[Cites 9, Cited by 0]
Chattisgarh High Court
State Of Chhattisgarh vs Udit Narayan Pandey (U.N. Pandey) on 12 March, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
2026:CGHC:11784-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Digitally
signed by
BABLU
BABLU RAJENDRA
RAJENDRA BHANARKAR
BHANARKAR Date:
2026.03.13
10:09:48
+0530
WA No. 215 of 2026
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department Of Higher
Education Mahanadi, Mantralaya, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur, Distt.
Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
2 - The Commissioner Higher Education, Govt. Of Chhattisgrh, Indravati
Bhawan, Nava Raipur, Distt. Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
3 - The Principal C.M.D. Post Graduate College, Bilaspur, Distt.
Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.
...Appellants
versus
Udit Narayan Pandey (U.N. Pandey) S/o Late Shri Ramkishore Pandey
Aged About 75 Years R/o K-37, Kranti Nagar (West), Bilaspur, Tahsil
And Distt. Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.
... Respondent(s)
For Appellants : Mr.S.S.Baghel, Advocate
For Respondent(s) : Mr.Manish Upadhyay, Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Order on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
12.03.2026
1. Heard Mr. S.S.Baghel, learned Government Advocate appearing
for the appellants/State on I.A. No.01 of 2026, which is an
application for condonation of delay of 428 days in preferring the
writ appeal. Also heard Mr. Manish Upadhyay, learned counsel for
the respondent.
2. Mr. Dharmesh Shrivastava, learned Government Advocate ,
appearing for the State/appellants, submits that the impugned
order has been passed by learned Single Judge on 25.09.2024.
Thereafter, the department initiated proceeding to file writ appeal
against the impugned order before the Division Bench of this
Court. Office of the Advocate General has given opinion to prefer
writ appeal before Division Bench of this Court on 07.11.2025.
Thereafter, on 15.12.2025 the Law & Legislative Affairs
Department, Government of Chhattisgarh has granted permission
for filing aforesaid writ appeal.
3. He further submits that the Under Secretary, Law & Legislature
Department, Government of Chhattisgarh directed to file writ
appeal against the impugned order before the Division Bench of
this Court and Assistant Professor (Law), Legal cell was
appointed as Officer-in-Charge of the case and the relevant
documents have been received by the concerned Officer-in-
Charge on 16.12.2025 and then the process for filing aforesaid
writ appeal was initiated by the Officer-in-Charge and writ appeal
has been prepared and filed before the Division Bench of the
Hon'ble High Court. He also submits that the aforesaid delay has
been caused due to departmental procedure, which is bonafide
and not intentional and therefore, the same is liable to be
condoned.
4. On the other hand, Mr. Manish Upadhyay, learned counsel for the
respondents have vehemently argued and pointed out that
challenging the order of learned Single Judge in the other similar
matters, a batch of writ appeals was filed and the same was
dismissed by this Court, against which the State has preferred an
SLP before the Supreme Court which too was dismissed vide
order dated 07.11.2025 on the ground of delay.
5. The question for determination before this Court is whether the
provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (i.e. Act 9 of
1908 i.e. the old Limitation Act) would apply to an application for
condonation of delay.
6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Postmaster General
and others v. Living Media India Limited and another, (2012) 3
SCC 563, has dealt with the limitation issue and held as under:-
"27. It is not in dispute that the person(s)
concerned were well aware or conversant with
the issues involved including the prescribed
period of limitation for taking up the matter by way
of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They
cannot claim that they have a separate period of
limitation when the Department was possessed
with competent persons familiar with court
proceedings. In the absence of plausible and
acceptable explanation, we are posing a
question why the delay is to be condoned
mechanically merely because the Government
or a wing of the Government is a party before
us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a
matter of condonation of delay when there was no
gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of
bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted
to advance substantial justice, we are of the view
that in the facts and circumstances, the
Department cannot take advantage of various
earlier decisions. The claim on account of
impersonal machinery and inherited
bureaucratic methodology of making several
notes cannot be accepted in view of the
modern technologies being used and
available. The law of limitation undoubtedly
binds everybody including the Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the
government bodies, their agencies and
instrumentalities that unless they have
reasonable and acceptable explanation for the
delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no
need to accept the usual explanation that the file
was kept pending for several months/years due to
considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the
process. The government departments are under
a special obligation to ensure that they perform
their duties with diligence and commitment.
