[Cites 19, Cited by 0]
Chattisgarh High Court
Smt. Chandrakala Devi vs The State Of Mp on 11 March, 2026
Author: Parth Prateem Sahu
Bench: Parth Prateem Sahu
1 / 19
2026:CGHC:11753
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 2660 of 1999
PAWAN
KUMAR Reserved on: 02.02.2026
JHA
Digitally Delivered on: 11.03.2026
signed by
PAWAN
KUMAR JHA
Uploaded on : 11.03.2026
• Smt. Chandrakala Devi W/o Hariram Agrawal, aged 45 years,
Housewife, R/o Jail Durga Auto Centre Saraipali, Police Station
Saraipali, District Mahasamund (M.P.) (now C.G.)
--- Appellant/Defendant
versus
1. State of Madhya Pradesh through the C.B.I.
---Respondent/Plaintiff
____________________________________________________________
For Appellant : Mr. Ravindra Sharma, Advocate
For Respondents : Mr. Vaibhav A. Goverdhan,
Adv and Ms. Anuja Sharma, Adv
Hon'ble Shri Justice Parth Prateem Sahu
C.A.V. Judgment
1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of conviction and order of
sentence dated 30.09.1999 passed by learned Fifth Additional
Sessions Special Judge (CBI), Jabalpur in Special Case No. 2/96,
convicting and sentencing the appellant in following manner.
CONVICTION SENTENCE
U/s 420/120B of IPC R.I. for 2 years and fine of ₹ 5000 in
default, R.I. for 6 months
U/s 468/471/120B of IPC R.I. for 1 year and fine of ₹ 3000 in
default, R.I. for 6 month
R.I. for 1 year and fine of ₹ 3000 in
U/s 477A/120B of IPC
default, R.I. for 6 month
U/s 13(1)(d)/13(2) of the R.I. for 1 year and fine of ₹ 4000 in
Prevention of Corruption Act read default, R.I. for 6 month
with Section 120B of IPC
2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that accused B.P. Rautre was posted
as Clerk/Special Assistant at the Central Bank of India, Saraipali
Branch, in April 1992. He entered into a criminal conspiracy with co-
accused/ appellant Chandrakala Devi to defraud the said bank. In
pursuance of the alleged conspiracy, on 30.04.1992, accused B.P.
Rautre withdrew a sum of ₹ 20,000/- from H.S.S. Account No. 2442
belonging to Surendra Kumar Saluja and ₹10,000/- from H.S.S.
Account No. 4978 belonging to Upendra Kumar Bhoi. Out of the said
amounts, ₹20,000/- was transferred, through a transfer voucher, to
H.S.S. Account No. 3666 standing in the name of accused
Chandrakala Devi. It is alleged that, despite having knowledge of
balance of only ₹460.57/- in her account, accused Chandrakala Devi
issued Cheque No. 3963 dated 30.04.1992 for ₹40,000/-. Before
detection of the alleged irregularities, she closed the said account.
According to the prosecution, by issuing the cheque and receiving the
amount which had been transferred through illegal means, accused
Chandrakala Devi dishonestly induced the bank to part with ₹40,000/-
and thereby committed fraud.
3. Upon receiving information regarding the fraud at the Saraipali Branch,
Shri C.K. Pandey conducted a preliminary inquiry on the directions of
the Chief Internal Auditor and submitted his report. Thereafter, the
matter was handed over to the CBI. On the basis of the information
received, the Superintendent of Police, CBI, Jabalpur registered FIR
bearing RC No. 54(A)/92 dated 30.11.1992 and entrusted investigation
to Inspector Devendra Singh. During investigation, various documents
were seized, witnesses were examined, and specimen handwriting and
signatures of concerned persons ie., Tulsiram Sahu, N.K. Meher,
Umeshchand Guchhayat, Upendra Kumar Bhoi and accused
Chandrakala Devi, Narsingh Sahu etc., were obtained and sent to the
Government Examiner of Questioned Documents, Central Forensic
Institutes, Calcutta. After completion of investigation and receipt of the
expert report, investigating agency concluded that the accused persons
had committed offences punishable under Sections 120B, 420, 468,
471, 477-A of the Indian Penal Code and Section 13(1)(d) read with
Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. As accused/
appellant Chandrakala Devi was not a public servant and accused B.P.
