Chattisgarh High Court
Shyamlal Mehar vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 7 August, 2025
Author: Rajani Dubey
Bench: Rajani Dubey
1 / 18
2025:CGHC:39514
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 262 of 2014
Shyamlal Mehar, S/o Late Shri Shambhuram Mehar, aged
about - 60 years, R/o Palace Road, Kosta para, Raigarh,
P.S. City Kotwali, Raigarh, Civil and Revenue District -
Raigarh (C.G.)
... Appellant
versus
State of Chhattisgarh Through : Officer In-charge of the P.S.
AJAK, Raigarh, Tahsil and District Raigarh (C.G.)
... Respondent
For Appellant : Mr. Abhishek Saraf, Advocate.
For Respondent/State : Ms. Nand Kumari Kashyap, P.L.
Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey, J
Judgment on Board
07.08.2025
1. The appellant in this appeal under Section 374(2) of CrPC
has challenged the legality, validity and propriety of the
judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated
2 / 18
07.03.2014 passed by the Special Judge (constituted under
SC/ST Atrocities) Act, 1989, Raigarh (C.G.), in Special Case
No. 21/2005, whereby the appellant stands convicted under
Section 294 of IPC, however, considering the provision of
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short 'the Act'), he is convicted and
sentenced as under:
Conviction Sentence
Under Section 3 (1) (x) of R.I. for 03 years with fine of
S.C./S.T. Act, Rs.6,000/-, in default of
payment of fine amount to
undergo additional R.I. for 06
months
2. Prosecution story, in brief, is that complainant Chandel
Singh Manhar, who is a member of Scheduled Caste was
working as Educational Coordinator in Bhupdev Sankul
Kendra. On 18.03.2005 at around 12.30 PM, he was
preparing the list of Supervisor for 5th and 8th Board
Examination in the Sankul Kendra. Along with him
Vidyadhar Thethwar, Incharge, Sankul was also present. At
the relevant time, appellant Shyamlal Mehar came there on
the pretext of giving monthly statement and started hurling
filthy abuses. The complainant objected the act of the
appellant then he told him to take monthly statement saying
3 / 18
that who made this Chamar as Educational Coordinator and
started scuffling with Vidyadhar Thetwar, Sankul In-charge
and tore the list of Supervisors which caused obstruction in
work of examination. The said incident was witnessed by
Ramlal Nishad, Assistant Teacher, Primary School,
Sambhalpuri, Dhaniram Bareth, Peon, Sankul Kendra
Bhupdev Primary School, Vidyadhar Thetwar, Bhupdev
Primary School and one teacher Sant Michael. Further
prosecution story is that on scuffling with Thetwar, In-charge
Sankul, the complainant tried to intervene the matter but he
started abusing the complainant by repeatedly saying 'move
aside chamar' and threatened to teach him lesson.
Thereafter, the complainant lodged written report (Ex.P-6) in
Police Station against the appellant. On the basis of said
written report (Ex.P-6), an FIR (Ex.P-9) was registered for
the offence punishable under Section 294 of IPC and
Section 3 (1) (x) of the Act, 1989. During investigation,
statement of the complainant and witnesses were recorded.
The case certificate (Ex.P-8) of the applicant was seized
vide Ex.P-7. After completing usual investigation, charge
sheet for the offence punishable under Sections 294 of IPC
and 3 (1)(x) of the Act, 1989 was filed before the
jurisdictional Court. Thereafter, learned trial Court framed
4 / 18
charge under Sections 294 of IPC and 3(1) (x) of the Act,
1989, to which he abjured his guilt and prayed for trial.
3. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined as
many as 10 witnesses. Statement of the accused was also
recorded under Section 313 of CrPC in which he denied all
the incriminating circumstances appearing against him in
the prosecution case, pleaded innocence and false
implication.
