[Cites 7, Cited by 0]
Chattisgarh High Court
D.K. Bhuiya vs A. K. Sinha on 27 February, 2026
1
ARBA No. 4 of 2023
2026:CGHC:10217
AFR
Digitally
signed by
RAHUL
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
RAHUL JHA
JHA Date:
2026.02.27
13:29:57
+0530 Judgment reserved on 24/02/2026
Judgment delivered on 27/02/2026
ARBA No. 4 of 2023
D.K. Bhuiya S/o S.R. Bhuiya Aged About 54 Years R/o Flat No. 21,
Kanchanapuram Apartment Ashish Nagar, Risali, Bhilai, Tehsil And District
Durg. (Chhattisgarh)
Appellant(s)
Versus
A. K. Sinha S/o M.P. Sinha Aged About 52 Years R/o Quarter No. 210/17,
Ashish Nagar East, Risali, Bhilai, Tehsil And District Durg. (Chhattisgarh)
Respondent(s)
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Appellant(s) : Ms. Sweksha Sharma, Advocate
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Punit Ruparel, Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, J
C A V Judgment
1. This Appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 (henceforth 'the Act, 1996') is directed against the order dated
05.11.2022 passed by the learned II Additional District Judge, Durg
(C.G.) in M.J.C. Civil No. 17/2022, whereby the learned Court has
rejected the application preferred by the appellant under Section 34 of
the Act, 1996 on the ground of limitation by declining to condone the
delay, and consequently affirmed the arbitral award dated 18.08.2016
passed by the learned Sole Arbitrator.
2. (a) Briefly stated facts of the case are that the appellant purchased
Flat No. 21 situated on the second floor of "Kanchanpuram Apartment"
from the respondent/developer pursuant to an agreement dated
19.12.2007 for a total sale consideration of ₹16,50,000/-, which amount
was admittedly paid through cheques. Subsequently, the said amount
reached upto ₹25,00,000/- owing to interior, furniture, putti work, etc.
According to the appellant, despite receipt of the entire consideration,
the respondent failed to provide the promised amenities and delivered
possession of a flat suffering from serious construction defects,
including deficient finishing work, non-functional lift facility, etc.
thereby compelling the appellant to institute Consumer Complaint No.
CC/14/69 before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum,
Durg, on 12.03.2014 alleging deficiency in service and unfair trade
practice. The District Forum, upon appreciation of the material on
record, allowed the complaint vide order dated 22.08.2015 and awarded
compensation of ₹4,55,000/- in favour of the appellant. In appeal
preferred by the respondent, the State Commission remanded the matter
for technical inspection. Thereafter, upon reconsideration and in light of
the inspection report, the District Forum once again awarded
compensation of the same amount of ₹4,55,000/- by order dated
19.12.2016. The respondent carried the matter in further appeal,
whereupon the State Commission, vide order dated 22.04.2017, partly
modified the award and reduced to ₹3,23,000/- (Rs.2,23,000/- towards
compensation and Rs.1,00,000/- towards mental harassment). The
respondent herein thereafter filed Revision Petition No. 1421/2017
(Arvind Sinha @ A.K. Sinha v Dilip Kumar Bhuiyan) before the National
Commission, New Delhi, wherein the respondent herein personally
appeared before the Forum and the appellant herein represented through
his counsel and made a submission that the parties arrived at an amicable
settlement for a sum of ₹2,23,000/-, and the proceedings were finally
disposed of on 06.02.2018 in terms of the compromise, thus bringing the
consumer dispute between the parties to a quietus.
(b) It is the appellant/buyer's case that notwithstanding the aforesaid
proceedings, disputes purportedly arising out of the same agreement
dated 19.12.2007 were referred to arbitration, and the learned Sole
Arbitrator proceeded ex parte to pass an award dated 18.08.2016
directed the appellant/buyer to pay an amount of Rs.4,03,000/- along
with interest at the rate of 18% per annum to the respondent/developer.
The appellant asserts that no signed copy of the arbitral award was ever
delivered to him in the manner contemplated under Section 31(5) of the
Act, 1996, and that he remained unaware of the said award. According to
him, knowledge of the award was acquired for the first time on
23.07.2019 during the course of execution proceedings initiated by the
respondent under Section 36 of the Act in Execution Case No. 267/2017.
Immediately upon gaining such knowledge, the appellant, acting bona
fide and within the statutory period computed from the date of
knowledge, filed an application under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 on
07.09.2019, however, the said application was inadvertently filed in the
pending execution proceedings instead of by way of an independent
application. The application was subsequently withdrawn on 21.12.2021,
and thereafter a properly constituted application under Section 34,
accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act
seeking condonation of delay explaining the bona fide circumstances,
was instituted on 04.01.2022. The said application having been
dismissed by the II Additional District Judge, Durg vide the impugned
order on the ground of delay and laches. Hence, the present appeal has
been preferred.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that limitation under Section
34(3) commences only from the date of receipt of a signed copy of the
award. In absence of proper service in terms of Section 31(5), the
question of delay does not arise. The appellant had acted with due
diligence immediately upon gaining knowledge of the award and had
been bona fide in prosecuting the remedy. According to the learned
counsel, the learned Court has failed to consider that a litigant
prosecuting a remedy in good faith ought not to be non-suited on
technical grounds. Learned counsel would submit that the learned Court
has not at all appreciated the fact that copy of the award was not
provided to the appellant by the arbitrator. She would submit that when
in the execution proceedings the copy of the award provided to the
appellant, he immediately moved the application under Section 34.
Despite the said fact and without appreciating the entire facts and
circumstances of the case in its true perspective rejected the said
application. The impugned order, therefore, suffers from patent illegality
and misapplication of the law relating to limitation and deserves to be set
aside.
