[Cites 16, Cited by 0]
Chattisgarh High Court
State Of Chhattisgarh vs Anuj Uikey on 13 March, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
2026:CGHC:12086-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
ACQA No. 81 of 2016
State of Chhattisgarh Through The Police Station Nevai, District Durg,
Chhattisgarh.
... Appellant(s)
versus
1. Anuj Uikey S/o Uttam Uikey Aged About 22 Years Occupation
Student, R/o Plot No. 2, Ashish Nagar W, Thana Nevai, District
Durg, Chhattisgarh.
2. Pranjal Sharma S/o Gop Kumar Sharma Aged About 22 Years R/o
Village Bhurka, Thana Champaran, Presently R/o Sai Collection,
Krishna Talkies Road, Risali, Thana Nevai, District Durg,
Chhattisgarh.
... Respondent(s)
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For State/Appellant : Mr. Priyank Rathi, Government
Advocate.
For Respondent No. 1 : Ms. Meena Shastri, Advocate.
For Respondent No. 2 : Mr. Awadh Tripathi, Advocate.
Digitally
signed by
BRIJMOHAN
BRIJMOHAN MORLE
MORLE Date:
2026.03.13
18:59:43
+0530
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Order on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
13.03.2026
1. Heard Mr. Priyank Rathi, learned Government Advocate for the
State/appellant. Also heard Ms. Meena Shastri, learned counsel,
appearing for respondent No. 1 and Mr. Awadh Tripathi, learned
counsel, appearing for respondent No. 2.
2. By this acquittal appeal under Section 378(1) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called as "CrPC"), the
appellant/State calls in question legality and propriety of the judgment of
acquittal dated 28.02.2014 passed by learned Special Judge [SC & St
(Prevention of Atrocity) Act], Durg (C.G.) (for short, 'learned trial Court')
in Special Sessions Case No.12 of 2013, whereby the respondents
have been acquitted from the offences punishable under Sections 363,
366, 366-A and 376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section
3(2)(5) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention
of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short, 'Act of 1989').
3. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the victim (PW-2) was
residing at Priyanka Nagar alongwith her parents, who were earlier
residing at Ashish Nagar. When they were residing at Ashish Nagar, the
victim was having talks with the accused Anuj Uikey who resides just
near the house of the victim at Ashish Nagar. On the date of incidence
i.e. on 07.10.2012 at about 4.00 p.m. when the parent of the victim went
to Church, and the victim went to the house of one Bhawana for
meeting and when Bhawana was not found in the house upon which
when the victim was returning back to her house, at about 8.30 p.m. the
accused Anuj Uikey came with a white color swift car bearing its
registration no. CG. 07-MB-1394 and just near the victim, the said car
was stood by the accused. In the said car, alongwith two other boys, the
accused Anuj Uikey was. The said two other boys were in the front sits
of the car and the accused was in back sit of the car. The accused Anuj
stated the victim for walking and forcefully took the victim in the car. The
vicitm was taken away for some distance. In the car, the accused
started teasing with the victim and upon intervening by the victim, the
accused forcefully committed rape with the victim without her will and
wishes. The accused wandered the victim for one and half hour in the
said car and thereafter, the victim was left to the place from which she
was taken by the accused and the victim was threatened by the
accused not to say anything to anybody. After expiry of two days, the
incident was narrated by the victim to her parent and thereafter, on
09.10.2012 a report was lodged at P.S. Neval.
4. Based upon the report lodged by the victim, the FIR (Ex.P/2)
bearing Crime No. 306 of 2012 was registered by the P.S. Neval against
the accused and the investigation was started by the police in the
matter. During the course of investigation, the victim was medically
examined. The cloths of the victim were seized which were sent for
examination. The date of birth certificate (Ex.P/5A) of the victim was
also seized. During the course of further investigation, the
memorandum statement of accused Anuj Uikey was recorded upon
which his cloths were seized and the same was sent for medical
examination. The spot map was prepared. The search was also made
from the accused Pranjal Sharma and from the accused Anuj Uikey, one
swift car as well as its documents were seized. During the course of
investigation, the birth certificate of the victim, being the member of ST,
was seized. The accused Anuj and Pranjal were arrested.