4. Learned trial Court after hearing counsel for the respective
parties and considering the material available on record, by
the impugned judgment convicted and sentenced the
accused/appellant as mentioned in para 1 of this judgment.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the finding of
the learned trial Court is erroneous and contrary to the
settled principle of law and also against the rule of
prudence. The three eye-witnesses were examined by the
Prosecution but PW-2 Dhaniram Bareth turned hostile, PW-
3 Ramlal Nishad and PW-8 Vidyadhar Thathwar both have
categorically admitted that the main basis of incident was
with regard to the payment of monthly fee only and except
that there was no such reason for altercation, which shows
that the caste of the complainant was nowhere reason for
the quarrel. Learned counsel further submits that according
to the eye-witnesses PW-2, PW-3 and PW-8, the incident
5 / 18
took place in a room of the school which was not within the
public domain, therefore, Section 3 (1) (x) of the Act, 1989 is
not attracted against the appellant. Learned counsel also
submits that except PW-2, PW-3 and PW-8, other witnessed
like Puniram PW-1, Deepak Patel PW-4 and Benudhar
Pandhi PW-9, who were also material witnesses of the
case, turned hostile and there is contradiction in their
statements to that of the statements recorded under Section
161 of Cr.P.C. Learned counsel also submits that defence
witness namely G.S. Sidar (A.S.I.) (D.W.-1) was also
examined by the, who has categorically stated that the first
report (Ex.D-5) was lodged by the appellant against the
complainant and when the complainant came to know about
this report, he lodged the instant report just to implicate the
appellant in Atrocities Act. The learned trial Court ought to
have appreciated the statement of defence witness while
passing the impugned judgment. Learned counsel also
submits that there are numbers of material contradictions
and omission amongst the prosecution witness and,
therefore, the benefit of doubt, of course, has to go to the
appellant. Learned counsel also submits that the caste
certificate was issued by the Tahsildar which was valid for
six months and the same was issued after the occurrence of
6 / 18
the incident, therefore, also no case is made out against the
appellant.
In support of his submission, learned counsel placed
reliance on the decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
matter of Karuppudayar Vs. State represented by the
Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lalgudi, Trichy & Ors.
reported in 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 133 and Rabindra Kumar
Chhatoi Vs. State of Odisha & Anr. reported in 2024
LiveLaw (SC) 975.
6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State strongly
opposed the prayer of the appellant and submits that the
learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant and no
interference is called for by this Court.
7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record of the learned trial Court.
8. It is apparent from the record of the trial Court that the
learned trial Court framed charge against the appellant
under Sections 294 of IPC and 3 (1) (x) of the Act, 1989,
and after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence,
the learned trial Court considering the provision of Act,
1989, convicted and sentenced him as mentioned in para of
of this judgment.
9. As regards the conviction of the appellant under Section 3
(1) (x) of the Act, 1989, it transpires from the record of the
7 / 18
learned trial Court that the prosecution has produced caste
certificate (Ex.P/8), perusal of which goes to show that it
was issued by Nayab Tahsildar, Raigarh on 23.06.205 and
valid for only 6 months. The FIR (Ex.P-9) was lodged by the
complainant on 25.05.2005. Thus, it is clear that this caste
certificate was issued by the Nayab Tahsildar after the
occurrence of the incident and after lodging of FIR. Neelam
Toppo (PW-3), Tahsildar, has stated that on 23.06.2005, he
issued caste certificate (Ex.P-8) to Chandel Singh Manhar,
S/o Late Rajaram, R/o Rajeev Nagar, Raigarh of Scheduled
Caste Satnami. This witness in her cross-examination has
admitted that the case certificate (Ex.P-8) is temporary,
which is valid for only 06 months and thereafter permanent
caste certificate is being issued. He has also submitted that
he had issued the caste certificate on the basis of
documents and affidavit.
10. The question which arises for consideration before this
Court whether the conviction of the accused/appellant under
the provision of SC/ST Act is sustainable or not when there
is temporary caste certificate available on record.
11. While dealing with the issue where the case certificate was
issued after the occurrence of incident, the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh observed in the matter of Babulal Patel
Vs. The state of M. P. order dated 15.05.2024, passed in
8 / 18
Criminal Appeal No. 648 of 2004, held in paras 6,7 & 8 as
under:-
6. The learned trial court has convicted the
accused for the offence of Section 3(1)(x) of the
Act and for this, reliance has been placed upon
the provisional caste certificate of complainant,
marked as Ex.P-2. It was issued by Tahsildar on
18.12.2002 and contents thereof reveal that it was
issued temporarily while the incident of the
present case occurred on 8.12.2002, therefore, it
is clear that this provisional caste certificate was
obtained from Tahsildar after the date of incident.
