[Cites 17, Cited by 0]
Chattisgarh High Court
State Of Chhattisgarh vs A.E. Gabriyal on 16 March, 2026
Author: Rajani Dubey
Bench: Rajani Dubey
1
2026:CGHC:12373-DB
Digitally
signed AFR
by AMIT
PATEL
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
ACQA No. 175 of 2018
State of Chhattisgarh Through- The Superintendent of Police, Special
Police Establishment, Lokayukt Office, Raipur, Chhattisgarh., District :
Raipur, Chhattisgarh
... Appellant
versus
1 - A.E. Gabriyal S/o E. Gabriyal Aged About 80 Years The Then Regional
Officer State Housing Cooperative Federation, Raipur, R/o- New Shanti
Nagar, Raipur Chhattisgarh, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
2 - Vinay Mitra S/o N.D. Mitra Contractor, R/o House No. E/9, Adarsh
Nagar, Durg District Durg Chhattisgarh
3 - Shankar Sharma S/o Jhumuklal Sharma Aged About 66 Years The
Then Revenue Inspector, Nandghat, District Durg C. G. R/o Shankar
Nagar Durg District Durg C. G.
4 - Gendlal Guru S/o Khurju Ram Guru Aged About 66 Years The Then
Revenue Inspector, Office Of The Assistant Settlement Officer, Dhamtari
C. G. R/o Village And Post Pawari, Tahsil Gurur, District Balod C. G.
... Respondents
For State/Appellant : Mr. Avinash Singh, G.A.
For Respondent No. 1 : None present
and 2
2
For Respondents No. 3 Ms. Vartika Shrivastava, Advocate on behalf of
and 4 Mr. P.R. Patankar, Advocate.
Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey, J.
Hon'ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal, J.
Judgment on Board
16.03.2026
Per, Rajani Dubey, J.
1. The present appeal has been preferred by the appellant/State
against the judgment dated 18.07.2017 passed by learned Special
Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988), Durg, District- Durg in
Special Case No. 01/2001, whereby the learned trial Court
acquitted the accused/respondents No. 1, 3 and 4 of the charges
under Sections 120 (B), 420 and 467 of IPC and Section 13 (1) (d)
read with Section Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act
and respondent No. 2 acquitted of offence under Sections 120 (B),
420 and 467 of IPC.
2. The brief facts of the prosecution case are that on the basis of a
written complaint lodged by the complainant- Basarat Khan, an
offence bearing Crime No. 40/1999 came to be registered by the
Special Police Establishment, Bhopal against the present
respondents/accused persons. It was alleged in the complaint that
the respondents, in furtherance of a criminal conspiracy and in
collusion with other co-accused persons, had illegally and
fraudulently sold the land belonging to Chhattisgarh Vikas Griha
Nirman Sahkari Samiti situated at Village Padumnagar, Charoda,
Tahsil Patan, District- Durg (Chhattisgarh), admeasuring 6.53 acres
to about 14 purchasers. The prosecution case is that the said land
was wrongfully represented and shown as agricultural land, despite
the fact that it belonged to the said cooperative society and could
not have been legally transferred in the manner in which it was
done. By misrepresenting the nature and status of the land and
abusing their official position, the accused persons allegedly
facilitated the illegal sale, thereby causing wrongful loss to the
society and corresponding wrongful gain to themselves and the
purchasers. On the basis of the said complaint, the Special Police
Establishment registered the aforementioned crime and initiated
investigation into the matter. During the course of investigation, the
investigating agency collected relevant documentary evidence,
records relating to the land in question and statements of witnesses.
Upon scrutiny of the material so collected, the investigating agency
found prima facie involvement of the present respondents in the
commission of the alleged offences. After completion of
investigation, a charge-sheet was filed before the learned Special
Court against the respondents/accused persons for offences
punishable under Sections 120-B, 420 and 467 of the Indian Penal
Code and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act. The learned Special Judge, after
conducting the trial and upon appreciation of the oral as well as
documentary evidence available on record, by the impugned
judgment acquitted accused/respondents No. 1, 3 and 4 of the
charges under Sections 120-B, 420 and 467 of the IPC and Section
13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act
and acquitted respondent No. 2 of the offences punishable under
Sections 120-B, 420 and 467 of the IPC. Being aggrieved by the
judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Special Judge, the
State/Appellant has preferred the present appeal challenging the
legality and correctness of the impugned judgment and seeking
reversal of the order of acquittal passed in favour of the
respondents.
3. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant/State submits that the
impugned judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court is
contrary to law and facts on record and therefore the same
deserves to be set aside. It is contended that the learned Trial Court
has failed to properly appreciate the oral as well as documentary
evidence adduced by the prosecution and has recorded findings
which are not borne out from the material available on record. It is
further submitted that the prosecution has successfully established
the ingredients of the offences punishable under Section 420 of the
IPC as well as the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, by
leading cogent, reliable and consistent evidence. The evidence
brought on record clearly demonstrates that the
accused/respondents, in furtherance of a criminal conspiracy,
misrepresented the nature and status of the land belonging to
Chhattisgarh Vikas Griha Nirman Sahkari Samiti and dishonestly
facilitated the sale of the said land to various purchasers by
projecting it as agricultural land. Such acts of the accused persons
amount to cheating and dishonestly inducing innocent purchasers to
part with money, thereby causing wrongful loss to the concerned
society and corresponding wrongful gain to themselves and others.
Learned counsel further submits that the prosecution witnesses
have clearly supported the prosecution case and the documentary
evidence collected during the course of investigation, including the
relevant land records and documents pertaining to the transactions,
sufficiently establish the role and involvement of the
accused/respondents in the commission of the alleged offences. It
is argued that the learned trial Court, while passing the impugned
judgment, has ignored material pieces of evidence and has adopted
a hyper-technical approach in evaluating the prosecution case. It is
also contended that the learned trial Court has failed to consider
that the respondents, being public servants had abused their official
position and acted in a manner which falls squarely within the ambit
of Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, by obtaining pecuniary advantage for themselves or
for others through illegal and dishonest means. The prosecution
evidence clearly indicates that the acts of the accused were not
merely irregular administrative actions, but were deliberate acts
committed with dishonest intention, thereby attracting the provisions
of the aforesaid statute. The Trial Court has failed to consider the
cumulative effect of the entire evidence on record and has
erroneously granted the benefit of doubt to the accused persons
despite the prosecution having proved its case beyond reasonable
doubt. It is therefore argued that the impugned judgment suffers
from serious legal infirmities and has resulted in miscarriage of
justice. In view of the evidence available on record and the
established legal position, the findings recorded by the learned Trial
Court are unsustainable in law. Therefore, looking to the facts and
circumstances of the case, the judgment and finding of the learned
trial Court is perverse and is liable to be set aside.
4. None present for respondent Nos. 1 and 2, despite service of notice.
5. Ex adverso, learned counsel for the respondents No. 3 and
4/accused supporting the impugned judgment submits that the
learned trial Court minutely appreciated the oral and documentary
evidence and rightly acquitted the respondents/accused of the
aforesaid charges. Therefore, the impugned judgment does not
suffer from any irregularity or infirmity warranting interference by this
Court in the instant appeal.
6. We have heard learned counsel for both the parties and perused the
material available on record.
7. It is evident from the record of the learned Trial Court that it framed
charges against the respondent Nos. 1, 3 and 4 for offence under
Sections 120 (B), 420 and 467 of IPC and Section 13 (1) (d) read
with Section Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 and against respondent No. 2 for offence under Sections 120
(B), 420 and 467 of IPC and after appreciation of oral and
documentary evidence available on record, the learned Trial Court
acquitted the respondents of all the aforesaid charges on this
ground that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond
reasonable doubt against the respondents/ accused.
8. It is undisputed that at the time of incident, respondent No. 1- A.E.
Gabriyal was posted as Co-operative Inspector and In-charge of the
Chhattisgarh Housing Co-operative Society, Charoda, District Durg;
respondent No. 2, Vinay Mitra was a contractor; respondent Nos. 3
and 4, Gendlal Guru and Shankar Sharma, were posted as
Revenue Inspectors. It is further not in dispute that certain sale
deeds were executed by Vinay Mitra.
