Citation : 2023 Latest Caselaw 5007 Cal
Judgement Date : 14 August, 2023
AD-12
Ct No.09
14.08.2023
TN
WPA No. 10529 of 2022
IA No: CAN 1 of 2023
KK Importers Private Limited and others
Vs.
Debts Recovery Tribunal-III, Kolkata and others
Mr. Sakya Sen,
Mr. Arindam Chandra,
Mr. Atish Ghosh,
Ms. Antara Dey
.... for the petitioners
Ms. Amrita Panja Moulick
.... for the respondent
nos. 3 & 4 Mr. Jayanta Sengupta, Ms. Shebatee Datta .... for the applicant/ respondent no. 5
On consent of parties, the writ petition itself is
taken up for hearing, along with the application for
vacating the interim order passed herein, since the
adjudication on the vacating application would
virtually involve taking up the writ petition itself on
merits.
The writ petition was preferred at a juncture
when the regular Presiding Officer was absent in the
concerned Debts Recovery Tribunal, that is, the Debts
Recovery Tribunal, 3rd Bench, and was entertained on
such score.
Vide order dated June 27, 2022, the learned
Single Judge taking up the matter had observed that
since the matter was fixed before the DRT-III on the
same day, that is, on June 27, 2022 and the writ
petition had not been considered on merits, the
respondents shall take leave of the court before
initiating any action against the petitioners. The writ
petition was directed to be listed after three weeks. In
the event the interim application or any other
proceeding is decided by the DRT-III, parties were
given liberty to mention the matter before this court.
Learned counsel for the parties point out that on
the said date, that is, on June 27, 2022, the matter
was taken up for hearing and ultimately on July 12,
2022, the IA of the writ petitioners, filed against the
order passed by the concerned District Magistrate
under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, was
decided by the DRT-III. The said order dated July 12,
2022 has been annexed by the parties respectively to
their vacating application and supplementary
affidavit.
It transpires from the said order that the
Tribunal took into consideration the order dated
June 27, 2022 passed by the coordinate Bench in the
connected writ petition.
Thereafter, the Tribunal proceeded to decide on
the petitioners' application, ultimately coming to the
conclusion that the Tribunal did not find prima facie
any defect in the order of the District Magistrate. It is
seen from the said order that the Tribunal elaborately
considered several aspects of the matter, including the
fact that the District Magistrate had passed a
reasoned and speaking order which reflected his
consideration and satisfaction on the affidavit
declaring nine clauses as laid down in Section 14(1)(b)
of the SARFAESI Act, 2002.
However, it is contended by the writ petitioners
that the District Magistrate did not consider the most
important facet of the challenge taken out by the
petitioners, to the effect that patent fraud had been
practised on the District Magistrate insofar as the
affidavit filed before the Magistrate did not disclose
that the property was fully tenanted, which is evident
from the notice of possession as well as the demand
notice issued in the present case against the
petitioners/borrowers by the financial institution.
In the absence of such consideration, it is
submitted that the adjudication dated July 12, 2022
is palpably vitiated.
As such, the petitioners have taken out an
application for recall of the said order, primarily on
the ground that the facet of the allegations regarding
fraud was not considered by the Tribunal at all.
Learned counsel appearing for the respondent-
financial institution/applicant in the vacating
application contends that the writ petitioners sat tight
over the recall application for over a year without
moving the same. As such, it is clearly seen that the
attempt of the writ petitioners is to stall the
proceeding and is not bona fide. It is submitted that
in the absence of an independent challenge against
the order dated July 12, 2022 before the appropriate
forum designated in law, that is, the Debts Recovery
Appellate Tribunal, this court ought not, within the
limited scope of the writ petition, to entertain the
dispute raised regarding the said order.
That apart, learned counsel for the respondent-
financial institution argues that the writ petition is not
maintainable as of today. It is argued that the same
was entertained simply because the DRT-III was not
functioning regularly at the relevant juncture.
However, as of today, it is evident that the said
Tribunal is fully functional, which is also exemplified
by the order dated July 12, 2022 passed by the said
forum. As such, the writ petition ought to be
dismissed on the ground of maintainability alone, if
not on other grounds. Learned counsel for the
respondent-financial institution places reliance on the
judgment of Phoenix ARC Private Limited vs. Vishwa
Bharati Vidya Mandir and others, reported at (2022) 5
SCC 345 and argues that a writ petition against a
private party is, under normal circumstances, not
maintainable. It is only maintainable when a public
function/public duty is carried out by the authority.
However, it was also held by the Supreme Court,
it is contended, that if proceedings are initiated under
the SARFAESI Act and/or any proposed action is to be
taken and the borrower is aggrieved by any of the
actions of the private bank/bank/ARC, the borrower
has to avail the remedy under the SARFAESI Act and
no writ petition would lie and/or is maintainable
and/or entertainable under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
The peculiar predicament in the present case is
that the respondent-financial institution argues that
the writ petition is not maintainable at the present
juncture due to availability of the DRT-III, although it
might have been justified for the court to entertain the
same at the relevant point of time, when the DRT-III
was not functioning regularly. However, the said
objection has to be taken with a pinch of salt.