7. The circular issued by General Administration
Department of Madhya Pradesh Government
dated 30.6.2001 with No.F.7-32/2000/s very
relevant here because it came into existence prior
to the issuance of provisional certificate of Ex. P-2
in this case. This circular makes it clear that the
practice of issuing provisional caste certificate is
being stopped henceforth and only in exceptional
circumstances, the provisional caste certificate
would be issued. Those exceptional
circumstances have also been discussed in the
circular itself and they are:
(1) for seeking admission in an education
institute. (2) for applying for a Government
job. (3) for appearing in an interview. (4) for
applying in a Government scheme.
Under only these four exceptional conditions and
9 / 18
that too when the caste certificate is required
immediately, the provisional caste certificate was
supposed to be issued; for it an application is duly
supported with the affidavit and the reason of
urgency was to be made. The circular further
clarifies that the validity period of this caste
certificate would be maximum six months and all
such cases in which provisional caste certificate is
issued shall be enquired into within the prescribed
time frame and if the applicant is not found to be
entitled to the certificate, his provisional caste
certificate would be cancelled.
8. The above discussed circular was in
enforcement when the provisional caste certificate
of complainant, marked as Ex.P-2, was issued by
Tahsildar. This caste certificate was issued to
prove the caste of complainant in a criminal case.
Obviously, the purpose of issuing this provisional
caste certificate was not covered under the
circular of 30.6.2001. Thus, the learned trial court
was in error in relying upon the caste certificate of
Ex.P-2 which was issued in flagrant violation of
the existing circular of Madhya Pradesh
Government dated 30.6.2001. In the light of this
observation, it is held that the caste of
complainant was not duly proved in the case by
any credible document.
12. Further, this Court in the matter of Meghnath Vs. State of
Chhattisgarh [ Cr.A. No.822/2002 dated 24.06.2024],
referring the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of
10 / 18
Kumari Madhuri Patil Vs. Additional Commissioner,
Tribal Development reported in AIR 1995 SC 94, held in
paras 11 and 12 as under :-
13. "11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
matter of Ku. Madhuri Patil (supra) which has
been followed by this court in the case of Pilla
Bai (supra). Supreme Court in Ku. Madhuri Patil
(supra) has specifically observed that the
application for grant of social status certificate
shall be made to the Revenue Sub-Divisional
Officer and Deputy Collector or Deputy
Commissioner and the certificate shall be issued
by such officer rather that officer at Taluk or
Mandal Level.
14. 12. Considering the overall material and
evidence available on record, in the light of the
matter of Ku. Madhuri Patil (supra), it is found
that the Caste Certificate vide (Ex.P-3) of the
complainant was issued by the Village-Sarpanch
(PW-6) who is not a competent authority to issue
caste certificate. Therefore, the conviction of the
appellant for the offence punishable under
Section 3 (1) (x) of S.C. and S.T. (Prevention of
Atrocities Act) is not found proved beyond
reasonable doubt and the same is liable to be set
aside."
15. Thus, from the aforesaid judgment of High Court of Madhya
Pradesh and this Court, when looked into the present case,
the caste certificate was issued after the occurrence of
11 / 18
incident and it was valid for only six months. The present is
not an exceptional case. In the light of above judgment
Babulal and Meghnath (supra), in the instant case, it is
clear that caste certificate (Ex. P/8) was issued by Nayab
Tahsildar after the date of incident on the basis of
documents and affidavit of complainant, but learned Trial
Court relied on temporary/provisional caste certificate, which
was issued by Nayab Tahsildar, Raigarh, though it was only
valid for six months and wrongly convicted the appellant for
offence under Section 3(1)(x) of SC & ST Act. Thus,
conviction of the accused/appellant under Section 3 (1)(x) of
SC/ST Act is not sustainable, as such, findings recorded by
learned Trial Court in this regard are set aside and the
appellant is acquitted of the charge under Section 3 (1)(x) of
SC/ ST Act.