Rautre had already been separated from service, no sanction for
prosecution was obtained, and a charge-sheet was filed before the
competent court.
4. During trial, accused B.P. Rautre remained absconding and was
declared so by the court. Charges were framed against accused
Chandrakala Devi for the offences under Sections 420, 468, 471, 477-A
read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and Section 13(1)(d)
read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
5. Appellant denied the charges, pleaded innocence and falsely
implicated and prayed for trial. Prosecution examined as many as 8
witnesses on its behalf namely P.C. Lunia, Retd. Senior Manager
(P.W.-1), Umeshchand Gucchayat, Probationary Officer in Central Bank
of India (P.W.-2), Sureshchand Gupta (P.W.-3), Upendra Kumar Bhoi
(P.W.-4), T.R. Sahu, Branch Manager (P.W.5), Surendra Kumar Saluja
(P.W.6), C.K. Pandey, Internal Auditor (P.W.-7) and Devendra Singh,
Inspector (P.W. 8). Statement of appellant was recorded under Section
313 of Cr.P.C. in which she denied all incriminating evidence appearing
against her and pleaded innocence and false implication. No witness
was examined in defence on her behalf.
6. Trial Court upon appreciating oral and documentary evidence available
on record, held that prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that
accused/appellant had committed the offence under Sections 120-B,
420, 468, 471, 477-A of the Indian Penal Code and Section 13(1)(d)
read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and
accordingly, convicted and sentenced her in the manner as described
above.
7. Learned counsel for appellant submits that learned trial court erred in
accepting the case of prosecution that the co-accused B.P. Rautrai,
employee of the Bank, has withdrawn amount of ₹ 30,000 from the
other account holders and deposited in the account of appellant on
30.04.1992 and on the same date the amount had been withdrawn and
the fact of withdrawal of ₹ 40,000 from appellant was admitted by
appellant in her statement recorded under Section 313 of CrPC. He
would submit that the learned court below fell into error in not
considering that the ledger account which is produced and proved as
Ext. P-3, which would show that the amount of ₹ 20,000 was deposited
on 22.04.1992 and 23.04.1992 and subsequently it has been
withdrawn on 30.04.1992. It is contention of learned counsel for
appellant that from the nature of allegation and the documents,
prosecution could not able to prove in clear terms the deposit of the
amount of ₹ 40,000 in the account of appellant, which is stated to be
deposited on 30.04.1992, as there is no documentary evidence
specifically mentioning the date of deposit to be 30.04.1992. He would
also submit that document Ext. P-3 (ledger) has been proved by two
witnesses ie., PW-2, Umeshchand Gucchayat, and PW-7, Shri C.K.
Pandey. Both the witnesses have not made any submission with regard
to the date appearing in Ext. P-3 as 22/23.04.1992 on which date ₹
20,000 each was deposited in the account of appellant. Appellant has
taken specific defence and made categorical statement in her
statement recorded under Section 313 of CrPC that amount of ₹
40,000 was deposited by appellant in her account prior to 30.04.1992,
however, after signing the cheque, she handed over the cheque to the
bank employee trusting upon him to withdraw the same. Accordingly
the amount was withdrawn on 30.04.1992. There is no other evidence
in record to suggest that the alleged amount of ₹ 40,000 which is
stated to be withdrawn by co-accused B.P. Rautre from the accounts of
other account holders of bank was deposited in the account of
appellant on 30.04.1992. In absence of such evidence, prosecution
could not able to prove withdrawal of amount of ₹ 40,000 fraudulently
from the account of others by B.P. Rautre and its deposit in the account
of appellant in connivance with the appellant and further withdrawn the
said amount by hatching conspiracy with the co-accused. Appellant in
this case has been convicted for offence under Sections 420, 468, 471,
477-A read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and Section
13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
8. Learned counsel for respondent-CBI would oppose the submission of
learned counsel for appellant and would submit that learned Trial court
upon appreciating the evidence brought on record by the prosecution
has rightly convicted appellant. He contended that document Ext. P-3
is a document seized by prosecution agency from the bank and the
witnesses proved it ie., PW-3 and PW-7 who categorically made
statement before the court that deposit entry made are of 30.04.1992.
