Asim Kumar Ghorai vs The State Of West Bengal And Others
2024 Latest Caselaw 4709 Cal

Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)

Asim Kumar Ghorai vs The State Of West Bengal And Others on 13 September, 2024

                IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
            CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
                          Appellate Side


Present:

The Hon'ble Justice Ajay Kumar Gupta


                          C.R.R. 1375 of 2017


                          Asim Kumar Ghorai
                                Versus
                The State of West Bengal and Others




For the Petitioner          :      Mr. Amal Krishna Samanta, Adv.




For the State               :      Mr. Debasish Roy, Ld. PP
                                   Ms. Sreyashee Biswas, Adv.




Heard on                    :      25.06.2024



Judgment on                 :      13.09.2024
                               2




Ajay Kumar Gupta, J:

1.

Petitioner being the de-facto complainant has filed this

Criminal Revisional application under Sections 401 read with Section

482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 challenging the

Judgment and Order dated 18.02.2017, thereby the Learned

Sessions Judge, Purba Medinipur dismissed the Criminal Appeal No.

04/2016, which was preferred against the Judgment and Order dated

25.01.2016, passed by the Learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, 3rd

Court, Tamluk, Purba Medinipur, in G.R. Case No. 1558 of 2013 (T.R.

No. 820/2014) arising out of Moyna Police Station Case No.

182/2013 dated 29.09.2013 under Sections

457/380/447/427/323/506/34 of the Indian Penal Code.

2. By the said Judgment and Order dated 25.01.2016, the

Learned Trial Court acquitted the accused persons under Section 248

(1) of the CrPC, 1973 from the aforesaid G.R. Case No. 1558 of 2013.

3. The factual matrix prior to filing of this instant Criminal

Revisional application is as under:

3a. On 28.09.2013, the accused persons had trespassed in the

residence of Asim Kumar Ghorai and beaten up him. The said

accused persons also taken away the gold ornaments by breaking

Almirah valued at 1, 80,000/= along with brass metal utensils and

caused damage to him.

3b. Upon receiving such complaint, the Police officer of Moyna

Police Station registered a case being Moyna Police Station Case No.

182/2013 dated 29.09.2013 under Sections

457/380/447/427/323/506/34 of the Indian Penal Code against

three accused persons, petitioners herein and investigation was

initiated. After conclusion of investigation, the Investigating Officer

submitted charge sheet under Sections

457/380/447/427/323/506/34 of the Indian Penal Code against all

the accused, when materials collected during investigation

established a prima facie case. Thereafter, charge was framed under

Sections 323/427/506/447/380 of the IPC by the Learned Trial

Court.

3c. It is the contention of the petitioner that on the date of

examination of the prosecution witnesses i.e. on 25.01.2016, the

petitioner (P.W. 1) and his brother (P.W. 2) entered into the Court

room, when the matter was called on. When they entered into the

court room, the Learned Magistrate initially asked the petitioner (P.W.

1) whether he agreed to compromise with the matter as the dispute

was between the brothers. The petitioner expressed his willingness.

Thereafter, the Learned Magistrate directed the petitioner and his

brother to sign on the paper. They signed on the side of the blank

papers on the same date i.e. on 25.01.2016. They did not stand in

the witness box for their examination or for cross-examination.

3d. It is further contended that the Learned Judicial Magistrate,

1st Class, 3rd Court, Tamluk did not call any other witnesses for

examination from the side of prosecution and then and there closed

the evidence from the side of prosecution. Thereafter, the Learned

Magistrate pronounced the Judgment and Order of acquittal of the

accused persons without examining them under Section 313 of the

CrPC. After collecting the copies of the depositions and Judgment and

Order dated 25.01.2016 passed by the Learned Judicial Magistrate,

1st Class, 3rd Court, Tamluk, the petitioner was surprised and

perplexed to know that the accused persons have been acquitted

from the case. In such a circumstance, petitioner had no other

efficacious remedy except filing of the appeal before the Learned

Sessions Judge, Purba Medinipur at Tamluk feeling aggrieved and

dissatisfied with the manner of deciding the criminal case though

there were sufficient incriminating materials available against the

accused persons.