4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/developer would submit
that the appeal is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed at the
threshold. It is contended that the arbitral award was passed on
18.08.2016 and the statutory period prescribed under Section 34(3) of
the Act, 1996 expired long ago. The application under Section 34 having
been filed only on 04.01.2022 suffers from gross and inordinate delay
which is beyond the period that can be condoned under the scheme of
the Act. It is further submitted that Section 34(3) prescribes a strict
limitation period of three months with a further grace period of thirty
days, and the Court has no jurisdiction to condone delay beyond the said
period. The respondent would contend that the plea of non-service of
award is an afterthought and that the appellant had sufficient opportunity
and knowledge of the proceedings. The earlier application filed in
execution proceedings does not save limitation, nor can withdrawal of
such application revive a time-barred remedy. Therefore, it is submitted
that the learned Court has rightly rejected the application under Section
34 on the ground of limitation and the present appeal under Section 37
does not warrant any interference.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the
material available on record.
6. The short question which arises for consideration in the present appeal is
whether the learned II Additional District Judge, Durg was justified in
rejecting the application preferred by the appellant under Section 34 of
the Act, 1996 on the ground of limitation by holding that the delay was
beyond the condonable period prescribed under Section 34(3) of the Act.
7. Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 provides that
an application for setting aside an arbitral award shall not be made after
the expiry of three months from the date on which the party making the
application had received the arbitral award. The proviso thereto
empowers the Court to entertain the application within a further period
of thirty days, if sufficient cause is shown for the delay, but not
thereafter. The expression "had received the arbitral award" occurring in
Section 34(3) must be read in conjunction with Section 31(5) of the Act,
which mandates delivery of a signed copy of the award to each party.
8. It is pertinent to mention here that when a copy of the signed award is
not delivered to the party itself, it would not amount to compliance with
the provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 31 of the Act, 1996. Proper
compliance with section would mean delivery of a signed copy of the
arbitral award on the party, which gives the right to proceed under sub-
section (3) of Section 34 of the Act, 1996.
9. The Supreme Court in the matter of Benarshi krishna Committtee &
Others v. Karamyogi Shelters Private Limited, (2012) 9 SCC 496 held
that if copy of signed award is not delivered to party itself, it would not
amount to compliance with provisions of Section 31 (5) of the Act, 1996.
In the case at hand, delivery of arbitration award having not been made
delivered on the party and as such in the considered opinion of this
Court, the provisions of Section 31 (5) has not been complied with in its
true perspective.
10. From the above decision renderred by the Supreme Court, it is crystal
clear that if the copy of signed arbitral award is not delivered to party
itself, it would not amount to compliance with provisions of Section
31(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and hence limitation
of three months under Section 34 (3) has to be reckoned from the date
on which, the party itself received a signed copy of the award.
11. In the present case, the categorical stand of the appellant is that no
signed copy of the award dated 18.08.2016 was ever delivered to him
and that he acquired knowledge of the award for the first time on
23.07.2019 during the execution proceedings initiated by the respondent
under Section 36 of the Act, 1996 in Execution Case No. 267/2017. The
record indicates that immediately thereafter, on 07.09.2019, the appellant
filed an application under Section 34, though in the pending execution
proceedings. The said application was later withdrawn on 21.12.2021
and a properly constituted application under Section 34 along with an
application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of
delay was filed on 04.01.2022.
12. The learned II Additional District Judge, Durg, while rejecting the
application, proceeded on the premise that the award was passed on
18.08.2016 and that the limitation prescribed under Section 34(3) stood
exhausted long prior to the filing of the application on 04.01.2022.
However, the crucial aspect which required consideration was the date of
receipt of the signed copy of the award and not merely the date of
pronouncement of the award. In absence of a finding, based on cogent
material, that the signed copy of the award was duly delivered to the
appellant in terms of Section 31(5), computation of limitation from the
date of the award itself would not be in consonance with the statutory
scheme.
13. Further, the conduct of the appellant in filing an application under
Section 34 soon after acquiring knowledge of the award cannot be
lightly brushed aside. Merely because the said application was filed in
the execution proceedings instead of as an independent petition, the
same would not ipso facto render the prosecution mala fide. The
question whether the appellant was bona fide prosecuting the remedy
and whether such prosecution would have any bearing on limitation
required a considered determination. The approach adopted while
rejecting the application appears to have been hyper-technical, without
adverting to the explanation furnished by the appellant regarding non-
service of the award and the circumstances leading to the filing and
withdrawal of the earlier application.
14. At the same time, it cannot be lost sight of that Section 34(3) prescribes a
strict timeline and the Court has no jurisdiction to condone delay beyond
the aggregate period of three months and thirty days from the date of
receipt of the award. Therefore, the foundational issue as to when and in
what manner the award was served assumes pivotal significance. In
absence of a clear finding on service in terms of Section 31(5), rejection
of the application solely on the basis of the date of the award would not
be legally sustainable.
15. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned order dated
05.11.2022 passed in M.J.C. Civil No. 17/2022 cannot be sustained and
accordingly the same is hereby set aside. The matter is remitted to the
learned II Additional District Judge, Durg for fresh consideration of the
application under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 filed by the
appellant/buyer, in accordance with law and on its own merits without
insisting on the question of delay.
16. Consequently, the appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above,
leaving the parties to bear their own cost(s).
Sd/-
(Bibhu Datta Guru)
Judge
Rahul/Gowri
HEAD NOTE
If the copy of signed arbitral award is not delivered to party itself, it
would not amount to compliance with provisions of S. 31(5) of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 and hence limitation of three months u/S 34 (3) has
to be reckoned from the date on which, the party itself received a signed copy
of the award.
