Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 8560 Cal
Judgement Date : 21 December, 2022
02 21.12. WPA 13348 of 2018
2022
Ct. No. 25 Santanu Chowdhury
Vs.
BM,JR The State of West Bengal and others.
---------------
Mr. Arkadipta Sengupta Mr. Alminhaz Karim ... for the petitioner.
Mr. Raghunath Chakraborty Mr. Mahaboob Ahmed ... for Maheshtala Municipality.
Mr. Manas Kundu
Ms. Neelam Singh ... for the State.
The petitioner has challenged the decision of the
Board of councilors in its meeting held on August 30,
2017, which was signed by the Chairman of the
Municipality on September 5, 2017 whereby the
building plan submitted by the petitioner for sanction of
the second floor was cancelled on the ground of material
misrepresentation and adopting fraudulent means.
The petitioner claims to have purchased the ground
floor roof of the building in question from one Jaya
Mondal by virtue of a deed of conveyance dated April 3,
2012 being no. 3692 of 2012. The further case of the
petitioner is that Jaya Mondal obtained a sanctioned
plan from the Mahestala Municipality (for short "the
municipality") sometimes in the year 2011 for
constructing a two storied building. But after
completing the construction of the ground floor, she had
transferred the ground floor roof in favour of the
petitioner herein together with right to raise
construction on the roof of the ground floor of the said
building. The petitioner claims to have constructed the
first floor in accordance with the sanctioned plan
accorded in favour of Jaya Mondal and thereafter in the
year 2014 applied for sanction of the building plan for
raising the second storey over the roof of the first floor
of the two storied building.
The municipal authority, by the order dated
August 30,,2017 signed on September 5, 2017,
cancelled the building plan submitted by the petitioner
for raising the second storey on the ground that the writ
petitioner has suppressed the material fact of existence
of the previous sanctioned building plan; has completed
the first floor without change of name in respect of the
previous sanctioned building plan and also showed the
existing building having both floors being commercially
used whereas the real fact is otherwise.
Mr. Sengupta, learned advocate for the petitioner
contended that before according sanction of the building
plan, the municipality realised site plan fees, building
plan fees, development fees and retention fees and only
after the amount demanded by the municipality on such
account was paid, the municipality granted sanction for
construction of the second floor. He further contended
that after realising retention fees from the petitioner, the
Municipality could not have cancelled the plan in
question.
Mr. Chakraborty, learned advocate representing the
municipality draws the attention of the Court to the
impugned order dated August 30, 2017 signed on
September 5, 2017 and contended that the writ
petitioner in his application for construction of another
floor did not refer to existing sanctioned plan. He further
submitted that the writ petitioner showed the existing
building having both the floors being commercially used
whereas it appears from the previous sanctioned plan
that the ground floor was for commercial use and the
first floor was for residential use.
Mr. Chakraborty refers to the provisions laid down
under section 217 of the West Bengal Municipal Act,
1993 (for short ""the 1993 Act") to contend that if the
suppression of fact amounts to material
misrepresentation, the municipality can invoke its
power to cancel the building plan already sanctioned. As
to what would amount to fraud and mis-representation,
Mr. Chakraborty relied upon the provisions laid down
under Section 17 and 18 of the Indian Contract Act,
1872.
Mr. Chakraborty, submits that a person intending
to construct while applying for permission to make
addition or alteration of building has to indicate about
the sanctioned plan in case of any existing structure
and in support of such contention he referred to the
provisions laid down under the West Bengal Municipal
Building Rules. Mr. Chakraborty also refers to a
decision of a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case
of Tapan Bhattacharyya versus Kolkata Municipal
Corporation reported at 2011(5) CHN 66 to contend that
there is a difference between a mere mis-statement of
fact and deliberate material mis-representation and/or
fraudulent statement. Mr. Chakraborty concluded by
submitting that the suppression of fact and/or making
a mis-representation in the case in the case on hand
amounts to deliberate material mis-representation
and/or fraudulent statement for which municipality was
justified in cancelling the sanctioned plan.
Heard learned advocates for the parties and
perused the materials placed.
