Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 1098 Cal
Judgement Date : 9 March, 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon'ble Justice Joymalya Bagchi
And
The Hon'ble Justice Bivas Pattanayak
CRA 86 of 2013
+
CRAN 3 of 2014 (Old No. CRAN 3012 of 2014)
With
CRAN 4 of 2021
(via video conferencing)
Sariful Sk. & Anr.
Vs.
The State of West Bengal
For the Appellant No.1: Mr. Md. Asraf Ali, Adv.
Mr. R.I Sardar, Adv.
For the Appellant No.2 Mr. Sumanta Ganguly,Adv.
Amicus Curiae:
For the State : Mr.Neguive Ahmed,Learned APP.
Ms. Amita Gaur, Adv.
Ms. Z.N. Khan, Adv.
Heard on : 15.02.2022
Judgment on: 09.03.2022
Bivas Pattanayak, J:-
1.
This appeal is directed against the judgement and order dated 28.01.2013
and 29.01.2013, passed by Additional District & Sessions Judge, Fast Track
3rd Court, Rampurhat, Birbhum in Sessions trial no. 40(9)/2011 arising out
of Sessions case no. 119/2011 convicting the appellants under Section
376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing the appellants for rigorous
imprisonment for life and pay fine of Rs. 20,000/- each in default rigorous
imprisonment for a further period of one year for offence punishable under
section 376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code.
2. The prosecution case against the appellants is to the effect that on
17.05.2011 in the morning while the victim was returning after offering puja
at Tulsipur village and had reached near Tulsipur River the appellant no.1
forcibly took her near the canal and committed rape upon her. Victim tried to
raise alarm but was threatened by appellant no.1 that he would have her and
her son murdered. Appellant no. 2 at the material point of time kept
surveillance upon the passer-bys. After committing rape appellant no. 1 took
away the golden earing and bangle from the victim and both of the miscreants
fled away. In relation to the incident Murarai Police Station case no. 42 of
2011 dated 17.05.2011 under Section 376(2)(g)/379 of the Indian Penal Code
was initiated against both the appellants.
3. Upon completion of investigation police submitted charge sheet under
Section 376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code against the appellants.
4. Thereafter on compliance of legal formalities the case was committed to the
Court of Sessions which was incidentally transferred to Additional District &
Sessions Judge, Fast Track 3rd Court, Rampurhat, Birbhum for trail and
disposal.
5. Charge under Section 376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code was framed
against both the appellants who pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
6. The prosecution in order to prove the aforesaid charge against the
appellants has examined as many as 17 witnesses and proved number of
documents. Defence did not adduce any evidence, however the defence case is
of innocence and false implications. From the trend of cross-examination it
appears that the appellants tried to make out a positive case that due to their
protest against the illegal selling of country liquor (Cholai Mod) by the
husband of the prosecutrix (victim) they have been falsely implicated in this
case.
7. Upon consideration of the materials and the evidence on record the trial
judge by the impugned judgment and order dated 28.01.2013 and
29.01.2013 convicted and sentenced the appellants as aforesaid.
8. Mr. Md Asraf Ali, learned advocate appearing for appellant no.1 submitted
that the evidence of the victim is full of inconsistencies and infirmities and
therefore, is not at all reliable to convict the appellants on the basis of the
same. Further it is evident from the statement of PW16, Swapan Mondal, who
helped her to reach her home after the incident, that PW1 (victim) only stated
to him that her sari was pulled by somebody nothing more nothing less.
Moreover, as per the doctor (PW15) and the medical report of the victim
(Exhibit 7) she did not sustain any injuries either to her private parts or other
parts of the body to probabilise the occurrence, as alleged. Furthermore he
submitted that there is delay in lodging FIR resulting in embellishment and
conjectures. He further submitted that the husband of the victim has illegal
business of selling country liquor (Cholai Mod) in the locality which was
objected by the appellants which led to false implication. In view of his above
submissions he prayed that the appeal be allowed and the appellant no.1be
acquitted from the case.