3e. The petitioner, therefore, preferred an appeal before the

Learned Sessions Judge, Purba Medinipur at Tamluk against the

aforesaid Judgment and Order dated 25.01.2016, passed by the

Learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, 3rd Court, Tamluk, Purba

Medinipur, in G.R. Case No. 1558 of 2013 (T.R. No. 820/2014) being

Criminal Appeal No. 04/2016.

3f. After hearing the parties on 18.02.2017, the Learned

Sessions Judge was pleased to dismiss the appeal on contest on the

ground that the same was non-maintainable. Learned Sessions Judge

has observed that appellant cannot be termed as a 'Victim' in any

view of the matter. Accordingly, appellant has no right to appeal

against the acquittal order and thus, the appeal found as not

maintainable as such, the petitioner has approached before this

Hon'ble High Court praying for setting aside the Judgment and Order

of both the Learned Courts below. Hence, the Criminal Revisional

application came up before this Bench for consideration.

4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner

vehemently argued and submitted that no sufficient opportunity was

afforded to the petitioner to place his case at the time of trial. Simply,

the Learned Trial Judge asked the witnesses whether they are willing

to compromise with the matter or not as the dispute was between the

brothers. When one of the witnesses i.e. P.W. 1 expressed his

willingness to compromise, the Learned Trial Court has recorded his

examination and cross-examination without adducing any evidence

or standing on the court dock. On the same date, evidence of the

prosecution was closed, Judgement and Order was delivered and

acquitted the three accused persons. Although one accused person

was absent on that date. No accused persons were examined under

Section 313 of the CrPC prior of delivery of judgment. The Learned

Trial Magistrate did not follow the actual procedure prescribed in

Chapter XIX of the CrPC for a trial. The accused persons were very

much involved in the offence alleged by the petitioner/de-facto

complainant. The accusation against the accused persons was

serious in nature as the accused persons trespassed in the residence

of Asim Kumar Ghorai and beaten up him, taken away the gold

ornaments and caused damage to him. If the Learned Magistrate

would have given proper opportunity to the witnesses, the result

would have been different. Only P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 have been

examined though other witnesses were also listed in the charge sheet.

The intention of the Learned Magistrate was not justified while

deciding the case of the petitioner and acquitted all the accused

persons though one of the accused persons was absent on the date of

delivery of Judgment.

4a. The petitioner had preferred a criminal appeal before the

Learned Sessions Judge, Purba Medinipur at Tamluk vide Criminal

Appeal No. 4/2016 but the Learned Sessions Judge, without going

into the merits the case of the petitioner, out rightly dismissed the

appeal on a very simple reason that the de-facto complainant cannot

be termed as 'victim'. The de-facto complainant has no right to appeal

against the acquittal order and thus, the appeal is found to be not

maintainable. The appeal was dismissed only on the ground of non-

maintainability though de-facto complainant sustained injuries when

accused persons assaulted him. He also suffered damages when they

ransacked the complainant's house and taken away the gold

ornaments. He falls within the term 'victim' as defined in Section 2

(wa) of the CrPC.

4b. Learned counsel for the petitioner place a reliance of a

judgement delivered in the case Nirmal Kumar Batabyal vs- State of

West Bengal & Ors.1 to bolster his aforesaid submission. Finally,

petitioner prayed for setting aside the judgement and order of

dismissal of criminal appeal passed by the Learned Session Judge.

Not only that, the Judgment and Order passed by the Learned Trial

Court is also liable to be set aside and matter should be remanded

back for proper disposal after following the procedure as enshrined in

the Code of Criminal Procedure at the time of trial of a case by the

Magistrate.