9. I have learned counsel for the parties and also perused the record of
trial court.
10. The core question involved in this appeal is whether the prosecution
has proved offence of criminal conspiracy against appellant for
punishing her under Section 120-B IPC, beyond reasonable doubt.
11. Undisputedly, when Internal Audit department received information
under instructions of Chief Internal Auditor of Central Bank, of
some irregularities committed by B.P. Rautre, Clerk/ Special
Assistant at Central Bank of India, Saraipali Branch, Shri C.K.
Pandey PW-7, conducted enquiry at Central Bank of India, Saraipali
Branch. In the enquiry, he found that B.P. Rautre, Clerk, by forging
withdrawal forms, withdrew an amount of ₹ 40,000/- (₹ 20,000 each)
from bank accounts of Surendra Kumar Saluja and Upendra Kumar
Bhoi. This information was forwarded to the CBI, based upon which,
crime was registered. Initially, FIR was registered only against Bank
employees and during the course of investigation, appellant was
also arrayed as an accused. After completion of investigation, in
charge-sheet, only two persons were made accused, ie appellant and
B.P. Rautre, Clerk, at Branch, Saraipali.
12. Shri C.K. Pandey was examined before trial Court as PW-7. In his
evidence, he stated that in January 1992, he was posted as Internal
Auditor in Saraipali Branch of Central Bank of India. He stated names
and account numbers of the account holders from which B.P. Rautre
had withdrawn amount by forging withdrawal forms/vouchers. He
further stated that H.S.S. Account No. 3666 belonged to appellant Smt.
Chandrakala Devi.
13. PW-2, Umesh Chand Gucchayat, Probationary Officer in his evidence,
stated that he is well known to B.P. Rautre as he worked with him in the
bank, he is also aware of his handwriting and his signature. Vide Ext.
P-3, ledger of account No. 3666 of appellant-Smt. Chandrakala Devi,
there are entries of depositing ₹ 20,000 twice on 30.04.1992 by
transfer. He further stated that Ext. P-5 and Ext. P-6 are the ledger of
H.S.S. Account No. 4978 of Mr. Upendra Kumar and H.S.S. Account
No. 2442 of Mr. Surendra Kumar Saluja. In both the accounts there are
entries of withdrawing of ₹ 20,000 each on 30.04.1992. The said
entries were made by B.P. Rautre. In his cross-examination also, he
stated that on 30.04.1992, vide Ext. P-5 & P-6, H.S.S. account, there
are entries of withdrawing ₹ 20,000 each made by B.P. Rautre, and
there is no signature or handwriting of Chandrakala Devi.
14. Appellant is punished with aid of Section 120-B of IPC alleging that she
is party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence, as committed by
other co- accused (absconding). Section 120-A of IPC defines criminal
conspiracy and Section 120-B IPC provides punishment for criminal
conspiracy. Elements of criminal conspiracy have been stated to be (a)
an object to be accomplished; (b) a plan or scheme embodied means
to accomplish that object; (c) an agreement or understanding between
two or more of the accused persons, whereby they become definitely
committed to cooperate for the accomplishment of the object by the
means embodied in the agreement, or any or by any effectual means
and; (d) in the jurisdiction, where the statute required an overt act.
Conspiracy consists not merely in the intention of two or more, but in
the agreement of two or more to do an unlawful act by unlawful means.
So long as such a design rests in intention only, it is not indictable.
15. Undoubtedly, in cases involving the offence of criminal conspiracy,
direct evidence of agreement between the accused persons is seldom
available. The very nature of the offence is such that it is generally
hatched in secrecy. The essential ingredient of the offence is the
existence of an agreement between two or more persons to commit an
illegal act, or to commit a lawful act by illegal means. The gravamen of
the charge lies not in the accomplishment of the object, but in the
unlawful agreement itself. Such agreement may be established either
by direct evidence, if available, or more commonly, by circumstantial
evidence, or by a combination of both. It is a matter of common judicial
experience that direct evidence to prove conspiracy is rarely
forthcoming.
