Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Kalabati Gupta & Ors vs The State Of West Bengal on 20 September, 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
Hon'ble Justice Chitta Ranjan Dash
AND
Hon'ble Justice Partha Sarathi Sen
C.R.A No. 644 of 2005
With
IA No. CRAN 4 of 2007 (Old No. CRAN 542 of 2007)
Kalabati Gupta & Ors.
Vs.
The State of West Bengal
For the Appellant : Mr. Himanshu De, Sr. Adv.,
: Mr. Navanil De, Adv.,
: Mr. Rajeshwar Chakraborty, Adv.,
: Mr. Srinjan Ghosh, Adv.,
: Mr. Subhrajit Dey,Adv.
For the State : Mr. Debabrata Chatterjee, Adv.,
: Md. Kutubuddin, Adv.,
: Mr. Santanu Deb Roy, Adv.
Heard on : 13.09.2022
Judgment on : 20.09.2022
PARTHA SARATHI SEN, J. : -
1. The present appeal arises out of a judgement and order dated
25.08.2005 and 26.08.2005, as passed by Learned Additional Sessions
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Judge, 1st Fast Track Court, Hooghly, in Sessions Trial No. 30 of
2003(arising out of GR Case No.75 of 2003, P.S. Bhadreswar P.S. Case
No. 29/2003 dated 11.02.2003, under Sections 498A/326 IPC). By the
impugned judgement and order the Learned Trial Court found two
accused persons namely; Onkar Nath Gupta (appellant no.2 herein) and
Anil Gupta (appellant no.3 herein) guilty under Sections 498A/302/34
IPC and accused Kalabati Gupta (appellant no.1 herein) under Section
498 A IPC and thus, convicted them under Section 235(2) of the Cr.P.C.
2. The convicts felt aggrieved and thus preferred the instant appeal.
3. For effective disposal of the instant appeal, the facts leading to filing
of Bhadreswar P.S Case No. 29 /2003 dated 11.02.2003, are required to
be dealt with in nut shell.
4. On 11.02.2003, one Paresh Nath Bhagat, son of Late Gangaram
Bhagat of Tarakeswar Mandir Para , P.S Tarakeswar , District Hooghly,
lodged a written complaint with the Officer -in-Charge, Bhadreswar Police
Station, District Hooghly, stating inter alia; that on 7th March, 2003, his
sister Malati Gupta @ Malu Gupta was given marriage with one Onkar
Nath Gupta, son of Kanta Prosad Gupta of Angus Majher Goalapara, P.S
Bhadreswar, District Hooghly. It is the further version of the de-facto
complainant that in such marriage which was solemnized as per Hindu
Rights and Customs, he had given cash of Rs. 15,000/-, cot with bedding
materials, gold and other nuptial gifts. It has been stated further by the
de-facto complainant that thereafter his aforementioned sister went to her
matrimonial home and started residing there with her husband as
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married couple. It has been alleged further that sometimes after the
marriage of his sister, her husband Onkar Nath Gupta, her mother-in-law
Kalabati Gupta and her two brother-in-laws namely; Sunil and Anil
Kumar Gupta started torturing her both physically and mentally. It has
also been stated in the said written complaint that in the mean time his
sister had given birth of a male child but in spite of that the torture at the
instance of the aforementioned persons increased day by day and
whenever his sister used to come to her paternal home she used to
disclose the said incidents of torture at the behest of the aforementioned
persons to him as well as to the other family members. However, with the
hope that in future everything will be in order, the family members of the
de-facto complainant tried to pacify her grievance and sent her back to
her matrimonial home. In the said written complaint it has also been
disclosed that on 11.02.2003, he came to learn from others that on the
said day at about 2:30 p.m his brother-in-law Onkar Nath Gupta and
mother-in-law Kalabati Gupta set fire on her person and as a result
whereof she was seriously ablazed and she was thereafter taken to
Chandernagore Sub-Divisional Hospital for her treatment.
