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Bengal vs Amalendu Bikas Mohapatra & Ors
2021 Latest Caselaw 3168 Cal

Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 3168 Cal
Judgement Date : 10 June, 2021

Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Bengal vs Amalendu Bikas Mohapatra & Ors on 10 June, 2021
                   IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
                           (Appellate Side)
                  CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION



                                             W.P.S.T. 19 of 2020

                                          Date of hearing:- 26.02.2021

                                          Date of decision:-10.06.2021



The Principal Secretary, Department of Finance, Government of West
Bengal


                                                             ...Petitioners


                                  -versus-


Amalendu Bikas Mohapatra & Ors.
                                                           ...Respondents



 CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH BINDAL, CHIEF JUSTICE (ACTING)

           HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIRUDDHA ROY

Present:- Mr. Joytosh Majumder, Learned Government Pleader,
          Mr. Pinaki Dhole, and
          Ms. Kakali Samajpaty, Advocates

                                               ...for the petitioner
           Mr. Amalendu Bikas Mahapatra

                                                ...for the respondent No.1



                                ORDER

Aniruddha Roy, J.:

1. The present writ petition has been filed by the State employer

challenging the order dated April 3, 2019 (for short, the impugned

order) passed by the West Bengal Administrative Tribunal, Kolkata

(for short, the Tribunal) in OA No. 1366 of 2014 (Amalendu Bikas

Mahapatra vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors) [for short, the W.P.S.T. 19 of 2020

Original Application], whereunder, direction was made for revision of

the leave encashment of the first respondent in the manner stated

therein.

2. The first respondent was employed as Assistant Evaluation

Officer under the Administrative Control of Additional Director of

Agriculture (Evaluation), Directorate of Agriculture, West Bengal. He

superannuated on August 31, 2007. The first respondent had

received all his retirement benefits as well as pension as on the date

of his superannuation. Subsequently, the Revision of Pay and

Allowances Rules, 2009 (for short, ROPA 2009) came into force w.e.f.

January 1, 2006. According to the first respondent he had received

the revised pension payment order on May 3, 2011 for difference of

gratuity and Commuted Value of Pension. The grievance of the first

respondent was that the leave encashment for unutilized 300 days

earned leave as provided under Rule 168 (A) of the West Bengal

Service Rules, Part I, 1971 (for short, the 1971 Rules) was not

revised in terms of ROPA 2009. Ventilating such grievance the first

respondent filed a previous Original Application being OA No. 1377

of 2011 before the Tribunal, claiming the difference of leave

encashment of 300 days of earned leave on the basis of ROPA 2009.

Vide order dated December 11, 2011 the said previous Original

Application was disposed of directing the Finance Secretary to treat

the same as his representation and dispose of the same after giving a

personal hearing to him.

3. On February 8, 2013 the Finance Secretary passed his reasoned

order rejecting the claim of the first respondent. On the basis of the

said reasoned order a contempt application was filed by the first

respondent before the Tribunal in connection with the said previous W.P.S.T. 19 of 2020

Original Application. The same was dropped vide order dated

February 27, 2013.

4. Being aggrieved by the said order dated February 27, 2013 the

petitioner filed a writ petition before this Court being WPST 413 of

2013. The same was disposed of by this Court vide order dated

November 25, 2013 directing the petitioner to take appropriate

decision with regard to the claim of first respondent for sanctioning

the leave encashment benefit after providing an opportunity of

hearing to him. By an order dated April 23, 2014 the petitioner

rejected the claim of the first respondent holding, inter alia, that

leave encashment benefit under the policy of the State employer is

not a part of the retiral benefits.

5. Being aggrieved by the said decision of the petitioner dated April

23, 2014 the said Original Application was moved by the first

respondent which was disposed of by the impugned order.

6. Mr. Joytosh Majumdar, the learned Government Pleader,

appearing with Mr. Pinaki Dhole and Ms. Kakuli Samajpati,

Advocates representing the State employer/writ petitioner, at the

outset submitted that, the benefit of right to receive cash equivalent

to leave salary, for the period of unutilized leave earned accruing as

on the date of retirement is a condition of service. The entitlement of

the employee as to the same are provided and dealt with under Rules

168 and 168A of the 1971 Rules. Referring to the said Rule he

submitted that, the leave salary of a State employee on account of

unutilized leave is not a retiral benefit. The Tribunal while passing

the impugned order had failed to appreciate the aforesaid

submission, misconstrued the relevant Service Rules and passed the

impugned order. He submitted that, ROPA 2009 was given effect to W.P.S.T. 19 of 2020

from January 1, 2006 notionally and the actual effect was granted

from April 1, 2008. All the serving employees were granted the actual

benefit from April 1, 2008 and onwards. No arrear on difference of

pay was allowed to any State employee for the period between

January 1, 2006 and March 31, 2008, as the benefit accrued to the

employee was given notionally and the actual payment of difference

was made w.e.f. April 1, 2008. Thus, the employees who retired w.e.f.

