[Cites 9, Cited by 0]

Chattisgarh High Court

State Of Chhattisgarh vs Kuldeep Singh Thakur on 16 March, 2026

Author: Ramesh Sinha

Bench: Ramesh Sinha

Digitally
2026:CGHC:12379-DB
signed by
ANURADHA
ANURADHA TIWARI
NAFR
TIWARI Date:
2026.03.16
17:47:52
+0530 HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

WA No. 220 of 2026

1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Water Resources
Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Atal Nagar, Naya Raipur,
District Raipur C.G.
2 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, General Administration
Department, Raipur, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Atal Nagar, Naya
Raipur, District Raipur C.G.
3 - Collector, Janjgir District Janjgir Champa C.G.
... Appellants
versus

1 - Kuldeep Singh Thakur S/o. Late Shri Santosh Singh Thakur, Aged About
27 Years R/o. Purana Chandaniya Para, Ward No. 17, Parshuram Marg,
District Janjgir Champa C.G.
2 - Managing Director, Chhattisgarh Infrastructure Development Corporation
(Wrongly Typed As Sports And Youth Welfare Department (Transport Section)
Sardar Vallabh Bhai Patel International Hockey Stadium), Chhattisgarh Rajya
Kaushal Vikas Pradhikaran Bhawan, Second Floor, Old Phq Campus, Near
Raj Bhawan, Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.)
3 - Chief Executive Officer, Zila Panchayat, Janjgir District Janjgir Champa
C.G.
... Respondents

(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)

For Appellants : Mr. Shashank Thakur, Additional Advocate General

For Respondent No.1 : Mo. Naqeeb, Advocate

Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge

Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 16.03.2026

1. Heard Mr. Shashank Thakur, learned Additional Advocate General,

appearing for the State/appellants on I.A. No.02, which is an application for

condonation of delay of 230 days in preferring the present writ appeal.

2. Mr. Thakur submits that the present writ appeal has been preferred

against the order dated 05.05.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in

W.P.(S) No. 995/2020; however, there has occurred a delay of 230 days in

filing the same. It is submitted that the delay in filing the appeal is neither

intentional nor deliberate but has occurred due to unavoidable administrative

and procedural formalities within the State machinery. It is further submitted

that after the impugned order was passed, the concerned department sought

legal opinion from the Office of the Advocate General, Chhattisgarh. Upon

receipt of the opinion recommending filing of the appeal, the matter was

processed through the competent authorities for obtaining necessary

sanction from the Law and Legislative Affairs Department. After completion of

the said procedural formalities, sanction for filing the appeal was granted on

24.12.2025 and thereafter the Officer-in-Charge was appointed on

02.01.2026, pursuant to which the present writ appeal has been drafted and

filed.

3. Learned counsel further submits that the State is an impersonal

machinery functioning through several departments and levels of decision-

making and, therefore, some amount of delay in obtaining approvals and

sanctions is inevitable. It is contended that the delay has occurred on account

of bona fide administrative procedures and not due to any negligence or lack

of diligence on the part of the appellants. It is lastly submitted that the

appellants have a strong case on merits and substantial questions arise for

consideration in the accompanying writ appeal. Reliance is placed upon the

judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao,

(2005) 3 SCC 372, wherein it has been held that a pragmatic and justice-

oriented approach should be adopted while considering applications for

condonation of delay filed by the State. Therefore, it is prayed that the delay

in filing the present writ appeal may kindly be condoned in the interest of

justice.

4. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1

opposes the prayer for condonation of delay and submits that the appellants

have failed to show any sufficient cause for the inordinate delay in filing the

present writ appeal. It is contended that the explanation offered by the State

regarding administrative and procedural formalities is vague and cannot be

accepted as a valid ground for condonation of delay. It is further submitted

that the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge is well reasoned

and does not call for any interference. Therefore, the application for

condonation of delay deserves to be dismissed.

5. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Postmaster General and

others v. Living Media India Limited and another, (2012) 3 SCC 563, has

dealt with the limitation issue and held as under:-

"27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot

claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.

29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.

30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay."

6. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Madhya

Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 INSC 932, while considering the

delay, issued some directions and observed as follows:-

"5. The legal position is that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the petitioner has to explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi, 2021 SCC Online SC 1260, it was held by this Court that even though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. A reference was also made to the decision of this Court in Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC Online 92 wherein, it was held as follows:

"13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81] while rejecting an application for condonation of delay for lack of sufficient cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as follows: "15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to

passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."

