business and profession of shikar outfitters for foreign tourists.

(3) Prior to March 8, 1968, there was no restriction whatsoever on the export of skins of tigers, leopards, panthers and other wild animals whether as accompanied or unaccompanied baggage of the foreign tourists. With effect from March 8, 1968 the Central Government promulgated the Exports Control Order, 1968 under the powers vested in the Government under Sections 3 and 4 A of the Imports and Exports Control Act, 1947 (Act 18 of 1947). The effect of that Order was that tiger, leopard and panther skins and cubs could be taken out of India by foreign tourists without any export restrictions.

(4) The Central Government incorporated the effect of the Control Order in paragraph 58 of the Export Trade Control Handbook of Policy and Procedure, 1968. Paragraph 58 of that book dealt with concessions to travellers to save them from the trouble of applying for export license in respect of certain articles which were part of bona fide personal baggage. Those articles were mentioned in Appendix X and included shikar trophies such as tiger, lion, panther or leopard skins with or without their heads mounted or unmounted.

(5) On June 15, 1968 an amendment order was issued by the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports so as to make the exports of tigers, leopards, panthers and their products as items not normally allowed. The position arising out of the amendment order was explained by the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports in a letter dated June 18, 1968, and it was stated that the ban on export of tigers, leopards and panthers, dead or alive, or part thereof, was restricted to commercial exports, and that visitors and hunters with permission to shoot those animals would be allowed to take the skins as accompanied baggage. According to letter dated July 17, 1968 the above facility for the export of shikar trophies as unaccompanied baggage for a period of six months was extended. The said position continued till September, 1970. On September 8, 1970 the Central Government issued export instruction whereby the export of tiger, leopard and panther skins or the products made there from was absolutely prohibited. The material part of the import instruction reads as under :- "IT has been decided in consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Community Development and Cooperation that, with immediate effect, export of skins of tigers, leopards and panthers shall not be allowed even by foreign tourists and hunters who have shot these animals after obtaining permission from the State Government concerned, whether as accompanied or unaccompanied baggage."

 (6) On September 15, 1970, the following export trade notice was issued:    "IT has been decided in consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Community Development and Cooperation that, with immediate effect, export of skins of tigers, leopards and panthers shall not be allowed even by foreign tourists and hunters who have shot these animals after obtaining permission from the State Government concerned, whether as accompanied or unaccompanied baggage."  

 (7) On October 14, 1970 the Directorate of Tourism addressed the the following memorandum to all approved shikar outfitters :    "ACCORDING to the notification issued by the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports (Export Instruction No. 64/70 dated 8th September, 1970), it has been decided that export of tiger, leopard and panther skins and/or the products made there from, used or unused, as personal baggage, whether accompanied or unaccompanied by outgoing passengers including tourists, should be banned with immediate effect."  

 (8) The petitioners by means of these petitions have prayed for the issuance of a writ to quash the Export Instruction dated September 8, 1970, the Export Trade Notice dated September 15, 1970 and the memorandum dated October 14, 1970 reproduced above. Prayer has also been made for the issuance of a writ for prohibiting the respondents from in any way interfering with the export of shikar trophies of tigers, panthers and leopards which have already been hunted, and for other ancillary reliefs.  
 

 (9) The case of the petitioners is that the impugned orders and instructions are liable to be quashed for the following reasons :    (1)The impunged orders and instructions could not have been validly issued by the Central Government as they relate to the protection of wild life which is a State subject. (2) The impugned orders and instructions are violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution inasmuch as they impose unreasonable restrictions on the petitioners' right to carry on their trade and occupation. (3) In any case the impugned orders and instructions could not operate to the prejudice of the petitioners in respect of their past commitments.  

 (10) The petitions have been resisted by the respondents and the affidavits of Shri S. K. Batta, Controller of Imports and Exports, have been filed in opposition to the petitions.  
 

(11) The first contention, which has been raised on behalf of the petitioners by their learned counsel, Mr. Phadke, is that the object of the respondents in issuing the impugned orders and instructions is to protect tigers, leopards and panthers. The protection of such animals is covered by Entry No. 20 in the State List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution which deals with "protection of wild animals and birds". As such, it is urged, only the State Governments, and not the Central Government or its officers, can issue the impugned orders and instructions. In banning the-export of skins of tigers, leopards and panthers, the respondents according to the counsel, did something which is akin to colourable legislation and had resorted to colourable exercise of power. The above stand has been controverter by Mr. Mehta on behalf of the respondents and he contends that the matter is covered by Entry No. 41 in the Union List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution which pertains to "trade and commerce with foreign countries; import and export access customs frontiers; definition of customs froatiers." There has. been, it is submitted, nothing akin to colourable legislation, or colourable exercise of power. In our opinion, there is force in the submission of Mr. Mehta.

