State Of Chhattisgarh vs Bhuwal Sonkar @ Notta
2022 Latest Caselaw 838 Chatt

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                                                                      NAFR
         HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

                      CRMP No. 933 of 2013


      The State of Chhattisgarh, Through : Police Station -
       Dongargaon, District Rajnandgaon (C.G.).
                                                          ---- Applicant
                                   Versus
      Bhuwal Sonkar @ Notta, S/o Late Arjilal, aged about 25
       years, R/o village Arjuni P.S. Dongargaon, District
       Rajnandgaon (C.G.).


                                                       ---- Respondent

For Petitioner/State : Mr. Amit Singh Chouhan, P.L. For Respondent : Mr. Abhishek Sharma, Advocate.

Hon'ble Smt Justice Rajani Dubey

Judgment on Board

18/02/2022

1. Heard on prayer for grant of leave to appeal.

2. The present petition has been filed by the State seeking

leave to appeal under Section 378 (3) of the code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 assailing the judgment and

order dated 28.02.2013 passed by Sessions Judge,

Rajnandgaon (C.G.), in Sessions Trial No.16/2021

acquitting the accused/respondent for the offence

punishable under Sections 457, 354 and 306 of Indian

Penal Code.

3. Brief facts of the case are that on 05.11.2011 at night,

Santoshi Bai (since deceased) along with her daughter

was sleeping in a room, whereas her in-laws were

sleeping in adjacent room. At the relevant time, the

accused/respondent entered the room of Santoshi Bai

and tried to outrage her modesty. She somehow freed

from the clutches of accused/respondent, came to

courtyard and took kerosene oil which was kept there.

Santoshi Bai with a view to scare the

accused/respondent said that if he (accused/respondent)

harasses her, she would die pouring kerosene oil on her.

On which, the accused/respondent said her to die.

Thereafter, she poured kerosene oil on her and set

herself on fire. After the incident of burn, she was taken

to the hospital where she succumbed to the burn

injuries. On the basis of which, FIR bearing Crime

No.238/2011 was registered under Sections 458 and 354

IPC against unknown person. Prior to one day of the

date of incident, deceased Santoshi Bai had disclosed

the name of intruder to be the present

accused/respondent to her sister-in-law namely

Tameshwari Bai (PW/12). After investigation, charge

sheet was filed against the accused/respondent. The trial

Judge framed the charges against accused/respondents

under Sections 457, 354 and 306 IPC.

4. So as to hold the accused/respondent guilty, the

prosecution has examined 21 witnesses. Statement of

the accused/respondent was also recorded under

Section 313 of Cr.P.C. in which he denied the

circumstances appearing against him in the prosecution

case, pleaded innocence and false implication.

5. The trial Court after hearing counsel for the respective

parties and considering the material available on record

has acquitted the accused/respondent as mentioned in

para-1 of this judgment. Hence, this petition for leave to

appeal.

6. Learned counsel for the State submits that the trial Court

has erred in law in acquitting the accused/respondent

even when there is ample evidence against him. He also

submits that the prosecution has proved its case by

reliable witnesses.

7. On the other hand, learned counsel for

respondent/accused supported the impugned judgment

of acquittal.

8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

material available on record.

9. From the evidence of Leela Bai (PW/6) and Chamru Ram

(PW/7), though they have stated that the deceased had

told them that the accused/respondent tried to outrage

her modesty, therefore, she poured kerosene oil on her

and set herself ablaze, but PW/6 and PW/7 have not

uttered anything specific about the accused/respondent

in their police statement recorded under Section 161 of

Cr.P.C.. That apart, there is dying declaration (Ex.P/7) of

the deceased which was recorded by Executive

Magistrate Rajendra Prasad Tiwari (PW/16), according to

which, the deceased had denied to identify the

accused/respondent. Furthermore, the version of

deceased gets corroborated by Dehati Nalishi (Ex.P/15),

wherein also the deceased had also told about some

unknown person. The trial Court, in para 17, has

recorded that according to the evidence of Chamru

(PW/7), father-in-law of deceased, one day prior to the

date of incident he was taken by the

accused/respondent to consume liquor, and suspicion

was raised by the prosecution that the

accused/respondent was well aware about non-

availability of deceased's husband at night and this

circumstance goes against the accused/respondent, but

only on this basis, it cannot be held that the

accused/respondent was the only person who had

entered the room of the deceased at night. The mere

suspicion, howsoever strong it is, can not take the place

of proof.

10. Considering the statements of Shital (PW/2), Hirendra

Kumar (PW/3), Raj Kumar (PW/4), Prakash (PW/5), Leela

Bai (PW/6), Chamru (PW/7), dying declaration (Ex.P/7) of

the deceased and Dehati Nalishi (Ex.P/15), the trial court

has come to the conclusion that the prosecution has

failed to prove its case beyond the shadow of doubt and

thus acquitted the accused/respondent of the charges

levelled against him. The learned Court below has

meticulously examined the evidence of prosecution

witnesses and recorded its finding of acquittal. I find no

illegality in the order impugned acquitting the

respondent particularly when there is a settled legal

position that if on the basis of record two conclusions

can be arrived at, the one favouring the accused has to

be preferred. Even otherwise, the prosecution thus has

utterly failed in proving its case beyond reasonable

doubt and the trial Court has been fully justified in

recording the finding of acquittal which is based on

proper appreciation of evidence available on record.

Furthermore, in case of appeal against the acquittal the

scope is very limited and interference can only be made

if finding recorded by the trial Court is highly perverse or

arrived at by ignoring the relevant material and

considering the irrelevant ones. In the present case, no

such circumstance is there warranting interference by

this Court.

11. Accordingly, the CRMP preferred by the State/applicant is

bereft of any substance and, therefore, the same is

liable to be and is hereby dismissed at the admission

stage itself leading to refusal of leave to appeal as

sought for by the State.

Sd/-

(Rajani Dubey) JUDGE

pekde