5. As stated above on receipt of such written complaint, Bhadreswar
P.S Case No.291/2003 dated 11.02.2003, under Sections 498A/326 IPC
was started. Investigation was taken up and on completion of the same
charge sheet was submitted against Onkar Nath Gupta, Kalabati Gupta ,
Anil Kumar Gupta, Sunil Kumar Gupta and Kanta Prosad Gupta under
Sections 498A/326/302/34 IPC and also under Section 3 of the Dowry
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Prohibition Act. After commitment learned Sessions Judge, Hooghly,
transferred the aforementioned case to the learned trial court for trial and
disposal. Lower Court Records reveals that the learned trial court on
10.11.2003, after considering the entire materials as placed before him
and also on perusal of the CD, framed charges under Sections 498
A/304B/302/34 IPC against all the aforementioned charge sheeted
accused persons. Since all the aforementioned charge sheeted five
accused persons pleaded their innocence and claimed to be tried, the trial
before the learned trial court proceeded.
6. Lower Court Record reveals that in order to bring home the charges
as framed against the aforementioned five charge sheeted accused
persons, the prosecution has examined 19 witnesses in all and exhibited
15 documents including two materials exhibits.
7. In order to prove their innocence on behalf of the defence seven
witnesses have been examined and five documents have been exhibited.
8. In support of the instant appeal, learned advocate for the appellant
at the very outset draws the attention of this Court to the impugned
judgement as passed by the learned trial court. It is contended on behalf
of the appellants that learned trial court while passing the impugned
judgement has not considered the salutary principles as embodied in
Section 32 (1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, relating to acceptance of
dying declaration and at the same time the learned trial judge
misconstrued the principle of acceptance of dying declaration as time to
time enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. It is contended
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further on behalf of the appellant that if the evidence of PW2 (doctor of
NRS Hospital, Kolkata), PW17 (Sub Inspector of Police, Entally Police
Station), Exhibit 10 (alleged dying declaration) are considered conjointly
in its proper perspective, it will reveal that the learned trial court while
passing the impugned judgement committed gross error of fact as well as
of law in holding that such oral and documentary evidence are not
sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused. It is contended further that
learned trial court while passing the impugned judgement ought to have
come to a conclusion that Exhibit 10 cannot come under the purview of a
dying declaration in view of the proposition of law as enunciated in the
reported decision Laxman Vs. State of Maharastra reported in (2002) 6
SCC 710 and Koli Chunilal Savji and Anr. Vs. State of Gujarat
reported in (1999) 9 SCC 562. It is further argued on behalf of the
appellant that from the oral evidence of the prosecution witnesses it has
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt that the alleged murder of the
victim was committed by the present appellant nos.2 and 3 in furtherance
of common intention of all within the meaning of Section 34 of the Indian
Penal Code and thus, the finding of the learned trial court that the
present appellant no. 2, Onkar Nath Gupta and appellant no.3, Anil
Kumar Gupta are guilty under Sections 302/34 IPC is erroneous.
9. Learned advocate for the appellant while drawing attention of this
Court to the oral evidence of the prosecution witnesses further contended
that in absence of any cogent materials to attract the provisions of Section
498A IPC, learned trial court equally committed an error of fact as well as
6
of law in holding all the appellants herein guilty under Section 498A since
the allegations of the relative prospection witnesses are not specific and
on the contrary those are merely omnibus allegations. Learned advocate
for the appellant thus, submits that this is a fit case for allowing the
instant appeal by setting aside the impugned judgement and order dated
25.08.2005 and 26.08.2005 as passed by the learned trail court.
10. While opposing the contention of the learned advocate for the
appellant, the learned advocate for the State also relied upon the reported
decision of Laxman (supra). It is contended by him that PW12 being a
medical practitioner of NRS Medical College and Hospital, Kolkata and
PW17 being a Sub-Inspector of Police of Entally Police Station are non-
interested witnesses and thus, there is no reason to disbelieve their oral
testimonies as well as the dying declaration (Exhibit 10) as recorded by
PW17. It is strongly contented on behalf of the State that in the reported
decision of Laxman(supra) it has been clarified by the Larger Bench of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India that the mandatoriness of certification of
a doctor about the fit and conscious state of mind of the victim patient is
a hyper-technical view and, therefore, the dying declaration being Exhibit
10 as recorded by PW17 ought to have been given due importance and
should be considered as a cogent evidence to bring home the charges as
framed against the accused and as has been rightly done by the learned
trial court.