April 30, 2008 or thereafter received the actual benefit of ROPA

2009. As such the first respondent who had retired from service on

August 31, 2007 cannot have any right to receive the leave

encashment benefit in terms of ROPA 2009 and the claim in this

regard is wholly frivolous, misconceived and without any merit.

7. The first respondent appeared in person and submitted that,

ROPA 2009 came into force w.e.f. January 1, 2006. He submitted

that, the relevant Service Rules does not prohibit allowing the leave

salary benefit to be paid to him in terms of ROPA 2009. He further

submitted that, the leave encashment benefit had been earned by

him in course of his employment tenure and as such he is entitled to

receive such benefit in terms of ROPA 2009 in addition to what he

had already received. On January 1, 2006 when ROPA 2009 came

into force he was in employment. Thus, he submitted that, in the

previous round of litigations specific directions were passed by the

Tribunal as well as by this Court to consider his claim. He submitted

that, all such directions were made upon considering that the claim

of the first respondent being legitimate and otherwise tenable.

8. The first respondent further submitted that, the State employer

having not allowed the claim of the petitioner had acted in contempt

of the directions earlier issued by the Tribunal and this Court.

W.P.S.T. 19 of 2020

9. In support of his contentions the first respondent had relied

upon several judgments, which are, In the matter of: Priya Gupta &

Anr. vs. Additional Secretary, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare &

Ors., reported at (2013) 11 SCC 404; In the matter of: Amalendu

Kumar Bera & Ors. vs. State of West Bengal, reported at (2013) 4 SCC

52; In the matter of: Regional Manager, Central Bank of India vs.

Madhulika Guruprasad Dahir & Ors., reported at (2008) 13 SCC 170;

In the matter of: Union of India & Ors. vs. Nripen Sarma, reported at

(2013) 4 SCC 57; In the matter of: State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs.

Jitendra Kumar Srivastava & Anr., reported at (2013) 12 SCC 210 and

In the matter of: Postmaster General & Ors. vs. Living Media India

Limited & Anr., reported at (2012) 3 SCC 563.

10. Having heard the submissions made on behalf of the parties and

on perusal of the material before this Court, it appears that, the

relevant facts, namely, the first respondent retired on August 31,

2007, ROPA 2009 came into force w.e.f. January 1, 2006 but the

actual effect was given on and from April 1, 2008 and that the first

respondent had received all his retirement benefits including the

leave encashment benefit, are not disputed by the parties.

11. Rule 168 and 168A of the 1971 Rules are reproduced herein

below:

Leave preparatory to retirement.

168. (1) A government employee may be permitted by the

authority competent to grant leave to take leave preparatory

to retirement to the extent of earned leave due not exceeding

240 days together with half-pay leave due, subject to the

condition that such leave extends up to and includes the date

of retirement.

W.P.S.T. 19 of 2020

(2)(a) Where a Government employee who is on foreign

service in or under any local authority or in a corporation or

company wholly or substantially owned or controlled by the

Government or a body controlled or financed by the

Government (hereinafter referred to as the local body) applies

for leave preparatory to retirement, the decision to grant such

leave shall be taken by the foreign employer with the

concurrence of the lending authority under the Government.

(b) The Government employee on foreign service shall also be

allowed to encash earned leave at his credit on the date of

retirement in the manner provided in sub-rule (2) of rule

168A.

(3) Where a Government employee is on foreign service in or

under a local body other than those mentioned in clause (a)

of sub-rule (2), leave preparatory to retirement shall be

admissible to him only when he quits duty under the foreign

employer:

Provided that where the Government employee continuous in

service under such foreign employer, he shall not be eligible

for grant of cash payment in lieu of leave under rule 168A.