9. Mr. Sumanta Ganguly, appearing as amicus curiae on behalf of appellant
no.2 also submitted in similar fashion and asserted that the case of the
prosecution against the appellants has not been proved to the hilt and there
are several loop-holes in the prosecution case. He further submitted that the
appellant no. 2 as per the prosecution case did not take any active part in the
commission of the offence alleged and he was only standing beside the place
of occurrence and therefore no culpability is attributed to appellant no. 2. He
prayed the appellant no.2 be acquitted from the instant case.
10. Mr. Neguive Ahmed, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for
the State submitted that as per the statement of the victim there are specific
allegations against appellant no. 1 of committing forcible rape upon the victim
and the appellant no. 2 contributed to the offence by threatening the victim
and also keeping watch on the local people who were crossing the place of
occurrence. Thus, both the accused persons have concert and they shared
common intention in committing the offence upon the victim. Furthermore,
the statement of the victim in the FIR and before the magistrate is
corroborative of what she has stated before the court during her deposition.
He further submitted that although as per the medical report the victim did
not sustain any injuries, yet such aspect does make the prosecution
unreliable as presence of injuries is not sine qua non for establishing an
offence of rape. Further the defence did not lead any evidence to probabilise
false implication. Moreover the FIR has been lodged on the day of occurrence
itself and there is nominal delay of few hours which does not at all affect the
prosecution case. Therefore, when the evidence of the victim is intrinsic and
reliable it should be acted upon to reach a logical conclusion in a prosecution
of rape and thus in the facts and circumstances of the case the conviction
and sentence of the appellants made by the trial judge should be affirmed.
11. In the present case the appellants are charged with the offence of gang
rape. It is trite law that in a prosecution of rape the testimony of the victim of
sexual assault is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which
necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should not
find any difficulty in acting on such testimony of the victim of sexual assault
alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is
found to be reliable. In the aforesaid backdrop the evidence of the victim
(PW1) is to be analysed in order to ascertain the extent of its reliability.
11.1.PW1 (victim) deposed that on 17.05.2011 at about 2 PM while she was
returning after offering puja at Tulsipur village and was crossing the river by
walking, since there was little water, at that time appellant no. 1 caught hold
of her hand and appellant no. 2 caught hold of the hand of her minor son
aged about two years and thereafter appellant no. 1 undressed her, torn her
blouse and committed rape upon her. She further deposed that appellant
no.2 threatened her of killing the victim and her son by putting 'hasua' on the
throat of her son. Although the victim did not state either in her written
complaint or statement under section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code
that of the above role played by appellant no.2 yet such are minor
discrepancies in view of the fact that the aspect of threat upon her has been
stated in both her aforesaid statements. The presence of the appellant no.2
during the occurrence is well established. Further there are evidence that
both of them fled away after the incident. The victim (PW1) has been
extensively cross-examined, however, no such notable contradictions or
infirmities is seen in her cross-examination as regards her statement made
in-chief against the appellants save and except which has been indicated
above.In the written complaint (Exhibit 1/1) and statement made before the
Magistrate under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code the victim also
disclosed similar circumstances and the manner in which the rape was
committed upon her at the instance of the appellants. Before PW15, Dr
Nirapada Das the victim stated about the involvement of the appellant no. 1
in perpetration of rape upon her during her medical examination.
11.2. The victim (PW1) also deposed that she informed the incident to her
mother-in-law, sister-in-law and thereafter her mother-in-law also informed
the matter to her elder brother-in-law, who in turn informed it to her
husband. She further deposed that when her husband returned home she
along with her husband and sister-in-law went to Murarai police station and
lodged written complaint. She proved her signature on the written complaint
marked Exhibit 1.The prosecution has examined the husband (PW2), the
sister-in-law (PW 3) and the brother-in-law (PW4).
PW2, Satya Narayan Bhakat husband of the victim deposed that he came to
know of the incident from his elder brother Kali Prasad Bhakat and further
stated that his wife (victim) narrated to him that the appellant no. 1
committed rape upon her and appellant no 2 was standing nearby.