14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court did not commit any mistake in dismissing the delay condonation application of the present appellant."

Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case and that, the expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party.

5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, 2024 INSC 262, wherein, one of us (J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a member, after referring to various decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal terms observed by this Court that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity and rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The relevant passage of the same is profitably extracted below:

"24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very clear that we are not going to look into the merits of the matter as long as we are not convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of such a long and inordinate delay.

25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and

158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings.

26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.

27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. xxx xxx xxx

34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to the conclusion that the High Court committed no error much less any error of law in passing the impugned order. Even otherwise, the High Court was exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial

justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case.

36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs."

Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that the High Court correctly refused to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal by observing that such inordinate delay was not explained satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was shown for the same, and no plausible reason was put forth by the State.

Therefore, we are inclined to reject this petition at the threshold.

6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the delay occurred in preferring the second appeal, due to callous and lackadaisical attitude on the part of the officials functioning in the State machinery. Though the Government adopts systematic approach in handling the legal issues and preferring the petitions/applications/appeals well within the time, due to the fault on the part of the officials in merely communicating the information on time, huge revenue loss will be caused to the Government exchequer. The present case is one such case, wherein, enormous delay of 1788 days occasioned in preferring the second appeal due to the lapses on the part of the officials functioning under the State, though valuable Government lands were involved. Therefore, we direct the State to streamline the machinery touching the legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases before the Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix the responsibility on the officer(s) concerned, and penalize the officer(s), who is/are responsible for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of the loss caused to the Government. Such direction will have to be followed by all the States scrupulously.

7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we have noticed that whenever there is a

plea for condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the same. For example if the period of limitation is 90 days then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within that period of limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Another v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC 733)."

7. Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present case, in

the light of aforementioned judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the

matters of Postmaster General (supra) and Ramkumar Choudhary (supra),

it is evident that Government Departments/Public Sector Undertakings are

under a special obligation to discharge their duties with due diligence and

commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception, not the rule, and cannot

be claimed as a matter of right or anticipated privilege by Government

Entities/Public Sector Undertakings. The law casts its protection equally upon

all litigants and cannot be distorted to confer undue advantage upon a select

few.

8. Upon considering the matter in its entirety and in light of the chronology

placed on record, we find that the impugned judgment and order was passed

on 05.05.2025, whereas the present writ appeal has been filed after a delay

of about 230 days beyond the prescribed period of limitation of 45 days under

Section 2(1) of the Chhattisgarh High Court (Appeal to Division Bench) Act,

2006. The explanation furnished by the appellants indicates that after passing

of the impugned order, the Water Resources Department sought legal opinion

from the Office of the Advocate General, Chhattisgarh, vide letter dated

04.07.2025. Thereafter, the Office of the Advocate General accorded opinion

recommending filing of appeal in October 2025, pursuant to which the

proposal was sent to the Law and Legislative Affairs Department and sanction

for filing the appeal was granted on 24.12.2025. Subsequently, the Officer-in-

Charge was appointed on 02.01.2026 and the present appeal has been filed

thereafter. However, the explanation essentially discloses movement of files

and administrative correspondence within the departments, and no material

has been placed on record to demonstrate that prompt and diligent steps

were taken within the prescribed period of limitation.

9. It is well settled that the law of limitation binds the State and its

instrumentalities in the same manner as any other litigant. Administrative or

bureaucratic procedures cannot be accepted as a ground for condonation of

delay as a matter of course. The appellants have not shown any exceptional

or unavoidable circumstance which prevented them from approaching this

Court within the period of limitation. The reasons assigned, being general in

nature and based primarily on departmental processing of the matter, do not

constitute "sufficient cause" within the meaning of law.

10. This Court is further of the view that the pleadings made in the

application for condonation of delay do not disclose any satisfactory

explanation for the prolonged delay. The grounds urged are largely routine

and relate to internal administrative processes of the State Government. The

State, having a structured administrative and legal framework, is expected to

act with due diligence and promptitude in pursuing legal remedies. The

chronology placed on record reflects avoidable delay and lack of prompt

action on the part of the concerned authorities.

11. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are not inclined to condone the

delay of about 230 days in filing the present writ appeal. Consequently, the

application for condonation of delay is rejected. As a result, the writ appeal

stands dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, without entering into the

merits of the case.
                       Sd/-                                    Sd/-
            (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)                      (Ramesh Sinha)
                       Judge                                Chief Justice



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