Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)

Debasish Saha vs Union Of India & Ors on 10 March, 2021

10.03.2021.
Item no. 26.
Court No.13
   ap
                                 W.P.A. No. 2111 of 2020
                                          With
                                     CAN 2 of 2021
                               (Through Video Conference)

                                    Debasish Saha
                                        Versus
                                 Union of India & Ors.

                      Mr. Sandip Kumar Bhattacharyya,
                      Mr. Kaustava Chakraborty,
                      Mr. Gaurav Dutta.
                                                ...For the petitioner.
                      Mr. Debapriya Gupta,
                      Mr. Sourav Mondal.
                                                       ..For the respondents.


                      The writ petition has been filed by a Havaldar of

               the    Indian    Army,     who   last    served    under   the

               respondent      no.5,    Commanding         Officer,   Training

               Battalion-III, Madras Engineering Group & Centre,

               Bangalore.

                      The prayers made in this writ petition are to

               seek    General    Court    Marshal      Proceedings     under

               Section 47 of the Army Act, 1950 against the

               Commanding Officer one Colonel Kamlesh Singh

               Bisht, TB III MEG is under the G.O.C. Southern

               Command.

                      A writ of prohibition is also sought restraining

               the respondents from taking action or accepting the

               local discharge of the petitioner at Bangalore from

               service.
                             2




      The brief facts relevant for the purpose of this

order are inter alia, that the petitioner while serving as

a Havaldar, claims that he was harassed by his

superiors. He participated in the selection process to

the post of J.C.O. He is stated to have cleared the

examination. In course of examination process and

with a view to humiliate and victimize the petitioner,

his superiors initially formed a Court of Enquiry. Not

having found any evidence against the petitioner to

commence trial against him, the petitioner claims that

he was sent for psychiatric evaluation to the Air Force

Hospital at Bangalore. After psychiatric evaluation, the

writ petitioner claims that he was forced to sign an

application for premature voluntary discharge from

Armed Forces for taking care of his aged mother and

two little children out of his second marriage.

      The writ petitioner claims that he could not have

sought discharge since he was found fit to rejoin

service by the psychiatrist at the Air Force Hospital at

Bangalore.

      It is further submitted that after having applied

for promotion to the post of J.C.O. and having

participated therein, the petitioner could not have

applied for discharge.

      On facts, Counsel for the Armed Forces submits

that the petitioner was, in fact, found guilty in course
                                 3




of Code of Enquiry and with a view to avoid trial, he

had submitted his application for voluntary discharge.

      After the aforesaid events, the petitioner moved

to Calcutta to stay with his wife and family. While at

Calcutta, the petitioner's wife, who is a serving

Judicial Officer, addressed a complaint to the General

Officer   in    Command,        Eastern    Region,     Kolkata

complaining of gross ill-treatment against her husband

and   has      sought     enquiry     against   the    Officials

responsible for the same.

      The writ petition was filed in February, 2020 but

could not be moved in view of the Pandemic. The writ

petition was taken up on 24th February, 2021 when

the issue of territorial jurisdiction was kept open for

being argued today.

      The jurisdiction of this High Court is invoked by

the petitioner primarily on the ground that the Armed

Forces    Tribunal      where   the   petitioner's    grievance

should ordinarily have been agitated, is non-functional

at Kolkata.

      The Armed Forces Tribunal at Kolkata and the

Calcutta High Court, according to the petitioner, would

have territorial jurisdiction on the basis of the

petitioner's wife's complaint to the G.O.C., Eastern

Command, Kolkata as regards her husband's ill-

treatment      by   the   Commanding       Officer,   Training

Battalion-III, Madras Engineering Group & Centre,
                              4




Bangalore.    Rule 6 (2) of the Armed Forces Tribunal

(Procedure) Rules 2008 are relied upon in this regard.

      Reliance in this regard is placed first by Mr.

