[Cites 2, Cited by 0]
Chattisgarh High Court
Janardan Singh Patel vs Hriti Patel on 12 March, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
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2026:CGHC:11977
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRR No. 358 of 2026
Janardan Singh Patel S/o Shivmurat Singh Patel Aged About 30 Years
Resident Of Village Bidar, Post - Rajkhand, Police Station And Tehsil -
Duddhi, District - Sonbhadra, Uttar Pradesh.
KUNAL
... Applicant(s)
DEWANGAN
Digitally
versus
signed by
KUNAL
DEWANGAN Hriti Patel W/o Janardan Singh Patel Aged About 23 Years Resident Of
Village Gandhinagar, Tehsil - Ambikapur, District - Sarguja, Chhattisgarh.
... Non-applicant(s)
For Applicant : Mr. Rohan, Advocate.
For Non-applicant : None.
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Order on Board
12.03.2026
1. Mr. Rohan, learned counsel for the applicant on I.A. No. 02 of 2026,
which is an application for condonation of delay of 164 days in preferring
the instant criminal revision.
2. Learned counsel for the applicant submit that the applicant has
preferred the present revision petition before this Court against the order
dated 12.06.2025 passed by the learned Family Court, Ambikapur (C.G.),
whereby partly allowed the application filed by the non-applicant and
amount of Rs. 3000/- has been awarded towards maintenance to the non-
applicant. It is further submitted that the delay in filing the present revision
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is neither intentional nor deliberate, but has occurred due to bona fide and
unavoidable circumstances. It is submitted that the applicant, being a
resident of District Sonbhadra (U.P.), had to arrange certified copies of
the impugned order and other relevant documents and thereafter obtain
proper legal advice, which consumed considerable time. It is further
submitted that the applicant is a person of limited means and was facing
financial and personal difficulties, due to which the revision could not be
filed within the prescribed period of limitation. It is also submitted that the
delay has occurred due to bona fide and procedural reasons and not due
to any negligence on the part of the applicant and that no prejudice would
be caused to the non-applicant if the delay is condoned, whereas the
applicant would suffer irreparable loss if the same is not condoned.
3. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the applicant as also
perused the application for condonation of delay in preferring the instant
criminal revision.
4. The primary question that arises for consideration before this Court
is whether the delay of about 164 days in preferring the present revision
petition deserves to be condoned or not.
5. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of
Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 INSC 932, while
considering the delay, issued some directions and observed as follows:-
"5. The legal position is that where a case has
been presented in the Court beyond limitation,
the petitioner has to explain the Court as to
what was the "sufficient cause" which means
an adequate and enough reason which
prevented him to approach the Court within
limitation. In Majji Sannemma v. Reddy
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Sridevi, 2021 SCC Online SC 1260, it was
held by this Court that even though limitation
may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has
to be applied with all its rigour when
prescribed by statute. A reference was also
made to the decision of this Court in Ajay
Dabra v. Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC Online 92
wherein, it was held as follows:
"13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v.
Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14
SCC 81] while rejecting an application for
condonation of delay for lack of sufficient
cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as
follows:
"15. The law on the issue can be
summarised to the effect that where a case
has been presented in the court beyond
limitation, the applicant has to explain the
court as to what was the "sufficient cause"
which means an adequate and enough
reason which prevented him to approach
the court within limitation. In case a party is
found to be negligent, or for want of bona
fide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to have
not acted diligently or remained inactive,
there cannot be a justified ground to
condone the delay. No court could be
justified in condoning such an inordinate
delay by imposing any condition
whatsoever. The application is to be
decided only within the parameters laid
down by this Court in regard to the
condonation of delay. In case there was no
sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to
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approach the court on time condoning the
delay without any justification, putting any
condition whatsoever, amounts to passing
an order in violation of the statutory
provisions and it tantamounts to showing
utter disregard to the legislature."
14. Therefore, we are of the considered
opinion that the High Court did not commit
any mistake in dismissing the delay
condonation application of the present
appellant."
Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to
condone the delay has to be exercised
judiciously based on facts and
circumstances of each case and that, the
expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be
liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction
or lack of bona fides is attributed to the
party.
5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji
Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, 2024
INSC 262, wherein, one of us
(J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a member, after
referring to various decisions on the issue, it
was in unequivocal terms observed by this
Court that delay should not be excused as a
matter of generosity and rendering
substantial justice is not to cause prejudice
to the opposite party. The relevant passage
of the same is profitably extracted below:
"24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we
made it very clear that we are not going to
look into the merits of the matter as long as
we are not convinced that sufficient cause
has been made out for condonation of such
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a long and inordinate delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a
private party or a State or Union of India
when it comes to condoning the gross delay
of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses
to approach the court long after the lapse of
the time prescribed under the relevant
provisions of the law, then he cannot turn
around and say that no prejudice would be
caused to either side by the delay being
condoned. This litigation between the
parties started sometime in 1981. We are in
2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed.
