Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 2163 Cal/2
Judgement Date : 11 August, 2022
In The High Court at Calcutta
Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction
Original Side
The Hon'ble Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya
W.P.O. No. 831 of 2021
Supratik Ghosh
Vs.
Commissioner of Police of Kolkata and others
For the petitioner : Mr. Tapas Dutta
For the
State of West Bengal : Mr. Amitesh Banerjee,
Ms. Ipsita Banerjee
For High Court Administration : Mr. Siddhartha Banerjee,
Mr. Soumajit Majumder
Hearing concluded on : 02.08.2022
Judgment on : 11.08.2022
The Court:
1. The petitioner lodged a complaint against one Bipro Das Chatterjee
and his Company, upon which a First Information Report was
registered under Section 420/120B of the Indian Penal Code. Bipro
Das was arrested and released on bail upon giving an undertaking
that he would pay 50 per cent of the total outstanding amount
claimed by the petitioner, which would not be less than Rs.6,55,000/-
according to the petitioner. It is alleged that such amount was to be
paid within 15 days as per the undertaking of the accused, which was
allegedly not complied with by the accused.
2. The present respondent no.4 was the Investigating Officer of the case
and filed an FRT on October 3, 2001 indicating that the case was civil
in nature. During investigation, the respondent no.4 seized all
original documents like bills, challans, cheques, etc., by two Seizure
Lists dated February 27, 2001 and April 3, 2001.
3. The petitioner thereafter filed Money Suit No.01 of 2003 before the
Civil Judge, Senior Division, 8th Court at Alipore, against the said
Bipro Das Chatterjee and his Company for an amount of
Rs.10,58,166/-. Ad valorem court fees to the tune of Rs.25,550/- was
paid for institution of the suit.
4. In the meantime, vide order dated June 25, 2008, the Chief Judicial
Magistrate at Alipore directed respondent no.4 to return the original
documents to the petitioner, which was not complied with according
to the petitioner.
5. In evidence in connection with the Money Suit, respondent no.4 was
summoned as witness and he stated that the case diary was missing
and he was not in a position to produce the original seized
documents.
6. The Money Suit was ultimately dismissed by the Judgment and
Decree dated April 26, 2012. It is submitted that such dismissal was
due to non-production of the original documents.
7. The petitioner preferred an appeal bearing FAT 386 of 2012 against
the said Judgment and Decree dated April 26, 2012 but the appeal
was dismissed due to non-payment of deficit court fees vide order
dated September 9, 2013. As per the petitioner, such payment could
not be made due to the petitioner's financial hardship.
8. After dismissal of the appeal, the petitioner filed a writ petition bearing
WP No. 31667 (W) of 2013 on September 27, 2013 against the
respondent-authorities for compensation due to loss suffered by the
petitioner for the respondents' failure to hand over the original
documents to petitioner, which led to the dismissal of his suit.
9. In FAT 386 of 2012, the petitioner had filed an application bearing
CAN 4617 of 2016 for leave to file a review application. However, the
appeal was dismissed on September 9, 2013, without such leave being
granted. Consequently, the application was dismissed vide order
dated June 23, 2016.
10. The petitioner then filed a review application in the Trial Court on
June 29, 2016, which was registered as Miscellaneous Case No.8 of
2016, along with an application for condonation of delay.
11. While disposing of WP No.31667 (W) of 2013, a co-ordinate Bench,
vide order dated June 26, 2018, observed that since the State was
making over the photocopies of the documents seized by the police on
that date, certifying them to be exact photocopies of the documents
seized, it would be open to the petitioner to produce such documents
before the appropriate authority in accordance with law. It was
further held that since the petitioner, in law, was then in a position to
lead secondary evidence in support of his claim before the
adjudicating authorities, the claim for compensation need not be
assessed on that stage.
12. However, the petitioner's review application was dismissed vide order
dated June 15, 2019, upon refusal by the Court to condone the delay
in filing the review application. The said order of dismissal was
challenged in revision, giving rise to CO No. 598 of 2020, which was
also dismissed vide August 26, 2021 by this Court.
13. Subsequently, it is alleged, the petitioner learnt that the companies of
the accused/defendant no longer exist.