5. After completion of investigation, the charge-sheet was filed before
the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Durg against the accused
Anuj and Pranjal Sharma as the co-accused Ajitesh Mishra was
absconded during the investigation. In turn, the case was committed for
adjudication before the learned Sessions Court and after receiving the
case, the learned trial Court has framed the charges.
6. To bring home the charge, the prosecution examined 12 witnesses
and exhibited 29 documents, marked as Exs. P/1 to P/29.
7. The statements of the accused/respondents were recorded under
Section 313 of the CrPC, wherein they denied all incriminating
circumstances appearing against them in the prosecution evidence.
They asserted that they had been falsely implicated in the case and
claimed complete innocence.
8. After affording due opportunity of hearing to both sides and upon
appreciation of the evidence available on record, the learned trial Court,
by the impugned judgment dated 28.02.2014, acquitted the
accused/respondents of the charge framed against them.
9. Aggrieved by the judgment of acquittal, the State has preferred the
present appeal.
10. Learned State counsel submits that the learned trail Court erred in
acquitting the respondents of the charges leveled against them. He
contends that a perusal of the prosecution's evidence and witness
testimonies establishes that the victim was below 16 years of age at the
time of the incident--a fact expressly affirmed by the learned trial Court
in paragraph 12 of the impugned judgment. Notwithstanding this finding,
the respondents were erroneously acquitted. Furthermore, learned
State counsel asserts that the learned trial Court failed to properly
appreciate the testimony of the victim (PW-2), who categorically
deposed that the accused, Anuj Uikey, committed rape without her
consent. It is argued that the prosecution's case was not viewed in the
proper perspective despite clear evidence of the offense. Consequently,
learned State counsel submitted that the acquittal appeal should be
allowed and the impugned judgment set aside.
11. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents supports
the findings of the impugned judgment, submitting that the learned trial
Court's decision to acquit was based on a comprehensive evaluation of
the material evidence on record. They contends that there is no infirmity
in the learned trial Court's reasoning and that the acquittal is well-
founded in law and fact. Accordingly, they submits that the acquittal
appeal lacks merit and deserves to be dismissed.
12. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the
impugned judgment and records of the trial Court.
13. This appeal challenges the acquittal by learned trial Court under
Section 378(1) of the CrPC. While exercising appellate jurisdiction, the
Court must act with caution, recognizing that the learned trial Court has
the advantage of observing witness demeanour and assessing
credibility firsthand. The accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt, but
only if it is real and substantial, such as a doubt a reasonable person
would honestly entertain. Mere theoretical doubts or minor
discrepancies not affecting the core prosecution case cannot justify
acquittal. The appellate Court must ensure the trial Court properly
appreciated all evidence and extended the benefit of doubt in line with
settled principles.
14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of C. Antony v.
Raghavan Nair1, and Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhunath Jha2 has
observed that an appellate Court should not substitute its own view
unless the learned trial Court's findings are perverse or relevant,
convincing evidence has been unjustifiably ignored, providing
compelling reason for interference.