PW3, Felurani Jaiswal deposed that on the date of incident after returning
from Tulsipur village, the victim (PW1) narrated the incident to her alleging of
forcible rape committed upon her by the appellants and also of intimidation
meted out to her. She also deposed that as per instruction of the victim (PW1)
she scribed the written complaint. She proved the written complaint marked
Exhibit 1/1.
PW4, Kali Prasad Bhakat who is the elder brother-in-law of the victim stated
that he came to learn from her elder sister (PW3) about the incident of rape
upon the victim by the appellants which occurred by the side of Tulsipur
River. There is discrepancy as to the source of information of this witness to
the extent he deposed that he got information from his elder sister while
victim (PW1) deposed that her mother-in-law informed PW4(brother-in-law).
Be that as it may, it is quite natural for PW4 (brother-in-law) to receive
information of the incident from any of the family members. Whether
information is received from his mother or elder sister is of hardly any
consequence.
Upon going through the cross-examinations of the aforesaid witnesses it is
found that there are no notable contradictions or inconsistencies in their
statements. All the aforesaid witnesses have corroborated the evidence and
version of the victim (PW1).
11.3. The victim (PW1) also deposed that she handed over her "saya" and
torn blouse which she was wearing at the time of incident to the police and
she proved her signatures on the seizure list (Exhibit 2).PW17, Brajendranath
Maity (investigating officer) also deposed that he seized the wearing apparels
of the victim. PW5, ASI Sunil Kumar Dey and PW6, Constable Amal Kumar
Saha who are witness to the said seizure also supported the fact of seizure of
such wearing apparels of the victim by the investigating officer. Further PW5,
ASI Sunil Kumar Dey also identified the said torn blouse of the victim marked
Mat Exhibit I. The aforesaid seizure list has been marked as Exhibit 2/4.
Thus the seizure of the wearing apparels is supportive of the version of the
victim (PW1).
11.4. It has been strenuously argued on behalf of appellants as per
deposition of PW16, Swapan Mondal, the person who helped the victim to
reach home after the incident, the victim only stated that somebody pulled
her sari and hence no incident of rape took place as alleged. In her
examination victim (PW1) deposed that she narrated the incident to one
Swapan and thereafter Swapan and one of his relatives reached her to her
house at Barua Gopalpur. PW16, Swapan Mondal stated that the victim
informed them that someone pulled her sari hence she returned to their
village. Be that as it may, I am unable to accept such proposition inasmuch
as generally a victim of rape would only narrate her terrible and unpleasant
experience to the person of her confidant and trust and none else.
Accordingly, the victim had inhibition in narrating her trauma of sexual
assault to PW16, Swapan Mondal who is an outsider and therefore her not
divulging the incident to PW16, Swapan Mondal is quite natural.
11.5. Further it has been vehemently argued on behalf of the appellants that
the victim (PW1) did not sustain any injuries either to her private parts or any
portion of the body which conclusively establishes the fact that no incident
took place in the manner as has been alleged. PW15, Dr Nirapada Das, who
examined the victim, deposed in his cross-examination that he did not find
any injuries on the private parts of the victim. He proved the injury report
marked Exhibit 7. Upon perusal of the injury report (Exhibit 7) it is found
that no injuries are noted either in the private parts of the victim or in any
other portion of her body. At this juncture the question arises whether such
aspect makes the prosecution case unworthy of acceptance. It is settled
principle that mere absence of injury either in the private parts or person of
the victim cannot be a ground to hold that no rape was committed and also
not an evidence of falsity of the allegation. In the present case the victim is a
married grown up lady having a child she was threatened with dire
consequences at the time of incident and therefore, it can readily be inferred
that during the occurrence she was not in a position to physically resist the
appellants in committing the crime due to fear and as such the absence of
injury to her private parts or the body is not of much significance.[See
Santosh Kumar versus State of M.P reported in (2006) 10 SCC 595] Thus
I am not in conformity with such proposition advanced on behalf of
appellants.