14. Thus, on the allegation of having suffered losses due to purported
negligent act of the respondent-authorities, particularly respondent
no.4, the petitioner has preferred the instant writ petition bearing
WPO No. 831 of 2021 for compensation to the tune of Rs.7,22,165/-
with 16 per cent per annum interest, to the tune of Rs.1,70,30,175/-,
for court fees paid to the tune of Rs.25,480/-, business loss, lawyer's
fees, miscellaneous expenses, alleged mental agony, etc.
15. Learned counsel for the petitioner argues that the Money Suit was
dismissed due to inability of the petitioner to produce the original
documents on which he relied on as evidence in the suit, due to the
respondent no.4 not handing over such originals to the petitioner.
The dismissal of the appeals for non-payment of deficit court fee was
due to the stringent financial condition of the petitioner. In any event,
it is argued that such dismissal was on a technical ground, as was the
dismissal of the review on the ground of limitation. Hence, the
petitioner's claim for compensation was never turned down on merits.
The affirmance of the dismissal by this Court in revision, it is argued,
does not alter such scenario.
16. Learned counsel submits that the writ court can take evidence and
grant compensation even if the respondents raise disputes on facts.
Such award of compensation will be on a prima facie notional figure,
which the Court can arrive at. In case of a disputed money claim, a
writ petition lies according to the petitioner.
17. In support of such propositions, learned counsel cites Popatrao
Vyankatrao Patil Vs. State of Maharashtra and others [(2020) 19 SCC
241], Sunil Kumar Wadhwa and another Vs. State of Punjab and others
[(2020) 19 SCC 678] and ABL International Limited and another Vs.
Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. and others [(2004) 3
SCC 553].
18. The petitioner cites Meghashyam Sadashivrao Vadhave Vs. State of
Maharashtra and others [(2017) 13 SCC 681] and N. Nagendra Rao &
Co. Vs. State of A.P. [(1994) 6 SCC 205] to elaborate his submissions
on the scope of interference by the writ court in such cases.
19. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that, while
dismissing the previous writ petition, the learned Single Judge had
refused compensation "at that stage", thereby keeping the question of
compensation open.
20. In support of the submission that the High Court, in a writ petition,
may direct the respondent-authority to pay compensation for wrongful
or negligent acts done by government servants, learned counsel for
the petitioner places reliance on Meghashyam Sadashivrao Vadhave
(supra) and N. Nagendra Rao & Co. (supra).
21. It is next contended that the writ court has the jurisdiction to
entertain a writ petition even if disputed questions of fact arise, in an
appropriate case, and award compensation. For the said proposition,
learned counsel cites Century Spinning and manufacturing Company
Ltd. and another Vs. The Ulhasnagar Municipal Council and another,
reported at (1970) 1 SCC 582, ABL International Ltd. and another Vs.
Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. and others, reported
at (2004) 3 SCC 533 and Popatrao Vyankatrao Patil (supra).
22. The next contention put forward by learned counsel for the petitioner
is that a writ petition is maintainable even involving monetary claim
when there is no fraud or misrepresentation, even though a suitable
efficacious alternative remedy is available by way of a suit.
Considering the age of the dispute, a writ petition was held to be
maintainable in ABL International Ltd. (supra).
23. Learned counsel for the petitioner also places reliance on ABL
International Ltd. (supra) for the proposition that a writ petition is
maintainable when the impugned action of the State or its
instrumentality is arbitrary and unreasonable so as to violate the
constitutional mandate of Article 14 or for other valid and legitimate
reasons. Lastly, learned counsel cites Sunil Kumar Wadhwa (supra) in
support of the proposition that the High Court was held in the said
case to have erred in law in relegating the appellant to the civil court
with liberty to file civil suit.
24. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent nos.1 to 4 submits that
the plaintiff/petitioner had available before him the option to file an
application under Section 65(c), read with Section 63, of the Evidence
Act for adducing copies of the documents-in-question as secondary
evidence. However, having not taken recourse to the said provisions,
it does not now lie in the mouth of the petitioner to claim
compensation for loss of the documents-in-question.
25. In the order dated March 23, 2017 passed by a co-ordinate bench in
connection with WP No.31667 (W) of 2013, with CAN 238 of 2014, it
was recorded that the learned advocate for the present petitioner, who
was also the petitioner therein, submited that the original Case Diary
records of the criminal proceedings have since been lost from the
Court's custody and referred to the report submitted by the District
Judge concerned and the Police Station concerned.