Condonation of delay is an exception and should
not be used as an anticipated benefit for
government departments. The law shelters
everyone under the same light and should not be
swirled for the benefit of a few.
30. Considering the fact that there was no proper
explanation offered by the Department for the
delay except mentioning of various dates,
according to us, the Department has miserably
failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons
sufficient to condone such a huge delay.
Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be
dismissed on the ground of delay."
7. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of
Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 INSC 932,
while considering the delay, issued some directions and observed
as follows:-
"5. The legal position is that where a case has
been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the
petitioner has to explain the Court as to what was
the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate
and enough reason which prevented him to
approach the Court within limitation. In Majji
Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi, 2021 SCC Online
SC 1260, it was held by this Court that even
though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a
party, it has to be applied with all its rigour when
prescribed by statute. A reference was also made
to the decision of this Court in Ajay Dabra v.
Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC Online 92 wherein, it was
held as follows:
"13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v.
Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14
SCC 81] while rejecting an application for
condonation of delay for lack of sufficient
cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as
follows:
"15. The law on the issue can be
summarised to the effect that where a
case has been presented in the court
beyond limitation, the applicant has to
explain the court as to what was the
"sufficient cause" which means an
adequate and enough reason which
prevented him to approach the court
within limitation. In case a party is
found to be negligent, or for want of
bona fide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to
have not acted diligently or remained
inactive, there cannot be a justified
ground to condone the delay. No court
could be justified in condoning such an
inordinate delay by imposing any
condition whatsoever. The application
is to be decided only within the
parameters laid down by this Court in
regard to the condonation of delay. In
case there was no sufficient cause to
prevent a litigant to approach the court
on time condoning the delay without
any justification, putting any condition
whatsoever, amounts to passing an
order in violation of the statutory
provisions and it tantamounts to
showing utter disregard to the
legislature."
14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion
that the High Court did not commit any mistake in
dismissing the delay condonation application of
the present appellant."
Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to
condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously
based on facts and circumstances of each case
and that, the expression 'sufficient cause' cannot
be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or
lack of bona fides is attributed to the party.
5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji
Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, 2024 INSC
262, wherein, one of us (J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a
member, after referring to various decisions on
the issue, it was in unequivocal terms observed
by this Court that delay should not be excused as
a matter of generosity and rendering substantial
justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite
party. The relevant passage of the same is
profitably extracted below:
"24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we
made it very clear that we are not going to
look into the merits of the matter as long as
we are not convinced that sufficient cause
has been made out for condonation of such
a long and inordinate delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a
private party or a State or Union of India
when it comes to condoning the gross delay
of more than 12 years. If the litigant
chooses to approach the court long after the
lapse of the time prescribed under the
relevant provisions of the law, then he
cannot turn around and say that no
prejudice would be caused to either side by
the delay being condoned. This litigation
between the parties started sometime in
1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years
have elapsed. However, till date the
respondent has not been able to reap the
fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of
justice if we condone the delay of 12 years
and 158 days and once again ask the
respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the
legal proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a relevant
matter which the court must take into
consideration while considering whether the
delay should be condoned or not. From the
tenor of the approach of the appellants, it
appears that they want to fix their own
period of limitation for instituting the
proceedings for which law has prescribed a
period of limitation. Once it is held that a
party has lost his right to have the matter
considered on merits because of his own
inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to
be non-deliberate delay and in such
circumstances of the case, he cannot be
heard to plead that the substantial justice
deserves to be preferred as against the
technical considerations. While considering
the plea for condonation of delay, the court
must not start with the merits of the main
matter. The court owes a duty to first
ascertain the bona fides of the explanation
offered by the party seeking condonation. It
is only if the sufficient cause assigned by
the litigant and the opposition of the other
side is equally balanced that the court may
bring into aid the merits of the matter for the
purpose of condoning the delay.
27. We are of the view that the question of
limitation is not merely a technical
consideration. The rules of limitation are
based on the principles of sound public
policy and principles of equity. We should
not keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging
over the head of the respondent for
indefinite period of time to be determined at
the whims and fancies of the appellants.
xxx xxx xxx
34. In view of the aforesaid, we have
reached to the conclusion that the High
Court committed no error much less any
error of law in passing the impugned order.
Even otherwise, the High Court was
exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it
has been said that delay should not be
excused as a matter of generosity.
Rendering substantial justice is not to cause
prejudice to the opposite party. The
appellants have failed to prove that they
were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the
matter and this vital test for condoning the
delay is not satisfied in this case.