However, till date the respondent has not
been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It
would be a mockery of justice if we condone
the delay of 12 years and 158 days and
once again ask the respondent to undergo
the rigmarole of the legal proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a relevant
matter which the court must take into
consideration while considering whether the
delay should be condoned or not. From the
tenor of the approach of the appellants, it
appears that they want to fix their own
period of limitation for instituting the
proceedings for which law has prescribed a
period of limitation. Once it is held that a
party has lost his right to have the matter
considered on merits because of his own
inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to
be non-deliberate delay and in such
circumstances of the case, he cannot be
heard to plead that the substantial justice
deserves to be preferred as against the
technical considerations. While considering
the plea for condonation of delay, the court
must not start with the merits of the main
matter. The court owes a duty to first
ascertain the bona fides of the explanation
offered by the party seeking condonation. It
is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the
litigant and the opposition of the other side
is equally balanced that the court may bring
into aid the merits of the matter for the
purpose of condoning the delay.
27. We are of the view that the question of
limitation is not merely a technical
consideration. The rules of limitation are
based on the principles of sound public
policy and principles of equity. We should
not keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging
over the head of the respondent for
indefinite period of time to be determined at
the whims and fancies of the appellants.
xxx xxx xxx
34. In view of the aforesaid, we have
reached to the conclusion that the High
Court committed no error much less any
error of law in passing the impugned order.
Even otherwise, the High Court was
exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it
has been said that delay should not be
excused as a matter of generosity.
Rendering substantial justice is not to cause
prejudice to the opposite party. The
appellants have failed to prove that they
were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the
matter and this vital test for condoning the
delay is not satisfied in this case.
36. For all the foregoing reasons, this
appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There
shall be no order as to costs."
Applying the above legal proposition to the
facts of the present case, we are of the opinion
that the High Court correctly refused to
condone the delay and dismissed the appeal
by observing that such inordinate delay was
not explained satisfactorily, no sufficient cause
was shown for the same, and no plausible
reason was put forth by the State. Therefore,
we are inclined to reject this petition at the
threshold.
6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush
aside the delay occurred in preferring the
second appeal, due to callous and
lackadaisical attitude on the part of the officials
functioning in the State machinery. Though the
Government adopts systematic approach in
handling the legal issues and preferring the
petitions/applications/appeals well within the
time, due to the fault on the part of the officials
in merely communicating the information on
time, huge revenue loss will be caused to the
Government exchequer. The present case is
one such case, wherein, enormous delay of
1788 days occasioned in preferring the second
appeal due to the lapses on the part of the
officials functioning under the State, though
valuable Government lands were involved.
Therefore, we direct the State to streamline the
machinery touching the legal issues, offering
legal opinion, filing of cases before the Tribunal
/ Courts, etc., fix the responsibility on the
officer(s) concerned, and penalize the
officer(s), who is/are responsible for delay,
deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of the
loss caused to the Government. Such direction
will have to be followed by all the States
scrupulously.
7. There is one another aspect of the matter
which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a
period of time, we have noticed that whenever
there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at
the instance of a private litigant or State the
delay is sought to be explained right from the
time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay
of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end
of the same. For example if the period of
limitation is 90 days then the party seeking
condonation has to explain why it was unable
to institute the proceedings within that period
of limitation. What events occurred after the
91st day till the last is of no consequence. The
court is required to consider what came in the
way of the party that it was unable to file it
between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is
true that a party is entitled to wait until the last
day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when
it allows the limitation to expire and pleads
sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier,
the sufficient cause must establish that
because of some event or circumstance
arising before the limitation expired it was not
possible to file the appeal within time. No
event or circumstance arising after the expiry
of limitation can constitute such sufficient
cause. There may be events or circumstances
subsequent to the expiry of limitation which
may further delay the filing of the appeal. But
that the limitation has been allowed to expire
without the appeal being filed must be traced
to a cause arising within the period of
limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and
Another v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC
733)."
6. Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present
case, in the light of the aforementioned judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), it is evident that the discretion
to condone delay has to be exercised with great caution and only upon a
clear and satisfactory demonstration of "sufficient cause." The law is well-
settled that ignorance of law, by themselves, do not constitute such
sufficient cause, and that negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot
be overlooked under the guise of advancing substantial justice.
7. In the backdrop of the aforesaid legal principles and upon careful
consideration of the rival submissions, this Court finds that the delay of
164 days in filing the present revision is grossly inordinate. The
explanation offered by the applicant that the delay occurred due to the
time consumed in obtaining certified copies of the impugned order,
seeking legal advice and owing to financial and personal difficulties faced
by the applicant, appears to be bona fide and not deliberate, though
invoking sympathy, cannot be treated as "sufficient cause" in the eye of
law. It is now well-settled that ignorance of law by themselves do not
constitute adequate justification for condoning delay, nor can the valuable
right that accrues to the opposite party by virtue of the law of limitation be
lightly taken away.
8. The doctrine of limitation is founded upon public policy that seeks to
ensure certainty and finality in litigation. Once the statutory period has
expired, a litigant seeking indulgence of the Court must show diligence
and bona fides, and must explain satisfactorily the circumstances which
prevented timely action. In the present case, the applicant has not been
able to point out any circumstance arising within the period of limitation
which disabled him from approaching this Court. On the contrary, the
record reveals that he remained inactive for a long period. Such
explanation cannot be construed as sufficient cause for condonation of
delay, particularly when the delay is prolonged and unexplained for a
substantial period.
9. Therefore, this Court is constrained to hold that no case for
condonation of delay is made out. The application for condonation of
delay is accordingly rejected. As a consequence, the instant criminal
revision petition, being hopelessly barred by limitation, also stands
dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.
Sd/-
(Ramesh Sinha)
Chief Justice
Kunal
