Gopal Chandra Roy @ Gopal Roy vs The State Of West Bengal & Ors
2021 Latest Caselaw 4010 Cal

   11                         WPA No. 2595 of 2021
30.07.2021
                              (VIA VIDEO CONFERENCE)
   KC
                              Gopal Chandra Roy @ Gopal Roy
                                           Vs.
                             The State of West Bengal & Ors.

             Mr. Prosenjit Mukherjee.
                              ... for the petitioners.

             Mr. Achintya Kumar Banerjee
             Ms. Indumouli Banerjee.
                              ... for the respondent nos. 7 to 17 & 19 to 21.

Ms. Sima Adhikary Ms. Kakoli Naskar.

... for the State.

Petitioner complains of police inaction.

Learned advocate for the petitioner submits that,

there subsists a decree passed by a Civil Court in Title Suit

No. 77 of 1993. He draws the attention of the Court to the

order dated January 11, 2016 passed in W.P. No. 25074(W) of

2015 and submits that, despite the Court directing the police

to ensure that the right, title and interest of the petitioner

declared by the Civil Court in respect of the plot of land in

question is protected, the police are inactive. He refers to

the bunch of complaints lodged by the petitioner with the

police. He submits that the private respondents are

continuing to disturb the possession of the petitioner in

respect of the suit property as also trying to prevent the

petitioner from cultivating the suit land. The police are

inactive.

            State    and   the   private   respondents    are

represented.

Learned advocate for the State, on the basis of

written instructions, submits that, all complaints received by

the police either by the petitioner or from any other party

relating to the immovable property concerned and the

incidents relating thereto, were either investigated into by

registering the same as a First Information Report or on

inquiry a prosecution was submitted. The last complaint of the

petitioner was inquired into and a prosecution under Section

107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure submitted.

Learned advocate for the private respondent

submits that, the writ petitioner is guilty of suppression of

material facts. He submits that, his client applied for

recalling of the ex-parte decree. The recall application is

pending. His client also filed a suit of declaration, which is

pending. He submits that challenging the proceedings in

respect of the record of rights, an appeal was preferred and

in such appeal there was an order of status quo granted on

May 7, 2014. He submits that, such order of status quo with

regard to possession of land in question is still continuing. He

relies upon an order passed in a review petition on September

1, 2015. He submits that, another writ petition of the writ

petitioner was dismissed by an order dated September 28,

2016.

In the facts of the present case, there subsist a

decree passed by a Civil Court, which governs the petitioner

and the private respondents. The private parties are obliged

to abide by and adhere to the decree of the Civil Court.

Although an application for recalling of the decree, as claimed

by the private respondent is pending, the decree is yet to be

recalled. So long the decree is not recalled, the same remains

binding upon the parties to such suit and the persons claiming

title through the parties to such suit. The Civil Court before

which the suit filed by the private respondents is pending did

not pass any interim order. Therefore, as the situation

obtains presently in respect of the immovable property

concerned, there subsists a decree passed by a Civil Court,

which binds the private parties.

The police are obliged to ensure that the parties

governed by a decree passed by the Civil Court abides by the

same. Therefore, at any point of time when the police

receives a complaint that any person is acting contrary to the

decree of the Civil Court, the police must act and ensure that

the parties governed by the decree act in terms therewith.

There is a proceeding under the Land Reforms Act

in respect of the immovable property concerned. There is an

appeal also in which an order of status quo subsists. The

order of status quo passed in WPLRT 58 of 2014 relates to

possession of the immovable property. It was passed on

March 26, 2014 and extended on May 7, 2014. The order of

status quo still subsists.

In W.P. No. 25047(W) of 2015 being an earlier

writ petition of the writ petitioner, an order dated January 11,

2016 was passed. The private respondent applied for recalling

of such order dated January 11, 2016. The review application

of the private respondent being RVW 300 of 2016 was

disposed of by an order dated September 1, 2016 after

construing the order dated May 6, 2014 of the Division Bench

passed in WPLRT 58 of 2014 and the order dated January 11,

2016. The relevant portion of the order dated September 1,

2016 passed in the review petition is as follows:

"The Order passed by the Division Bench dated

May 07, 2014 directs maintenance of status quo with

regard to the possession of the land in question will the

disposal of the tribunal application. The status obtaining

as on the date of the order passed by the Division Bench

on March 26, 2104 as extended on May 07, 2014 has

been made available on record. Be that as it may, by my

order dated January 11, 2016 I did not direct the police

authorities to disturb anybody's possession. I had only

provided that, the police authorities will extend all

facilities to the petitioner in protecting the right, title

and interest of the writ petitioner as declared by the

Civil Court in respect of the plot of land in question. In

my view, there is no conflict of my order with that of

the Division Bench.

In such circumstances, I find no merit in the

review application. RVW 300 of 2016 is dismissed

without any order as to costs."

There is another writ petition being W.P. 4485(W)

of 2019 which is pending. The same is at the instance of the

private respondent. In such writ petition, an application for

addition of party was allowed by a judgment and order dated

July 4, 2019. An appeal was preferred therefrom, which was

dismissed on January 13, 2020.

The writ petitioner filed another writ petition

being W.P. 21069(W) of 2016, which was dismissed on

September 28, 2016. Such writ petition was directed against

the police demanding the petitioner to bear costs for deputing

police personnel at the property in question. Dismissal of such

writ petition, does not invalidate the subsisting decree of the

Civil Court and does not diminish the right of the petitioner in

respect of the immovable property through the subsisting

decree of the Civil Court.

There may be diverse proceedings pending

between the private parties in different forai. However, the

fact that there is a decree governing an immovable property

still subsisting cannot be disputed.

The police claim that, the complaint of the

petitioner was inquired into and a prosecution under Section

107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure submitted.

Given the chequered history of the litigation with

regard to the immovable property concerned and the problem

of law and order relating to such immovable property, it would

be appropriate to direct the police to ensure that the

petitioner is able to enjoy the immovable property as decreed

by the Civil Court to its fullest and without any let, hindrance

and obstruction from any person, unless, such decree is

recalled, set aside or dealt with by an appropriate forum.

Therefore, till such time, the decree passed by

the Civil Court subsists, the police will extend all and every

facility to the petitioner. The police will ensure that there is

no breach of peace in the suit property as described in the

decree passed by the Civil Court.

It would be appropriate to permit the parties to

file affidavits.

Let affidavit-in-opposition be filed within four

weeks from date; reply thereto, if any, be filed two weeks

thereafter. The writ petition will be treated as 'ready for

hearing' immediately on completion of the time period

prescribed for filing affidavits. Liberty to the parties to

mention for early hearing.

(Debangsu Basak, J.)