2016 (3) AICLR 661 (Cal)

5. On the other hand, Learned PP appearing on behalf of the

State vehemently opposed the prayer of the petitioner and further

candidly submitted that the Learned Trial Court has examined two

witnesses i.e. P.Ws. 1 and 2, who were the vital witnesses. But they

neither disclose anything about the incident nor substantiate the

case of assault by the accused persons. PW 1, Sri Asim Kumar

Ghorai, de-facto-complainant simply stated in examination-in-chief

that he cannot say about the incident as he cannot remember about

the incident. Not only that, he has further deposed that accused

persons did not assault him and he has no allegations against the

accused persons. During cross-examination, he admitted similar

statements made in examination-in-chief. The similar statements

were also narrated by the P.W. 2, Mohan Lal Ghorai. From the

evidence of both the witnesses, it transpired there was smell of

compromise or understanding between the parties or witnesses, thus,

they did not depose anything against the accused persons. If the

parties have settled the dispute out of the Court and did not say

anything against the accused persons, the Learned Trial Court had

no option but to acquit the accused persons on the basis of evidence

available on the record. The Learned Trial Court has rightly decided

the case in favour of the accused persons and acquitted them when it

was found no sufficient evidence against the accused persons.

Therefore, the Criminal Revisional application, filed by the petitioner,

has no merits and is liable to dismissed.

DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS OF THIS COURT:

6. It is specific case of the petitioner that the Learned Trial

Court did not afford proper opportunity to adduce prosecution

evidence. P.W.1 and P.W. 2 were not examined on the court dock and

their signatures were obtained in blank papers as one of the

witnesses expressed his view to have compromised the matter. It is

further alleged that Learned Magistrate did not record their evidence

and delivered Judgement and Order on the same dated i.e. on

25.01.2016. The allegation is very serious against the Learned

Magistrate that their signatures were obtained in blank papers and

not recorded their deposition on the court dock.

7. Before dealing/entering into the seriousness of the

allegation, it would be appropriate to scan thoroughly the entire

materials available in the Trial Court Records. Meticulously perusal

of the Trial Court Records, it appears the examination-in-chief and

cross-examinations of the P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 were recorded by the

Learned Magistrate. Judgement and Order of acquittal was delivered

on the same date i.e., on 25.01.2016. It is admitted facts that

accused persons have not been examined under Section 313 of the

CrPC and one of the accused persons was also absent on that day by

filing petition. It is important to note here that while scanning of the

record and on perusal of order dated 25.01.2016, it reveals two

accused, namely, Sukumar Ghorai and Anup Kumar Ghorai were

present physically and another accused, namely, Jamuna Bala

Ghorai was absent but she was represented by her Learned Advocate

under Section 317 of the CrPC. At the same time, it further reveals

from the evidence of both P.W. 1 and P.W. 2, they did not state

anything against the accused persons, though the contention of the

de-facto complainant was that he sustained injuries. It is trite law

that injured witness is a vital witness, who can be an eye witness. On

the basis of evidence of sole eye witness, a conviction can be

awarded. But in the present case, both the vital witnesses stated

nothing against any of the accused persons rather during cross-

examination, de-facto complainant himself stated the case was filed

due to misunderstanding. P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 deposed that they have

no allegation against the accused. In view of the above facts and

circumstances, further examination of witnesses from the side of

prosecution would have been mere formalities and wastage of

valuable time of the Court. Furthermore, prosecution also prayed for

closing of evidence. Contention of the Petitioner with regard to the

non-appearance of the accused at the time of trial and non-

examination of the accused persons under Section 313 of the CrPC is

meaning less and baseless and not tenable in law because when the

accused was represented by his learned advocate under Section 317

of the CrPC, it is incumbent upon the Court to see the personal

attendance of the accused before the Court is necessary or not for the

interest of justice. At the same time, Court may dispense with his

attendance and proceed with the inquiry or trial in his absence, and

may, at any subsequent stage of the proceedings, direct the personal

attendance of such accused. In this regard, this Court would like to

refer the Section 317 of the CrPC for ready reference and for better

understanding as under:

"317. Provision for inquiries and trial being held in the absence of accused in certain cases.--(1) At any stage of an inquiry or trial under this Code, if the Judge or Magistrate is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded, that the personal attendance of the accused before the Court is not necessary in the interests of justice, or that the accused persistently disturbs the proceedings in Court, the Judge or Magistrate may, if the accused is represented by a pleader, dispense with his attendance and proceed with such inquiry or trial in his absence, and may, at any subsequent stage of the proceedings, direct the personal attendance of such accused.

