Citation : 2023 Latest Caselaw 1899 Cal/2
Judgement Date : 7 August, 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction
Original Side
(Commercial Division)
Present :-
The Hon'ble Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya
AP 289 of 2023
with
AP 368 of 2023
M/s. Binoy Trading Co. and Another
vs.
Tata Motors Finance Limited
For the Petitioner : Mr. Shyamal Chakraborty, Adv.
Mr. Debajyoti Mondal, Adv.
Ms. Anjana Das, Adv.
For the Respondent : Mr. Rohit Banerjee, Adv.
Mr. Saubhik Chowdhury, Adv.
Ms. Tapasika Bose, Adv.
Last Heard on : 02.08.2023
Delivered on : 07.08.2023
2
Moushumi Bhattacharya, J.
1. The petitioner/award-debtor has filed the present applications under
section 34 of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for setting aside of two
awards dated 4.8.2022 and 1.11.2022 passed by the learned sole arbitrator in
arbitrations where the petitioner was the respondent. Both the applications
involve identical facts. Learned counsel for the respondent in both the
applications have argued on the point of maintainability. Hence the
applications are being disposed of together.
2. The respondent/award-holder has taken a preliminary point of
maintainability of the present applications on sections 2(1)(e) and 42 of the Act
of 1996. The respondent says that the present applications should be filed
before the Ld. City Civil Court since the petitioner has already filed a
miscellaneous application in that Court. Learned counsel appearing for the
respondent also takes the point of pecuniary jurisdiction of the High Court and
the City Civil Court as determined by a Notification dated 20.3.2020 issued by
the Judicial Department of the Government of West Bengal.
3. The brief facts of the case is that the petitioner has suffered an award
dated 1.11.2022 for a principal sum of Rs. 82,91,536.50/-. The respondent
filed a post-award application for interim relief under section 9 of the Act before
the Ld. City Civil Court on 29.12.2022. An ad-interim order was passed on the
same day inter alia authorising the Receiver to take necessary steps with
regard to the petitioner's vehicle and that the vehicle would remain in the
custody of the Receiver. The petitioner filed an application thereafter on
4.4.2023 connected with the Misc. Case (No. 7612 of 2022) of the respondent
praying for dismissal of the Misc. Case and for a direction on the Receiver to
handover the vehicle to the petitioner. The present applications were filed for
setting aside of the award on 28.4.2023.
4. Since the respondent / award-holder has raised an objection with regard
to the maintainability of the present applications, that question will be decided
first.
5. Section 2(1)(e) of the Act defines "Court" for the purposes of domestic
arbitration, as the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district and
includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction,
having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of the
arbitration if the same had been the subject matter of a suit, but does not
include any Civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any
Court of Small Causes.
6. Section 42 begins with a non-obstante clause and stipulates that any
application made in respect to an arbitration agreement under Part-I of the
1996 Act would confer that Court alone with jurisdiction over arbitral
proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that agreement and
the arbitral proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no other Court.
7. The object of section 42 is to prevent conflict and multiplicity of decisions
of different Courts. The section aims to provide uniformity by bringing the
parties to the Court where the first application was made under an arbitration
agreement and ensuring that all subsequent applications are made only in that
Court.
8. The undisputed facts indicate that the petitioner approached the Ld.
City Civil Court in the Misc. Case filed by the respondent and prayed for
appropriate orders with regard to release of the petitioners' vehicle. The
petitioner has also made specific averments in the application stating that the
City Civil Court is empowered to forthwith try and entertain the application
and pass necessary orders. The petitioner, at such point of time, did not take
any stand of the City Civil Court not being competent or empowered to try and
entertain the application.
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on a Division Bench
decision passed in Shri Sushanta Malik vs. Srei Equipment Finance Limited
reported in AIR 2015 Cal 335 to urge that the Ld. City Civil Court does not
have pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the section 34 application since it is
not a principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction and that the present
applications can therefore only be filed before the Calcutta High court.
10. The decision of the Division Bench in Sushanta Malik was however
delivered on 8.9.2015 whereas the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 was published
in the Gazette of India dated 31.12.2015 and was deemed to have come into
force on 23.10.2015.