(12) According to Article 73 of the Constitution, subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the executive power of the Union shall extend, inter alia, to the matters with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws. It is thus manifest that in the absence of anything to the contrary the executive power of the Union is coextensive with the legislative power of the Parliament. As the Parliament could enact laws in respect of matters referred to in entry No. 41 of the Union List, the Central Government could exercise executive powers in respect of those matters. Perusal of the impugned orders and instructions, which have been reproduced above, shows that they dealt with the export of skins of tigers, leopards and panthers and placed a ban on such exports. As the subject of import and export across customs barriers falls under the aforesaid entry No. 41, it would follow that the respondents were well within their power in issuing the impugned orders and instructions. It is significant that no order has been made by the respondents placing a ban on the sheeting of tigers, leopards and panthers. Had they done so, it might perhaps have been said that they had transgressed into the field reserved for the State Governments,

(13) As the orders and instructions stand, there has been no encroachment or trespass into the domain reserved for the States. It -is no doubt true that the motive and intention of the respondents in issuing the impugned orders and instructions is to conserve and: save from extermination the beautiful species of Indian wild life, namely, tigers, leopards and panthers, but that fact, in our opinion, would not affect the validity of the impugned orders and instructions as in pith and substance they relate to matters which fall within the Union List. It cannot be disputed that if the legislature is competent to pass a particular law, the motives which impelled it to act are irrelevant. On the other hand, if the legislature lacks such competence the question of motive does not arise at all. See K. C. Gajapati Narayan Deo and others v. The State of Orissa 1954 Scr 1.(1) In deciding whether an impugned legislation or order is intra vires regard must be had to its pith and substance. The principle is that if a statute is found in substance to relate to a topic within the competence of the legislature it should be held to be intra vires even though it might incidentally trench on matters not within its legislative competence. Reference in this connection may be made to the following observations of Sir Maurice Gwyer C.C. in the case of Subrahmanyan Chettiar v. Muttuswami Goundan (1940) F.C.R. 188(2) :- "IT must inevitably happen from time to time that legislation, though purporting to deal with a subject in one list, touches also on a subject in another list, and the different provisions of the enactment may be so closely interwined that blind adherence to a strictly verbal interpretation would result in a large number of statutes being declared invalid because the Legislature enacting them may appear to have legislated in a forbidden sphere. Hence the rule which has been evolved by the Judicial Committee whereby the impugned statute is examined to ascertain its 'pith and substance' of its 'true nature and character', for the purpose of determining whether it is legislation in respect of matters in this list or in that. . . ."

(14) 'THE above dictum was approved by the Judicial Committee in Prafull Kumar Mukherjee v. The Bank of Commerce, Ltd. (1946-47) 74 I.A. 23, and has been followed by the Supreme Court in a number of cases. See A. S. Krishna v. State of Madras, 1957 Scr 399, and Chaturbhai M. Patel v. The Union of India and others 1960(2) Scr 262. It is equally well settled that the power to legislate on a topic of legislation carries with it the power to legislate on an ancillary matter which can be said to be reasonably included in the power given. See The State of Rajasthan v. Shri G. Chawlu and Dr. Pohumal Air 1959 Scr 904. Keeping in view the above-mentioned principles we have no doubt in our mind that the matters to which the impugned orders and instructions relate fall within the purview of Entry No. 41 in the Union List.

(15) So far as the argument relating to colourable piece of legislation is concerned, we are of the opinion that it is equally bereft of force. The doctrine of colourable legislation implies that the legislature cannot overstep the field of its competence, directly or indirectly, and that the Court would scrutinise the law to ascertain whether the legislature by device purports to make a law which, though in form appears to be within its sphere, in effect and substance, reaches beyond it. See Milkhi Ram Amar Nath v. State of Punjab Air 1-964 Punjab 513. The doctrine of colourable legislation does not involve any question of bona fides or mala fides on the part of legislature. The doctrine is essentially a matter of the competence of the legislature to enact a particular law. Such a question arises under a Constitution which distributes legislative powers amongst different bodies and the matter which needs determination is whether the legislature in a particular case has or has not, in respect of the subject matter of the statute, transgressed the limits of its constitutional powers. Such transgression may be patent, manifest or direct, but it may also be disguised, convert and indirect. It is to the latter class of cases that the expression" colourable legislation" has been applied. The idea conveyed by the expression is that although apparently a legislature in passing a statute purported to act within the limits of its powers, yet in substance and in reality it transgressed those powers, the transgression being veiled by what appears, on proper examination, to be a mere pretence or disguise. The Courts must, therefore, look to the substance and not the form or outward appearance of the. legislation. If the subject-matter in substance is something which is beyond the powers of the legislature, the form in which the law is clothed would not save it from being struck down. The Courts for this purpose must direct their attention to the true nature and character and not merely the form of the legislation. See K. C. Gajapati Narayan Deo and Others v. The State of Orissa, 1954 Scr l.