9. As per the prosecution case, all the accused persons, in furtherance
of a criminal conspiracy, illegally sold land belonging to
Chhattisgarh Vikas Griha Nirman Sahkari Samiti, situated at Village
Padumnagar, Charoda, Tahsil Patan, District- Durg (Chhattisgarh),
admeasuring 6.53 acres to about 14 purchasers by misrepresenting
the land as agricultural land.
10. PW-1 Surekha Deshlehara deposed that land bearing Khasra No.
433/8, admeasuring 40 decimal was purchased on 16.01.1995 for a
consideration of Rs. 12,000/-. She further stated that the said
transaction was carried out by her husband with the seller, though
she was not aware of the name of the seller. In her cross-
examination, she stated that at the time of execution of the sale
deed, the market value of the land was the same as the price at
which it was purchased.
11. PW-2 Pukhraj Jain has stated that land bearing Khasra No. 433/9,
admeasuring 40 decimal was purchased on 16.02.1995 for a
consideration of Rs. 12,000/- from Chhattisgarh Vikas Griha Nirman
Sahkari Samiti situated at Padumnagar, Charoda. His wife Kalpana
had also purchased a land bearing Khasra No. 432 admeasuring 30
decimal for a consideration of Rs. 9,000/-. He further stated that a
case regarding payment of deficient stamp duty in respect of the
said land was registered against his wife before the Collector, Durg,
and pursuant to the Collector's order, an additional stamp duty of
Rs. 16,784/- was paid. In his cross-examination, he admitted this
suggestion of defence that Collector of every district determines the
guideline rates for registration of land in all villages and areas every
year and irrespective of the actual sale consideration, the stamp
duty is required to be paid on the basis of the value fixed by the
Collector. According to the Collector's guideline rate, he was
required to pay an additional stamp duty of Rs. 10,400/-.
12. PW-4 Mohini Bai Kochar has stated that she purchased land from
Chhattisgarh Vikas Griha Nirman Sahkari Samiti for a consideration
of Rs. 15,000/- and She further stated that she was not aware of the
notice issued by the office of District Registrar regarding deficiency
in stamp duty and also did not know whether the police had
recorded her statement or not. The prosecution declared her hostile
and cross-examined her; however, she stated that she was not
aware whether the land bearing Khasra No. 430/2 admeasuring
0.49 decimal, situated at Padumnagar was purchased and further
expressed ignorance as to whether she had deposited stamp duty
of Rs. 821/- on 20.03.1996 after receiving notice from the District
Registrar. She herself stated that it may be deposited by her
nephew.
In para 6 of her cross-examination, she stated that the land
purchased by her is still in her possession.
13. PW-5- B. S. Naik, District Registrar produced sale-deed of all land
which was executed by the society and stated that he produced 14
cases before Lokayukta, Raipur. Memo is Ex. P/4 and all cases are
Ex. P/5 to Ex. P/18. The prosecution declared him hostile and
cross-examined him, then in para 7, he denied this suggestion that
he is involved with the accused in the crime in question and that for
the purpose of protecting them, he is refusing to depose before the
Lokayukta, Raipur regarding the document marked as Ex. P/19.
He admitted the defence's suggestion that the stamp duty
was paid based on the value of the land fixed by the Collector.
In para 11 of his cross-examination, he admitted that the
amounts shown in Ex.P/5 to Ex.P/18 were paid by the respective
purchasers.
14. PW-7 Chandrahas Pandey stated that on 06.08.1985 he was
working as an Accountant in Chhattisgarh Vikas Griha Nirman
Sahkari Samiti Maryadit. He further stated that the Anti-Corruption
Bureau seized certain files in accordance with the seizure memo
(Ex.P/20), wherein admitted his signature on B to B part. He stated
in para 2 that " प्रकरण के अभिलेख में मैंने जप्ती दिनांक 04.08.1999 को द्वारा
प्रस्तुत करने पर प्रदर्श पी-20'बी' के अनुसार आदेश दिनांक 10.02.1994 की सत्य
प्रमाणित प्रतिलिपि की जप्ती की गई थी। एसीबी के अधिकारियों द्वारा दिनांक
04.08.1999 को मेरे द्वारा प्रस्तुत करने पर प्रदर्श पी-20 सी. के अनुसार कुर्की आदेश
की असल की जप्ती की गई थी। मैंने जप्ती दिनांक को एसीबी के अधिकारियों को प्रदर्श
पी-20'डी', जो कि संस्था की असल संपत्ति की कुर्की करने हेतु आदेश की सूचना दिया
था, जिसकी असल प्रति प्रकरण के अभिलेख में संलग्न है। प्रदर्श पी-20'ई. निरीक्षण
प्रतिवेदन की असल प्रति है।"
15. PW-8 Vishambar Pradhan deposed that he was posted as Collector
of Stamp, District Registrar Office, Durg, and had issued notices to
the purchasers. He admitted his signatures on orders Ex. P/5 to Ex.