11. It is further contended on behalf of the State that before the learned
trial court not only the relative witnesses deposed against the present
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appellants about their torture upon the victim but also the neighbouring
people of the accused persons deposed consistently that the victim/
house-wife was subjected to torture at her matrimonial home at the
instance of the present appellants. It is thus, contended that before the
learned trial court the prosecution is successful in bringing home the
charges as against the accused persons and thus, learned trial court
rightly passed the impugned judgement and the same need not be
interfered in this appeal.
12. Since before the learned trial court 19 witnesses have been
examined by the prosecution for the convenience of us, the said
prosecution witnesses have been categorized and sub-categorized in the
manner indicated hereunder:-
Private Witnesses
Relatives Neighbours Others
(i) PW1 (i)PW3 (i)PW2
(de facto complainant (a resident of same (scribe of the written
brother of the victim) locality of the accused) complaint)
(ii)PW 5 (ii)PW4 (ii)PW7
(Cousin brother of the (next door neighbour of the (a seizure list witness)
deceased) accused)
(iii)PW6 (iii)PW11 (iii)PW9
(Cousin brother of the (a resident of same (a photographer)
deceased) locality of the accused) (iv)PW10
(Registrar of Marriage)
Government Officials
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Medical Practitioner Others Police Officials
(i) PW12 (i)PW14 (i)PW13
(A doctor of NRS (Executive Magistrate) (Recording Officer)
Hospital, Kolkata)
(ii)PW15 (ii)PW16 (ii)PW17
(A doctor of NRS (Secretary of R.G.Kar (S.I. of Police Entally
Medical College and Medical College and P.S.)
Hospital in Forensic Hospital)
Department)
(iii)PW18 (iii)PW19
(Autopsy Surgeon) (I.O.)
13. Since in the impugned judgement learned trial court while holding
appellant nos. 2 and 3 herein guilty under Sections 498A/302/34 IPC put
much reliance upon the alleged dying declaration of the deceased (Exhibit
10) vis-a-vis the oral testimony of PW17 and PW 12, we think it proper to
look to the provisions of Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act and the
same is reproduced hereunder in verbatim:-
"Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person
who is dead or cannot be found etc. is relevant .-
Statements, written or verbal , of relevant facts made by a
person who is dead, or who cannot be found or who has
become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance
cannot be procured, without an amount of delay or expense ,
which under the circumstances of the case, appears to the
court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the
following cases:
(1) When it relates to cause of death.- When the statement is
made by a person as to the cause of his death, in cases in
which the causes of that person's death comes into question.
Such statement are relevant whether the person who made
them was or was not, at the time when they were made,
under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature
of the proceeding in which the case of his death comes into
question.
(2) ................................................................................................
(3) ................................................................................................
(4) ................................................................................................
(5) ................................................................................................
(6) ................................................................................................
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(7) ..............................................................................................
(8) ..............................................................................................".
14. Since learned advocates of both the parties have placed the reliance
upon the celebrated decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the
reported decision of Laxman (supra), we have minutely gone through the
same and for appreciation of the evidence as recorded by the learned trial
court, the principle of law as discussed in the said reported decision is
given herein below and the same is hereunder:-
"3. The juristic theory regarding acceptability of a dying
declaration is that such declaration is made in extremity,
when the party is at the point of death and when every hope
of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is
silenced, and the man is induced by the most powerful
consideration to speak only the truth. Notwithstanding the
same, great caution must be exercised in considering the
weight to be given to this species of evidence on account of
the existence of many circumstances which may affect their
truth. The situation in which a man is on the deathbed is so
solemn and serene, is the reason in law to accept the
veracity of his statement. It is for this reason the
requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed
with. Since the accused has no power of cross-examination,
the courts insist that the dying declaration should be of such
a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its
truthfulness and correctness. The court, however, has
always to be on guard to see that the statement of the
deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting
or a product of imagination. The court also must further
decide that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and had
the opportunity to observe and identify the assailant.