(2) If the accused in any such case is not represented by a pleader, or if the Judge or Magistrate considers his

personal attendance necessary, he may, if he thinks fit and for reasons to be recorded by him, either adjourn such inquiry or trial, or order that the case of such accused be taken up or tried separately."

8. It is further admitted facts that the Learned Trial Magistrate

delivered the Judgment and Order dated 25.01.2016 in absence of

one of the accused persons considering the situation under Section

353 (6) of the CrPC.

"353. Judgment reads as follows:--

(1) ...............

(2) ................

(3) .................

(4) ................

(5) ................

(6) If the accused is not in custody, he shall be required by the Court to attend to hear the judgment pronounced, except where his personal attendance during the trial has been dispensed with and the sentence is one of fine only or he is acquitted:

Provided that, where there are more accused than one, and one or more of them do not attend the Court on the date on which the judgment is to be pronounced, the presiding officer may, in order to avoid undue delay in the disposal of the case, pronounce the judgment notwithstanding their absence.

(7) ...............

(8) ..............."

Therefore, this Court is of the view that the Learned

Magistrate has not committed any error while dispensing with the

attendance of the accused, which was after all represented by his

Learned Advocate and there was no sufficient evidence against the

accused and there was every possibility of acquittal.

9. So far as the question of non- examination of accused under

Section 313 of the CrPC is concerned, as raised by the learned

counsel for the petitioner prior to delivery of the Judgement is also

meritless and bearing no consequence because in the instant case,

the Learned Trial Magistrate did not examine the accused persons

under Section 313 of the CrPC since no incriminating or iota of

evidence transpired from the depositions of the P.W. 1 and P.W. 2

who were the vital witnesses. They stated nothing against any of the

accused persons rather admitted during cross-examination that the

case was filed due to misunderstanding. When it was found by the

Learned Magistrate that no incriminating or iota of evidence against

the accused persons, question of the examination under Section 313

of the CrPC does not arise owing the reasons the examination of

Section 313 of the CrPC generally puts question when the Court

considers necessary for the purpose of enabling the accused

personally to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence

against him. But in the instant case, nothing is found against the

accused persons. It is true that the duty of the Learned Trial Court is

to put each of the accused to various circumstances appearing

against them and further put the prosecution case generally for the

purpose of affording the accused an opportunity to explain the

circumstances appearing against them but here nothing found any

circumstances against the accused. Consequentially, the Learned

Trial Court had duly followed the procedure of trial in accordance

with law and delivered the final Judgement and Order dated

25.01.2016, thereby acquitted the accused persons under Section

248(1) of the CrPC from the offence punishable under Section

323/427/506/447/380 of the IPC.

10. The Learned Sessions Judge has dismissed the appeal

preferred by the de-facto complainant on the ground that the de-facto

complainant cannot be termed as 'victim'. The de-facto complainant

has no right to appeal against the acquittal order and thus, the

appeal is found to be not-maintainable. The appeal was dismissed

only on the ground of non-maintainability though the case of the de-

facto complainant was that he sustained injuries on his person, when

accused persons assaulted him. He also alleged he suffered damages

when they ransacked the complainant's house and taken away the

gold ornaments. Then he may surely fall within the term 'victim' as

defined in Section 2 (wa) of the CrPC. When he termed as 'Victim', he

can file an appeal against the order of acquittal under Section 372 of

the Cr.P.C. This provision has given right to appeal by the victim

because he alleged that he sustained injuries, suffered financial loss

and damages. Accordingly, appeal would have been maintainable.

11. The provision u/s 372 of the CrPC clearly mentioned that

victim shall have a right to prefer an appeal against any order of

acquittal passed by the Court or convicting for a lesser offence or

imposing inadequate compensation. For proper adjudication, this

Court would also like to refer the Section 2 (wa) of the Criminal

Procedure Code. Which defines 'victim' as follows: -

"S. 2(wa)- "victim" means a person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of the act or omission for which the accused person has been charged and the expression "victim" includes his or her guardian or legal heir."

