Calcutta High Court
Sandipta Gangopadhyay vs The Indian Bank And Ors on 8 May, 2025
OD - 5
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
ORIGINAL SIDE
WPO/1086/2024
IA NO: GA/1/2025
SANDIPTA GANGOPADHYAY
VS
THE INDIAN BANK AND ORS.
BEFORE :
HON'BLE JUSTICE PARTHA SARATHI CHATTERJEE
DATE : 8th May, 2025.
Appearance :
Mr. Rahul Karmakar, Adv.
Mr. Sounak Mukherjee, Adv.
...for the petitioner.
Mr.Shiv Managal Singh, Adv.
..for the respondent bank.
The Court :- The present writ petition has been filed challenging the
justifiability of the transfer order dated June 28, 2024. In addition, the petitioner
has sought directions to the respondent bank to make adequate arrangements for
travel, including the grant of traveling allowance, and to treat the petitioner as
being on official duty in order to enable him to effectively contest the criminal
proceeding, being Special Case No. 02 of 2015, which is presently pending final
adjudication before the Learned Additional Sessions Judge, 1st Court, Hooghly at
Chinsurah.
Briefly stated, the facts that led to filing of this writ petition are that the
petitioner commenced his service career as a Manager with Allahabad Bank in
the year 2008. In April 2021, he was transferred to the Zonal Office at Chinsurah,
where he served as Manager, Credit. He is presently posted in the SAM Vertical at
the Mumbai Branch. During his tenure as Manager, Credit at the Zonal Office,
Chinsurah, the petitioner was allegedly involved in accepting an illegal
gratification of ₹25,000/- from one Moni Majumder, purportedly to facilitate the
sanctioning of a loan in Mr. Majumder's favour. The alleged transaction was
video graphed, and the Officer-in-Charge of the jurisdictional police station is
reported to have recovered the currency notes from the possession of the
petitioner. Pursuant to this incident, a formal complaint was lodged against the
petitioner.
Based on that complaint, an FIR was registered as Magra P.S. Case No. 316
of 2014 dated 20th August, 2014, under Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860, and Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Thereafter, the
respondent Bank granted sanction for prosecution against the petitioner under
Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act by an order dated 28.02.2015.
Upon completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed, and following the
completion of necessary formalities, the case was committed to the Court of the
Learned Sessions Judge, Hooghly. Subsequently, the matter was transferred to
the Court of the Learned Additional Sessions Judge, 1 st Court, Hooghly at
Chinsurah, for trial.
In contemplation of disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner, he was
placed under suspension. The petitioner thereafter submitted a representation
before the competent authority seeking revocation of the suspension order.
However, despite receipt of the said representation, no effective decision was
taken by the authority. Consequently, the petitioner was constrained to file a writ
petition, being W.P. No. 5762(W) of 2015. The said writ petition was disposed of
by an order dated 25.03.2015, whereby the competent authority was directed to
reconsider the petitioner's prayer for revocation of the suspension order.
However, the competent authority ultimately declined to revoke the order
of suspension. Aggrieved by this decision, the petitioner filed another writ
petition, being WPA No. 7288 of 2015, challenging the refusal to revoke his
suspension. The said writ petition was disposed of by an order dated 21.04.2015,
whereby the competent authority was directed to permit the petitioner to resume
his duties. The respondent Bank challenged the said order dated 21.04.2015 by
filing an intra-court appeal, being FMA No. 3541 of 2015. However, the said
appeal was ultimately dismissed by the Hon'ble Court on 30.08.2019.
Pursuant to the order dated 30.08.2019, the petitioner was permitted to
rejoin his duties. However, despite his reinstatement, no back wages were
released in his favour, which gave rise to another round of litigation. The
petitioner accordingly filed a writ petition, being WPA No. 5611 of 2020, seeking
an order for payment of back wages. The said writ petition was disposed of by an
order dated 04.12.2020, directing the bank authorities to disburse the back
wages to the petitioner. In compliance with the said order, the petitioner
subsequently received the back wages.
Subsequently, the petitioner was transferred to the post of Senior Manager
in the SAM Vertical, Recovery Cell, at the Mumbai Central Office. Aggrieved by
the said transfer order, the petitioner submitted a representation to the
competent authority, seeking its revocation.
However, as the earlier representation failed to elicit any favourable
response, the petitioner was compelled to once again approach this Hon'ble
Court by filing a fresh writ petition, being WPO 753 of 2024. The said writ
petition was disposed of by an order dated 19th September, 2024, whereby the
Bank was directed to reconsider the petitioner's transfer order.
Pursuant to the aforesaid direction dated 19.09.2024, the Bank issued an
order dated 28th June, 2024, whereby it declined to revoke the transfer order.
Aggrieved by the said order dated 28th June, 2024, the petitioner has preferred
the present writ petition.
Mr. Karmakar, learned advocate for the petitioner, submits that following
the petitioner's implication in the aforesaid criminal case, he was subjected to
various forms of harassment and became a victim of bureaucratic high-
handedness. It is submitted that the petitioner's salary was withheld, and he was
placed under suspension, thereby compelling him to approach this Hon'ble Court
by filing a writ petition. The petitioner, having faced continued adversity, was
constrained to seek the intervention of this Hon'ble Court on multiple occasions.