16. It is equally well settled that there must be a meeting of minds between
the alleged conspirators, culminating in a conscious decision to commit
the unlawful act. Where the prosecution seeks to infer the existence of
conspiracy from surrounding circumstances, the circumstances relied
upon must be of such a nature that they give rise to a conclusive or
irresistible inference of an agreement between two or more persons to
commit the alleged offence. Mere knowledge, association, or similarity
of conduct does not by itself establish conspiracy unless it is shown
that there was prior consensus or concert.
17. Like any other criminal offence, the burden lies squarely upon the
prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. The prosecution must prove that the circumstances, taken
cumulatively and viewed in their entirety, clearly indicate a meeting of
minds between the conspirators for the purpose of committing an illegal
act or achieving a lawful object through illegal means. The inference of
conspiracy must flow naturally and logically from the proved facts, and
not from conjectures or surmises.
18. Though conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial evidence, each
incriminating circumstance relied upon must itself be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. Further, the circumstances so established must form
a complete and unbroken chain of events, leading only to the
hypothesis of guilt of the accused and ruling out every other
reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence. If the chain is
incomplete, or if two views are possible, the benefit must necessarily
go to the accused.
19. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ram Narayan Popli v. CBI and other
cases reported in (2003) 3 SCC 641 has categorically held that the
essence of criminal conspiracy lies in the agreement and that such
agreement may be proved either by direct or circumstantial evidence,
though direct evidence is seldom available and has held as under:
(paras 343, 344, 345 and 346)
"343. No doubt, in the case of conspiracy there
cannot be any direct evidence. The ingredients of
offence are that there should be an agreement
between persons who are alleged to conspire and
the said agreement should be for doing an illegal
act or for doing by illegal means an act which
itself may not be illegal. Therefore, the essence
of criminal conspiracy is an agreement to do an
illegal act and such an agreement can be proved
either by direct evidence or by circumstantial
evidence or by both, and it is a matter of common
experience that direct evidence to prove
conspiracy is rarely available. Therefore, the
circumstances proved before, during and after the
occurrence have to be considered to decide about
the complicity of the accused.
344. In Halsbury's Laws of England (vide 4th
Edn., Vol. 11, p. 44, para 58), the English law as
to conspiracy has been stated thus:
"58. Conspiracy consists in the agreement of
two or more persons to do an unlawful act, or
to do a lawful act by unlawful means. It is an
indictable offence at common law, the
punishment for which is imprisonment or fine
or both in the discretion of the court.
The essence of the offence of conspiracy is the
fact of combination by agreement. The
agreement may be express or implied, or in part
express and in part implied. The conspiracy
arises and the offence is committed as soon as
the agreement is made; and the offence
continues to be committed so long as the
combination persists, that is until the
conspiratorial agreement is terminated by
completion of its performance or by
abandonment or frustration or however it may
be. The actus reus in a conspiracy is the
agreement to execute the illegal conduct, not
the execution of it. It is not enough that two or
more persons pursued the same unlawful object
at the same time or in the same place; it is
necessary to show a meeting of minds, a
consensus to effect an unlawful purpose. It is
not, however, necessary that each conspirator
should have been in communication with every
other."
345. There is no difference between the mode of
proof of the offence of conspiracy and that of any
other offence. It can be established by direct or
circumstantial evidence. [See : Bhagwan Swarup
Lal Bishan Lal v. State of Maharashtra [AIR
1965 SC 682 : (1965) 1 Cri LJ 608] (AIR at p.
686).]
346. It was held that the expression "in reference
to their common intention" in Section 10 is very
comprehensive and it appears to have been
designedly used to give it a wider scope than the
words "in furtherance of" in the English law;
with the result, anything said, done or written by
a co-conspirator, after the conspiracy was
formed, will be evidence against the other before
he entered the field of conspiracy or after he left
it. Anything said, done or written is a relevant
fact only.