Normally, therefore, the court in order to satisfy whether the
deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying
declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But where the
eyewitnesses state that the deceased was in a fit and
conscious state to make the declaration, the medical opinion
will not prevail, nor can it be said that since there is no
certification of the doctor as to the fitness of the mind of the
declarant, the dying declaration is not acceptable. A dying
declaration can be oral or in writing and any adequate
10
method of communication whether by words or by signs or
otherwise will suffice provided the indication is positive and
definite. In most cases, however, such statements are made
orally before death ensues and is reduced to writing by
someone like a Magistrate or a doctor or a police officer.
When it is recorded, no oath is necessary nor is the presence
of a Magistrate absolutely necessary, although to assure
authenticity it is usual to call a Magistrate, if available for
recording the statement of a man about to die. There is no
requirement of law that a dying declaration must necessarily
be made to a Magistrate and when such statement is
recorded by a Magistrate there is no specified statutory form
for such recording. Consequently, what evidential value or
weight has to be attached to such statement necessarily
depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular
case. What is essentially required is that the person who
records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the
deceased was in a fit state of mind. Where it is proved by
the testimony of the Magistrate that the declarant was fit to
make the statement even without examination by the doctor
the declaration can be acted upon provided the court
ultimately holds the same to be voluntary and truthful. A
certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and
therefore the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration
can be established otherwise."
In this regard, we also consider it necessary to have a look to a
latest reported decision of theHon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case
of Purshottam Chopra vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2020) 11
SCC 489 where the principle regarding admissibility and acceptability of
dying declaration have been elaborately discussed.
15. In the said judgement of Purshottam Chopra(supra) it has also
been decided that a person who has suffered 92% burn injuries can give a
dying declaration and the same can be accepted by a court if it inspires
confidence of the court and if the same is free from tutoring and otherwise
reliable. Accordingly, we consider it necessary to reproduce the relevant
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portions of the judgement of Purshottam Chopra (supra) and the same is
hereunder:-
"19. In Dal Singh case [State of M.P. v. Dal Singh, (2013) 14
SCC 159 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 141] , this Court has pointed
out that the law does not provide as to who could record
dying declaration nor is there a prescribed format or
procedure for the same. All that is required is the person
recording dying declaration must be satisfied that the maker
is in a fit state of mind and is capable of making such a
statement. This Court also pointed out that as to whether in
a given burn case, the skin of thumb had been completely
burnt or if some part of it will remain intact, would also be a
question of fact. This Court said: (SCC p. 167, paras 20-22)
"20. The law on the issue can be summarized to the effect
that law does not provide who can record a dying
declaration, nor is there any prescribed form, format, or
procedure for the same. The person who records a dying
declaration must be satisfied that the maker is in a fit state
of mind and is capable of making such a statement.
Moreover, the requirement of a certificate provided by a
doctor in respect of such state of the deceased, is not
essential in every case."
.......................................................................................
....................................................................................
"(B) Can a person who has suffered 92% burn injuries
be in a condition to give a dying declaration?
24. This question is also no longer res integra. In Vijay
Pal v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Vijay Pal v. State (NCT of Delhi),
(2015) 4 SCC 749 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 733] , we notice the
following discussion: (SCC p. 759, paras 23-24)
'23. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant
that when the deceased sustained 100% burn injuries, she
could not have made any statement to her brother. In this
regard, we may profitably refer to the decision in Mafabhai
Nagarbhai Raval v. State of Gujarat [Mafabhai Nagarbhai
Raval v. State of Gujarat, (1992) 4 SCC 69 : 1992 SCC (Cri)
810] wherein it has been held that a person suffering 99%
burn injuries could be deemed capable enough for the
purpose of making a dying declaration. The Court in the said
case opined that unless there existed some inherent and
apparent defect, the trial court should not have substituted
its opinion for that of the doctor. In the light of the facts of the
case, the dying declaration was found to be worthy of
reliance.