15. The principles in Tota Singh and another v. State of Punjab 3,
clarify that while an appellate Court can examine an acquittal, it must do
1 AIR 2003 SC 182
2 AIR 2004 SC 1053
3 AIR 1987 SC 1083
so cautiously. The learned trial Court has the advantage of observing
witnesses and assessing credibility. Interference is warranted only if the
trial Court committed a manifest error, ignored material evidence, or
reached a conclusion based on conjecture or misappreciation. Minor
discrepancies cannot outweigh the core, consistent, and credible
testimony unless they go to the root of the case. Interference is justified
only in exceptional circumstances where failure to do so would result in
a miscarriage of justice and held in para 6 as under:-
"..........the mere fact that the Appellate
Court is inclined on a re-appreciation of the
evidence to reach a conclusion which is at
variance with the one recorded in the order
of acquittal passed by the Court below will
not constitute a valid and sufficient ground
for setting aside the acquittal. The
jurisdiction of the appellate Court in dealing
with an appeal against an order of acquittal
is circumscribed by the limitation that no
interference is to be made with the order of
acquittal unless the approach made by the
lower Court to the consideration of the
evidence in the case is vitiated by some
manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded
by the Court below is such which could not
have been possibly arrived at by any Court
acting reasonably and judiciously and is,
therefore, liable to be characterised as
perverse. Where two views are possible on
an appraisal of the evidence adduced in the
case and the Court below has taken a view
which is a plausible one, the Appellate Court
cannot legally interfere within an order of
acquittal even if it is of the opinion that the
view taken by the Court below on its
consideration of the evidence is erroneous."
16. In State of Rajasthan Vs. Kistoora Ram4, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held that an appellate Court must exercise extreme caution
before interfering with an acquittal. The trial Court's advantage in
observing witness demeanour and trial conduct cannot be lightly
disregarded. Interference is warranted only in exceptional cases where
the learned trial Court committed a manifest error, overlooked material
evidence, relied on conjecture, or reached a palpably perverse
conclusion. Minor contradictions or inconsistencies not affecting the
core prosecution case cannot justify acquittal. Thus, while an appellate
Court may review an acquittal, it must do so circumspectly, extending
the benefit of doubt only when a reasonable and substantial doubt
exists and has held as follows:-
"8. The scope of interference in an appeal
against acquittal is very limited. Unless it is
found that the view taken by the Court is
impossible or perverse, it is not permissible
to interfere with the finding of acquittal.
Equally if two views are possible, it is not
permissible to set aside an order of
acquittal, merely because the Appellate
Court finds the way of conviction to be more
probable. The interference would be
warranted only if the view taken is not
possible at all."
17. Further, in the matter of Jafarudheen and others v. State of
Kerala5, the Supreme Court held as under:-
"25. While dealing with an appeal against
acquittal by invoking Section 378 of the
Cr.PC. the Appellate Court has to consider
4 2022 SCC OnLine SC 984
5 (2022) 8 SCC 440
whether the trial Court's view can be
termed as a possible one, particularly when
evidence on record has been analyzed.
The reason is that an order of acquittal
adds up to the presumption of innocence in
favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate
court has to be relatively slow in reversing
the order of the trial court rendering
acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in
favour of the accused does not get
weakened but only strengthened. Such a
double presumption that enures in favour of
the accused has to be disturbed only by
thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal
parameters."
18. While exercising appellate jurisdiction against an acquittal, the
Court may re-appreciate all evidence such as, oral and documentary, to
determine whether the trial Court correctly weighed the materials and
assigned valid reasons. If the trial Court's conclusions are
unsustainable, erroneous, or perverse, the appellate Court may arrive at
its own conclusion.
19. The learned trial Court, while partly acquitting the
accused/respondents, observed in the impugned judgment that the
evidence on record establishes that the victim was acquainted with the
accused Anuj Uikey prior to the incident and used to communicate with
him over the mobile phone. There is also nothing on record to indicate
that the victim had any prior enmity or dispute with the accused. In such
circumstances, there is no reasonable basis to assume that the victim
would falsely implicate the accused without any cause. It is well
recognized that a woman would not ordinarily stake her dignity and
reputation by making a false allegation of rape against an individual
without justification. On the basis of the testimony of the victim, the
learned trial Court held that the offence of rape against the victim was
proved against Anuj Uike. However, the evidence on record did not
establish that the victim had been taken away with the knowledge that
she would be compelled to engage in illicit sexual intercourse with any
other person. Further, there was no evidence to show that the accused
Anuj committed the offence on the basis of the caste of the victim with
the knowledge that she was a member of a Scheduled Tribe.