(16) We have examined the impugned orders and instructions, and are of the opinion that they essentially and in substance relate to the subject of imports and exports. As such, the respondents had the competence to issue the impugned orders and instructions in accordance with the power conferred by Entry No. 41 of the Union List. It cannot, therefore, be said that the respondents have transgressed the limits of their constitutional powers or that there has been colourable exercise of power.

(17) We are also not impressed by the argument that the imports and exports across customs frontiers, referred to in Entry No. 41 of the Union List, must be during the course of trade and commerce with foreign countries, and that if such imports and exports are not in the course of trade and commerce, they would not fall under Entry No. 41. The above entry comprises three subjects, namely, (1) trade and commerce with foreign countries, (2) import and export across customs frontiers and (3) definition of customs frontiers. Each one of these subjects, though allied, is distinct and independent. The imports and exports across customs frontiers would be covered by Entry No. 41 irrespective of the fact whether they are in the course of trade and commerce with foreign countries or not. The fact that an export is not in the course of trade with foreign countries would not take such an export out of the ambit of Entry No. 41. We may in this context refer to Section 11 of the Customs Act. 1962. According to clause (k) of sub-section (2) that Section, the Central Government may prohibit either absolutely or subject to some conditions the import or export of goods for the object of protection of human, animal or plant life or health.

(18) It would, in our opinion, be straining the words of Entry No. 41 to hold that the import and export, referred to in that entry, are restricted to such import and export only as are in the course of foreign trade. We have consequently no hesitation in rejecting such a construction.

(19) It has next been argued that the impugned orders and instructions are violative of the right of the petitioners to carry on their occupation, trade or business and as such infringe Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The restrictions imposed by the aforesaid orders and instructions, it is urged, cannot be held to be reasonable and in the interests of the general public. There is, in our opinion, no force in this contention.

(20) It cannot be disputed that the burden to prove that the impugned restrictions are reasonable and in public interest is upon the respondents The phrase "reasonable restriction" indicates that the limitation imposed on a person in enjoyment of the right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature, beyond what is required in the interests of the public The word "reasonable" indicates intelligent care and deliberation that is the choice of a course which reason dictates. See Chintamanrao and another v. The State of MadhyaPradesh in deciding whether the restriction is reasonable or not, the Court in the words of Patanjali Sastri C.J. in the case of State of Madras v V r Row, 1952 Scr 597, should consider not only factors such as the duration and the extent of the restrictions, but also the circumstances under which and the manner in which their imposition has been authorised. It is important in this context to bear in mind that the test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be applied to each individual statute impugned, and no abstract standard, or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases.

(21) The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict. In evaluating such elusory factors and forming their own conception of what is reasonable, in all the circumstances of a given case, .it is inevitable that the social philosophy and the scale of values of the judges participating in the decision should play an important part, and the limit to their interference with legislative judgment in such cases can only be dictated by their sense of responsibility and self-restraint and the sobering reflection that the Constitution is meant not only for people of their way of thinking but for all, and that the majority of the elected representatives of the people have, in authorising the imposition of the restrictions, considered them to be reasonable. It is also well-settled that the restriction referred to in Article 19 can in appropriate cases amount to prohibition and total restraint. In such a case the test of reasonableness is more strict and the matter needs closer scrutiny. We may in this context refer to the case of Narendra Kumar & Others v. The Union of India and others 1960(2) SCR. 365, wherein it was observed : "THE contention that a law prohibiting the exercise of a fundamental right is in no case saved, cannot, therefore, be accepted. It is undoubtedly correct, however, that when, as in the present case, The restriction reaches the stage of prohibition special care has to be taken by the Court to see that the lest of reasonableness is satisfied. The greater the restriction, the more the need for strict scrutiny by the Court."

 (22) Their Lordships further laid down the following test of reasonableness in such a case :-    "IN applying the test of reasonableness, the Court has 'to consider the question in the background of the facts and circumstances under which the order was made, taking into account the nature of the evil that was sought to be remedied by such law, the ratio of the harm caused to individual citizens by the proposed remedy, to the beneficial effect reasonably expected to result to the general public. It will be necessary to consider in that connection whether the restraint caused by the law is more, than was necessary in the iriterests of the general public."  

