[Cites 10, Cited by 0]

Chattisgarh High Court

State Of Chhattisgarh vs Jaijeet Acharya on 19 March, 2026

Author: Ramesh Sinha

Bench: Ramesh Sinha

2026:CGHC:13104-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WA No. 235 of 2026
1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department of Forest
Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhavan, Naya Raipur, District- Raipur (CG)
2 - Principal Chief Conservator of Forest Aranya Bhavan Medical
College Road Raipur-492001, (CG)
3 - General Administration Department Through Its Secretary,
Government Of Chhattisgarh, Mantralaya, Naya Raipur, (CG)
... Appellants
versus
1 - Jaijeet Acharya S/o Lt. Shri Arun Kumar Acharaya Aged About 61
Years Presently Posted As A.C.F. Research And Extension, Raipur
Division Chhattisgarh, R/o J-10a, Shriram Nagar Phase-I, Near TV
Tower Shankar Nagar, Raipur (CG)
2 - Manas Kumar Rai S/o Late Baleshwar Rai Aged About 59 Years
Presently Posted As A.C.F. Administration (Gazette/coordination)
Aranya Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Naya Raipur, Chhattisgarh R/o B/38
Kanchanganga Phase-Ii, Rohinipuram, Raipur, Chhattisgarh
3 - Devendra Kumar Singh S/o Late J.D. Maurya Aged About 59 Years
Presently Posted A.C.F. Campa, Aranya Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Naya
Raipur Chhattisgarh R/o Hig Ii/118, Borsi Extension, Durg, Chhattisgarh
4 - D.K. Singh S/o Late Badri Nayayan Singh Aged About 59 Years
Presently Posted As A.C.F. Attach Officer, C.C.F. Office, Durg,
Chhattisgarh, R/o Jain Mandir Road, Viddut Nagar Colony, Durg,
Chhattisgarh
5 - Vishwanath Mookherjee S/o Late Kanai Lal Mookherjee Aged About
58 Years Presently Posted As Sub Divisional Officer (Forest), Raipur
Division, Raipur, Chhattisgarh R/o Block-17, Flat No. 204,ashoka Ratan
Vidhan Sabha Road, Mowa, Raipur Chhattisgarh
6 - A.K Vyas S/o Late Shri Roopchand Vyas Aged About 60 Years
ROHIT
KUMAR
CHANDRA Presently Posted As Sub Divisional Officer (Forest), Baloda Bazar,
District- Balodabazar Chhattisgarh, R/o House No. 75 Krishna Nagar,
Digitally signed
by ROHIT
KUMAR
CHANDRA

Bilaspur Chattisgarh
7 - Tahid Ahmad Khan S/o Late Shri A.W. Khan Aged About 60 Years
Presently Posted As Sub Divisional Officer (Forest), R/o House No. 03
2