11. Section 2(1)(b) of The Commercial Courts Act, 2015 defines "Commercial
Courts" as the Commercial Court constituted under section 3(1) of the said Act.
Section 3 empowers the State Government in consultation with the concerned
High Court to constitute Commercial Courts by notification as may be
necessary for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction and powers conferred on
the Courts. Section 3(1-A) empowers the State Government to also specify the
pecuniary value while section 3(2) empowers the State Government to specify
the local limits of the area to which the jurisdiction of a Commercial Court
shall extend.
12. Section 10(3) of the 2015 Act empowers all Commercial Courts exercising
territorial jurisdiction to receive petitions where the subject matter of
arbitration constitute a commercial dispute of a specified value. Section 12(2)
provides for basis of determination of a specified value for cases where the
subject matter of arbitration is a commercial dispute. Section 21 of the Act
declares that the Act shall have overriding effect on any other law for the time
being in force.
13. By a Notification published on 20.3.2020 in the Kolkata Gazette
Extraordinary, by the Judicial Department, Government of West Bengal, the
pecuniary jurisdiction of the City Civil Court and the Calcutta High Court was
notified in exercise of the power conferred under section 3(1-A) of the 2015 Act.
The pecuniary jurisdiction was specified in terms of the value of the
commercial disputes and provided that in case of Commercial Courts within
the territorial jurisdiction of the City Civil Court at Calcutta of an amount
exceeding Rs. 10 lacs but not exceeding Rs. 1 crore would concurrently be with
the City Civil Court and the Commercial Division with the High Court,
Calcutta. The other parts of the Notification have not been mentioned as they
are not relevant to the present matter.
14. Admittedly, the value of the arbitration petition is somewhere between
Rs. 10 lacs - 85 lacs. The ambiguity is on account of the petitioner saying that
the subject matter of the award is in excess of Rs. 10 lacs while the respondent
says that the value of the arbitration petition is in excess of Rs. 85 lacs.
Whatever be the case, the Notification, which has fixed the pecuniary
jurisdiction of the learned City Civil Court and the Calcutta High Court, makes
it clear that both the City Civil Court and the High Court will have concurrent
pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the present arbitration petition.
15. Section 42 of the 1996 Act will however settle the jurisdiction in favour of
the City Civil Court since the respondent first approached with an application
for interim relief and the petitioner subjected itself to the jurisdiction of the
City Civil Court also by making a separate application for interim relief in the
form of release of the petitioner's vehicle. As stated above, section 42 mandates
that when any application with regard to an arbitration agreement has been
made under Part I in a Court, that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over the
arbitral proceedings and all subsequent application arising out of that
agreement and further that no other Court shall have jurisdiction in such
cases.
16. It is undisputed that the section 9 application arose out of the arbitration
agreement between the parties and was a post-award application made by the
respondent. The present application under section 34 for setting aside of the
award must also therefore be filed before the City Civil Court also by reason of
the fact that the City Civil Court has pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the
application under section 34 of the 1996 Act.
17. The Division Bench of this Court in Sushanta Malik held that the Original
Side of this Court alone will have jurisdiction to entertain an application under
the 1996 Act where the value of the subject matter of the dispute in arbitration
exceeds Rs. 10 lacs. As stated above, this decision was pronounced before The
Commercial Courts Act, 2015 was notified on 31.12.2015. Therefore, the
decision of this Court has to abide by the 2015 Act read with the Notification
dated 20th March, 2020 which has since been the guiding document for
determining the Court competent to entertain a commercial dispute in
accordance with the pecuniary limits fixed under the Notification.
18. This Court therefore is constrained to hold that the learned City Civil
Court is the competent Court to entertain the present application. The above
discussion reflects the reasons for this view.
19. AP 289 of 2023 and AP 368 of 2023 are accordingly dismissed as not
being maintainable.
Urgent photostat certified copies of this judgment, if applied for, be
supplied to the parties upon fulfillment of requisite formalities.
(Moushumi Bhattacharya, J.)
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