P/17.
In para 07 of his cross-examination, he stated as under:-
"7.साक्षी से यह पूछने पर कि उप पंजीयक दर्गु द्वारा स्टाम्प शुल्क कम होने के
संबंध में कोई रिफरेंस, नहीं किया गया था, कथन करता है कि उसके द्वारा जो भी
लिखित में आदेश पारित किया गया उसमें उल्लेख किया गया है। स्वतः कहा कि
स्वप्रेरणा से भी जिला पंजीयक कार्यवाही करने में सक्षम है यह आवश्यक नहीं है
कि उप पंजीयक के रिफरेंस पर कार्यवाही किया जावें। "
In para 08 of his cross-examination, he admitted as under:-
"8. यह कहना सही है कि मेरे द्वारा पारित आदेश प्रदर्श पी-5 से प्रदर्श पी-17
में कृषि भूमि मानकर उसका स्टाम्प शुल्क का मूल्यांकन किया गया हैं। यह
कहना सही है कि शासन द्वारा निर्धारित बाजार मूल्य तथा पक्षकारों के मध्य तय
की गई विकय की राशि को आधार मानकर स्टाम्प शुल्क की गणना की जाती
है। "
16. PW-6 Rakesh Bhatt deposed that in June 1999, while posted as
Inspector in the Lokayukta Office Raipur, he enquired into the
complaint dated 04.05.1999 filed by Basrat Khan. He seized
documents vide seizure memo (Ex. P/20) and admitted his
signature on A to A part. He also prepared memo (Ex. P/21) and
seized a typed copy of the Additional Collector's order (Ex. P/22).
In para 18 of his cross-examination, he admitted as under:-
"18. यह कहना सही है कि जॉच में मैंने पाया था कि आरोपी विनय मित्रा
ने छ.ग. गृह निर्माण सहकारी समिति के भवनों का निर्माण ठे केदार के रूप में किया
था तथा उसके बकाया का भुगतान उक्त संस्था के द्वारा किया जाना था। यह
कहना सही है कि बकाया राशि के वसूली के लिए विनय मित्रा ने उप-पंजीयक दर्गु
के न्यायालय में वाद प्रस्तुत किया था। इस वाद में विनय मित्रा के पक्ष में
10,02416 रूपये का अवार्ड पारित हुआ था। इस राशि का भुगतान करने में गृह
निर्माण समिति असमर्थ रही थी। यह कहना भी सही है कि इस स्थिति में बकाया
के भुगतान के लिए उप पंजीयक सहकारी संस्था दर्गु ने संस्था को अपनी जमीन
बेचकर भुगतान करने का आदेश दिया था। "
In para 23 of his cross-examination, he also admitted as under:-
"23. यह कहना सही है कि बशारत खान की शिकायत पर ए.के. (अमल कुमार)
बैनर्जी की जांच रिपोर्ट दिनांक 24-10-1996 को अभियोग पत्र के साथ संलग्न की
गई है। यह कहना सही है कि उक्त जांच रिपोर्ट की कंडिका-5 में श्री ए. के. बैनर्जी
द्वारा लेख किया गया है कि शिकायतकर्ता द्वारा लगाया गया आरोप निराधार व
द्वेषवश लगाया गया प्रतीत होते हैं, जो कि न्यायालयीन अवार्ड के परिपालन में
समस्त संव्यवहार किये गये हैं......।"
17. It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Jupally
Lakshmikantha Reddy Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and
another1held in paras 18 to 20 as under:-
18. "18. We are unable to accept her submission
on this score too. There is nothing on record to show
the appellant had manufactured the alleged fake
document which is a sine qua non to attract Section
465 IPC [punishment for forgery]. In fact, the original
fabricated document had not been recovered.