It is not in dispute that by virtue of the deed of
conveyance being no.3692 of 2012 the petitioner had a
right to construct over the roof of the ground floor of
the building. It is also not in dispute that the erstwhile
owner obtained sanctioned plan from the municipality
for constructing a two storied building thereon which
was valid till 2014. On a specific query put by the Court
to Mr. Chakraborty as to what formalities the petitioner
has to comply with for completing the construction
according to the sanction plan accorded in favour of his
vendor, Mr. Chakraborty, in his usual fairness,
submitted that he could not find out any provision
either in the 1993 Act or rules framed thereunder in
that regard for the purpose of completing construction
according to the plan sanctioned in favour of the
erstwhile owner/vendor. In the absence of any
provision either in the statute or in the rules framed
thereunder requiring the subsequent purchaser to apply
for permission for construction on the basis of the
sanction plan issued in favour of his vendor, the
petitioner could not be said to be at fault by making
construction on the basis of plan sanctioned in favour of
his vendor. It is also not the contention of the
municipality that the first floor was constructed after
the sanction plan issued in favour of the erstwhile
vendor had lapsed.
It is evident from the record that the petitioner got
his name mutated on July 6,2012 that is during the
validity period of the building plan issued in favour of
the vendor of the petitioner. The petitioner applied for
sanction of the building plan sometimes in the year
2014 for constructing the second floor over the two
storied building after he completed the construction of
the first floor.
Record reveals that municipality scrutinized the
application for sanction in details and after the same
was made ready for sanction directed the petitioner to
deposit a sum of Rs.1,27,551/- (Rupees one lakh twenty
seven thousand five hundred fifty one) only on account
of site plan fees, building plan fees, development fees
and retention fees by issuing a memo dated October 15,
2015. Though it has not been specifically stated in the
said memo as to why municipality realized retention fees
from the petitioner but in the absence of any valid
explanation from the municipality, this Court holds that
the said retention fees was charged by the municipality
from the petitioner for the purpose of retaining the
existing construction. The decision to charge retention
fees together with other fees shall be deemed to have
been taken after considering all factors relevant for
retaining the existing construction. Thus, the ground
indicated in the impugned order that the petitioner has
suppressed the fact that he has changed the mode of
user or that the earlier plan was not disclosed by the
petitioner at the time of making application for sanction
plan is of no relevance at present.
This Court is, therefore of the considered view that
the municipality after realizing the retention fees from
the petitioner as indicated in the memo dated October
15, 2015 is estopped from canceling the sanctioned plan
on the ground of alleged material mis-representation or
fraudulent statement after issuance of the Memo dated
October 15, 2015.
There is, however, no quarrel to the proposition of
law laid down by the co ordinate bench in Tapan
Bhattacharyya (supra) that there is a difference between
misstatement of fact and deliberate material mis-
representation or fraudulent statement. But the fact
remains that in the case on hand, the municipality after
accepting the retention fees from the petitioner shall be
deemed to have condoned all alleged acts of material
misrepresentation and/ or fraudulent statement, if any.
Therefore, the proposition laid down in Tapan
Bhattacharyya (supra) is of no assistance to the
Municipality in the case on hand.
"Fraud" defined under Section 17 and "Misrepresentation" defined under Sectio18 of the
Indian Contract Act, 1872 as relied upon by Mr.
Chakraborty is of no assistance to the petitioner in view
of the findings and observations made hereinbefore.
For the reasons as aforesaid, this Court is of the
considered view that the impugned order dated August
30, 2015 signed on September 5, 2017 is liable to be set
aside and quashed.
It would be relevant at this stage, to take note of
the fact that the plan in question, which was sanctioned
for constructing the second floor was valid till 5th
November, 2018. A stop work notice was issued on
January 19, 2017 and the plan stood cancelled by an
order of the Municipality dated September 5, 2017. The
writ petition was also pending since 2018. For such
reason, the petitioner could not construct on the basis
of the said plan.
Section 207(2) of 1993 Act permits renewal of
sanction of the building plan for a further period of
three years upon payment of prescribed fees. Since,
this Court is inclined to set aside the order canceling
the plan, the petitioner will be at liberty to apply for
renewal of the sanction building plan. However, he shall
be obliged to pay the prescribed fees therefor.
For all the reasons as aforesaid, the impugned
order dated August 30, 2017 signed on September 5,
2017 is set aside and quashed. In the event all
formalities for renewal of plan is complied with, the
Municipality shall renew the said plan as expeditiously
as possible but positively within a period of four weeks
from the date of making such application.
The writ petition accordingly stands allowed.
There shall be no order as to costs.
Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment be
given to the parties upon compliance of all formalities.
(Hiranmay Bhattacharyya, J.
Publish Your Article
Campus Ambassador
Media Partner
Campus Buzz
LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026
LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!