 (23) It is also manifest that to the person whose rights are affected the restriction will be irksome and may well be regarded by .him as unreasonable, but the question cannot be decided on that basis. What the Court has to consider is whether the restrictions imposed are reasonable in the interests of the general public. In the light of that approach as well as the test of reasonableness laid down in the case of State of Madras v. V. G. Row, the Supreme Court held in the case of Mohd. Hanif Quarashi and others v. the State of Bihar 1959 Scr 629 that a total ban on the slaughter of cows of all ages and calves of cows and of she buffaloes was reasonable and valid. Keeping the above principles in view, we are of the opinion that the restriction on the export to skins of tigers, leopards and panthers cannot be held to be unreasonable. The affidavit of Shri Batta shows that for the last several years the question of steady and ever increasing decline in the population of the wild life of India, more particularly tigers, lions, leopards and panthers resulting from a large scale and indiscriminate killing of them by the hunters, had been engaging the attention of the Government of India. In April, 1952, the Government of India in the Ministry of Food and Agriculture constituted a Central Board for Wild Life with a view to devise ways and means for conservation and control of wild life in India and for preservation of the fauna of India and preventing extinction of any species of wild life. The main factors which led to the steady decline in the population of the Indian wild life, particularly of the above-mentioned species, was noticed in papers read at the Tenth General Assembly of the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (hereinafter referred to as IUCN) held in New Delhi in 1969. It was stressed in those papers that one of the major causes of the disappearance of wild life was the hunting by man. The papers also showed that prior to 1947 there was hardly any Shikar Company like the petitioners organizing tiger hunts, and that thereafter 27 such Companies came into existence all over the country. These companies did roaring business because the tiger skins and other tiger trophies attracted the eye of and fetched very high price in foreign markets. The increasing demand for the skins of such animals from India raised the price of tiger skins from Rs. 300.00 in 1950 to Rs. 3,000.00.- in 1960, and this was an incentive to shikaris and shikar outfitters as well as to others to kill these animals and collect tiger skins. As a result of this discussion, the General Assembly of thc Iucn adopted the following resolution:-    "IN view of the grave threat to the tiger populations in the countries where the animal occurs, due to direct and indirect methods of destruction-such as licensed hunting. indiscriminate use of crop protection guns, commercial hunting, poisoning, burning of breeding cover, destruction of habitat, and biotic activity such as grazing and the fur and skin trade, the 10th General Assembly of Iucn meeting at New Delhi in November, 1969, recommends to the Governments of these countries the declaration of a moratorium on killing of this animal until such time as censuses and ecological studies, which are in operation or are proposed, uncompleted and reveal the correct position as regards population trends; further recommends that the tourist and "economic contribution of the tiger should be shifted rinm killing by a few licensed or commercial hunters to enabling it to be watched and photographed wild in sanctuaries and national parks for the benefit of many. "Expresses satisfaction that the export of tigers (and leopards) skins commercially has been forbidden, but regrets to find on open sale tiger skins and other trophies and articles, and requests the Government of India to take measures in order to close any remaining loopholes either in the scope or the enforcement of the relevant legal restrictions."  

 (24) In response to the aforesaid resolution, the Executive Committee of the Indian Board for Wild Life decided on January 3, 1970, to recommend to the State Governments that shooting of tigers be completely banned for a period of five years from July 1) 1970. Most of the States have consequently declared a moratorium by prohibiting the shooting of tigers for periods varying from two to five years.  
 

(25) The affidavit of Shri Batta further shows that prior to 1962 the tigers and their products were allowed to be exported without restriction. As far back as June, 1955, the Indian Board of Wild Life recommended that restriction be imposed on export of tiger and tiger cubs and accordingly export instructions were issued by the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports allowing the export of tigers and tiger cubs on merits provided a certificate of origin was produced from a Surveyor of Forests of the State concerned cr from the Public Zoo. The object of the restriction was to prevent the traffic of these animals for export purposes. Shortly thereafter, the Iucn recommended to all countries to introduce control on the Import and export of skins of spotted animals like leopards and panthers in the processed or unprocessed form as there was a threat to the continued existence of these animals. The Government of India accepted the recommendation and listed skins of ordinary panthers or leopards and tigers and tiger cubs under Part B of Schedule I to the Export Control Order, 1962 then in force. This meant that export of those items could be allowed on merits and subject to ceiling and other conditions. The Study Group on Wild Life and Wild Life Products, however, recommended free export of the skins of panthers and leopards until a decision in this regard was taken by the Indian Board cf Wild Life in view of the need to earn foreign exchange. Accordingly, the export of the skins was licensed freely. Subsequently, however, representations were made to Government that such free export of skins of these animals was leading to indiscriminate shooting and suggestions were made that the export of such skins be banned except when they were taken out as trophies by bona fide foreign tourists. Accordingly, on June 15, 1968. the Government issued an order under Section 3 of the Imports and Exports Control Act, 1947. so as to make the export of tigers, leopards panthers and their products not normally permissible. These amendments prohibited the export of tigers, leopards, panthers or their products on commercial basis. Contrary to the Government's expectations, however, the export of these products went up to Rs. 18,39,714.00 during 1968-69 after the imposition of the ban in June. 1968. as against Rs. 14,87,903.00 during the previous year. It was then realised that the step which was designed to preserve what remained of these animals had only served to accelerate their destruction. It was in the above circumstances that the Government of India issued the impugned orders and instructions.