Street No. 01, Sector-B, Panchsheel Housing Society Borsi, Durg
Chhattisgarh
8 - Manoj Kumar S/o Shri Mahesh Prasad Shah Aged About 55 Years
Presently Posted As Sub Divisional Officer, Forest Division- Surajpur,
Chhattisgarh, R/o Ring Road, Namna Kalan, Ambikapur Chhattisgarh
9 - Shyam Bihari Pandey S/o Late Chhanu Pandey Aged About 55
Years Presently Posted As Sub Divisional Officer, Forest Sitapur,
Sarguja Chhattisgarh
10 - Rajendra Kumar Singh Sisodia S/o Shri Digvijay Singh Sisodia.
Aged About 61 Years Presently Posted As A.C.F. Superintendent
Wildlife Sancturay Gomarda District- Raigarh Chhattisgarh, R/o Bhima
Talab In Front Of Sadar School, District- Janjgir -Champa, Chhattisgarh
11 - Shyam Singhdeo S/o Shri T.D. Singhdeo Aged About 59 Years
Presently Posted As Sub Divisional Officer, Forest Wadrafnagar,
Balrampur Division, Chhattisgarh, R/o F.D.-43, Dc Road Near P.W.D.
Office, Ambikapur, District- Sarguja, Chhattisgarh
12 - Biswajit Bishwas S/o Late Shri A.K. Bishwas Aged About 61 Years
Presently Posted As A.C.F. By. Manager, C.C.F. Officer Jagdalpur,
Chhattisgarh, R/o 69/70 Green City Dhrampur, District Jagdalpur,
Bastar, Chhattisgarh
13 - S.K Gupta, Suresh Kumar Gupta S/o Late Shri H.L. Gupta Aged
About 61 Years Presently Posted As Sub Divisional Officer, Pathalgao,
Jashpur Divison, District Jashpur, Chhattisgarh
14 - Shri Vinod Singh Thakur S/o Shri Surendra Singh Thakur Aged
About 60 Years Presently Posted As Sub Divisional Officer, Kasdol,
Baloda Bazar Division, R/o 2/ 658 Main Road Kota, Gudiyari, In Front
Of Sahu Floor Mill, Raipur, Chhattisgarh
... Respondents

For State/Appellants : Mr. Praveen Das, Addl. Advocate General For Respondents : Mr. P. Acharya, Advocate

Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge

Order on Board

Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 13.01.2026

1. Heard Mr. Praveen Das, learned Additional Advocate General,

appearing for the State/appellants. Also heard Mr. P. Acharya,

learned counsel, appearing for the respondents on I.A. No.02 of

2026, which is an application for condonation of delay of 43 days

in preferring the instant appeal.

2. Learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the

State/appellants submits that after passing of the impugned order

on 03.11.2025 in WPS No. 6405 of 2021 (Jaijeet Acharya &

Others Vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Others), opinion has been

sought by the Department of Forest from the Office of Advocate

General for filing an appeal vide letter dated 27.11.2025,

thereafter, on 05.12.2025 opinion was delivered by the Office of

Advocate General for filing writ appeal against the impugned

order and vide letter dated 14.01.2026, the Department of Law

and Legislative Affairs accorded its permission for filing writ

appeal before this Court and on 16.01.2026, the Officer-In-

Charge of the case approached the Office of Advocate General

for preferring appeal against the order under challenge and in

turn, he was directed to bring the entire relevant records of the

case and thereafter documents and information with respect to

the case has been collected and the instant appeal has been

filed before this Hon'ble Court, however, some delay was

occurred due to fulfillment of various departmental formalities

and working of the Government machinery. He further submits

that the State Government is a multi functioning body, hence, at

times the fulfillment of departmental formalities takes unexpected

delay, therefore, in some cases the State is prevented from filing

the case within the prescribed period of limitation, which is

bonafide and not deliberate nor intentional.

3. The question for determination before this Court is whether the

provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (i.e. Act 9 of

1908 i.e. the old Limitation Act) would apply to an application for

condonation of delay.

4. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Postmaster

General and others v. Living Media India Limited and

another, (2012) 3 SCC 563, has dealt with the limitation issue

and held as under:-

"27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation

undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.

29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.

30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay."

5. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of

Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 INSC 932 ,

while considering the delay, issued some directions and

observed as follows:-

"5. The legal position is that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the petitioner has to explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi, 2021 SCC Online SC 1260, it was held by this Court that even though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. A reference was also made to the decision of this Court in Ajay

Dabra v. Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC Online 92 wherein, it was held as follows:

"13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81] while rejecting an application for condonation of delay for lack of sufficient cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as follows: "15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."

14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court did not commit any mistake in dismissing the delay condonation application of the present appellant."

Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case and that, the expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be

liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party.

5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, 2024 INSC 262, wherein, one of us (J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a member, after referring to various decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal terms observed by this Court that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity and rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The relevant passage of the same is profitably extracted below:

"24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very clear that we are not going to look into the merits of the matter as long as we are not convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of such a long and inordinate delay.