168A. (1) No leave shall be granted to a Government

employee beyond-

(a) the date of his retirement on superannuation, or

(b) the date of his final cessation of duties, or

(c) the date on which he retires by giving notice to

Government or he is retired by Government by giving

him notice or pay and allowances in lieu of such notice, W.P.S.T. 19 of 2020

in accordance with terms and conditions of his service,

or

(d) the date of his resignation from service.

(2)(a) Where a Government employee retires on attaining the

age of superannuation, the authority competent to grant

leave shall suo motu issue an order granting cash equivalent

of leave salary for earned leave, if any, at the credit of the

Government employee on the date of his retirement, subject

to a maximum of 240 days.

(b)(i) The cash equivalent under clause (a) shall be

calculated as follows and shall be payable in one lump

sum as one tome settlement. No house rent allowances or

hill allowance or other compensatory allowances will be

admissible. Medical allowance not being a compensatory

allowance may be granted along with such leave salary.

(ii) such cash equivalent shall not be subject to reduction

on account of pension and pension equivalent to gratuity.

(3) A Government employee who retires from service on

attaining the date of retirement while under suspension,

shall become eligible for the benefit of cash equivalent of

earned leave that was at his credit on the date of his

retirement calculated in the manner provided in clause (b) of

sub-rule (2), on conclusion of the proceedings against him, if

the authority competent to re-instate him in service holds that

the suspension was wholly unjustified.

(4) A Government employee who retires or is retired from

service in the manner mentioned in clause (c) of sub-rule (1)

may be granted, suo motu, by the authority competent to W.P.S.T. 19 of 2020

grant leave, cash equivalent of leave salary in respect of

earned leave at his credit subject to a maximum of 240 days

and also in respect of all the half pay leave at his credit,

provided this period does not exceed the period between the

date on which he so retires or is retired from service and the

date on which he would have retired in the normal course

after attaining the age of superannuation.

The cash equivalent shall be equal to the leave salary as

admissible for earned leave and/or equal to the leave salary

as admissible for half pay leave plus dearness and medical

allowances as admissible on that leave salary for the first

240 days, at the rates in force in the date the Government

employee so retires or is retired from service. The pension

and pension equivalent of other retirement benefits and ad-

hoc relief/graded relief on pension shall be deducted from

the leave salary paid for the period of half pay leave, if any,

for which the cash equivalent paid for the period of half pay

leave, if any, for which the cash equivalent is payable. The

amount so calculated shall be paid in one lump sum as one

time settlement. No house rent allowance, hill allowance and

other compensatory allowance shall be payable:

Provided that if leave salary for half-pay leave component

falls short of pension and other pensionary benefits, cash

equivalent of half-pay leave shall not be granted:

Provided further that a Government employee who is retired

by Government by giving him pay and allowances in lieu of

notice, may apply for leave within the period for which such

pay and allowances were given, and where he s granted W.P.S.T. 19 of 2020

leave, the leave salary shall be allowed only for the period of

leave excluding that period for which pay and allowances in

lieu of notice have been allowed.

(5)(i)(a) Where the services of a Government employee are

terminated by notice or otherwise in accordance with the

terms and conditions of his appointment may be granted, suo

motu by the authority competent to grant leave, cash

equivalent in respect of earned leave at his credit on the date

on which he ceases to be in service subject to a maximum of

240 days.

(ii) If a Government employee resigns or quits service, he may

be granted suo motu by the authority competent to grant

leave, cash equivalent in respect of earned leave at his credit

on the date of cessation of service, to the extent of half of

such leave at his credit, subject to a maximum of 120 days.

(iii) A Government employee who is reemployed after

retirement, may on termination of his re-employment, be

granted, suo motu, by the authority competent to grant leave,

cash equivalent in respect of earned leave at his credit in the

date of termination of re-employment subject to a maximum

of 240 days including the period for which encashment was

allowed at the time of retirement.

(b) The cash equivalent under clause (a) shall be equal to

leave salary admissible for earned leave calculated under

rule 176 plus dearness and medical allowance admissible on

that leave salary at the rates in force on the date the

Government employee ceases to be in service. The amount so

calculated shall be paid in one lump sum as one time W.P.S.T. 19 of 2020

settlement. No house-rent allowance or hill allowance or other

compensatory allowance shall be payable.

12. From a plain reading and construction of the relevant Service

Rules as quoted above, it is clear that a government employee may

be permitted by the employer to take leave preparatory to retirement

to the extent of earned leave due not exceeding 240 days together

with half-pay leave due, subject to the condition that such leave

extends up to and includes the date of retirement. No leave shall be

granted to a government employee beyond the date of his retirement

on superannuation or the date of final cessation of service. The first

respondent had admittedly superannuated from his service on

August 31, 2007. Thus, according to the said Service Rules, under

which the first respondent was governed, the first respondent is not

entitled to nor can claim any benefit on account of or attached to his

leave beyond the date of his superannuation i.e. August 31, 2007.

Therefore, the claim of the first respondent on account of his leave

encashment quantum in terms of ROPA 2009 which notionally came

into force w.e.f. January 1, 2006 has no merit. ROPA 2009 was

effected actually w.e.f. April 1, 2008, when admittedly the first

respondent was superannuated. It is elementary that an employee

can only take leave during his service tenure and not beyond and as

such any benefit attached with such leave can only be claimed by

such an employee for his service tenure and not beyond that.

Therefore, the first respondent could and cannot claim any benefit

under ROPA 2009 beyond his service tenure.

13. In as much as, the petitioner was superannuated on August 31,

2007 and he had admittedly received all his service benefits

immediately thereafter. ROPA 2009 notionally came into force w.e.f.

W.P.S.T. 19 of 2020

January 2006 and actual effect was given w.e.f. April 1, 2008. The

first respondent for the first time about four years after his

superannuation in 2011 filed the previous Original Application being

OA 1377 of 2011 before the Tribunal and lodged his claim. In any

event the said previous application was beyond the period of

limitation as prescribed under Section 21 of the Administrative

Tribunal Act, 1985. This clearly shows that the challenge of the first

respondent even at the initial stage was a result of an after thought.

Be that as it may, finally by an order dated April 23, 2014 the

petitioner rejected the claim by showing elaborate reasons.

14. From a close perusal of the said reasoned order dated April 23,

2014 passed by the petitioner it appears to this Court that the same

is well founded and reasoned and the same was passed on due

consideration of the relevant materials and the applicable legal

provisions in the present case.

15. In the matter of: Priya Gupta & Anr. (supra), the Hon'ble

Supreme Court had laid down general principles which can

constitute a willful disobedience/contumacious conduct to proceed

in a contempt proceeding and sentencing as justified. In the matter

of: Amalendu Kumar Bera & Ors.(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court

had laid down principles as to what would constitute as sufficient

cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and to

construe such sufficient cause with a liberal approach and not

warranted to be accepted even in favour of a State litigant, if it not

otherwise to the satisfaction of the Court. In the matter of: Regional

Manager, Central Bank of India (supra), this was a case where a fraud

was practiced by a concerned employee while submitting the

necessary documents to obtain the service. The Hon'ble Supreme W.P.S.T. 19 of 2020

Court had observed that in case of a fraud equitable jurisdiction of

High Court is not available to such employee. In the matter of: Union

of India & Ors. (supra), it was again a case of unsatisfactory

explanation of delay in filing an appeal. In the matter of: State of

Jharkhand & Ors. (supra), it was on the point that an executive

instruction cannot substitute the law/rules. In the matter of:

Postmaster General & Ors.(supra), this was again a judgment on

condonation of delay in connection with Section 5 of the Limitation

Act, 1963. The ratio decided in all these judgments referred to on

behalf of the first respondent have no application in the facts and

circumstances of this case. The question of condonation of delay in

filing a proceeding is not the subject matter in the present writ

petition. The question of exercise of equitable jurisdiction by a Writ

Court in the facts and circumstances of this case is also not an issue

in the present writ proceeding. In as much as, the relevant service

rules as already discussed above specifically provides that beyond

the period of superannuation no benefit of leave is available to a

government employee. In as much as ROPA 2009 was actually given

effect to much after superannuation of the first respondent and as

such the first respondent cannot claim any benefit thereunder. So

the question of substituting any law or rules by ROPA 2009 does not

and cannot arise in the facts of this case.

16. In view of our foregoing discussions and the reasons mentioned

above the writ petition is allowed. Impugned order dated April 3,

2019 passed by the Tribunal stands set aside. The reasoned decision

of the petitioner dated April 23, 2014 stands affirmed and is not

interfered with.

W.P.S.T. 19 of 2020

17. The present writ petition being W.P.S.T. 19 of 2020 stands

allowed.

(Rajesh Bindal) Chief Justice (Acting)

(Aniruddha Roy) Judge

Kolkata 10.06.2021

................

P.A. (RM)

 
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