"... 'as against each of the persons believed to be
so conspiring as well for the purpose of proving
the existence of the conspiracy as for the purpose
of showing that any such person was a party to
it'. ... In short, the section can be analysed as
follows : (1) There shall be a prima facie
evidence affording a reasonable ground for a
court to believe that two or more persons are
members of a conspiracy; (2) if the said
condition is fulfilled, anything said, done or
written by any one of them in reference to their
common intention will be evidence against the
other; (3) anything said, done or written by him
should have been said, done or written by him
after the intention was formed by any one of
them; (4) it would also be relevant for the said
purpose against another who entered the
conspiracy whether it was said, done or written
before he entered the conspiracy or after he left
it; and (5) it can only be used against a co-
conspirator and not in his favour." (AIR p. 687,
para 8)
We are aware of the fact that direct independent
evidence of criminal conspiracy is generally not
available and its existence is a matter of
inference. The inferences are normally deduced
from acts of parties in pursuance of a purpose in
common between the conspirators. This Court in
V.C. Shukla v. State (Delhi Admn.) [(1980) 2 SCC
665 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 561] held that to prove
criminal conspiracy, there must be evidence,
direct or circumstantial, to show that there was an
agreement between two or more persons to
commit an offence. There must be a meeting of
minds resulting in ultimate decision taken by the
conspirators regarding the commission of an
offence and where the factum of conspiracy is
sought to be inferred from circumstances, the
prosecution has to show that the circumstances
give rise to a conclusive or irresistible inference
of an agreement between two or more persons to
commit an offence. As in all other criminal
offences, the prosecution has to discharge its
onus of proving the case against the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances in a
case, when taken together on their face value,
should indicate the meeting of minds between the
conspirators for the intended object of
committing an illegal act or an act which is not
illegal, by illegal means. A few bits here and a
few bits there on which the prosecution relies
cannot be held to be adequate for connecting the
accused with the commission of the crime of
criminal conspiracy. It has to be shown that all
means adopted and illegal acts done were in
furtherance of the object of conspiracy hatched.
The circumstances relied for the purposes of
drawing an inference should be prior in time than
the actual commission of the offence in
furtherance of the alleged conspiracy.
20. Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of K.R. Purushothaman v. State of
Kerala reported in (2005) 12 SCC 631 has reiterated that the unlawful
agreement is the sine qua non of the offence and that suspicion,
however strong, cannot substitute proof of meeting of minds and held
as under: (para 13, 14, 15)
"13. To constitute a conspiracy, meeting of minds
of two or more persons for doing an illegal act or
an act by illegal means is the first and primary
condition and it is not necessary that all the
conspirators must know each and every detail of
the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary that every
one of the conspirators takes active part in the
commission of each and every conspiratorial
acts. The agreement amongst the conspirators can
be inferred by necessary implication. In most of
the cases, the conspiracies are proved by the
circumstantial evidence, as the conspiracy is
seldom an open affair. The existence of
conspiracy and its objects are usually deduced
from the circumstances of the case and the
conduct of the accused involved in the
conspiracy. While appreciating the evidence of
the conspiracy, it is incumbent on the court to
keep in mind the well-known rule governing
circumstantial evidence viz. each and every
incriminating circumstance must be clearly
established by reliable evidence and the
circumstances proved must form a chain of
events from which the only irresistible
conclusion about the guilt of the accused can be
safely drawn, and no other hypothesis against the
guilt is possible. Criminal conspiracy is an
independent offence in the Penal Code. The
unlawful agreement is sine qua non for
constituting offence under the Penal Code and
not an accomplishment. Conspiracy consists of
the scheme or adjustment between two or more
persons which may be express or implied or
partly express and partly implied. Mere
knowledge, even discussion, of the plan would
not per se constitute conspiracy. The offence of
conspiracy shall continue till the termination of
agreement.
14. Suspicion cannot take the place of legal proof
and prosecution would be required to prove each
and every circumstance in the chain of
circumstances so as to complete the chain. It is
true that in most of the cases, it is not possible to
prove the agreement between the conspirators by
direct evidence but the same can be inferred from
the circumstances giving rise to conclusive or
irresistible inference of an agreement between
two or more persons to commit an offence. It is
held in Noor Mohd. Mohd. Yusuf Momin v. State
of Maharashtra [(1970) 1 SCC 696 : 1970 SCC
(Cri) 274 : AIR 1971 SC 885] , that: (SCC pp.
699-700, para 7)
"[In most cases proof of conspiracy is largely
inferential though the inference must be
founded on solid facts. Surrounding
circumstances and antecedent and subsequent
conduct, among other factors, constitute
relevant material."
15. It is cumulative effect of the proved
circumstances which should be taken into
account in determining the guilt of the accused.
Of course, each one of the circumstances should
be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The acts or
conduct of the parties must be conscious and
clear enough to infer their concurrence as to the
common design and its execution. While
speaking for the Bench it is held by P.
Venkatarama Reddi, J. in State (NCT of Delhi) v.
Navjot Sandhu [(2005) 11 SCC 600 : 2005 SCC
(Cri) 1715 : JT (2005) 7 SC 1] (p. 63) as follows:
(SCC pp. 691-92, para 103)
"103. We do not think that the theory of agency
can be extended thus far, that is to say, to find
all the conspirators guilty of the actual offences
committed in execution of the common design
even if such offences were ultimately
committed by some of them, without the
participation of others. We are of the view that
those who committed the offences pursuant to
the conspiracy by indulging in various overt
acts will be individually liable for those
offences in addition to being liable for criminal
conspiracy; but, the non-participant
conspirators cannot be found guilty of the
offence or offences committed by the other
conspirators. There is hardly any scope for the
application of the principle of agency in order
to find the conspirators guilty of a substantive
offence not committed by them. Criminal
offences and punishments therefor are governed
by the statute. The offender will be liable only
if he comes within the plain terms of the penal
statute. Criminal liability for an offence cannot
be fastened by way of analogy or by extension
of a common law principle."
21. In the present case, the principal allegations of forgery and fraudulent
withdrawal are directed against the co-accused, a bank employee, who
is alleged to have committed offences under Sections 420, 468, 471
and 477-A of the Indian Penal Code, as well as under Section 13(1)(d)
read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
However, the said co-accused was neither apprehended nor tried,
having been declared an absconder. The trial, therefore, proceeded
and concluded only against the present appellant, who is not a bank
employee but merely an account holder of the concerned branch.
22. It is significant to note that the appellant has been convicted only with
the aid of Section 120-B of the IPC, i.e., on the allegation of criminal
conspiracy. The appellant is a housewife residing at Saraipali, where
the concerned branch of the Central Bank of India is situated. She
maintained a savings bank account, the details of which are borne out
from the evidence of PW-2, Umesh Chand Guchhayat. The sole
circumstance relied upon by the prosecution to implicate the appellant
is that the co-accused bank employee allegedly transferred ₹20,000/-
each from H.S.S. Account No. 4978 of Upendra Kumar and H.S.S.
Account No. 2442 of Surendra Kumar Saluja, by forging vouchers, into
the appellant's account, and that the said amount was subsequently
withdrawn through a cheque issued in her name. It has also come on
record that the cheque in question was filled up by the co-accused
himself, who is presently absconding.
23. In her statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, the appellant offered an explanation that the banking
transactions relating to deposits and withdrawals were generally
handled by the co-accused B.P. Rautre. According to her, she had
signed the cheque at his instance and entrusted it to him for withdrawal
of the amount, as she seldom visited the bank personally. This
explanation, though denied by the prosecution, forms part of the record
and must be evaluated in light of the surrounding circumstances.
24. Considering the facts of the case, the appellant, being a housewife and
a customer of the bank where the co-accused was employed, stood in
a relationship of consumer and banker with him. The explanation
furnished by her cannot be said to be inherently improbable or
unnatural in such circumstances. More importantly, the prosecution
evidence itself reveals that the co-accused had allegedly withdrawn
amounts fraudulently from 10-12 different accounts, and the total
amount so withdrawn by committing forgery was stated to be
₹3,22,000/-, as per the testimony of prosecution witnesses including
PW-7. Out of this total amount, only ₹40,000/- is alleged to have been
transferred to and withdrawn from the appellant's account. There is no
allegation that the remaining substantial amount was deposited in or
routed through the appellant's account.
25. The prosecution has not placed on record any material explaining the
manner in which the remaining ₹3,12,000/- was dealt with or
appropriated. The evidence of PW-2, particularly Ext. P-3, shows that
on 30.04.1992, ₹20,000/- each was withdrawn from Account Nos. 4978
and 2442 and deposited in the appellant's account. The entries were
admittedly in the handwriting of co-accused B.P. Rautre. On the same
date, the amount was withdrawn through a cheque. However, mere fact
of deposit and withdrawal on the same day, without independent
evidence of prior agreement between the appellant and the co-
accused, does not by itself establish the essential ingredients of
conspiracy, namely, meeting of minds.
26. Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State
of Maharashtra, reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116 while acquitting the
accused therein, holding that the prosecution failed to establish a
complete chain of circumstances leading unerringly to guilt, laid down
principles governing circumstantial evidence in criminal trials, clarified
courts should assess chains of circumstances when direct evidence is
absent, setting enduring standards for proof beyond reasonable doubt
and held thus:
"153. A close analysis of this decision would
show that the following conditions must be
fulfilled before a case against an accused can be
said to be fully established:
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion
of guilt is to be drawn should be fully
established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that
the circumstances concerned "must or should"
and not "may be" established. There is not only a
grammatical but a legal distinction between "may
be proved" and "must be or should be proved" as
was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao
Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC
793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783]
where the observations were made: [SCC para
19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p. 1047]
"Certainly, it is a primary principle that the
accused must be and not merely may be guilty
before a court can convict and the mental
distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long
and divides vague conjectures from sure
conclusions."
(2) the facts so established should be consistent
only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the
accused, that is to say, they should not be
explainable on any other hypothesis except that
the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive
nature and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible
hypothesis except the one to be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete
as not to leave any reasonable ground for the
conclusion consistent with the innocence of the
accused and must show that in all human
probability the act must have been done by the
accused."
27. It is not the prosecution case that the bulk of the amount allegedly
withdrawn by the co-accused through forged vouchers was deposited
in the appellant's account. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that
except for the transaction relating to ₹40,000/- on a single day, no other
amount out of the alleged fraudulent withdrawals from 10-12 different
accounts was transferred to or routed through the appellant's account.
When the prosecution itself asserts that the co-accused had withdrawn
a total sum of ₹3,22,000/- by committing forgery from several accounts,
and only ₹40,000/- is connected to the appellant, the absence of any
link between the appellant and remaining transactions assumes
significance. This selective connection weakens the inference of a
broader conspiratorial arrangement.
28. In the aforesaid factual background, there is no material to suggest that
there existed any agreement or meeting of minds between the
appellant and the co-accused to commit the alleged offences. The sole
circumstance relied upon by the prosecution is that ₹40,000/- was
deposited into the appellant's account by the co-accused and was
withdrawn on the same day through a cheque filled up and processed
by him. This circumstance, standing alone and uncorroborated by
independent evidence of prior concert or common design, does not
constitute a complete chain of circumstances leading to the only
irresistible conclusion of guilt. The prosecution has thus failed to
establish the essential ingredient of criminal conspiracy, namely, an
unlawful agreement supported by a meeting of minds, beyond
reasonable doubt.
29. In view of the foregoing discussion, and in light of the principles laid
down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decisions referred to
hereinabove, this Court is of the considered opinion that the appellant
is entitled to the benefit of doubt. The conviction of the appellant rests
solely upon the application of Section 120-B of the IPC, without
adequate proof of conspiracy. Accordingly, the findings recorded by the
learned Trial Court convicting the appellant for offences under Sections
420 read with 120-B, 468 read with 120-B, 471 read with 120-B, 477-A
read with 120-B of the IPC, and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section
13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with Section 120-B
IPC, cannot be sustained in law.
30. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. Conviction and sentence of
appellant for offences under Sections 420 read with 120-B, 468 read
with 120-B, 471 read with 120-B, 477-A read with 120-B of the IPC,
and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 read with Section 120-B IPC are hereby set aside.
Appellant is acquitted of all the charges. Appellant is reported to be on
bail. Therefore, her bail bonds are discharged.
Sd/-
(Parth Prateem Sahu)
Judge
pwn