In view of the above discussion I find that the version of the victim (PW1) is
trustworthy, reliable and consistent to act upon. In order to impeach the
version of the victim the defence has tried to make out a case that as they
protested against illegal selling of liquor (Cholai Mud) in the locality by the
husband of the victim, she had falsely entangled them in the present case.
However it is placed on record that no such evidence is forthcoming from the
side of the defence to probabilise such fact. There is no reason as to why the
victim would falsely implicate the appellants. Further PW10, Dr Dipak Kumar
Morothi who examined appellant no.1 proved the medical report (Exhibit 5).
In the medical report (Exhibit 5) it has been reported that there is nothing to
suggest that appellant no.1 is incapable of sexual intercourse.
11.6. It has been vociferously argued on behalf of the appellants that the case
of the prosecution is shrouded with suspicion as there is immense delay in
lodging of the FIR. The incident took place on 17.05.2011 at 2PM and the FIR
has been lodged on the same day at 21.15 hours meaning thereby there has
been delay of some hours. Victim (PW1) deposed that after the incident with
the assistance of one Swapan and one of his relatives she reached her house
at 4 PM from Tulsipur village. Her brother-in-law Kali Prasad Bhakat (PW4)
informed her husband about the incident and as per PW2, Satyanarayan
Bhakat he received information of the incident at 4.30 PM. After her husband
returned home she along with him and her sister-in-law went to Murarai
police station at 8.30/9PM. The victim underwent a traumatic experience of
sexual assault and was panic stricken. She was confused and disoriented as
to what would bring succour to her and naturally she waited for arrival of her
husband who was in his office. After the arrival of her husband and on giving
a cool thought she went to the police station to lodge complaint in the evening
around 8.30/9PM. This obviously has led to delay of few hours in lodging of
the FIR. There is no case of embellishment or concoction of facts in the FIR
due to such delay. Even otherwise, the mere factum of delay in filing
complaint in regard to an offence of this nature by itself would not be fatal so
as to vitiate the prosecution case. [See State of Chhattisgarh versus Derha
reported in (2004) 9 SCC 699].Accordingly, the argument advanced in this
regard does not stand to reason.
11.7. It is submitted on behalf of appellant no. 2 that as per the prosecution
case he did not take any active part in the commission of the offence alleged
and was only standing beside the place of occurrence and therefore no
culpability is attributed to appellant no. 2.The role attributed to appellant
no.2 that he caught hold of the hand of her minor son of the victim aged
about two years and threatened her of killing the victim and her son by
putting "hasua" on the throat of her son is at variance with the earlier
statement made by the victim in her written complaint and statement before
the magistrate. Be that as it may, such aspect does not absolve appellant
no.2 from the offence in view of the fact that as per the victim he was present
during the occurrence and after the incident he fled away along with
appellant no.1 meaning thereby he shared common intention with appellant
no.1. Thus the prosecution has been able to show that both the appellants
acted in concert. The conduct of appellant no.2 to remain present during the
occurrence and flee away along with appellant no.1 soon after the incident
shows his prior concert and meeting of minds with appellant no.1.
Explanation 1 to Section 376(2) clearly provides that where a woman is raped
by one or more in a group of persons acting in furtherance of their common
intention, each of the persons shall be deemed to have committed gang rape
within the meaning of this sub-section. Thus where there is meeting of minds
and sharing of common intention in such an event all the accused will be
guilty irrespective of the fact that the victim girl has been raped by one or
more of them and it is not necessary for the prosecution to adduce evidence of
a completed act of rape by each one of the accused. The essence of joint
liability is the existence of common intention which presupposes prior concert
which may be determined from the conduct of the offenders revealed during
the course of action and it could arise and form suddenly but there must be
meeting of minds. [See Ashok Kumar versus State of Haryana reported in
(2003) 2 SCC 143]. Thus the argument advanced on behalf of appellant no.2
as above is of no substance.