He submits that by an order dated 21st April, 2015 passed in WPA No.
7288 of 2015, the petitioner's order of suspension was set aside. The intra-court
appeal preferred against the said order dated 21.04.2015 was also dismissed,
thereby affirming the petitioner's reinstatement. Subsequently, in compliance
with the order dated 4th December, 2020 passed in WPA No. 5611 of 2020, the
petitioner was paid his back wages. He further contends that, thereafter, the
concerned authorities transferred the petitioner to the post of Senior Manager in
the SAM Vertical, Recovery Cell, at the Bank's Mumbai Central Office.
Mr. Karmakar, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the
impugned transfer order stands vitiated by mala fides, having been issued with
an ulterior motive to prejudice the petitioner. By narrating the sequence of
adverse incidents faced by the petitioner, he attempts to link those incidents to
the present transfer order, and contends is tainted with malice.
He further submits that the purported reasoned order, which refuses to set
aside the transfer, cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. Accordingly, he prays
for an appropriate direction upon the respondent Bank to transfer the petitioner
to a location from which he can undertake an overnight journey to attend the
Sessions Court and effectively defend himself in the ongoing criminal trial. In aid
of his contention, he cites three decisions, reported at (1994) Supp(2) SCC 666
(Director of School Education, Madras & Ors. vs. O. Karuppa Thevan & Anr.)
and AIR 1993 SC 2486 (State of Punjab & Ors. vs. Joginder Singh Dhatt) and
(1991) 4 SCC 132 (Reserve Bank of India vs. Reserve Bank of India Staff Officers
Association and Ors.).
In rebuttal, Mr. Singh, learned advocate appearing for the respondent
Bank, submits that there is no nexus between the impugned transfer order and
the incidents narrated by the petitioner. He contends that the transfer order was
purely in the public interest and on account of administrative exigencies.
It is further submitted that the petitioner has already accepted the transfer
order and has joined the post at the transferred post. Therefore, according to Mr.
Singh, the petitioner is now estopped from challenging the transfer order at this
belated stage.
Mr. Singh further submits that the transfer order was issued strictly in
accordance with the Indian Bank (Officers') Service Regulations, 1979, and
reiterates that it was made in the interest of the Bank's administration. He also
asserts that the judgments relied upon by the petitioner are factually
distinguishable and have no application to the present case.
Heard the learned advocate. Perused the materials on record.
It is well settled that the provision of transfer forms an integral part of the
service jurisprudence, designed to ensure the smooth and efficient functioning of
the administration. Transfers serve the purpose of promoting transparency,
accountability, and equitable opportunities among employees. Continued posting
at one station or in one department is not conducive to good administration.
An employer enjoys broad discretion in placing an employee at a post based
on administrative needs and organizational requirements. It is the prerogative of
the employer to decide which employee would be posted at what place. No
employee can claim a vested right to remain posted at a particular place or
position. The scope of judicial review in matters of transfer is limited. A transfer
order may only be interfered with by the Court if it is demonstrated that the order
was issued in contravention of a statutory provision or applicable policy, is
tainted with mala fide intention, or is punitive in nature.
As previously noted, Mr. Karmakar attempts to draw a connection between
the incidents faced by the petitioner following his implication in the criminal case
and the impugned transfer order. He contends that these incidents influenced the
decision of the competent authority, thereby leading to the petitioner's transfer to
Mumbai. On this basis, he invites this Hon'ble Court to hold that the transfer
order stands vitiated by mala fide intention.
Mere proximity between two events is not, by itself, sufficient for a prudent
person to conclude that one event was motivated by the other. Allegations of mala
fide intention, which inherently involve a hidden state of mind, must be
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence manifested through the conduct
of the concerned authority. In the absence of cogent and credible material
indicating that the transfer order was issued on extraneous or irrelevant grounds,
such an order cannot be held to be vitiated by mala fides. Mere suspicion or
conjecture, without substantive proof, is insufficient to warrant judicial
interference.
Admittedly, the petitioner holds a transferable post and is liable to be posted at
any location within India, as per the terms of his service. It is also not in dispute
that the petitioner has accepted the transfer order and joined his new assignment
accordingly. While implication in a criminal case and subsequent detention in
judicial custody may give rise to departmental actions such as suspension or
disputes regarding service-related benefits, in the absence of cogent and
convincing material, it is difficult to arrive at a definitive conclusion that such
incidents were the motivating factors behind the issuance of the transfer order.
There can be no doubt as to the binding nature of the precedents cited by Mr.
Karmakar. However, the decisions cited by Mr. Karmkar are distinguishable on
facts. It is well settled that a judgment is an authority only for what it actually
decides, and even a slight variation in facts can significantly impact the decision-
making process. A precedent cannot be mechanically applied without first
examining whether the factual matrix and legal context of the cited case fit in
with the facts and circumstances of the case at hand.
Therefore, I do not find any justification to accept the petitioner's
contention. The petitioner has failed to produce any rule or regulation
establishing that the employer is under a legal obligation to make financial
provisions to enable an employee to attend a proceeding before a Court of law.
In view of the above, the writ petition stands dismissed. Consequently, the
application, if any, filed in connection with the writ petition is also dismissed.
However, there shall be no order as to costs.
(PARTHA SARATHI CHATTERJEE, J.)
sd//Arsad, AR(CR)