24. In State of M.P. v. Dal Singh (2013) 14 SCC 159 : (2014)
4 SCC (Cri) 141], a two-judge Bench placed reliance on dying
declaration of the deceased who had suffered 100% burn
injuries on the ground that the dying declaration was found
to be credible.'
25. Therefore, the mere fact that the patient suffered 92%
burn injuries as in this case would not stand in the way of
patient giving a dying declaration which otherwise inspires
the confidence of the Court and is free from tutoring, and can
be found reliable."
As discussed above in course of his argument, learned Advocate for the
appellant strongly contended that learned trial court for no reason
whatsoever put much reliance upon the oral evidence of PW17 vis-à-vis
Exhibit 10 since from the materials as available from the trial court's
record it reveals that PW17 being a Sub-Inspector of Police, Entally PS
has got no nexus with the present lis since from his Examination-in-Chief
as well as from his cross examination, it is clear that neither he has any
authority to record the alleged dying declaration (Exhibit 10) of the
deceased nor any such requisition has been obtained by him either from
the I.O of this case or from the attending doctor or from the NRS Hospital
Authority. It was equally argued that from the evidence of PW12 it would
reveal that he was neither the attending doctor of the said victim patient
nor he was at all aware as to whether at that material time the victim was
in a state of giving such dying declaration. It has further been argued that
learned trial court though considered Exhibit 10 is a valid piece of
evidence but at the same time he failed to visualize the injury report dated
11.02.2003, as prepared by DW 7 a doctor of Chandernagore Sub-
Divisional Hospital, wherefrom it reveals that the victim in a conscious
state of mind stated to her that she suffered accidental burn injury on
account of bursting of stove.
16. In our considered view, the argument as advanced by learned
advocate for the appellant is not tenable since in the case of Purshottam
Chopra (supra) it has been decided that law does not provide who can
record a dying declaration nor is there any prescribed form, format or
procedure for the same. It is not equally acceptable to us that the alleged
dying declaration as recorded by PW 17 cannot be accepted as a valid
piece of evidence since he has not been authorized to record such
statement especially when it is within our knowledge that NRS Medical
College And Hospital is situated within the Entally PS and there is no law
that in an unnatural burn case no police officer can record statement of
the victim. It is equally to be considered that both PW12 and PW17 are
the government officials being the medical practitioner and Sub Inspector
of Police respectively and there cannot be any cogent reason on the part of
them to adduce false evidence against the accused. On carefully scrutiny
of Exhibit 10 it appears to us that the victim at the time of making such
statement was quite conscious and her answers are equally coherent even
if, she suffered 80% burn injury.
17. Since the learned trial court convicted all the present three
appellants under Section 498A IPC it becomes obligatory to us to look to
the evidence of the relative witnesses i.e. PW 1,5 and 6 vis-à-vis the
evidence of the neighbors i.e. PWS 3,4,8 and 11. Admittedly, in their
respective Examination-in-chiefs the aforesaid relative witnesses
categorically stated that soon after the marriage of the victim she was
subjected to torture at the instance of the present appellants on account
of demand of dowry and other materials but none of the witnesses gave
any vivid description of such torture or tenable /probable date/dates of
commission of such torture upon her. Admittedly, the neighboring
witnesses namely; PWs 3 and 4 in their Examination-in-Chiefs stated that
they noticed unrest in the house of the accused persons but they never
stated that the same occurred on account of demand of dowry at the
behest of the accused persons. In view of such we are of considered view
that the findings of the learned trial court that the present appellants are
guilty under Section 498A IPC is not sustainable in the eye of law and the
same is set aside.
18. In order to come to a logical conclusion as to whether the learned
trial court is equally justified in convicting the appellant no.2 Onkar Nath
Gupta and appellant no.3 Anil Kumar Gupta, under Sections 302/34 IPC
we once again propose to look to Exhibit 10 being the dying declaration of
the deceased.
19. On perusal of Exhibit 10 it appears to us that it is the last
statement of the victim prior to her death that after the birth of her child
her husband took her to her matrimonial home from her paternal home
within 3-4 days and since then mental torture upon her started. It has
been stated further by the victim that on 11.02.20003, when she was
about to leave her matrimonial home for her paternal home and was
packing her wearing apparels, at that time her younger brother-in-law
Anil Kumar Gupta (appellant no.3 herein) poured kerosene oil on her
head and set fire on her person and at that time her husband and son
was in the room of her father-in-law. She stated further that thereafter
she could not find anything on account of such fire and afterwards her
husband took her hospital by riding an auto.