Sandip Kumar Bhattacharyya on the decision of the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Navinchandra

N. Majithia - Vs. - State of Maharashtra & Ors.

reported in (2000) 7 SCC 640. The facts of the said

case are that criminal proceedings were instituted in

Shillong,    Meghalaya     were   challenged    before    the

Bombay      High   Court    under   Article    226   of   the

Constitution of India where relief or quashing of the

same or transfer to Maharashtra were sought. The

High Court dismissed the writ application and the

same was reversed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The

Supreme Court found that a large number of events

had taken place at Bombay and the registration of the

FIR at Shillong was inappropriate. It is in that context

that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that the writ

petition ought to have been entertained in the Bombay

High Court.

      It is seen in the instant case that the petitioner

was last posted at Bangalore under the G.O.C.

Southern Command, Commanding Officer, Training

Battalion-III, Madras Engineering Group & Centre,

Bangalore. The entire cause of action and events

narrated in this writ application from posting to

psychiatric evaluation to the J.C.O. Examination to
                              5




incidents of ill-treatment and purported discharge, all

occurred at Bangalore.

      Useful   reference     may     be     made     to   the

Navinchandra     N.    Majithia     decision    (supra)    at

paragraph   38-41     in   this   regard.      The   relevant

paragraphs are set out hereinafter.

         "38. "Cause of action" is a phenomenon well
         understood in legal parlance. Mohapatra, J. has
         well delineated the import of the said expression
         by referring to the celebrated lexicographies. The
         collocation of the words "cause of action, wholly
         or in part, arises" seems to have been lifted from
         Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which
         section also deals with the jurisdictional aspect
         of the courts. As per that section the suit could
         be instituted in a court within the legal limits of
         whose jurisdiction the "cause of action wholly or
         in part arises". Judicial pronouncements have
         accorded almost a uniform interpretation to the
         said compendious expression even prior to the
         Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution as to
         mean "the bundle of facts which would be
         necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed,
         in order to support his right to the judgment of
         the court".
         39. In Read v. Brown [(1888) 22 QBD 128 : 58
         LJQB 120 : 60 LT 250 (CA)] Lord Esher, M.R.,
         adopted the definition for the phrase "cause of
         action" that it meant
         "every fact which it would be necessary for the
         plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support
         his right to the judgment of the court. It does not
         comprise every piece of evidence which is
         necessary to prove each fact, but every fact
         which is necessary to be proved".
         40. The Privy Council has noted in Mohd. Khalil
         Khan v. Mahbub Ali Mian [AIR 1949 PC 78 : 75 IA
         121] that the aforesaid definition adopted by Lord
         Esher M.R. had been followed in India. Even
         thereafter the courts in India have consistently
         followed the said interpretation without exception
         for understanding the scope of the expression
         "cause of action".
         41. Even in the context of Article 226(2) of the
         Constitution this Court adopted the same
         interpretation to the expression "cause of action,
         wholly or in part, arises" vide State of
         Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties [(1985) 3 SCC
         217] . A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Oil
         and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar
         Basu [(1994) 4 SCC 711] observed that it is well
                             6




         settled that the expression "cause of action"
         means that bundle of facts which the petitioner
         must prove, if traversed to entitle him to a
         judgment in his favour. Having given such a wide
         interpretation to the expression Ahmadi, J. (as
         the learned Chief Justice then was) speaking for
         M.N. Venkatachaliah, C.J. and B.P. Jeevan
         Reddy, J., utilised the opportunity to caution the
         High Courts against transgressing into the
         jurisdiction of the other High Courts merely on
         the ground of some insignificant event connected
         with the cause of action taking place within the
         territorial limits of the High Court to which the
         litigant approaches at his own choice or
         convenience.       The    following      are   such
         observations. (SCC p. 722, para 12)
         "If an impression gains ground that even in cases
         which fall outside the territorial jurisdiction of
         the court, certain members of the court would be
         willing to exercise jurisdiction on the plea that
         some event, however trivial and unconnected
         with the cause of action had occurred within the
         jurisdiction of the said court, litigants would seek
         to abuse the process by carrying the cause before
         such members giving rise to avoidable suspicion.
         That would lower the dignity of the institution
         and put the entire system to ridicule. We are
         greatly pained to say so but if we do not strongly
         deprecate the growing tendency we will, we are
         afraid, be failing in our duty to the institution
         and the system of administration of justice. We
         do hope that we will not have another occasion to
         deal with such a situation.""


     Reference in this regard is made to two several

decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, namely,

Morgan Stanely Mutual Fund - Vs. - Kartick Das

reported in (1994) 4 SCC 225 particularly paragraphs

43-44 set out hereunder:

         "Q. 5 : What is the scope of Section 14 of the Act?
            43. The said section reads as under:
            "(1) If, after the proceeding conducted under
         Section 13, the District Forum is satisfied that
         the goods complained against suffer from any of
         the defects specified in the complaint or that any
         of the allegations contained in the complaint
         about the services are proved, it shall issue an
         order to the opposite party directing him to take
         one or more of the following things, namely:
            (a) to remove the defect pointed out by the
         appropriate laboratory from the goods in
         question;
                              7




             (b) to replace the goods with new goods of
         similar description which shall be free from any
         defect;
             (c) to return to the complainant the price, or,
         as the case may be, the charges paid by the
         complainant;
             (d) to pay such amount as may be awarded by
         it as compensation to the consumer for any loss
         or injury suffered by the consumer due to the
         negligence of the opposite party.
             (2) Every order made by the District Forum
         under sub-section (1) shall be signed by all the
         members constituting it and, if there is any
         difference of opinion, the order of the majority of
         the members constituting it shall be the order of
         the District Forum.
             (3) Subject to the foregoing provisions, the
         procedure relating to the conduct of the meetings
         of the District Forum, its sittings and other
         matters shall be such as may be prescribed by
         the State Government."
             44. A careful reading of the above discloses
         that there is no power under the Act to grant any
         interim relief of (sic or) even an ad interim relief.
         Only a final relief could be granted. If the
         jurisdiction of the Forum to grant relief is
         confined to the four clauses [Ed. : Increased to
         nine clauses by Amendment Act 50 of 1993
         (w.e.f. 18-6-1993).] mentioned under Section 14,
         it passes our comprehension as to how an
         interim injunction could ever be granted
         disregarding even the balance of convenience."

      The case of Alchemist Ltd. and Anr.                 Vs.

State Bank of Sikkim and Ors. reported in (2007)

11 SCC 335 is also relevant. Paragraphs 20-39 of the

said decision are set out hereunder:

         "20. It may be stated that the expression "cause
         of action" has neither been defined in the
         Constitution nor in the Code of Civil Procedure,
         1908. It may, however, be described as a bundle
         of essential facts necessary for the plaintiff to
         prove before he can succeed. Failure to prove
         such facts would give the defendant a right to
         judgment in his favour. Cause of action thus
         gives occasion for and forms the foundation of
         the suit.
         21. The classic definition of the expression
         "cause of action" is found in Cooke v. Gill [(1873)
         8 CP 107 : 42 LJCP 98] wherein Lord Brett
         observed:
         " 'Cause of action' means every fact which it
         would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if
                     8




traversed, in order to support his right to the
judgment of the court."
22. For every action, there has to be a cause of
action. If there is no cause of action, the plaint or
petition has to be dismissed.
23. Mr Soli J. Sorabjee, Senior Advocate
appearing for the appellant Company placed
strong reliance on A.B.C. Laminart (P) Ltd. v. A.P.
Agencies [(1989) 2 SCC 163 : AIR 1989 SC 1239 :
JT (1989) 2 SC 38] and submitted that the High
Court had committed an error of law and of
jurisdiction in holding that no part of cause of
action could be said to have arisen within the
territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of
Punjab and Haryana. He particularly referred to
the following observations: (SCC p. 170, para 12)
"12. A cause of action means every fact, which if
traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff
to prove in order to support his right to a
judgment of the court. In other words, it is a
bundle of facts which taken with the law
applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to
relief against the defendant. It must include
some act done by the defendant since in the
absence of such an act no cause of action can
possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual
infringement of the right sued on but includes all
the material facts on which it is founded. It does
not comprise evidence necessary to prove such
facts, but every fact necessary for the plaintiff to
prove to enable him to obtain a decree.
Everything which if not proved would give the
defendant a right to immediate judgment must
be part of the cause of action. But it has no
relation whatever to the defence which may be
set up by the defendant nor does it depend upon
the character of the relief prayed for by the
plaintiff."
24. In our opinion, the High Court was wholly
justified in upholding the preliminary objection
raised by the respondents and in dismissing the
petition on the ground of want of territorial
jurisdiction.
25. The learned counsel for the respondents
referred to several decisions of this Court and
submitted that whether a particular fact
constitutes a cause of action or not must be
decided on the basis of the facts and
circumstances of each case. In our judgment, the
test is whether a particular fact(s) is (are) of
substance and can be said to be material,
integral or essential part of the lis between the
parties. If it is, it forms a part of cause of action.
If it is not, it does not form a part of cause of
action. It is also well settled that in determining
the question, the substance of the matter and
not the form thereof has to be considered.
                    9




26. In Union of India v. Oswal Woollen Mills
Ltd. [(1984) 2 SCC 646 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 348 :
AIR 1984 SC 1264 : (1984) 3 SCR 342] the
registered office of the Company was situated at
Ludhiana, but a petition was filed in the High
Court of Calcutta on the ground that the
Company had its branch office there. The order
was challenged by the Union of India. And this
Court held that since the registered office of the
Company was at Ludhiana and the principal
respondents against whom primary relief was
sought were at New Delhi, one would have
expected the writ petitioner to approach either
the High Court of Punjab and Haryana or the
High Court of Delhi. The forum chosen by the
writ petitioners could not be said to be in
accordance with law and the High Court of
Calcutta could not have entertained the writ
petition.
27. In State          of        Rajasthan v. Swaika
Properties [(1985) 3 SCC 217 : AIR 1985 SC
1289] the Company whose registered office was
at Calcutta filed a petition in the High Court of
Calcutta challenging the notice issued by the
Special Town Planning Officer, Jaipur for
acquisition of immovable property situated in
Jaipur. Observing that the entire cause of action
arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the
High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench, the
Supreme Court held that the High Court of
Calcutta had no territorial jurisdiction to
entertain the writ petition.
28. This Court held that mere service of notice
on the petitioner at Calcutta under the Rajasthan
Urban Improvement Act, 1959 could not give rise
to a cause of action unless such notice was "an
integral part of the cause of action".
29. In ONGC v. Utpal Kumar Basu [(1994) 4 SCC
711 : JT (1994) 6 SC 1] this Court held that
when the Head Office of ONGC was not located at
Calcutta, nor the execution of contract work was
to be carried out in West Bengal, territorial
jurisdiction cannot be conferred on the High
Court of Calcutta on the ground that an
advertisement had appeared in a daily (The Times
of India), published from Calcutta, or the
petitioner submitted his bid from Calcutta, or
subsequent representations were made from
Calcutta, or fax message as to the final decision
taken by ONGC was received at Calcutta
inasmuch as neither of them would constitute an
"integral part" of the cause of action so as to
confer territorial jurisdiction on the High Court of
Calcutta under Article 226(2) of the Constitution.
30. In CBI, Anti-Corruption Branch v. Narayan
Diwakar [(1999) 4 SCC 656 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 619
: AIR 1999 SC 2362 : JT (1999) 3 SC 635] , A was
posted in Arunachal Pradesh. On receiving a
wireless message through Chief Secretary of the
                    10




State asking him to appear before CBI Inspector
in Bombay, A moved the High Court of Guwahati
for quashing FIR filed against him by CBI. An
objection was raised by the department that the
High Court of Guwahati had no territorial
jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. But it
was turned down. The Supreme Court, however,
upheld the objection that Gauhati High Court
could not have entertained the petition.
31. In Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd. [(2002)
1 SCC 567 : AIR 2002 SC 126 : JT (2001) 9 SC
162] a question of territorial jurisdiction came up
for consideration. A filed a petition under Article
226 of the Constitution in the High Court of
Gujarat claiming benefit of the Passport Scheme
under the EXIM policy. Passport was issued by
Chennai Office. Entries in the passport were
made by the authorities at Chennai. None of the
respondents was stationed within the State of
Gujarat. It was, therefore, contended that the
Gujarat High Court had no territorial jurisdiction
to entertain the petition. The contention,
however, was negatived and the petition was
allowed. The respondents approached the
Supreme Court.
32. The judgment of the High Court was sought
to be supported inter alia on the grounds that
(i) A was carrying on business at Ahmedabad; (ii)
orders were placed from and executed at
Ahmedabad; (iii) documents were sent and
payment was made at Ahmedabad; (iv) credit of
duty was claimed for export handled from
Ahmedabad; (v) denial of benefit adversely
affected the petitioner at Ahmedabad; (vi) A had
furnished bank guarantee and executed a bond
at Ahmedabad, etc.
33. Allowing the appeal and setting aside the
order of the High Court, the Supreme Court held
that none of the facts pleaded by A constituted a
cause of action.
"Facts

which have no bearing with the lis or the dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the court concerned." (Adani Exports Ltd. case [(2002) 1 SCC 567 : AIR 2002 SC 126 : JT (2001) 9 SC 162] , SCC pp. 573-74, para 17.)

34. In Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India [(2004) 6 SCC 254 : JT (2004) Supp 1 SC 475] the appellant was a Company registered under the Companies Act having its head office at Mumbai. It obtained a loan from the Bhopal Branch of State Bank of India. The Bank issued a notice for repayment of loan from Bhopal under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. The appellant Company filed a writ petition in the High Court of Delhi which was dismissed on the ground of lack of territorial

jurisdiction. The Company approached this Court and contended that as the constitutionality of a parliamentary legislation was questioned, the High Court of Delhi had the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.

35. Negativing the contention and upholding the order passed by the High Court, this Court ruled that passing of a legislation by itself does not confer any such right to file a writ petition in any court unless a cause of action arises therefor. The Court stated: (Kusum Ingots case [(2004) 6 SCC 254 : JT (2004) Supp 1 SC 475] , SCC p. 261, para 20) "20. A distinction between a legislation and executive action should be borne in mind while determining the said question."

Referring to ONGC [(1994) 4 SCC 711 : JT (1994) 6 SC 1] , it was held that all necessary facts must form an "integral part" of the cause of action. The fact which is neither material nor essential nor integral part of the cause of action would not constitute a part of cause of action within the meaning of Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution.

36. In National Textile Corpn. Ltd. v. Haribox Swalram [(2004) 9 SCC 786 : JT (2004) 4 SC 508] referring to earlier cases, this Court stated that: (SCC p. 797, para 12.1) "12.1 ... the mere fact that the writ petitioner carries on business at Calcutta or that the reply to the correspondence made by it was received at Calcutta is not an integral part of the cause of action and, therefore, the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition and the view to the contrary taken by the Division Bench cannot be sustained."

37. From the aforesaid discussion and keeping in view the ratio laid down in a catena of decisions by this Court, it is clear that for the purpose of deciding whether facts averred by the appellant- petitioner would or would not constitute a part of cause of action, one has to consider whether such fact constitutes a material, essential, or integral part of the cause of action. It is no doubt true that even if a small fraction of the cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the court, the court would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit/petition. Nevertheless it must be a "part of cause of action", nothing less than that.

38. In the present case, the facts which have been pleaded by the appellant Company, in our judgment, cannot be said to be essential, integral or material facts so as to constitute a part of "cause of action" within the meaning of Article 226(2) of the Constitution. The High Court, in our opinion, therefore, was not wrong in dismissing the petition.

39. For the foregoing reasons, we see no infirmity in the order passed by the High Court dismissing the petition on the ground of want of territorial jurisdiction. The appeal, therefore, deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, we leave the parties to bear their own costs."

Applying the aforesaid dicta to the facts of the

writ petitioner was in fact serving in Bangalore. The

only event pleaded in this writ application to invoke

the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court and the

Armed Forces Tribunal at Kolkata is a letter addressed

by the petitioner's wife to the G.O.C., Eastern

Command. The said single event cannot, in my view,

suffice to confer jurisdiction on the Calcutta High

Court or the Armed Forces Tribunal at Kolkata to

entertain the grievance of the writ petitioner.

On the question of alternative remedy as

pleaded by the Counsel for the petitioner orally as also

in paragraph 3 of the writ application, the Army has

filed an application seeking recall of the order dated

24th February, 2021. Recall is sought on the ground

that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the writ

application and that the Armed Forces Tribunal at

Kolkata is fully functional. The reason for filing this

application is wholly ununderstood and to say the

least, the application is ridiculous.

The Court, on 24th February, 2021 had kept the

issue of maintainability of the writ application on

account of territorial jurisdiction open. The issue of

alternative remedy must also be deemed to have been

kept open since the writ application has not been

admitted till date.

Be that as it may, the documents annexed to

CAN 2 of 2021 are the cause list of the Armed Forces

Tribunal at Kolkata to indicate that the same is

functioning.

This Court finds that the cause list of the

Registrar has been annexed to the application.

Admittedly in terms of Section 5 of the Armed Forces

Tribunal Act, 2007 read with Rule 2 (xiii) of the Armed

Forces Tribunal Procedural Rules, 2008 clearly do not

confer any adjudicatory powers on the Registrar of the

Tribunal, while there is no clear evidence before this

Court that the Presiding Officer of such Tribunal has

not been appointed for a long period of time, this Court

cannot accept that the Tribunal is functioning merely

on the basis of cause list of the Registrar, who appears

to be giving dates to applications that are listed before

him. There is no adjudication admittedly occurring at

the Armed Forces Tribunal, Kolkata.

The above are not as relevant as a moot point

that this Court had noticed in course of submission by

the Counsel for the petitioner.

On a specific query raised, Mr. Sandip Kumar

Bhattacharyya, learned Senior Advocate for the

petitioner, has submitted that the purported certificate

of discharge dated 5th November, 2019 was never

served on the petitioner. It is submitted that an order

of discharge can only take effect upon compliance of

the provisions of Section 23 of the Army Act, 1950 and

Rules 12 Sub-Rule (2) of the Army Rules of 1954.

Applying the principles of Order VII, Rule 11 of

the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the statements

made in a plaint and in the instant case, the writ

application must be taken to be true and correct.

Hence as per the petitioner he is still on service of the

Army as Havildar. Hence in terms of Rule 6 of the

Armed Forces Tribunal (Procedure) Rules 2008, the

petitioner's remedy would have ordinarily been before

the Armed Forces Tribunal at Chennai having

jurisdiction over his Commanding Officer and place of

Command located at Bangalore. The jurisdiction of the

Principal Bench always be available to the petitioner

under any circumstances. The petitioner, therefore,

cannot invoke the provisions of Rule 6, Sub-Rule (2) of

the Armed Forces Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 2008,

which is set out hereinbelow.

"Rule 6: Place of filing application :- (1) An application shall ordinarily be filed by the applicant with the Registrar of the Bench within whose jurisdiction -

(i) the applicant is posted for the time being, or was last posted or attached; or

(ii) where the cause of action, wholly or in part, has arisen:

Provided that with the leave of the Chairperson the application may be filed with the Registrar of the Principal Bench and subject to the orders under section 14 or section 15 of the Act, such application shall be heard and disposed of by

the Bench which has jurisdiction over the matter.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub- rule (1), a person who has ceased to be in service by reason of his retirement, dismissal, discharge, cashiering, release, removal, resignation or termination of service may, at his option, file an application with the Registrar of the Bench within whose jurisdiction such person is ordinarily residing at the time of filing of the application."

This Court even otherwise is unable to accept Mr.

Bhattacharyya's submissions that prayer 'a' made in

the writ application can be entertained by this Court

in the light of Section 124 of the Army Act, 1950. The

said Commanding Officer Colonel Bhist, TB III MEG is

under the G.O.C. Southern Command. Any relief or

grievance against him must and should be agitated by

the petitioner before the Armed Forces Tribunal at

Chennai and in the absence of any functional Tribunal

thereat as in Kolkata, the High Courts of Karnataka or

Madras would have jurisdiction to deal with the

grievances and not the High Court at Calcutta.