16. The question which arise for consideration whether the
learned trial Court was fully justified in convicting the
appellant for the offence punishable under Section 294 of
the IPC.
17. Punai Ram (PW-1) and Dhaniram Bareth (PW-2) are the
Peon, who at the time of incident were posted in Bhupdev
Primary School, have not supported the prosecution case
and turned hostile. The prosecution cross-examined these
witnesses and they only admitted this suggestion that some
12 / 18
quarrel took place between the complainant and the
appellant. They have specifically denied this fact that the
appellant uttered caste remark against the complainant PW-
5.
18. Complainant Chandel Singh Manhar (PW-5) has stated that
at the time of the incident in the year 2005, he was posted in
Primary School Rampur and was doing the assigned task of
Educational Coordinator in the office of Bhupdev Boys
Primary School. On 18.3.2005, he and School Incharge Shri
Vidyadhar Thethwar (PW-8), Ramlal Nishad (PW-3) -
Teacher, Dhaniram (PW-2) and one teacher Shri Ajay Barwa
of Saint Michael School were also present and were
preparing the list of Supervisors for 10-12th Board
Examination. At the same time, at around 12:30 PM, the
peon of the appellant, whose name he does not know, came
to them to give monthly details. Vidyadhar Thethwar (PW-8)
said that the monthly details of all the schools have been
collected & submitted and they are doing some other work
and said him to bring the monthly details later, thereafter,
the peon of the appellant went back from there. He has also
stated that after some time, the appellant came to their
office with monthly details and asked Vidyadhar Thethwar
(PW-8) that why were they not taking monthly details, then
he (PW-8) said that he has sent the monthly details and
13 / 18
currently doing the exam related work. Meanwhile, the
appellant slapped Vidyadhar (PW-8) saying that why don't
he take monthly details and tore the list that they were
preparing. He has also stated that thereafter the appellant
took Vidyadhar (PW-8) outside and started beating him.
When he (this witness) tried to intervene, the accused called
me a bastard Chamaar who are you to save me and I will
deal with him first and then I will deal with you, saying this
the appellant called him a bastard Chamaar, and abused
him with filthy language and uttered caste remark. Even
then he was trying to intervene between the appellant and
Vidyadhar (PW-8). He has also stated that he separated
them, even then the appellant was abusing him and
Vidyadhar. Thereafter, he lodged a written report of the
incident in Harijan police station Raigarh vide Ex.P-6. The
police had seized his caste certificate (Ex.P-8) vide seizure
memo Ex.P-7 and has admitted his signature thereon. The
police had also seized the broken glasses and documents
vide Ex.P-4 and he admitted his signature thereon on 'B to
B' part. In cross-examination, he has admitted that the
appellant was Principal of Primary School and there was no
cordial relation between the appellant and Vidyadhar
Thethwar (PW-8) and there used to be quarrel between
them. This witness, in para 11, has also admitted this fact
14 / 18
that in written report (Ex.P-6) he did not write that the
appellant uttered caste remark when he tried to intervene
the dispute, and there is no reason for not writing the same
in his written report (Ex.P-6).
19. Vidyadhar Thethwar (PW-8) has stated that when the
appellant was quarreling with him, complainant Chandel
Singh Manhar (PW-5) came there to intervene the dispute
and then the appellant started uttering caste remark. In para
12 of his cross-examination, he has admitted that he had
not filed any report about the said incident in the office. He
has no knowledge that on 18.03.2005 whether the
appellant, in the capacity of Principal, had lodged any report
against him in police station or not. This witness has denied
this suggestion that on the date of incident, he threatened
the appellant that he will get a report lodged against him in
Harijan Police Station by complainant Chandel Singh
Manhar (PW-5) and will implicate him under the Harijan Act,
because he had filed a report against them yesterday.
20. It is clear from the statements of complainant (PW-5) and
other prosecution witnesses that the incident took place in
the room of the school in which the alleged overt act was
attributed to the appellant.
21. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Rabindra (supra) held in para 13
and 14 as under :-
15 / 18
"13.........The place of occurrence of the alleged
offence was at the backyard of the appellant's
house. Backyard of a private house cannot be
within the public view. The persons who
accompanied the second respondent were also
the employees or the labour force she had
engaged for the purpose of carrying out repairs
to her house which is adjacent to the appellant's
house. They cannot also be termed as public in
general.
14. In the circumstances, we do not think that
the alleged utterance of the appellant herein was
"in any place within public view". Therefore, the
allegation against the appellant herein, was not
made out as such."
22. While addressing the essentials to constitute Section 294
IPC, it is relevant to extract Section 294 of IPC as under :
"294. Obscene acts and songs. - Whoever, to the
annoyance of others -
(a) does any obscene act in any public place, or
(b) sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad
or words, in or near any public place,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to three
months, or with fine, or with both.
23. On order to secure a conviction, the provision of Section
294 IPC requires two particulars to be proved by the
prosecution, i.e (i) the offender has done any obscene act in
any public place or has sung, recited or uttered any obscene
16 / 18
songs or words in or near any public place; and (ii) has so
caused annoyance to others. If the act complained of is not
obscene, or is not done in any public place, or the song
recited or uttered is not obscene, or is not sung, recited or
uttered in or near any public place, or that it causes no
annoyance to others, the offence is not committed. The
courts should be sensitive to the changing perspectives and
concepts of morality to appreciate the effect of Section 294
IPC on today's society and its standards and its changing
views of obscenity. The expression 'public place' is not
defined in the Criminal Procedure Code or in the Penal
Code. In Queen v. Wellard [(1884) 14 QBD 63, Grose, J.
laid down that a public place "is a place where the public go,
no matter whether they have a right to go or not", and this
definition has been accepted by subsequent judicial
decisions both in India and in England. A place in order to
be public, must, therefore, be open to the public i.e. a place
to which the public have access by right, permission, usage
or otherwise.
24. It is apparent from the evidence of aforesaid prosecution
witnesses that the alleged incident took place in school
office and the independent witnesses PW1 and PW-2 have
not supported the prosecution case & Vidyadhar Thethwar
(PW-8) has admitted that the appellant has also filed
complaint against him. Further, in para 13, PW-8 has
admitted that in the instant incident, an inquiry was also
conducted by the office and the same was done by Block
Education Officer Mr. Swarnkar. He has also admitted that
during inquiry, their statements were recorded by Mr.
Swarnkar. He does not know that what conclusion was
drawn by the Investigating Officer in the Departmental
Inquiry. He cannot tell that whether the conclusion was
given in the investigation that the incident he described did
not occur. In para 14, he has also admitted that complainant
tried to intervene the dispute in the office room and then the
alleged incident of uttering caste remark took place. The
incident which took place in office room was subsided later
and he (PW-8) went from there, thereafter, no incident was
taken place with him on the same day. He has also stated
that he has no knowledge whether complainant (PW-5)
lodged any report in Harijan Police Station on 2-3rd day of
the incident or not. Having noticed the above fact, it is clear
that the incident took place in the room of the school and as
per Section 294 of IPC, it is not a public place. The
independent witnesses have also not supported the case of
the prosecution. The prosecution has utterly failed to prove
its case beyond reasonable doubt. So, Section 294 of IPC is
also not made out against the appellant.
25. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment
of conviction and order of sentence dated 07.03.2014
passed by the Special Judge (constituted under SC/ST
Atrocities) Act, 1989, Raigarh (C.G.), in Special Case No.
21/2005, is set aside and the Appellant is acquitted of the
charge levelled against him.
26. The appellant is already on bail. Keeping in view of the
provisions of Section 437-A Cr.P.C. (481 of the B.N.S.S.),
the appellant is directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond
in terms of Form No.45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal
Procedure of sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like
amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective
for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in
the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the
instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid
appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the
Hon'ble Supreme Court.
27. Let a copy of this judgment and the original record be
transmitted to the trial Court concerned forthwith for
necessary information and compliance.
Sd/-
(Rajani Dubey)
Judge
pekde