19. 19. In Sheila Sebastian v. R. Jawaharaj [(2018)
7 SCC 581, para 25], this Court held to attract
Section 464 IPC [Making a false document], the
prosecution must establish that the accused had
made the fake document. No material connecting the
appellant to the making of the fake document has
been adduced in the impugned charge sheet.
1 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1950
20. 20. Similarly, offences under Section 468 IPC
[forgery for purpose of cheating] and Section 471
IPC are not attracted, as the requisite mens rea, i.e.,
dishonest intention to cause wrongful loss to the
Education Department and wrongful gain to himself
has not been demonstrated as the issuance of the
recognition was not dependent on the production of
the alleged forged NOC."
21. Further in the matter of Vishal Noble Singh Vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh and another;2., the Hon'ble Supreme Court held in paras
17 to 21 and 24 as under:-
17. On a reading of the FIR as well as the charge-sheet,
we do not find that the offences aforestated is made out at
all. We do not find any criminal breach of trust nor any
cheating by impersonation. There is also no cheating and
dishonestly inducing delivery of property, nor has any
documents referred to any forgery or security or any
forgery for the purpose of cheating. There is no reference
to any document which has been forged so as to be used
as a genuine document and much less is as there any
criminal conspiracy which can be imputed to the appellants
herein in the absence of any offence being made out vis-a-
vis the aforesaid Sections.
18. In this regard, our attention was drawn to paras 42-44
and 46 of Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal,
2 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1680
(2007) 12 SCC 1, dealing with Sections 420 and 467 IPC,
which are extracted hereunder with regard to Section 420
IPC, it was observed thus:
"42. On a reading of the aforesaid section, it is manifest
that in the definition there are two separate classes of
acts which the person deceived may be induced to do.
In the first class of acts he may be induced fraudulently
or dishonestly to deliver property to any person. The
second class of acts is the doing or omitting to do
anything which the person deceived would not do or
omit to do if he were not so deceived In the first class of
cases, the inducing must be fraudulent or dishonest. In
the second class of acts, the inducing must be
intentional but need not be fraudulent or dishonest.
Therefore, it is the intention which is the gist of the
offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is
necessary to show that he had a fraudulent or dishonest
intention at the time of making the promise From his
mere failure to subsequently keep a promise, one
cannot presume that he all along had a culpable
intention to break the promise from the beginning.
43. We shall now deal with the ingredients of Section
467 IPC.
44. The following ingredients are essential for
commission of the offence under Section 467 1PC:
1. the document in question so forged;
2. the accused who forged it;
3. the document is one of the kinds enumerated in the
aforementioned section.
* * *
46. The court must ensure that criminal prosecution is
not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking
private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise
the accused. On analysis of the aforementioned cases,
we are of the opinion that it is neither possible nor
desirable to lay down an inflexible rule that would
govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Inherent
jurisdiction of the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC
though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and
with caution and only when it is Justified by the tests
specifically laid down in the statute itself and in the
aforementioned cases. In view of the settled legal
position, the Impugned judgment cannot be sustained.
(emphasis by
us)
19. On a careful consideration of the aforementioned
judicial dicta, we find that none of the offences alleged
against the Accused-Appellants herein is made out. In
fact, we find that the allegations of criminal intent and
other allegations against the Accused-Appellants
herein have been made with a malafide intent and
therefore, the Judgment of this Court in the case of
Bhajan Lal and particularly sub-paragraphs 1, 3, 5 and
7 of paragraph 102, extracted above, squarely apply to
the facts of these cases. It is neither expedient nor in
the interest of justice to permit the present prosecution
to continue.
20. This Court, in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v.
Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692,
reasoned that the criminal process cannot be utilized for
any oblique purpose and held that while Entertaining an
application for quashing an FIR at the initial stage, the
test to be applied is whether the uncontroverted
allegations prima facie establish the offence This Court
also concluded that the court should quash those
criminal cases where the chances of an ultimate
conviction are bleak and no useful purpose is likely to be
served by continuation of a criminal prosecution. The
aforesaid observations squarely apply to this case.