20. With regard to the accused Pranjal Sharma, the learned trial Court
observed that he neither touched the victim nor used any force against
her. It was also contended on behalf of the accused that the victim
admitted that on 10.10.2012 she had seen the accused persons at the
police station prior to the Test Identification Parade (TIP), thereby
rendering the identification proceedings doubtful. The victim stated that
she came to know the identity of Pranjal Sharma at the time of the
incident as Anuj was calling the other accused persons by their names.
Nevertheless, the record indicates that the victim had already seen
Pranjal Sharma at the police station prior to the identification
proceedings.
21. The accused Pranjal Sharma had been charged under Section
376(2)(g) of the IPC. The victim stated that Pranjal had remarked to
Anuj, "You have kept a good item; give it to me as well." However, this
statement was shown as an omission in her police statement (Ex.D/1)
and was also not mentioned in the written complaint (Ex.P/2). In view of
such omission in both the complaint and the police statement, the
learned Trial Court held that it could not be conclusively proved that
Pranjal Sharma had made the said remark.
22. The learned trial Court also relied upon the principles laid down by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in State of Rajasthan v. Hemraj &
Others, reported in 2009 AIR (SC) 2644, wherein it was held that in
order to establish the offence of gang rape under Section 376(2)(g) of
the IPC, it must be proved that more than one person shared a common
intention to commit the offence and that the act of each accused was
such as if he alone had committed the offence. Evidence of prior
planning or participation in furtherance of the common intention must
also be established. In the absence of any overt act attributable to the
accused in the commission of rape, acquittal under Section 376(2)(g) of
the IPC was upheld. Similarly, in Vishwanath & Others v. State by
Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, reported in 2008 AIR (SC) 2222, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held that where there is no evidence on record
to establish that the accused persons shared a common intention to
commit rape upon the victim, the charge of gang rape against the other
accused cannot be sustained.
23. On the basis of the evidence available on record, the learned trial
Court concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish that Pranjal
Sharma had either participated in the alleged offence or had actively
assisted the co-accused. Consequently, the charges against him under
Sections 363, 366, 366A and 376(2)(g) of the IPC and under Section
3(2)(5) of the Act of 1989 were held to be not proved. Accordingly,
Pranjal Sharma was acquitted of the said charges.
24. The accused Anuj Uikey was also acquitted of the charges under
Sections 363, 366 and 366A of the IPC and Section 3(2)(5) of the Act of
1989. However, instead of the charge under Section 376(2)(g) of the
IPC, he was found guilty and convicted for the offence punishable under
Section 376(1) of the IPC.
25. The State has preferred the present appeal challenging the
acquittal of the respondents--Anuj Uikey and Pranjal Sharma, as
recorded by the learned trial Court. The challenge in the present appeal
is primarily directed against the findings recorded by the learned trial
Court in acquitting the respondents of certain charges.
26. It is well settled that an appellate Court should exercise great
caution while interfering with an order of acquittal. Interference is
warranted only when the conclusions reached by the trial court are
perverse, manifestly illegal, or based on a misreading of the evidence
on record. The trial court, having had the advantage of observing the
demeanor of the witnesses and evaluating their testimony firsthand, is
in the best position to appreciate the evidence. Where two views are
reasonably possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the view
taken by the trial court ordinarily deserves to be upheld.
27. Upon examining the impugned judgment and the material
available on record, this Court finds that the conclusions drawn by the
learned trial Court are based on a proper appreciation of the evidence
and settled principles of criminal jurisprudence. The reasoning adopted
by the learned Trial Court cannot be said to be perverse or
unreasonable. No material evidence has been shown to have been
ignored or misappreciated so as to warrant interference with the
judgment of acquittal. Consequently, no ground is made out for granting
leave to appeal against the judgment of acquittal.
28. Accordingly, the present acquittal appeal filed by the State under
Section 378(1) of the Cr.P.C. is dismissed at the admission stage itself,
and the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court is hereby
affirmed.
29. The Registry is directed to transmit a certified copy of this
judgment along with the record of the case to the Court concerned for
information and necessary compliance.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Brijmohan