36. For all the foregoing reasons, this
appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There
shall be no order as to costs."
Applying the above legal proposition to the
facts of the present case, we are of the
opinion that the High Court correctly refused
to condone the delay and dismissed the
appeal by observing that such inordinate
delay was not explained satisfactorily, no
sufficient cause was shown for the same,
and no plausible reason was put forth by the
State. Therefore, we are inclined to reject
this petition at the threshold.
6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush
aside the delay occurred in preferring the
second appeal, due to callous and
lackadaisical attitude on the part of the
officials functioning in the State machinery.
Though the Government adopts systematic
approach in handling the legal issues and
preferring the petitions/applications/appeals
well within the time, due to the fault on the
part of the officials in merely communicating
the information on time, huge revenue loss
will be caused to the Government exchequer.
The present case is one such case, wherein,
enormous delay of 1788 days occasioned in
preferring the second appeal due to the
lapses on the part of the officials functioning
under the State, though valuable Government
lands were involved. Therefore, we direct the
State to streamline the machinery touching
the legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing
of cases before the Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix
the responsibility on the officer(s) concerned,
and penalize the officer(s), who is/are
responsible for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if
any, to the value of the loss caused to the
Government. Such direction will have to be
followed by all the States scrupulously.
7. There is one another aspect of the matter
which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a
period of time, we have noticed that whenever
there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at
the instance of a private litigant or State the delay
is sought to be explained right from the time, the
limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2
years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the
same. For example if the period of limitation is 90
days then the party seeking condonation has to
explain why it was unable to institute the
proceedings within that period of limitation. What
events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of
no consequence. The court is required to
consider what came in the way of the party that it
was unable to file it between the 1st day and the
90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait
until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal.
But when it allows the limitation to expire and
pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal
earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that
because of some event or circumstance arising
before the limitation expired it was not possible to
file the appeal within time. No event or
circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation
can constitute such sufficient cause. There may
be events or circumstances subsequent to the
expiry of limitation which may further delay the
filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has
been allowed to expire without the appeal being
filed must be traced to a cause arising within the
period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh
and Another v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC
733)."
8. Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present
case, in the light of aforementioned judgments of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the matters of Postmaster General (supra)
and Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), it is evident that
Government departments are under a special obligation to
discharge their duties with due diligence and commitment.
Condonation of delay is an exception, not the rule, and cannot be
claimed as a matter of right or anticipated privilege by
Government entities. The law casts its protection equally upon all
litigants and cannot be distorted to confer undue advantage upon
a select few.
9. Very recently on 12.09.2025, the Supreme Court in the matter of
Shivamma (dead) by LRS v. Karnataka Housing Board &
Others, 2025 INSC 1104 categorically held that the High Courts
ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State
authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra
cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-
authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and
lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the
apathy and pangs of a private litigant.
10. Upon due consideration of the submissions made by Mr.
Dharmesh Shrivastava, learned Deputy Advocate General,
appearing for the State/appellants, and Mr. Manish Upadhyay,
learned counsel, appearing for the respondents, this Court finds
that the instant writ appeal against the order dated 29.11.2024 in
W.P.(S) No. 7749/2024 suffers from inordinate delay of 298 days.
11. While the appellants have attributed the delay to routine
administrative and procedural steps, the explanation offered is
neither sufficient nor convincing. In light of the consistent legal
position laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Postmaster
General (supra) and Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), and other
subsequent judgments, mere departmental formalities or
bureaucratic processes cannot constitute sufficient cause for
condoning delay.
12. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, and in the
absence of any plausible, satisfactory, or bona fide explanation for
the inordinate delay, this Court is not inclined to exercise its
discretionary power to condone such an extraordinary delay.
Learned counsel appearing for the appellants/State has failed to
place on record any convincing or bona fide reason justifying the
delay. Consequently, no sufficient cause is made out for
condonation of the delay of 428 days in preferring the present
appeal.
13. In view of the aforesaid and taking note of the fact that the Special
Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No.51637/2024 preferred by the State
before the Hon'ble Supreme Court already stands dismissed vide
order dated 07.11.2025 on the ground of delay, the present writ
appeal is also liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and
laches.
14. Accordingly, the instant writ appeal is dismissed at the threshold
on the ground of delay and laches. There shall be no order as
to costs.
Sd/- Sd/-
d/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Bablu