11.8. From the aforesaid evidence on record it is found that the prosecution
has been able to establish the following requisites for sustaining an order of
conviction under section 376(2)(g):
(i)that more than one person had acted in concert with common intention to
commit rape on the victim with prior meeting of minds and with element of
participation in action;
(ii)that in furtherance of such common intention one or more persons of the
group actually caused rape on the victim.
As from the evidence on record it is found that the appellants in furtherance
of their common intention committed rape on the victim lady, the
presumption in law under section 114A of the Evidence Act comes into
operation. Section 114A of the Evidence Act reads hereunder.
" Section 114A of the Evidence Act-Presumption as to absence of consent in certain prosecution for rape.- In a prosecution for rape under clause(a) , clause(b), clause(c), clause (d), clause (e), clause(f) , clause(g), clause(h), clause(i), clause(j), clause(k), clause (l), clause(m) or clause(n) of sub-section (2) of Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), where sexual intercourse by the accused is proved and the question is whether it was without consent of the woman alleged to have been raped and such woman states in her evidence before the court that she did not consent, the court shall presume that she did not consent."
There is no case of the defence that the incident of rape was consensual. The
aforesaid presumption in law has also not been rebutted either from the
materials on record or by leading cogent evidence from the side of the
defence. Thus in view of statutory presumption envisaged in section 114A of
the Evidence Act it is presumed that the victim did not consent to such rape
by the appellants.
Accordingly, the conviction of the appellants made by the trial court is
upheld.
12. Now coming to the aspect of sentencing, the trial court has convicted the
appellants for offence punishable under Section 376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal
Code for rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs.20,000/- each.
At the outset it is noted that the aforesaid offence is a crime against women
which is direct insult to the human dignity of the society. Thus imposition of
any inadequate sentence in such offence not only results in injustice to the
victim and the society in general but also stimulates criminal activities. While
considering the appropriate punishment the court has not only to keep in
view the rights of the criminal/accused but also the rights of the victim who
suffers in the hands of the perpetrator of crime. However, keeping in mind the
entirety of the circumstances I am of the opinion that imposition of maximum
punishment for rigorous imprisonment for life by the trial court in respect of
offence under section 376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code needs to be
reappraised. Ordinarily sentence should be commensurate with the gravity of
offence and should act as deterrent to commission of such offences. Section
376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code contemplates punishment with rigorous
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than 10 years but may be for
life and shall also be liable to fine. In the case in hand it is found that there
are no such criminal antecedents of the appellants or any previous
convictions. Thus keeping in mind the aggravating as well as mitigating
circumstances, in my view, a term of 10 years of rigorous imprisonment with
fine of Rs.10,000/- each will be commensurate with the nature of offence.
Accordingly, the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for life imposed in respect
of Section 376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code with fine of Rs.20,000/- each
against the appellants is reduced to rigorous imprisonment for a term of 10
years with fine of Rs.10,000/- each. The default clause as imposed by the
trial court is maintained. The sentence in respect of offence under Section
376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code is modified to the aforesaid extent.
The period of detention undergone by the appellants during investigation,
inquiry or trial of the case shall be set-off from the substantive sentence in
terms of Section 428 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
13. In the light of the above discussion, the conviction of the appellants is
upheld and sentence passed by the learned trial court is modified to the
extent as aforesaid.
14.The instant appeal, accordingly, is allowed in part to the extent of
aforesaid modification in the sentence.
15.The connected CRAN No. 3 of 2014 (Old CRAN No. 3012 of 2014) and
CRAN No.4 of 2021 also stands disposed of.
16. Before parting I record my appreciation for the assistance rendered by
Mr. Sumanta Ganguly as amicus curiae.
17. The instant appeal being no. 86 of 2013 is thus disposed of.
18. Copy of the judgement along with the lower court records be sent down to
the learned trial court at once.
19. Urgent Photostat Certified copy of this judgement, if applied for, be
supplied expeditiously after complying with all necessary legal formalities.
I Agree, (Joymalya Bagchi,J) (Bivas Pattanayak,J)
Publish Your Article
Campus Ambassador
Media Partner
Campus Buzz
LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026
LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!