20. From the aforesaid dying declaration it thus, reveals that the victim
prior to her death in her dying declaration practically gave allegation as
against the present appellant no.3 Anil Kumar Gupta only but not as
against her husband Onkar Nath Gupta, who is the appellant no.2 herein.
From the mouth of the prosecution witnesses it no where transpires that
the alleged setting of fire took place in furtherance of common intention of
the present appellant nos. 2 and 3 and therefore, we are constrained to
hold that the finding of the learned trial court that the appellant no.2
Onkar Nath Gupta, is guilty under Sections 302/34 IPC is not equally
tenable and the same is thus set aside.
21. In order to decide as to whether learned trial court is equally
justified in holding the present appellant no. 3 Anil Kumar Gupta guilty
under Sections 498A/302/34 IPC, we propose to look to the order dated
10.09.2013, as passed in this Criminal Appeal whereby leave was granted
to the present appellant no. 3 Anil Kumar Gupta to file fresh application
for bail and subsequently on 13.09.2013 bail was granted to him. It is
pertinent to mention herein that previously by an order dated 07.03.2013,
the plea of juvenility of the present appellant no.3 was taken up for the
first time and accordingly, a report was called for from the learned trial
court for a limited purpose to ascertain the age of the appellant no.3 Anil
Gupta on the date of the alleged occurrence of the alleged incident.
22. From the trial court's record it reveals that as per direction of this
Court an enquiry was conducted by the learned trial court in view of
provisions of Rule 12 (3)(a)(i)(ii) and (iii) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Rules 2007 and on completion of the same, the
said enquiry report was sent to this court to the effect that present
appellant no.3 Anil Kumar Gupta on the date of occurrence i.e. on
11.02.2003 was found to be 14 years 10 months and as such he was a
juvenile in conflict with law at that time.
23. Since it is settled principle of law that trial of a juvenile in conflict
with law (JCL) cannot be done by a Court of Sessions and/or Additional
Sessions Judge, the finding of the Learned Trial Judge as against the
present appellant no.3 Anil Kumar Gupta holding him guilty under
Sections 498A/302/34 IPC vitiates and the same is thus, set aside.
24. In view of such the present appeal succeeds and as a result the
judgment and order dated 25.08.2005 and 26.08.2005 as passed by
Learned Additional Sessions Judge, 1st Fast Track Court, Hooghly, in
Sessions Trial No. 30 of 2003 is thus, set aside.
25. Since it has been observed by us that the present appellant no.3
Anil Kumar Gupta, was a juvenile(14 years 10 months) at the time of
alleged incident, it is obligatory on our part to direct the learned trial
court to send the relevant case records with all materials to the
Jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board for commencing fresh trial against
JCL, Anil Kumar Gupta afresh without being influenced by any of the
observation made by us in this judgement. However for ends of justice, we
are not doing so since JCL Anil Kumar Gupta was brought under arrest
on 14.02.2003 and he has been released on bail on 10.06.2003 by the
learned trial court and he was again taken into custody on 25.08.2005, by
the learned trial court while passing the impugned judgement and
thereafter he was released on bail on 13.09.2013 by this Court; that is he
was in custody for a period of 8 years 4 months and 14 days whereas
under the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2000, the maximum period of keeping a JCL in a special
home is for a period till he ceases to be a juvenile.
26. Accordingly, it is ordered that the appellants herein viz; Kalabati
Gupta, Onkar alias Omkar Nath Gupta and Anil Kumar Gupta are thus
dischargd from their respective bail bonds and be set at liberty at once, if
not detained in connection with any other case.
27. Let a copy of this judgement along with LCR be sent down at once.
28. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgement, if applied for, be
given to the parties on completion of usual formalities.
I agree.
(Chitta Ranjan Dash, J.) (Partha Sarathi Sen, J.)