25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings.

26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period

of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.

27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.

xxx xxx xxx

34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to the conclusion that the High Court committed no error much less any error of law in passing the impugned order. Even otherwise, the High Court was exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed

to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case.

36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs."

Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that the High Court correctly refused to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal by observing that such inordinate delay was not explained satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was shown for the same, and no plausible reason was put forth by the State. Therefore, we are inclined to reject this petition at the threshold.

6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the delay occurred in preferring the second appeal, due to callous and lackadaisical attitude on the part of the officials functioning in the State machinery. Though the Government adopts systematic approach in handling the legal issues and preferring the petitions/applications/appeals well within the time, due to the fault on the part of the officials in merely communicating the information on time, huge revenue loss will be caused to the Government exchequer. The present case is one such case, wherein, enormous delay of 1788 days occasioned in preferring the second appeal due to the lapses on the part of the officials functioning under the State, though valuable Government lands were involved. Therefore, we direct the State to streamline the machinery touching the legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases before the Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix the responsibility on the officer(s) concerned, and penalize the officer(s), who is/are responsible for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of the loss caused to the Government. Such direction will have to be followed by all the States scrupulously.

7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we

must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we have noticed that whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the same. For example if the period of limitation is 90 days then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within that period of limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Another v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC 733)."

6. Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present

case, in the light of aforementioned judgments of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in the matters of Postmaster General (supra)

and Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), it is evident that

Government departments are under a special obligation to

discharge their duties with due diligence and commitment.

Condonation of delay is an exception, not the rule, and cannot

be claimed as a matter of right or anticipated privilege by

Government entities. The law casts its protection equally upon

all litigants and cannot be distorted to confer undue advantage

upon a select few.

7. Very recently on 12.09.2025, the Supreme Court in the matter of

Shivamma (dead) by LRS Vs. Karnataka Housing Board &

Ors., 2025 INSC 1104 categorically held that the High Courts

ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of

State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra

cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-

authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity

and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of

the apathy and pangs of a private litigant.

8. Upon considering the matter in its entirety and also applying the

well settled principles of law to the facts of the present case, we

find that the State has failed to provide any proper or satisfactory

explanation for the delay in filing the present appeal. The only

reason cited is that after passing of the impugned order on

03.11.2025,opinion has been sought by the Department of

Forest from the Office of Advocate General for filing an appeal

vide letter dated 27.11.2025, thereafter, on 05.12.2025 opinion

was delivered by the Office of Advocate General for filing writ

appeal against the impugned order and vide letter dated

14.01.2026, the Department of Law and Legislative Affairs

accorded its permission for filing writ appeal before this Court

and on 16.01.2026, the Officer-In-Charge of the case

approached the Office of Advocate General for preferring appeal

against the order under challenge and in turn, he was directed to

bring the entire relevant records of the case and thereafter

documents and information with respect to the case has been

collected and the instant appeal has been filed before this

Hon'ble Court, however, some delay was occurred due to

fulfillment of various departmental formalities and working of the

Government machinery. Thus, the State has miserably failed to

demonstrate sufficient cause warranting the condonation of an

inordinate delay of 43 days.

9. Consequently, we are not inclined to exercise our discretionary

power under the law to condone such extraordinary delay. The

learned counsel for the State has not been able to establish any

convincing or bona fide reason for the delay. Therefore, there is

no justification for condoning the delay of 43 days in filing the

writ appeal. It is pertinent to note herein that in the similarly

situated appeal being WA No. 984/2025, which was barred by 72

days has already been dismissed on the ground of delay and

laches by this Court vide order dated 13.01.2026.

10. In view of the above, the instant writ appeal is hereby dismissed

on the ground of delay and laches.

                           Sd/-                                        Sd/-
                (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)                         (Ramesh Sinha)
                         Judge                                     Chief Justice



Chandra