21. We find that in recent years the machinery of criminal
justice is being misused by certain persons for their vested
interests and for achieving their oblique motives and
agenda. Courts have therefore to be vigilant against such
tendencies and ensure that acts of omission and
commission having an adverse impact on the fabric of our
society must be nipped in the bud.
24. We also find that the reliance by the High Court upon
the judgment of this Court in Neeharika Infrastructure is
not apposite. The facts in the aforementioned case and
the present case are quite different. The aforementioned
case concerned a special leave petition filed by a
complainant aggrieved by an interim order of the Bombay
High Court that granted protection to the applicant therein
from 'coercive steps'. The grievance of the complainant in
that case was that one-and-half-years after securing
protection from arrest from the Sessions Court, the
accused had filed a Writ Petition before the Bombay High
Court to quash the FIR. Accordingly, this Court had
quashed the interim order of 'no coercive steps' and
cautioned against the practice of directing 'no coercive
steps' while dismissing applications under Section 482 of
CrPC. This Court had also clarified that it was not
expressing any view on merits of the application for
quashing of the FIR in the said case. Therefore, the High
Court ought not to have relied upon the said judgment to
deny the relief to the present Accused-Appellants."
22. In the light of the aforementioned judgments and a close and careful
scrutiny of the testimony of all prosecution witnesses reveals
nothing beyond the fact that certain sale deeds were executed by
the accused/respondent No. 2- Vinay Mitra in favour of PW-1
Surekha Deshlahra, PW-2 Pukhraj Jain and other purchasers. The
core allegation of the prosecution is that the accused
persons/respondents, in connivance with each other, deliberately
misrepresented the disputed land as an agricultural land for their
self enrichment. However, this allegation stands materially
contradicted by the prosecution's own witness i.e., PW-8 Vishambar
Pradhan, the then Collector of Stamp, who unequivocally admitted
that in all orders Ex. P/5 to Ex. P/17, stamp duty was assessed and
demanded treating the land as agricultural. This admission strikes
at the very foundation of the prosecution story and renders the
allegation of misrepresentation wholly unsubstantiated. There is a
complete absence of cogent, reliable, and legally admissible
evidence to demonstrate (i) any prior meeting of minds constituting
conspiracy, (ii) any act of fabrication of documents, or (iii) any
misuse of official position by the accused persons for wrongful gain.
Mere execution of sale deeds, by itself, does not constitute proof of
criminal intent or establish the existence of a conspiracy. The
prosecution has thus failed to establish the essential ingredients of
the alleged offences beyond reasonable doubt. The chain of
circumstances is not only incomplete, but fundamentally deficient,
giving rise to serious doubts which must necessarily ensure to the
benefit of the accused. The learned trial Court upon a thorough and
meticulous appreciation of both oral and documentary evidence,
has rightly concluded that the prosecution failed to prove the
charges of conspiracy, fabrication or abuse of official position. The
finding of acquittal is well-reasoned, legally sound, and does not
suffer from any perversity or misappreciation of evidence,
warranting no interference in appeal.
23. The Hon'ble Apex Court vide its judgment dated 12.02.2024 passed
in Mallappa and Ors. Versus State of Karnataka3 has held in para
36 as under:-
"36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on
the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as
guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of
3 (2024) AIR SC 1252
criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of
justice. The principles which come into play while
deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized
as:-
(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a
criminal trial and such appreciation must be
comprehensive--inclusive of all vidence, oral and
documentary;
(ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may
result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground
of challenge;
(iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that
two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused
shall ordinarily be followed;
(iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible
view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify
the reversal of acquittal;
(v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the
acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it
must specifically address all the reasons given by the
Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts;
(vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the
appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity
or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court."
24. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the law
laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mallappa (supra) and
the view which has been taken by the learned trial Court appears to
be plausible and possible view and in the absence of any patent
illegality or perversity this Court is not inclined to interfere with the
impugned judgment.
25. Accordingly, the acquittal appeal is liable to be and is hereby
dismissed.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Rajani Dubey) (Radhakishan Agrawal )
JUDGE JUDGE
AMIT PATEL