(26) The facts brought out in the affidavit of Shri Batta, in our opinion, go to show that the restriction placed on the export of the skins of tigers, leopards and panthers is not unreasonable. The dwindling population of the aforesaid animals must naturally be a matter of great concern to the Government of India an all lovers of the wild life, and it, therefore, became essential that prompt measures he taken to prevent the extinct on of these majestic denizens of Indian forests who constitute such an important and attractive element in the fauna of India : AS the destruction of the above-mentioned animals was to a considerable extent linked with the demand for their skins in the foreign markets, there was, in our opinion, no element of unreasonableness in the ban which was placed on the export of such skins. The object of the ban essentially was to protect the aforesaid animals and it is obvious that in such a situation the measures have to be stringent because the life of each one of these animals counts. We, therefore, are unable to accept the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners that the impugned orders and instructions are violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

(27) Lastly, it has been argued by Mr. Phadke that the impugned orders and instructions should not operate to the prejudice of the petitioners in respect of their past commitments. The submission in this respect is two-fold. It is urged in the first instance that so far as tigers, leopards and panthers are concerned, which have already been shot in the course of hunting expeditions of foreign tourists organized by the petitioners with the permission of the State Governments, the petitioners may be permitted to export their skins. There is, in our opinion, force in the above submission of the petitioners. The affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioners shows that the petitioners in view of the past export policy of the Government have entered into commitments having financial implications with the foreign: tourists. The ban on the export of the skins of those animals, which have already been shot dead, it is urged by Mr. Phadke, is bound to cause financial loss to the petitioners who have acted on the basis of the past export policy of the Government. It is also obvious that the skins of those animals would not in any way affect the conservation of the wild life as those animals have already been shot dead. The dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of The Union of India and others v. M/s. Indo Afghan Agencies etc. Air 1968 Sc 718, though not directly applicable, has some bearing. It was held in that case where a person has acted upon representations made in an Export Promotion Scheme that import licenses up to the value of the goods exported would be issued, and had exported goods, his claim for import license for the maximum value permissible by the Scheme could not be arbitrarily rejected. The Court further held that it was open to a party who had acted on a representation made by the Government to claim that the Government shall be bound to carry out the promise made by it. Although no promise was held out in the present case by the respondents to the petitioners, we see no cogent ground as to why the petitioners, who entered into agreements with foreign tourists in view of the past export policy of the Government, should be debarred from exporting the skins of tigers, leopards and panthers which were shot dead with the permission of State authorities in expeditions of foreign tourists organized by the petitioners. In any case, the restriction to that extent cannot be held to be reasonable because it does not subserve the primary object of conserving the wild life.

(28) We are, however, not impressed by the further contention of Mr. Phadke that the petitioners should also be permitted to export skins of tigers, leopards and panthers which may be shot dead in the expeditions of the foreign tourists organized by the petitioners in pursuance of their past commitments in such States where such shooting is permissible. The acceptance of this argument must necessarily result in further shooting of those animals. This would run counter to the main objective of conserving these animals and as such we have no hesitation in repelling the above contention.

 (29) As a result of the above, we direct that the petitioners may be allowed to export shikar trophies in respect of tigers, leopards and panthers which have already been shot dead provided that the petitioners satisfy the respondents in respect of the following matters :    (1)There was an agreement between the petitioner and the foreign tourists about the export of shikar trophies relating to animals killed during hunting expeditions. (2) The aforesaid animals were shot dead before September 8, 1970 in hunting expeditions of the concerned foreign tourists organized by the petitioners. (3) The shooting of the aforesaid animals in the hunting expeditions was with the permission of the State authorities.  

 (30) In all other respects, this petition as well as the connected petition are dismissed. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs.