[Cites 41, Cited by 0]
Chattisgarh High Court
Dipen Chawda vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 10 March, 2026
1
2026:CGHC:11503
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
ORDER RESERVED ON 24.02.2026
ORDER DELIVERED ON 10.03.2026
ORDER UPLOADED ON 10.03.2026
MCRC No. 11 of 2026
1 - Dipen Chawda S/o Jawahar Chawda Aged About 52 Years R/o
Chaitinaya Tower Ananta Vihar Colony, Daldal Senoi, Distt. Raipur,
Chhattisgarh.
...Applicant(s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Acb/eow, Distt. Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
... Respondent(s)
For Applicant(s) : Shri Sunil Otwani, Sr. Counsel assisted
by Shri Gagan Tiwari, Advocate
For Respondent/State : Shri Praveen Das, Addl. Advocate
General
(Hon'ble Shri Justice Arvind Kumar Verma)
C A V Order
The present case emanates from the FIR No. 04/2024 dated
17.01.2024, registered at Police Station EOW/ACB, Raipur, for alleged
offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 read with Section
2
120-B of the IPC and Sections 7 and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 (as amended in 2018).
FACTS OF THE CASE
2. The genesis of the FIR lies in a disclosure made by the Enforcement
Directorate vide letter dated 11.07.2023 under Section 66 of the Prevention
of Money Laundering Act in ECIR No. 11/2022, upon which the State
agency initiated the present criminal proceedings. The applicant was
initially not an accused in the early stages of investigation. Subsequently,
the applicant came to be named only in the 6th supplementary charge-
sheet filed on 24.11.2025, wherein the prosecution has arrayed as many
as 117 accused persons and cited more than 1110 witnesses, relying upon
over 990documents.
3. The prosecution case against the present applicant rests primarily
on selectively extracted WhatsApp chats allegedly exchanged between
certain co-accused persons, namely Anwar Dewar, Anil Tuteja,
Soumya Chaurasiya and Vikash Agrawal. Significantly, there is no direct
communication alleged between the present applicant and the said co-
accused persons, and the only assertion made is that the applicant was
acquainted with co-accused Anwar Dewar. It is further alleged that
certain code words appearing in the chats, such as the letters "S.C."
allegedly referring to Soumya Chaurasiya and the expression "files"
allegedly representing monetary transactions, have been interpreted by the
investigating agency as indicating illegal gratification. However, no
independent material has been placed on record to establish the
authenticity, meaning, or context of such alleged code words, and the
entire inference is based solely on the interpretation of the investigating
agency.
4. However, the investigating agency did not seize any mobile phone or
electronic device belonging to the present applicant, nor has it
demonstrated that the applicant authored, transmitted, or received the
alleged messages. As per the prosecution itself, the purported chat data
was recovered from a mobile phone seized by the Income Tax Department,
allegedly belonging to co-accused persons. Furthermore, the alleged
electronic records have not been supported by any forensic laboratory
report, nor has the prosecution placed on record any material establishing
the chain of custody, extraction method, or preservation process of the
electronic data. There exists a complete break in the chain of custody with
regard to the alleged WhatsApp chats, and no valid certificate under
Section 65B of the the Indian Evidence Act has been produced to
authenticate the electronic records relied upon by the prosecution.
5. The prosecution has also alleged that the applicant was associated
with AJS Agro Company. However, the record itself indicates that the said
company was formed and controlled by co-accused Anwar Dhebar and
the present applicant was merely appointed to look after the day-to-day
functioning of the company in the capacity of a salaried employee. Notably,
no property, asset, document, or financial instrument has been recovered
from the possession of the applicant, nor has any material been produced
to demonstrate that any property was acquired in his name. The applicant
was arrested on 24.09.2025, and has been in judicial custody since then.
The investigation, insofar as the present applicant is concerned, stands
completed with the filing of the 6th supplementary charge-sheet dated
24.11.2025.
6. Despite the filing of multiple charge-sheets in the case, the trial has
not commenced till date and charges have not yet been framed. Given the
voluminous nature of the record, the large number of accused persons,
documents and witnesses involved, there appears to be no immediate
likelihood of the trial commencing or concluding in the near future. The
continued incarceration of the applicant, in these circumstances, amounts
to prolonged pre-trial detention, which is inconsistent with the guarantee of
personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANT
I. ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE APPLICANT ARE VAGUE AND NO
SPECIFIC ROLE IS ATTRIBUTED
7. It is submitted that the the prosecution's narrative, at best, paints a
broad and sweeping picture of the applicant's supposed involvement in the
"arrangement and movement of funds," yet scandalously omits the most
elemental particulars- when these alleged transactions occurred, where
they transpired, in what precise manner they were executed, to whom the
funds were directed, and under what circumstances such actions took
place. No dates, documents, bank statements, witness statements, or
digital trails are arrayed against the applicant to substantiate these claims.
This is not mere oversight; it is a glaring void that exposes the case as a
house of cards, built on conjecture rather than concrete evidence. Such
general, nebulous, and roving allegations, devoid of specificity cannot, and
do not, constitute a prima facie case warranting curtailment of the
applicant's personal liberty. The Apex Court has time and again sounded
caution against such prosecutorial overreach. In Mahipal v. Rajesh
Kumar [(2018) 17 SCC 785], Their Lordships emphatically held that while
adjudicating bail applications, courts must meticulously scrutinize whether
specific role and prima facie material exist against the accused, cautioning
that vague insinuations fall far short of the threshold. Echoing this, in
Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [(2010) 14 SCC 496], the
Apex Court has laid down the immutable principle that bail must be
declined only where specific allegations are buttressed by cogent prima
facie evidence; otherwise, the scales tilt decisively in favour of liberty. Their
Lordships observed: "If the allegations made against the accused do not
prima facie make out a case, there is no reason why the accused should
not be granted bail." The prosecution here falters on both counts--firstly,
no specific role is attributed, and secondly, no material bridges the chasm
between allegation and proof. This position finds further reinforcement in
State of Maharashtra v. Suresh [(1997) 5 SCC 387], where the Supreme
Court deprecated "omnibus allegations" lacking particulars as incapable of
sustaining arrest or detention, and in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of
Punjab [(1980) 2 SCC 565], which enshrined the golden rule that bail is
the norm, and jail the exception, vague FIRs cannot invert this
presumption. In the instant case, the absence of any such specificity not
only demolishes the prosecution's edifice but also underscores the
applicant's prolonged incarceration as a punitive measure masquerading
as preventive justice. To deny bail on these ethereal foundations would
perpetuate a grave miscarriage, offending Article 21 of the Constitution.
II. WHATSAPP CHATS RELIED UPON BY THE PROSECUTION ARE
LEGALLY INADMISSIBLE.
8. It is submitted that the entire case of the prosecution, insofar as the
present applicant is concerned, is founded upon selective extracts of
alleged WhatsApp chats. However, the said electronic material is
inadmissible in law for the following reasons:
(a) No seizure of mobile device from the applicant
The investigating agency has not seized any mobile phone or electronic
device belonging to the applicant from which the alleged chats were
recovered.
(b) Absence of chain of custody
The prosecution itself asserts that the alleged chats were recovered by the
Income Tax Department during search proceedings, yet no material has
been placed to demonstrate the custody chain of the device, the process
of extraction of data, or the authenticity of the alleged electronic record.
(c) Absence of forensic verification
No Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report has been filed
certifying the integrity, originality or extraction process of the alleged chats.
(d) No certificate, as envisaged under Section 65B(4) authored by a
person occupying a responsible official position in relation to the device or
management thereof has been produced to vouchsafe the authenticity,
integrity, or manner of production of these electronic records. This is not a
mere technicality; it is a statutory imperative, non compliance with which
vitiates the evidence ab initio. The law on this front stands crystallized by
the binding precedents of the Apex Court. The Constitution Bench in Arjun
Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal [(2020) 7 SCC 1]
unequivocally declared that a certificate under Section 65B is mandatory
for the admissibility of electronic records, overruling earlier contrary views
and laying down that "the rigor of Section 65B(4) cannot be diluted." Their
safeguard against tampering, fabrication or manipulation hallmarks of
digital evidence such records remain hearsay, excludable from judicial
consideration. This flows directly from the seminal ruling in Anvar P.V. v.
P.K. Basheer [(2014) 10 SCC 473], where the Apex Court categorically
held: "Any documentary evidence by way of an electronic record... can be
proved only in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Section
65B... In the absence of a certificate under Section 65B, the same cannot
be relied upon." Subsequent affirmations in Shafhi Mohammad v. State
of Himachal Pradesh [(2018) 5 SCC 311] (as modified) and Union of
India v. Ravindra only reinforce this unyielding threshold. Consequently,
the purported chats arrayed against the applicant are reduced to
unverified, unauthenticated electronic phantoms--legally non est,
incapable of sustaining even a whisper of suspicion. To predicate denial of
bail on such spectral evidence would flout statutory mandates and
constitutional safeguards under Article 21, inviting the peril of convicting on
shadows.
9. Despite allegations of circulation of large amounts of money, the
prosecution has failed to recover any currency, any ledger or accounting
record, any banking instrument, any gold or property traceable to alleged
proceeds, or any document linking the applicant with illegal funds. The
complete absence of recovery renders the prosecution case wholly
uncorroborated. The Apex Court in P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of
Enforcement has observed that in absence of recovery or direct evidence,
continued custody may not be justified once investigation is substantially
complete. No prima facie offence is made out against the applicant. It is
submitted that even if the allegations in the FIR and charge-sheet are
taken at their face value, the essential ingredients of the alleged offences
are not satisfied.
III. No Prima Facie Offence is made out against the applicant.
10. It is submitted that, even if the allegations in the FIR and charge-
sheet are assumed to be true in their entirety, they do not disclose the
essential ingredients of the offences invoked, and therefore no prima facie
case is made out against the applicant.
Offence under Section 420 IPC- The sine qua non of an offence under
Section 420 IPC is dishonest inducement or misrepresentation, leading to
delivery of property and consequent wrongful loss to a person and
corresponding wrongful gain to another. In the present case, there is not
even a bald allegation that the applicant made any false representation,
induced any person to part with property, or derived any wrongful gain. In
the absence of such specific assertions, the foundational ingredient of
cheating stands conspicuously missing.
Offences under Sections 467 and 468 IPC- For an offence under Sections
467 and 468 IPC, the prosecution must allege, at the very least, fabrication
of a document or electronic record, or its knowing use as genuine, with the
requisite fraudulent or dishonest intention. The materials on record do not
attribute to the applicant either the creation of any forged document or the
use of any such document as genuine. The applicant is nowhere shown as
the author, beneficiary, or user of any alleged forged instrument. Thus, the
core constituent elements of forgery and use of forged documents are
completely absent.
Offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act
Similarly, the invocation of the Prevention of Corruption Act is wholly
unsustainable. There is no allegation that the applicant demanded, offered,
solicited, or accepted any illegal gratification, or that he abused any official
position to obtain any pecuniary advantage. In the complete absence of
any averment of demand, acceptance, quid pro quo, or abuse of office, the
statutory ingredients of the alleged offences under the Prevention of
Corruption Act remain unfulfilled. In these circumstances, the mere
reproduction of penal sections, unaccompanied by factual assertions
satisfying their essential ingredients, cannot justify the continued
incarceration of the applicant.
IV. Scope of examination at the stage of bail is limited
11. It is submitted that at the stage of considering a bail application, the
Court is only required to examine whether a prima facie case exists, and
not undertake a meticulous evaluation of the evidence. In Niranjan Singh
v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote, the Apex Court held:
"Detailed examination of the evidence and elaborate documentation of the
merits should be avoided while passing orders on bail applications."
12. The above principle has been reaffirmed by the Apex Court in P.
Chidambaram v. Central Bureau of Investigation, wherein it was
observed:
"At the stage of granting bail, an elaborate examination of evidence and
detailed reasons touching upon the merits of the case which may prejudice
the accused should be avoided."Thus, the present application deserves to
be considered on the touchstone of prima facie satisfaction rather than a
detailed scrutiny of the prosecution case.
V. Prolonged incarceration violates Article 21
13. It is submitted that the applicant has been in custody since
24.09.2025, and the trial is likely to take considerable time as more than
1,100 witnesses have been cited by the prosecution. The Apex Court has
repeatedly held that continued incarceration without trial amounts to
violation of the fundamental right to life and liberty under Article 21 of the
Constitution. In Manish Sisodia Vs. Directorate of Enforcement, the
Supreme Court has observed:
"Over a period of time, the trial courts and the High Courts have forgotten a
very well settled principle of law that bail is not to be withheld as a
punishment... The principle that bail is a rule and refusal is an exception is
at times followed in breach."
The Court further emphasized that denial of bail in cases where trial
is likely to take long results in pre-trial punishment, which is impermissible.
VI. Constitutional courts can grant bail where trial is unlikely to
conclude
14. While special statutes impose stringent bail conditions, such
restrictions are not absolute and must bow to the fundamental rights
enshrined in Part III of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has
authoritatively settled this position in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb
[(2021) 3 SCC 713], where Their Lordships unequivocally held:"The
presence of statutory restrictions per se does not oust the ability of
constitutional courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part III of the
Constitution." The Apex Court further elaborated that where the accused
has endured prolonged incarceration and there is no likelihood of the trial
being completed within a reasonable time, the constitutional courts
possess the undoubted power to grant bail, even in stringent regimes like
UAPA or NDPS. Their Lordships reasoned that Article 21's guarantee of life
and personal liberty cannot be subordinated to statutory fetters indefinitely,
observing:"If the rigours of statutory restrictions delay the trial
unreasonably, constitutional courts can intervene to prevent the deprivation
of liberty becoming punitive rather than preventive."This principle finds
robust reinforcement in Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India [(2019)
SCC OnLine SC 1502], where the Court mandated bail after protracted
delays, and Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI [(2022) 10 SCC 51], which
catalogued trial delays as a paramount factor tilting the balance towards
liberty. Similarly, in Malkiat Singh v. State of Punjab [(1970) 2 SCC 113],
the Court deprecated indefinite detention pending trial as antithetical to
constitutional justice. In the instant case, the applicant has been
languishing in judicial custody for over 5 months, while the trial remains at
a nascent stage--mere compliance hearings, with no prosecution
witnesses examined and voluminous material yet to be supplied. The
prosecution admits that there co-accused at large; voluminous documents
pending analysis; protracted investigation. No reasonable prognosis exists
for trial conclusion within the foreseeable future, rendering the applicant's
continued detention a blatant Article 21 violation--punitive incarceration
under the garb of Ietting process become punishment where delays turn
liberty into a casualty. To deny bail in these circumstances would exalt
statutory form over constitutional substance, permitting the judicial process
itself to become an instrument of oppression.
VII. Right to speedy trial is a fundamental right
15. The right to speedy trial forms an integral part of Article 21 of the
Constitution. In Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, the Apex Court
held:
"No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be
regarded as reasonable, fair or just, and it would fall foul of Article 21."
Thus, continued incarceration pending an indefinitely long trial
violates the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty.
VIII. Bail cannot be used as a tool of punishment
16. The Supreme Court has consistently held that detention before
conviction must not become punitive. In Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of
Enforcement, the Court cautioned that: "Bail is not to be withheld as a
punishment." The principle that "bail is the rule and jail is the exception"
must therefore guide the exercise of judicial discretion. Investigation
stands completed; continued incarceration serves no investigative
purpose.
17. It is submitted that the investigation in the present case, insofar as
the applicant is concerned, already stands substantially completed and the
charge-sheet along with supplementary reports has been filed by the
respondent agency before the learned trial Court. All material documents
and evidence on which the prosecution proposes to rely have already been
seized and brought on record, and the prosecution case is predominantly
based on documentary evidence.
18. In such circumstances, custodial detention of the applicant no longer
serves any investigative purpose. The applicant has already undergone
custodial interrogation during investigation and has fully cooperated with
the investigating agency. The Apex Court has consistently held that once
the investigation is completed and the accused is no longer required for
custodial interrogation, continued incarceration becomes unjustified. In
State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, the Apex Court enunciated the well-
settled principle that: "The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail,
not jail."
19. Similarly, in Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), the
Apex Court observed that the object of bail is neither punitive nor
preventive, but merely to secure the appearance of the accused during
trial. Thus, once the investigation has concluded and the evidence is
already secured, detention of the applicant ceases to have any legitimate
purpose.
IX. Principle of parity -- similarly situated co-accused already
enlarged on bail.
20. The applicant further seeks bail on the principle of parity, which is a
well-recognized ground in bail jurisprudence. It is submitted that a large
number of co-accused persons, including those against whom more
serious allegations have been levelled, have already been granted bail by
this Court as well as the Apex Court. As demonstrated in the bail chart
placed on record, several co-accused persons such as:
Sanjay Mishra
Vijay Bhatia
Sunil Dutt
Arvind Singh
Trilok Singh Dhillon
Arun Pati Tripathi (Arrested: 11.04.2024 (~11 months incarceration) Bail
granted by the Supreme Court: 07.03.2025 in SLP(Crl) No. 14646/2024
[Allegations: Managing Director, CSMC; entrusted with maximum bribe
collection on liquor procured via CSMCL; FL-10A license operations. (Role
far more central/sinister than applicant's)
Vikash Kumar Goswami
Deolal Vaidya
Manish Mishra
Abhishek Singh have already been enlarged on bail by this Court. In fact,
approximately 40 out of the 45 accused persons in the case have already
been granted bail. It is further submitted that some of the said co-accused
persons are principal actors and policy-linked functionaries, whereas the
present applicant is alleged to have played a far lesser and peripheral role,
and no direct recovery has been effected from him.
21. In these circumstances, continued incarceration of the present
applicant would violate the principle of parity and equality before law under
Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Apex Court has repeatedly held
that similarly placed accused persons should not be treated differently
unless there exist distinguishing circumstances.
X. Criminal Antecedents Not Fatal To Bail
22. The applicant's solitary antecedent--Crime No. 04/2024 (EOW/ACB,
Raipur) u/s 11, 13(1)(k), 13(2) PC Act & 120B, 384, 409 IPC--pales
against merits. He has relied upon the precedentsof Ayub Khan v. State
of Rajasthan (2024 SCC OnLine SC 3763) [Para 10]: Antecedents merely
one factor; strong prima facie case + incarceration period can override.
In Prabhakar Tewari v. State of UP (2020 SCC OnLine SC 75)
[Para 7]: Criminal history not absolute bar where liberty outweighs.
23. The Charge-sheet itself admits applicant was namesake Director in
AJS Agro. Petrosun Bio Refinery owned by Trilok Singh Dhillion @
Pappu Dhillon and the applicant had no ownership/control/beneficial
interest, merely peripheral employee. Notably, Dhillon has been granted
bail by the Supreme Court (26.03.2025.
24. The prosecution has cited witnesses (Prakash Sharma @Chhotu,
Sohanlal Verma, Sidharth Singhania, Mandeep Chawla, Irfaan Meghji,
Laxminarayan Bansal, Suraj Pansari, Prateek Kumar Sahu) who are co-
accused/accomplices who admit their own facilitation roles. It is a settled
law that "Accomplice evidence needs independent corroboration and
cannot solely implicate as has been held in Haricharan Kurmi v. State of
Bihar (1964 SCC OnLine SC 28) thus:
"13. The legal position with regard to a
confession of a co-accused is well settled that
such confession does not constitute
substantive evidence against another accused.
It can only be taken into consideration as a
corroborative circumstance to lend assurance
to other independent evidence on record. The
court cannot commence its inquiry by relying
upon the confession of a co-accused; rather, it
must first evaluate the independent evidence
produced by the prosecution. Only after the
court forms a prima facie opinion regarding the
reliability and effect of such independent
evidence can the confession be looked into
merely to reinforce or lend assurance to the
conclusion otherwise drawn from the
substantive evidence. Thus, the confession of a
co-accused occupies a weak evidentiary value
and cannot, by itself, be made the foundation
for recording a finding of guilt against another
accused."
Similarly in Somasundaram v. State ((2020) 7 SCC 722) @ Para
84, pg. 183]. In Absence of corroboration, these statements are legally
inert against applicant. It has been observed as under:
"84. A statement recorded under Section 164
CrPC is not substantive evidence and cannot
by itself form the basis of conviction. The
substantive evidence in a criminal trial is the
testimony given by a witness before the court
during trial. Therefore, if a witness who earlier
made an incriminating statement under Section
164 CrPC resiles from it while deposing before
the court, and there is no other independent
evidence against the accused, conviction
cannot legally be sustained solely on the basis
of such statement recorded under Section 164
CrPC.
XI. The applicant satisfies the triple test governing grant of bail
25. It is submitted that the applicant satisfies the "triple test", which
governs the exercise of discretion while granting bail. The triple test
requires the Court to consider:
Whether the accused is a flight risk
Whether the accused is likely to tamper with evidence
Whether the accused may influence witnesses
The present applicant successfully satisfies all the three parameters.
(a) No flight risk
The applicant is a permanent resident of District Raipur, and his
family and social roots are firmly established in the local community. The
applicant has deep roots in society and there is no possibility of
absconding.
(b) No possibility of tampering with evidence
The prosecution case is primarily based on documentary and electronic
evidence already seized by the investigating agency.
Therefore, the question of the applicant tampering with such evidence
does not arise.
(c) No likelihood of influencing witnesses
There is no allegation whatsoever that the applicant has attempted to
influence or intimidate any witness.
In P. Chidambaram v. Central Bureau of Investigation, the
Supreme Court held that mere apprehension of the investigating agency,
without concrete material, cannot be a ground to deny bail. Thus, the
applicant satisfies all the parameters governing grant of bail.
XII. Mere apprehension cannot justify denial of bail
26. It is submitted that the impugned order of the learned Trial Court
rejected the applicant's bail prayer solely on the basis of vague and
unsubstantiated apprehensions regarding possible influence over
witnesses or tampering with evidence. Such rejection, bereft of any
concrete material or specific instances, constitutes a grave error apparent,
warranting interference by this Court. A perusal of the trial Court's order
reveals no identifiable material--no specific threats issued, no witness
complaints received, no instances of prior intimidation, and no tangible risk
demonstrated. The prosecution has arrayed nothing beyond speculative
fears, which cannot elevate conjecture to the pedestal of judicial
reasoning. Absent cogent and proximate material, such bald
apprehensions reduce to impermissible surmises, incapable of justifying
continued incarceration. The Supreme Court has authoritatively settled
this position in P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement [(2019) 9
SCC 24], where Their Lordships held: "Mere apprehension of the
prosecution that the accused may tamper with evidence or influence
witnesses is not a sound reason for refusal of bail if there is no concrete
material to show such likelihood."The Apex Court emphatically cautioned
that bail cannot be withheld on hypothetical possibilities or routine
misgivings, observing that "the court must balance the right to liberty of
the accused against society's interest, and speculative fears cannot
override Article 21 imperatives." This principle stands fortified in Prahlad
Singh Bhati v. NCT,Delhi [(2001) 4 SCC 280], mandating that tampering
apprehensions must rest on "definite material" rather than "general
propositions," and in State of Maharashtra v. Vishwanath [(2007) 15
SCC 246], deprecating denial of bail on "imagined apprehensions."In the
present case, the applicant stands admitted to custody for [insert period],
during which no whisper of tampering or influence has emanated from any
quarter. Co-accused with graver allegations have been enlarged on bail
(as detailed supra), underscoring the absence of genuine risk. Conditions
such as execution of bonds, sureties, and witness protection protocols--
routinely imposed by superior courts--stand ready to neutralize even
theoretical concerns. To sustain rejection on such ethereal foundations
would convert bail from rule to rarity, permitting court processes
apprehension to devour personal liberty. This Court, in its constitutional
jurisdiction, is prayed to set aside the impugned order and grant bail,
balancing justice's scales appropriately. Applicant's case far weaker than
parity co-accused; antecedents non-fatal; accomplice evidence
inadmissible sans corroboration.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OPPOSING THE BAIL
APPLICATION
27. The present bail application is vehemently opposed by the State.
Learned State Counsel respectfully submits the following submissions
opposing the prayer for bail.
I. The allegations disclose a large-scale organized economic offence
affecting public exchequer
28. Shri Das, learned State counsel submits that the allegations disclose
a large-scale, organized economic offence gravely impinging on the public
exchequer. This case unveils a meticulously orchestrated criminal
conspiracy in the implementation of the State liquor policy, occasioning
colossal loss to State revenues. Investigation materials unerringly reveal a
syndicate orchestrated by influential public officials, private intermediaries,
and proximate associates of principal conspirators, aimed at illicitly
siphoning vast sums from the liquor trade. These proceeds of crime were
thereafter laundered through an intricate web of hawala channels, shell
entities, benami property acquisitions, and multi-layered fund obfuscation,
masquerading illegality as legitimacy.
29. Such offences transcend private lis; they constitute organized
economic crimes that corrode public administration and the fiscal sinews of
the State, warranting a stringent bail calculus. The Supreme Court has
consistently accorded economic offences a distinct pedestal, mandating a
rigorous approach to bail. In Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. CBI [(2013) 7
SCC 546], it was observed:"Economic offences constitute a class apart
and need to be visited with a different approach in the matter of bail."
Echoing this, in Serious Fraud Investigation Office v. Nithin
Johari [(2022) 12 SCC 641], the Court held that deep-rooted conspiracies
entailing huge public fund depletion demand grave circumspection on bail.
II. The Applicant Played A Crucial Operational Role In The Criminal
Conspiracy
30. It is submitted that the present applicant Dipen Chawda is not a
peripheral participant, but a key operational member of the syndicate, who
actively participated in the execution of the illegal scheme. Investigation
has revealed that the applicant was a close and trusted associate of the
main accused Anwar Dhebar, who was the principal architect of the
illegal liquor syndicate. The charge-sheet clearly discloses that the
applicant worked as a manager at Hotel Willington Court, owned by the
main accused Anwar Dhebar, and played a significant role in collection of
illegally obtained funds, safe custody of such funds, movement and
transportation of illegal cash, coordination of hawala transactions, delivery
of funds to designated recipients, routing the funds through shell entities.
The applicant was thus an essential link in the money trail, without whose
active participation the illegal scheme could not have been executed.
III. The applicant facilitated concealment and layering of proceeds of
crime
31. Investigation has further revealed that the syndicate devised a
sophisticated mechanism for laundering the illegally collected money. The
proceeds of crime were routed through various channels including hawala
transactions, conversion into gold and silver, investments in land and
immovable properties, transactions through shell companies. In this
regard, two shell entities namely, AJS Agro Trade Private Limited and
Petrosun Bio Refinery Limited were used for projecting illegal proceeds as
legitimate investments. The applicant has been shown as a Director in AJS
Agro Trade Private Limited, through which several transactions were
executed. The investigation further reveals that as many as 41 properties
were purchased in the name of AJS Agro between 2019 and 2022, thereby
demonstrating the large-scale laundering of illicit funds. These transactions
clearly show that the applicant played a direct role in managing and
projecting the proceeds of crime through shell entities, which constitutes a
serious economic offence.
IV. Prosecution Case Bolstered (supported) by Copious Documentary
and Digital Evidence
32. The prosecution's narrative rests not on ethereal suspicion or
prosecutorial conjecture, but on a robust edifice of documentary and digital
evidence meticulously gathered during investigation, furnishing a
compelling prima facie case against the applicant. This evidentiary matrix
encompasses Digital forensic analysis of WhatsApp communications,
unmasking conspiratorial exchanges;Technical extractions from electronic
devices, yielding incriminating metadata;Meticulous financial ledgers,
balance sheets, and transactional trails; Corporate records procured from
the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, laying bare shell entities; and Testimonies
of a plethora of witnesses, solemnly recorded under Section 164 CrPC,
lending ocular corroboration. Particularly the grave and incriminating
WhatsApp chats between Anwar Dhebar and Anil Tuteja, which explicitly
reference the applicant as the linchpin in handling and routing illicit funds.
The attendant digital analysis report prepared through scientific scrutiny
irrefutably correlates:Temporal communication records with fund transfers;
Geospatial metadata of meetings aligning with transactional timelines;The
applicant's fingerprints across the conspiracy's execution, from fund
layering to hawala disbursals. Such scientific and technical evidence,
immune to whimsical fabrication, fortifies the prosecution's case, rendering
the applicant's complicity manifest and bail anathema at this juncture.
V. Applicant's Voluminous Admissions During Custodial
Interrogation
33. The prosecution's case acquires unassailable consistency from the
applicant's own unguarded disclosures during custodial interrogation,
meticulously memorialized in a detailed interrogation panchnama dated
17.09.2025--prepared in strict adherence to procedural safeguards in a
closely linked cognate case. These admissions, voluntarily tendered sans
coercion, furnish a confessional blueprint of the syndicate's clandestine
fund-routing apparatus, irrefutably tethering the applicant to the
conspiracy's operational core. The applicant, with piercing candour
(unreservedly truthful) admitted the following sequence of illicit operations:
a. Receiving slush funds on direct command:
He acknowledged obtaining substantial cash sums strictly on the
telephonic and personal instructions of Anwar Dhebar, the syndicate's
shadowy architect, thereby positioning himself as a trusted lieutenant in
the initial collection phase.
b. Procuring cash from syndicate operatives:
The applicant confessed to coordinating collections from a network
of intermediaries, prominently including Vikas Agrawal, who funneled
proceeds from liquor policy manipulations into his custody--cash amassed
through upfront licence fees and policy-driven kickbacks.
C. Delivering funds to ultimate beneficiaries:
He explicitly averred effecting physical delivery of these ill-gotten
collections to Laxminarayan Bansal @ Pappu Bansal, a pivotal upstream
figure, thereby closing the transfer loop and ensuring syndicate-wide
distribution.
d. Utilizing pre-designated handover points:
To minimize exposure, deliveries were orchestrated at
predetermined, low-profile locations--such as nondescript godowns and
peripheral meeting spots--meticulously chosen to elude law enforcement
surveillance.
e. Concealing bulk cash in everyday carriers:
The applicant detailed transporting crores in demonetized and fresh
currency notes, artfully concealed within innocuous cartons (labelled as
sundry/miscellaneous) and nondescript bags, thereby camouflaging the
proceeds amidst routine commerce.
f. Employing vehicular subterfuge to evade trails:
As a sophisticated counter-detection measure, he admitted routinely
switching vehicles mid-journey alternating between innocuous cabs,
private cars, and even goods carriers thwarting GPS tracking and potential
interception by deploying burner routes and decoy movements.
34. These disclosures, far from peripheral, illuminate the applicant's role
as the principal conduit and logistical mastermind in the syndicate's
hawala-esque fund-transfer architecture. They dovetail seamlessly with the
digital footprints (WhatsApp chats) and financial trails earlier delineated,
erecting a hermetic prima facie case that brooks no attenuation. Such self-
incriminating admissions--untainted by duress and corroborated by
material particulars resect any triable ambiguity, rendering anticipatory/pre-
trial bail antithetical to the ends of justice and the societal imperative
against organized and systematic plundering or ravaging of economic
resources through structured criminal syndicates.
VI. Prosecution Case Fortified by Corroborative Witness
Testimonies
35. The prosecution's edifice gains impregnable reinforcement from the
unimpeachable statements of multiple material witnesses, whose
testimonies solemnly recorded under Section 164 CrPC converge with
surgical precision to affirm the applicant's pivotal role in the syndicate's
illicit fund conduit. These witnesses, drawn from the conspiracy's
operational periphery, include Prakash Sharma @ Chhotu, who deposed
to the applicant's hands-on coordination of cash pickups from liquor
licensees; Sohan Lal Verma, attesting to the applicant's orchestration of
bulk cash handovers at shadowy rendezvous points; Siddharth
Singhania, a corporate intermediary who confirmed the applicant's
funneling of proceeds into shell entities for layering; Mandeep Chawla,
detailing the applicant's deployment of hawala networks for cross-border
routing; Irfan Meghji, whose account unmasks the applicant's investment
of laundered funds into benami realty; and Laxminarayan Bansal, the
upstream beneficiary, who unequivocally acknowledged receipt of
syndicate slush funds via the applicant as the trusted courier.
36. Each of these testimonies, independently recorded before a neutral
Magistrate, categorically establishes that illegally amassed funds,
siphoned through the perverted liquor policy were systematically routed
through the applicant, who thereafter masterminded their onward delivery,
obfuscation, and investment. Such statements, immune to collateral attack
at the interlocutory bail stage, carry transcendent evidentiary weight,
erecting a formidable prima facie case that obliterates any veneer of
innocence.
VII. Grave Apprehension of Witness Intimidation and Evidentiary
Tampering
37. The applicant's release on bail would pose a grave risk of
engendering a palpable and well-founded apprehension of witness
intimidation, evidentiary manipulation, and trial subversion--hallmarks of
his entrenched syndicate position. Vulnerable witnesses abound, including
Hotel staff at clandestine meeting venues, whose testimonies map the
conspiracy's logistical skeleton; Cash-handling intermediaries (ie, Vikas
Agrawal's network), pivotal to tracing fund origins;Shell entity principals,
holding ledgers exposing layering mechanics and Benami property
transactors, whose records unveil the laundering terminus. The applicant's
proven proximity to kingpins like Anwar Dhebar and Laxminarayan
Bansal--coupled with his operational clout renders these witnesses sitting
ducks for coercion (sitting in a vulnerable position), monetary inducements,
or outright threats. Electronic trails (WhatsApp metadata, device
extractions) and financial ledgers remain ripe for digital alteration or
custodial concealment, particularly given the applicant's demonstrated
vehicular subterfuge and counter-surveillance savvy. Bail, in this milieu,
would not merely imperil justice but actively subvert it, fracturing the
investigatory continuum and eroding public repose in the judiciary's resolve
against organized economic malfeasance. The triple test enunciated in
Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar and iterated in Satender Kumar Antil
v. CBI--stands inexorably breached.
VIII. Parity Principle Inapplicable to Applicant's Distinct Role
38. The applicant's invocation of parity--claiming bail akin to certain co-
accused crumbles under scrutiny, for parity is no mechanical entitlement
but a nuanced principle contingent on substantially identical roles and
culpability. As crystallized in State of Kerala v. Rajesh (2020) 12 SCC
693, mere co-nominal status confers no parity; rather, courts must dissect
the attributed roles with forensic precision, denying relief where material
disparities exist. The applicant's complicity eclipses that of peripheral co-
accused, manifesting in a hands-on, indispensable operational role:Direct
orchestration of illegal fund collection: Unlike passive beneficiaries, he
actively marshalled slush moneys from liquor licensees acting as the
syndicate's ground-level collector on Anwar Dhebar's behest;
39. Physical custody and hazardous cash transit: He confessed to
ferrying crores in cartons and bags across pre-designated drop points,
employing vehicular switches to foil detection--a logistical linchpin absent
in others' peripheral involvement; Layering through shell entities: Corporate
records and witness statements (e.g., Siddharth Singhania) unmask his
funneling of proceeds into MCA (Ministry of Corporate Affairs) - registered
facades, veiling illegality; Hawala coordination nexus: Interrogation
disclosures and Mandeep Chawla's testimony confirm his pivotal relay to
cross-border channels, cementing the laundering chain. By contrast,
granted co-accused played facilitative or upstream roles lacking this
applicant's confessional admissions, digital footprints, and custodial
confessions. Parity, thus, stands repugnant. Bail cannot become a
competition where the more guilty get the same leniency as the less
involved, turning justice into a mockery.
IX. Offence's Monumental Gravity and Societal Ramifications
Preclude Bail
40. The cataclysmic proportions of the offence, organized corruption
siphoning thousands of crores from the State exchequer via liquor policy
perversion elevate it beyond individual transgression to a systemic assault
on governance, warranting bail's stern denial. Its tentacles ravage Public
administration's edifice. The offence severely damages Public
Administration by bribing officials and twisting policy implementation, it
destroys government trust and spreads corruption.
• Policy Integrity: Deliberately rigging excise rules for private profit
violates Article 298 of the Constitution and threatens State finances.
• State Revenue: Massive losses shown in investigation records cut
funding for welfare, roads, and public services, harming ordinary
citizens inflicting diffuse societal injury.
41. The Supreme Court, in State of Gujarat v. Mohanlal Jitamalji
Porwal (1980) 2 SCC 293, sounded a clarion call:"Economic adventures of
the State are prone to be ravaged by the unscrupulous and the depraved.
Economic offences involving public funds are committed with cool
calculation and deliberate design and therefore deserve serious
consideration."
42. Echoing this, Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. CBI (2013) 7 SCC 546
mandates a "different approach" to bail in such cases, prioritizing societal
safeguarding over individual liberty. Here, the offence's magnitude, the
applicant's core role, and the imperative of exemplary deterrence
inexorably tilt the scales against discretionary bail--its grant would signal
judicial abdication before organized financial robbery or plunder.
X. Formidable Prima Facie Case Erected Against Applicant
43. The investigative matrix compendiously gathered and methodically
arrayed unfurls a compelling and impregnable prima facie case against the
applicant, unequivocally demonstrating his active, hands-on complicity in
the syndicate's organized criminal conspiracy. This evidentiary bulwark, far
from speculative, rests on interlocking corroborative strands that brook no
reasonable doubt at the interlocutory stage.
A. Documentary and Digital Pillars, Copious documentary evidence,
including requisitioned corporate records from the Ministry of Corporate
Affairs, unmasks shell entities engineered for fund layering; Irrefutable
digital forensics, comprising WhatsApp communications between Anwar
Dhebar and Anil Tuteja (explicitly referencing the applicant),
geospatial metadata (phone location data) of covert meetings, and
device extractions correlating timelines with fund flows--scientific proof
immune to fabrication.
B. Financial Transactional Trails Meticulous ledgers, balance sheets, and
bank statements delineate a labyrinthine web of hawala disbursals,
benami property infusions and policy-driven kickbacks, with the applicant's
fingerprints indelibly etched across crores in illicit transit, quantified losses
running into thousands of crores, per investigation charts.
C. Testimonies of Material Witnesses : Statements under Section 164
CrPC from a constellation of witnesses--Prakash Sharma @ Chhotu,
Sohan Lal Verma, Siddharth Singhania, Mandeep Chawla, Irfan
Meghji, and Laxminarayan Bansal--converge with one voice: the
applicant as the principal conduit, coordinating collections from Vikas
Agrawal's network, effecting physical deliveries at pre-designated drops,
and masterminding obfuscation.
D. Applicant's Own Incriminating Admissions: The interrogation
panchnama (17.09.2025) captures his stark confessions to receiving slush
funds on Dhebar's instructions, bulk cash transport in cartons via vehicular
subterfuge, and handovers to Pappu Bansal--self-incriminations that
dovetail seamlessly with external evidence, eviscerating any defence of
peripheral involvement. Viewed holistically, this tapestry weaves an
unassailable narrative of the applicant's centrality: from ground-level
collection to hawala relay, he was no bystander but the syndicate's
operational sinew. The triple test--prima facie case, tampering peril, and
flight risk--stands inexorably satisfied, tilting judicial balance decisively
against bail. To grant relief now would be to imperil the judicial duty to
safeguard public justice against economic malfeasance.
44. Lastly, it is submitted that the allegations disclose a serious
organized economic offence; the applicant played a crucial operational role
in the conspiracy; the prosecution case is supported by documentary and
digital evidence; the applicant's release may result in tampering with
evidence and influencing witnesses; the gravity and societal impact of the
offence warrant a strict approach therefore the present bail application
filed by the applicant Dipen Chawda may be dismissed.
SCOPE OF CONSIDERATION AT THE STAGE OF BAIL
45. Before adverting to the rival submissions, it is necessary to observe
that at the stage of bail, the Court is not required to conduct a detail
examination of the evidence or record findings on the merits of the case.
46. It merits specific notice that the allegations in the instant case unfold
a meticulously orchestrated economic offence of alarming proportions,
centred on the systematic illegal aggregation and channelling of illicit funds
through the State liquor trade. According to the prosecution's investigative
dossier (written record), this syndicate's machinations have precipitated
substantial, quantifiable depletion of public revenues, siphoning resources
meant for societal welfare and State exchequer. The gravity of such
transgressions--a species of organized fiscal malfeasance--cannot be
overstated, for economic offences wield corrosive influence, eroding public
trust, distorting governance, and inflicting diffuse injury on the collective
fiscal health. Their societal ripples extend beyond individual culpability,
striking at the foundational integrity of public administration and economic
equity. The Supreme Court has, with characteristic prescience, accorded
such offences a distinct juridical pedestal.
47. In Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. CBI [(2013) 7 SCC 546], Their
Lordships authoritatively expounded that "Economic offences constitute a
class apart and need to be visited with a different approach in the matter of
bail." This mandates a circumspect, stringent calculus at the bail juncture,
prioritizing societal safeguarding over unfettered personal liberty where
prima facie complicity in such organized plundering is manifest. The
investigative materials here--digital footprints, confessional admissions,
and witness convergences amply satisfy this threshold, rendering bail
antithetical to justice's ends.
48. However, it is trite law that the gravity of allegations, per se, cannot
constitute the sole determinant for repelling bail. The Court is
constitutionally ordained to strike a judicious balance between the severity
of the offence and the sacrosanct guarantee of personal liberty enshrined
under Article 21 of the Constitution. The material on record discloses that
the prosecution attributes to the applicant an association with principal
accused and active participation in the ferrying and handling of illicit
syndicate collections. To substantiate this, reliance is placed on witness
statements under Section 164 CrPC, documentary ledgers, and electronic
communications, materials that, at this juncture, furnish a compelling prima
facie case without traversing trial merits.
49. However, the Court is neither called upon nor empowered at this
interlocutory juncture to embark upon a meticulous dissection of the
evidentiary matrix or pronounce definitive findings on the prosecution's
case merits that tract is reserved exclusively for the trial Court post full-
dress adjudication. The contours of bail adjudication remain circumscribed,
as authoritatively delineated by the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v.
Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote [(1980) 4 SCC 22], to a prima facie
appraisal of materials, tempered by the triad of considerations: offence
gravity, custodial necessity, and liberty's sanctity. Elaborate evidence
probing would impermissibly convert bail proceedings into a mini-trial, pre-
empting the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused.
50. A perusal of the record unmistakably reveals that the investigating
agency has already filed the charge-sheet, augmented by supplementary
reports, crystallizing the prosecution narrative. The case pivots
predominantly on documentary bedrock--financial ledgers, corporate
filings--and electronic records (WhatsApp extracts, device metadata), all
meticulously collected, preserved, and annexed to the charge-sheet.
Unlike nascent probes warranting custodial leverage, the investigation vis-
à-vis the applicant stands substantially concluded; no further custodial
interrogation is evinced as requisite, nor any lacunae in the evidentiary
chain necessitating his continued incarceration for recovery or
confrontation. Equally compelling is the trial's protracted horizon. The
prosecution's array comprising a legion of witnesses (over 1110 witnesses)
and voluminous documents (990) --portends a trial of indeterminable
vintage, likely spanning years before culmination. Prolonged pre-trial
detention in such scenario would metamorphose punishment into
presumed guilt, offending Article 21's core mandate against arbitrary
deprivation of liberty.
51. The Supreme Court in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC
713] sounded a clarion imprimatur: "Where the Court is satisfied that the
likely period required for conclusion of trial would be sufficiently long and
the accused is not required to be in custody for the purposes of
investigation, the constitutional courts may grant bail to protect the
fundamental right to liberty under Article 21."
52. However, it is equally well settled that the gravity of the allegation
cannot be the sole determinative factor while considering the question of
bail, and the Court must balance the seriousness of the accusation with
the fundamental right to personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution.
53. This salutary exposition tilts the equities decisively towards bail,
rendering extended incarceration unconscionable. The principle of parity
emerges as an additional, potent factor. The materials on record disclose
that several co-accused, enmeshed in analogous roles within the
alleged syndicate, have secured enlargement on bail from this Court and
the Apex Court alike. While roles merit individuated scrutiny, parity is no
chimera (imagination) but a settled equity, claimable where factual
matrices converge absent material distinguishing features--be it complicity
depth, evidence quantum, or custodial utility. The Supreme Court in State
of Kerala v. Rajesh [(2020) 12 SCC 693] affirmed that "Parity arises on
account of similarity in the involvement of the accused in the crime and not
on account of the period of detention undergone by them. "No such
differentiators surface here; the applicant's position mirrors that of released
peers(co-accused), foreclosing discriminatory repulse. Finally, the State's
voiced apprehensions of witness influence or evidentiary tampering have
been duly adverted to. Yet, these are not insurmountable; judicial ingenuity
offers a panoply of safeguards reporting strictures, passport impounding,
round-the-clock GEQD monitoring of devices ("forensic monitoring of
electronic devices by government document experts), interaction
proscriptions with witnesses/prosecution personnel, and abjuration bonds
with sureties. Such strict conditions proven effective in similar economic
crime bail cases will prevent risks without destroying the applicant's liberty.
54. Another significant aspect which merits consideration is the principle
of parity. From the material placed on record, it appears that several co-
accused persons in the present case have already been enlarged on bail
by this Court as well as the Supreme Court. While the role attributed to
each accused is required to be assessed independently, the Court cannot
ignore the fact that similarly situated co-accused persons have already
been granted the benefit of bail.
55. The Supreme Court has consistently held that parity is a relevant
consideration while deciding bail applications unless there exist
distinguishing circumstances which justify differential treatment. The
apprehension expressed by the State regarding the possibility of the
applicant influencing witnesses or tampering with evidence has also been
considered by this Court. However, such apprehension can be adequately
addressed by imposing appropriate conditions while granting bail. It is also
relevant to note that the applicant is stated to be a permanent resident
having roots in the society, and there is no material placed before this
Court to indicate that the applicant is likely to abscond or evade the
process of law.
56. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventive but to secure the
presence of the accused during the course of trial. The Supreme Court in
State of Rajasthan v. Balchand succinctly laid down the principle that
"bail is the rule and jail is the exception." Similarly, in Dataram Singh v.
State of Uttar Pradesh, the Supreme Court reiterated that personal liberty
is a precious constitutional value and must not be curtailed unless
compelling circumstances exist.
57. However, it is to be noted that the present case arises out of Crime
No. 04/2024 registered by the Economic Offences Wing, Raipur, alleging a
large-scale criminal conspiracy involving illegal collection and
channelization of funds in connection with the liquor trade within the State.
The prosecution alleges that a syndicate comprising certain influential
individuals and intermediaries collected illegal gratification and
subsequently routed such funds through various channels including
hawala transactions, shell companies and property investments.
58. Upon perusal of the record, it emerges that the applicant was
arrested on 24.09.2025 and has remained in judicial custody since then. It
is further evident that charge-sheet has already been filed against the
present applicant, though the prosecution submits that the investigation
with respect to the larger conspiracy is still continuing under the relevant
provisions of law. Nevertheless, insofar as the role attributed to the present
applicant is concerned, the investigating agency has already collected the
material which forms the basis of the charge-sheet placed before the
competent Court.
59. It is also not disputed that cognizance has not yet been taken by the
trial Court and charges have not been framed so far. Considering the
voluminous nature of the charge-sheet, the large number of accused
persons and witnesses cited by the prosecution, the trial is likely to take
considerable time before it reaches its logical conclusion. Thus, though the
investigation with respect to the larger conspiracy may still be continuing,
the continued incarceration of the applicant cannot be justified merely on
that ground once the material forming the basis of the charge-sheet
against him has already been collected.
60. Another significant aspect which merits consideration is the principle
of parity. It has also been emphasized on behalf of the Applicant that a
considerable number of co-accused persons, including those who are
alleged to have played more prominent or dominant roles in the alleged
conspiracy, have already been enlarged on bail either by the Apex Court or
by this Court. It has further been submitted that the Apex Court has
extended the benefit of bail to certain co-accused persons, including
Arvind Singh in SLP (Crl.) No. 2608 of 2025 (order dated 19.05.2025),
Amit Singh in SLP (Crl.) No. 2545 of 2025 (order dated 19.05.2025),
Deepak Duary in SLP (Crl.) No. 298 of 2025 (order dated 07.03.2025),
Anurag Dwivedi in SLP (Crl.) No. 18386 of 2024 (order dated
07.03.2025), and Arunpati Tripathi in SLP (Crl.) No. 14466 of 2024
(order dated 07.03.2025).
61. By way of illustration, it has been pointed out that this Court has also
granted bail to co-accused Sanjay Mishra and Manish Mishra in MCRC
No. 7093 of 2025 (order dated 23.09.2025); Vijay Bhatia in MCRC No.
5601 of 2025 (order dated 25.09.2025); Sunil Dutt in MCRC No. 188 of
2025 (order dated 12.03.2025); Abhishek Singh in MCRC No. 7790 of
2025 (order dated 11.11.2025); Chaitanya Baghel in MCRC No. 8224 of
2025; Atul Singh in MCRC No. 8857 of 2025 (order dated 13.01.2026);
and Mukesh Manchanda in MCRC No. 8849 of 2025 (order dated
23.09.2025).
62. Relying upon the aforesaid orders, it has been contended that since
several co-accused persons, including those alleged to have played
significant roles in the alleged offence, have already been granted bail by
competent courts, the Applicant is likewise entitled to seek enlargement on
bail on the ground of parity.
63. From the material placed before this Court, it appears that several
co-accused persons in the present case have already been enlarged on
bail by this Court as well as the Supreme Court. While each case must
necessarily be examined on its own facts, the Court cannot ignore the
circumstance that similarly placed co-accused persons have already been
granted bail. The apprehension expressed by the State regarding the
possibility of the applicant influencing witnesses or tampering with
evidence has also been duly considered. However, at this stage, such
apprehension appears to be general in nature and can be adequately
addressed by imposing suitable conditions while granting bail.
64. It is also relevant to note that the applicant is stated to be a
permanent resident having roots in the society, and there is nothing on
record to suggest that he is likely to abscond or evade the process of law.
The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventive but merely to secure
the presence of the accused during the course of trial. In cumulative
consonance, the application merits allowance.
Analysis of Prosecution Material
65. This Court has perused the case diary and the material collected
during investigation. The prosecution has alleged that the applicant was
associated with the principal accused and participated in certain financial
transactions connected with the alleged conspiracy. The material relied
upon by the prosecution includes:
* witness statements,
* documentary records of transactions, and
* electronic communications.
However, the Court notes that the charge-sheet against the present
applicant has already been filed, which indicates that the investigating
agency has completed collection of material relating to the role attributed
to the applicant. Though the prosecution submits that the investigation with
respect to the larger conspiracy is still continuing, the material forming the
basis of allegations against the present applicant appears to have already
been gathered. Furthermore, the prosecution case is largely based on
documentary and electronic evidence, which is already in the custody of
the investigating agency.
66. Another important circumstance is the period of custody undergone
by the applicant. The applicant has remained in judicial custody since
24.09.2025. It is not disputed that cognizance has not yet been taken and
charges have not been framed so far.
67. In light of the totality of circumstances meticulously reviewed by this
Court, particularly, the completed filing of the charge-sheet against the
applicant, investigation in so far as the present applicant is concerned, the
predominance of documentary evidence, the absence of any recovery
attributable to the applicant, the principle of parity arising from bail granted
to co-accused persons, the fact that the applicant was not named in the
FIR, crystallizing the prosecution narrative, the fact that cognizance
remains pending and charges are yet to be framed, preserving the trial's
nascent stage, the protracted custody undergone since 24.09.2025--an
appreciable duration without corresponding investigative imperative, the
predominantly documentary and electronic nature of evidence already
collected, preserved, and impervious to further custodial augmentation;
and the grant of bail to several co-accused by competent fora, furnishing
compelling parity absent material differentiators, this Court is of the
considered and conscientious opinion that the applicant deserves
enlargement on bail. Liberty is not bestowed as indulgence but vindicated
as Article 21's birthright. It is, however, expressly clarified that the
foregoing observations are strictly prima facie, forged solely for bail
adjudication, and shall remain wholly inapposite and non-binding upon the
trial Court whilst adjudicating the lis on merits. The application stands
allowed.
68. It is directed that the Applicant shall be released forthwith on bail
subject to his furnishing a personal bond in the sum of ₹1,00,000/-
(Rupees One Lakh only) along with two local sureties of the like amount
to the satisfaction of the learned trial Court, subject to the following
conditions:
(i) he shall surrender his passport, if any, before
the Trial Court;
(b) the applicant must cooperate with the
investigation and the trial proceedings;
(c) he shall not directly or indirectly make any
inducement, threat or promise to any person
acquainted with the facts of the case;
(d) he shall commit no offence whatsoever
during the period he is on bail; and
(e) in case of change of residential address
and/or mobile number, the same shall be
intimated to the Court concerned by way of an
affidavit.
(f) any stringent conditions as may be imposed
by the trial court.
Sd/-
(Arvind Kumar Verma)
Digitally signed Judge
by SUGUNA
SUGUNA DUBEY
DUBEY Date:
2026.03.10
17:43:38 +0530