12. From perusal of the aforesaid definition, it reveals firstly,

who has suffered any loss or injury caused by the reason of the act or

omission for which the accused person has been charged is a victim

and secondly, it further clarifies that victim also includes his or her

guardian or legal heir.

13. The proviso of Section 372 of the CrPC inserted by the Code

of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008 (5 of 2009) with effect

from 31.12.2009 vide Notification No. S.O. 3313E, dated 30.12.2009

only to give statutory right to 'victim' to file appeal under Section 372

of the CrPC under three situations as mentioned hereunder:

Firstly, any order passed by the Court acquitting the accused;

Secondly, the Court convicting for a lesser offence and

Thirdly, if the Court imposes inadequate compensation.

14. Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure after its

amendment allowed a 'victim' to prefer an appeal against an order of

acquittal before a Court of appeal i.e. Sessions Judge, where

ordinarily appeal lies against the order of conviction of such Court.

Section 372 of the Code provides a right to a 'victim' for preferring an

appeal in cases arising out of a Police Report and the present case, in

hand, is arisen out of a Police Report.

15. The judgment referred by the learned advocate for the

petitioner is squarely applicable. The Hon'ble Co-ordinate Bench of

this Court has held in paragraph 24 of the aforesaid judgment as

under:

"24. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I hold as follows:-

a) A victim in a police case may prefer an appeal before the Court of Sessions against an order of acquittal passed by the learned Magistrate in terms of proviso to section 372 Cr.P.C. provided an appeal against an order of conviction in such cases lay before the Sessions Court. No opinion is expressed in respect of a victim in a complaint case as the factual matrix of this case does not require me to dwell on such controversy.

b) In the event, the victim prefers an appeal to the Court of Sessions in terms of the proviso to Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no leave is required to be granted by the High Court in terms of sub-section (3) of section 378 Cr.P.C. as amended by Act 25 of 2005 which restricts such leave only to appeals preferred before the High Court and not before any other forum."

16. This Court also relied a judgment of the Hon'ble Andhra

Pradesh High Court decided by Division Bench in Smt. P. Vijaya

Laxmi Vs. Smt. S.P. Sravana and Anr. (Criminal Petition No.

16742 of 2016). Where the Hon'ble High Court observed as follows:

"At the outset, it would be necessary to understand and delineate the contours of a complainant in the scheme of the Code. Though the term complainant has not been defined thereunder, sufficient guidance is available to understand its content and import from the definition of a complaint under Section 2(d) of the Code. This definition makes it clear that a police report is not included in the ambit of a complaint, as defined, but the explanation appended thereto indicates that such a police report shall be deemed to be a complaint and the police officer making such police report shall be deemed to be the complainant therein. The distinction between a private complainant and the police officer submitting a police report, who is deemed to be a complainant in that case, is therefore clear.

The victim or his near relation, in the case of homicide, who gives information to the police as to the commission of a non-cognizable offence, though they are the actual affected parties, do not assume the status of a complainant in that case and it is only the police officer who finally submits the police report under Section 173 of the Code, who is conferred the deemed status of being the complainant in that case. In consequence, in a criminal case arising out of a police report under Section 173 of the Code, the actual victim or his near relation, in the case of homicide, has a very limited participatory role. The law, as it existed prior to amendment of Section 372 of the Code, only provided for appeals being preferred against acquittal in such

cases by the State. The victim or his near relation in a case of this nature only had the right of preferring a revision under Section 397 of the Code, if an order of acquittal was passed therein. As it was felt that this limited remedy of revision was not adequate, as the scope of interference in a revision would be far less than in an appeal, the law makers thought it fit to provide the right of appeal to such a victim or his near relation by inserting the proviso to Section 372 of the Code".