Even on June 27, 2022, when the writ petition
was moved for the first time, it is evident that the
DRT-III was functioning, albeit to a limited extent,
since the order itself recorded that the matter was
fixed before the DRT-III on the said date. In fact, the
application of the writ petitioners was duly heard by
the DRT-III and an order passed therein on July 12,
2022, contemporaneously with the writ petition being
entertained.
Having not taken the point of maintainability
and the same being not kept open at that juncture,
the respondents have fully participated in the present
writ petition and cannot now resile and take an
objection regarding the maintainability of the same.
Such an exercise, if given premium to, would permit
the litigants to take opportunities and liberties before
the court, de hors the law.
Thus, the point of maintainability, taken at this
belated juncture, is turned down.
Learned counsel appearing for the respondent
no. 5, at this juncture, rightly points out that the said
respondent was not represented on June 27, 2022
when the order-in-question was passed and, as such,
there was no scope of taking any objection as to
maintainability of the writ petition.
However, it is recorded in the said order that the
affidavit-of-service filed on that date was kept on
record, indicating and implying that due service has
been effected on all the respondents. Thus, the
respondent no. 5 chose to lose its opportunity to
challenge the maintainability of the writ petition at the
earliest possible opportunity.
Moreover, no subsequent complaint has been
raised by the respondent no. 5 to the effect that no
copy of the writ petition was served on the said
respondent.
In fact, the respondent no. 5 waited for quite a
long time to file the application for modification, not
taking the point of maintainability specifically at any
point of time.
Since the order-in-question was passed by the
coordinate Bench on June 27, 2022, it cannot be said
that the respondent no. 5 had no opportunity
thereafter, to challenge the maintainability of the writ
petition. Rather, the said respondent has submitted
to the jurisdiction of the court by taking out an
application for vacating the interim order passed
therein.
Such belated challenge to the maintainability,
as such, cannot be entertained.
That apart, the point of maintainability loses
relevance on another aspect of the matter as well. It
is well-settled that fraud vitiates all and can be set up
as a ground of challenge before all forums.
The writ petitioners clearly canvassed the point
of fraud, insofar as the demand notice as well as the
notice of possession issued by the respondent no. 5
clearly mentioned the property being fully tenanted,
which was clearly suppressed in the affidavit filed by
the District Magistrate. Nothing in the order of the
District Magistrate, challenged in the writ petition,
discloses any consideration of such fraud at all. The
District Magistrate's order does not indicate anything
to show that it was pointed out to the District
Magistrate that the property was fully tenanted, which
would and should have prompted the District
Magistrate to enter into at least a preliminary enquiry
as to whether the tenancy was prior to the loan being
taken.
In any event, since the Debts Recovery Tribunal,
despite the said point having been taken by the writ
petitioners, also did not advert to the issue of fraud at
all, the exercise carried out by the Debts Recovery
Tribunal by its order dated July 12, 2022 has rightly
been challenged by way of a recall application by the
writ petitioners.
However, for the sake of propriety, although the
District Magistrate's order actually does not reflect
any consideration on the property being fully
tenanted, since the writ petitioners have chosen to
take out a recall application before the Debts Recovery
Tribunal, which is the designated forum in law to take
into consideration such aspect as well, this court is
not interfering in the present writ petition.
However, for all practical purposes, the recall
application of the writ petitioners ought to be
adjudicated first by the Debts Recovery Tribunal
before allowing the possession of the property to be
taken within the contemplation of Section 14 of the
SARFAESI Act, 2002, pursuant to the order impugned
in the present writ petition.
Accordingly, WPA No. 10529 of 2022 is disposed
of by restraining the respondents from taking any
coercive or other action in terms of the impugned
order passed by the District Magistrate under
Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, prior to
disposal of the recall application filed by the writ
petitioners before the DRT-III for recall of the order
dated July 12, 2022.
The Tribunal shall dispose of the said recall
application in accordance with law upon hearing
learned counsel for the parties, without being unduly
influenced by any of the observations made herein on
merits, by the end of September, 2023. Such time-
limit is, however, peremptory and mandatory.
IA No: CAN 1 of 2023 is, accordingly, disposed
of.
It is, however, made clear that the restraint
order passed herein shall continue till the disposal of
the recall application filed by the writ petitioners, as
indicated above, and shall be subject to the final order
passed on the said recall application by the Tribunal.
There will be no order as to costs.
Urgent photostat certified copies of this order, if
applied for, be made available to the parties upon
compliance with the requisite formalities.
(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)
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