26. After such admission, the present writ petition claiming damages
entirely against the respondent nos.1 to 4 is not maintainable at all, it
is argued. A copy of the order referred to is annexed at page 10 of the
affidavit-in-opposition filed by respondent no.4 Saroj Praharaj.
27. Learned counsel for the respondent nos.1 to 4 next points to the
sequence of events. After dismissal of the plaintiff/petitioner's money
suit, not merely on the ground of adverse inference for non-production
of relevant documents but also on the ground of preponderance of
probabilities, the petitioner preferred a review application, which was
also dismissed for the delay in filing the same.
28. An appeal was also preferred by the petitioner against the dismissal of
the suit which was also dismissed on the ground of non-payment of
deficit court fees by the writ petitioner himself.
29. Moreover, the petitioner could easily have produced collateral evidence
and/or oral or circumstantial evidence to satisfy the test of
preponderance of probabilities, which was also a ground for the trial
court to dismiss the suit. However, the said course of action was
deliberately not adopted by the petitioner.
30. It is, thus, submitted that the petitioner lost before every forum due to
none else but his own laches and, as such, cannot now claim
compensation from the respondent-authorities.
31. That apart, it is submitted that it is beyond the scope of Article 226 of
the Constitution for the Court to grant damages, particularly in view
of the amount being unliquidated.
32. After having failed in all forums, the petitioner has preferred the
present writ petition, which is not maintainable in the eye of law, it is
contended.
33. Learned counsel for the High Court, while adopting the arguments of
the respondent nos.1 to 4, cites the judgment reported at P.
Viswanathan Vs. Dr. A.K. Burman and another, reported at (2002) SCC
OnLine 805, to elucidate the cases in which a writ court can award
cost or damages.
34. In the present case, however, such tests are not fulfilled as per the
learned counsel for the High Court. Upon considering the
submissions of the parties and perusing the material-on-record, it is
evident that the respondent nos.1 to 4 are justified in submitting that
the writ petitioner could very well have resorted to provisions of
Section 65(c), read with Section 63, of the Evidence Act to adduce
secondary evidence by producing copies of the documents purportedly
lost. Ample scope was available in law to produce secondary evidence
in the suit even if the originals were lost, which the petitioner chose
not to avail. Hence, the petitioner cannot argue now, at this belated
stage, that the petitioner lost his litigation due to the loss of the
documents.
35. That apart, it was specifically contended on behalf of the petitioner on
fact that the documents were lost from the Court's custody, which was
also recorded by the co-ordinate bench in the order dated March 23,
2017 passed in WP No.31667 (W) of 2013, with CAN 238 of 2014.
There is no conceivable reason as to why such admission of fact, even
if made through counsel, should not bind the petitioner.
36. The said contention belies the petitioner's allegation that the
respondents were responsible for the alleged loss.
37. Furthermore, the chronology of events clearly indicates that the
petitioner took a chance before all possible forums and waited for the
outcome thereof. Only after the litigations were all dismissed,
primarily due to the petitioner's laches, the petitioner is testing his
fortune by preferring the present writ petition.
38. The civil suit was dismissed, inter alia, on the ground of non-
production of relevant documents. However, the petitioner was the
dominus litis and it was the burden and initial onus of the petitioner,
as plaintiff, to tender copies of the relevant documents as secondary
evidence since Section 65(c) of the Evidence Act clearly stipulates that
in case of loss of a document, a copy thereof can be produced as
secondary evidence. Having failed to adopt such course, the petitioner
himself cannot turn back and claim compensation from others for
such flaw on his own part.
39. That apart, none else but the petitioner is to blame for the
considerable delay of more than 1300 days in filing the review
application. After losing in the review application and in the revisional
court, the petitioner also lost his appeal against the dismissal of his
suit only on the ground of non-payment of court fees, which could be
attributed only to the petitioner. Such laches are merely being sought
to be covered up now by the petitioner, by filing the present writ
petition for compensation against the respondents. Inasmuch as the
judgments cited by the petitioner are concerned, none of those
strengthen the case of the petitioner.
40. In the case of Meghashyam Sadashivrao Vadhave (supra), the basis of
grant of the compensation was the purchase price of teak trees, which
was quantifiable in nature, unlike in the present case.
41. Again, in N. Nagendra Rao & Co. (supra), the compensation was based
on the stock value which is, by its very nature, quantifiable.
Moreover, the relief was granted in the context of a suit and not a writ
petition.
42. Inasmuch as Century Spinning and Manufacturing Company Ltd. and
another (supra) is concerned, paragraph no.13 of the same lays down
that the questions of fact raised therein were "elementary" in nature.
In similar tune, Popatrao Vyankatrao Patil Vs. State of Maharashtra
and others (supra) specifically observed that disputed questions of fact
can only be decided by the writ court if they do not require "elaborate
evidence to be adduced" and that such plenary power is to be
exercised by the High Court only in exceptional circumstances.
Moreover, in the said case, the amount granted as refund was the
sum which was specifically paid by one of the parties, which was
clearly of quantifiable nature as well.
43. The Supreme Court, in ABL International Limited (supra), observed
that where disputed questions of fact pertaining to the
interpretation/meaning of documents or parts thereof are involved,
the courts can decide the objections. It was held that there does not
exist any absolute bar to decide disputed questions of fact by a writ
court "in an appropriate case".
44. In ABL International Limited (supra) it was categorically observed by
the Supreme Court that the plenary right of the High Court to issue
prerogative writ is not exercised normally to the exclusion of other
remedies, unless the impugned action of the State or its
instrumentality is arbitrary and unreasonable so as to violate Article
14 or any other legitimate right.
45. Again, in the present case, the alleged negligence of the respondents is
not arbitrary or unreasonable, let alone patently, as in ABL
International Limited (supra).
46. Inasmuch as civil suits are concerned, the High Court has been held
to have erred in law in relegating matters to the civil court with liberty
to file civil suit only in exceptional cases, which call for decision on
questions of fact, for deciding which, elaborate evidence is required.
47. However, contrary thereto, in the present case, the amount of
compensation/damages claimed by the petitioner is entirely
unliquidated. There is no reasonable basis or yardstick disclosed in
the writ petition for assessing such quantum.
48. Secondly, detailed and elaborate evidence is required to be adduced
and assessed for the court to come to a conclusion as regards whether
compensation is actually payable to the petitioner and, if so, the
quantum thereof.
49. Thirdly, in view of the observations made above, the petitioner has
failed to make out a strong case of violation of any fundamental or
legal right and/or arbitrariness on the part of the respondent-
authorities, which resulted in the petitioner's suit being dismissed and
the subsequent review application, the revision therefrom as well as
the appeal from the suit having all been dismissed by competent
courts of law.
50. After having exhausted all legal remedies, the petitioner has taken out
the present writ petition in a last-ditch effort to get the relief which he
failed to secure in the regular civil suit filed by him. Such attempt
cannot be given a premium by the writ court, since the petitioner has
come with unclean hands.
51. As rightly held in P. Viswanathan Vs. Dr. A.K. Burman and another,
reported at (2002) SCC OnLine 805, by the Division Bench of this
Court, here also it would be improper for this Court to award
compensation in the writ jurisdiction where prima facie it is not a case
of absolute breach of fundamental right or the action having been
taken without any authority of law. Hence, there is no scope for
granting compensation.
52. In fact, in P. Viswanathan (supra), cited by the State, several
instances of high handed action, which called for grant of
compensation by the writ court, were given. Such reasons were of a
grave and serious nature, such as custodial death due to torture,
abduction and killing of seven persons by high police officials, death of
a child in police custody due to beating and assault by a police officer
and the killing of 21 people by the police who had assembled to held a
peaceful meeting at a place in Bihar and unauthorized and illegal act
of police officials forcing labourers to do hard work without payment
and further outraging the modesty of women labourers. Since, in the
present case, the petitioner has failed to establish any such instance
of arbitrary or high-handed action by the respondents and/or any
negligence on the part of the respondents to justify grant of
compensation in favour of the petitioner, there is no scope of
interference in the present writ petition.
53. Accordingly, WPO No.831 of 2021 is dismissed on contest, without,
however, any order as to costs.
54. Urgent certified copies of this order shall be supplied to the parties
applying for the same, upon due compliance of all requisite
formalities.
( Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J. )
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