17. Be that as it may, in the case in hand, the initial allegation

was that the de-facto complainant sustained injuries on his person

as well as suffered loss and damages due to trespass by the accused

in the residence of Asim Kumar Ghorai and beaten up. Accused

persons also taken away the gold ornaments and caused damage to

the de-facto complainant. So, Section 2(wa) will be applicable because

here the allegation of the de-facto complainant is that he sustained

injuries, suffered loss and damages due to reason or act of omission

for which the accused person has been charged. If the de-facto

complainant suffered loss then he is a 'victim' as per Section 2 (wa) of

the Criminal Procedure Code. There is a clear provision to file appeal

by the victim under Section 372 of the Criminal Procedure Code,

1973 against any order passed by the Court acquitting the accused

or convicting for a lesser offence or imposing inadequate

compensation, and such appeal shall lie to the Court of Sessions to

which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of such

Court. Therefore, judgement and order passed by the learned Session

judge is not sustainable in law.

18. In the light of above discussions and upon careful perusal of

the order of acquittal passed by the Learned Trial Magistrate under

challenge is apparently found correct, legal and justified. I do not find

any infirmity far less any jurisdictional error committed by the

Learned Trial Magistrate while acquitting the accused persons. Thus,

this instant Criminal Revisional application has devoid of merits and

is liable to be dismissed.

19. With regards to allegation levelled by the petitioner against

the Learned Trial Magistrate found baseless and without any

substance because this Court does not find any lacuna or materials,

which can substantiate any of the allegations mentioned by the

Petitioner. The deposition sheets of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 clearly and

specifically indicate it was typed and read over and explained in

Bengali by the Learned Magistrate himself to the witness and

admitted to be correct. The said declaration is available in the

deposition sheets. Furthermore, no such indication found from the

record that the P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 were not examined and cross-

examined on the court dock. It is unexpected that the Learned

Magistrate could obtain signatures on the blank papers without

examination or cross-examination in open court and in presence of

learned counsels for the parties. No any complaint made by the

petitioner either to the District Judge or to the Hon'ble High Court

with regards to allegations alleged by the petitioner immediately or

prior to filing of the appeal or Criminal Revisional application before

this Hon'ble High Court. Even, the petitioner did not mention about

such serious allegations, while filing appeal before the Learned

Sessions Judge, Purba Medinipur at Tamluk. This Court also did not

find any such allegations or grounds in the copy of an appeal filed

under Section 372 of the CrPC upon careful perusal. The Petitioner

has made such allegations first time before this Hon'ble High Court is

not at all acceptable and tenable. Hence, it cannot be entertained at

this stage.

20. Accordingly, C.R.R. 1375 of 2017 is, thus, dismissed.

Connected applications, if any, are also, thus, disposed of.

21. In addition, the allegations levelled against the Learned Trial

Magistrate are contemptuous allegations to the effect that the

Learned Trial Magistrate has obtained signatures of the two witnesses

i.e. P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 on the blank papers and typed examination-in-

chief and cross-examinations without standing on the Court dock.

Petitioner also raised doubt about the manner of disposal of the case

by the Learned Trial Magistrate is tantamount to scandalise and

lower the dignity and authority of the Court. Petitioner fails to

substantiate his allegations against the Court with reliable evidence.

It is apparently clear that the complaint alleging reckless allegations

of misuse of powers, biasness and working of a Magistrate is not

permissible and the same amounts to criminal contempt of Court

under Section 2(c) of the Act of 1971. The provision of the criminal

contempt as defined under Section 2(c) of the Act of 1971 is required

to be seen, which is as under:

"Criminal contempt" means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which--

(i) Scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any court; or

(ii) Prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or

(iii) Interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner;

From the aforesaid, it is apparently clear that if a complaint

alleging reckless allegations of misuse of powers, biasness and

working of a Magistrate made against the Trial Magistrate, falls under

the definition of the 'criminal contempt'. By the allegations as pointed

out hereinabove, an attempt was made by the petitioner to scandalize

and lower the majesty of the Court.

22. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Prashant

Bhushan and another, in Reference Suo Motu Contempt Petition

(Cri.) 1 of 2020 decided on 14th of August, 2020, reported in (2021) 1

SCC 745 has considered the definition of Section 2(c) of the Act of

1971 and has held as under:

"It could thus be seen, that it has been held by this Court, that hostile criticism of judges as judges or judiciary would amount to scandalizing the Court. It has been held, that any personal attack upon a judge in connection with the office he holds is dealt with under law of libel or slander. Yet defamatory publication concerning the judge as a judge brings the court or judges into contempt, a serious impediment to justice and an inroad on the majesty of justice. This Court further observed, that any caricature of a judge calculated to lower the dignity of the court would destroy, undermine or tend to undermine public confidence in the administration of justice or the majesty of justice. It has been held, that imputing partiality, corruption, bias, improper motives to a judge is

scandalisation of the court and would be contempt of the court."

23. A Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the

case of Baradakanta Mishra vs. High Court of Orissa, reported in

(1974) 1 SCC 374 has held as under:

"49. Scandalisation of the Court is a species of contempt and may take several forms. A common form is the vilification of the Judge. When proceedings in contempt are taken for such vilification the question which the Court has to ask is whether the vilification is of the Judge as a judge. (See Queen v. Gray), [(1900) 2 QB 36, 40] or it is the vilification of the Judge as an individual. If the latter the Judge is left to his private remedies and the Court has no power to commit for contempt. If the former, the Court will proceed to exercise the jurisdiction with scrupulous care and in cases which are clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Secondly, the Court will have also to consider the degree of harm caused as affecting administration of justice and, if it is slight and beneath notice, Courts will not 6 punish for contempt. This salutary practice is adopted by Section 13 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The jurisdiction is not intended to uphold the personal dignity of the Judges. That must rest on surer foundations. Judges rely on their conduct itself to be its own vindication.

50. But if the attack on the Judge functioning as a judge substantially affects administration of justice it becomes

a public mischief punishable for contempt, and it matters not whether such an attack is based on what a judge is alleged to have done in the exercise of his administrative responsibilities. A judge's functions may be divisible, but his integrity and authority are not divisible in the context of administration of justice. An unwarranted attack on him for corrupt administration is as potent in doing public harm as an attack on his adjudicatory function."

From the aforesaid judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court

and the definition provided under Section 2(c) of the Act of 1971, it is

apparently clear that even an attempt to scandalize or lower the

authority of a Court falls under the definition of 'criminal contempt'.

24. There is hierarchy of courts being made under the judicial

system. Aggrieved party may approach to the Superior Court by way

of filing revision/appeal, as the case may be, or may raise his/her

grievances to the complaint cell or Superior Officer. Petitioner made

such serious allegations first time before this Hon'ble High Court

when he lost appeal before the Learned Sessions Judge. Making

reckless allegations against the working of a Judge is not permissible

and the same amounts to Criminal Contempt of Court. Judicial

officer works for the interest of justice and for the interest of public at

large.

25. Upon careful perusal entire records and considering the

submissions made by the parties, it is found the allegations are

baseless and unsubstantiated against the Learned Trial Magistrate.

This Court finds the allegations made by the petitioner or drafted by

the Learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner is undesirable and

need to be deprecated and may be dealt with in accordance with law.

Therefore, this Court constrains to direct for issuance of a notice to

the petitioner to show cause as to why an appropriate action under

the provision of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 or otherwise shall

not be initiated against him. Notice shall be issued to the petitioner

along with copy of this Judgment and Order by the Registry of this

Court, returnable on 27.09.2024. Affidavit-in-response to the notice

be filed by the petitioner on the adjourned date.

26. Case Diary, if any, is to be returned to the Learned Counsel

for the State.

27. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.

28. Let a copy of this judgment be sent to the Learned Court

below for information.

29. Parties will act on the server copies of this Judgment

uploaded on the official website of this Court.

30. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied

for, is to be given as expeditiously to the parties on compliance of all

legal formalities.

(Ajay Kumar Gupta, J)

P. Adak (P.A.)