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Dredging And Desiltation Company ... vs Mackintosh Burn And Northern ...
2021 Latest Caselaw 356 Cal/2

Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 356 Cal/2
Judgement Date : 7 April, 2021

Calcutta High Court
Dredging And Desiltation Company ... vs Mackintosh Burn And Northern ... on 7 April, 2021
                                   1


                    IA No. GA 6 of 2020
                            With
                    IA No. GA 7 of 2021
                      CS 242 of 2018
            IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
             Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction
                   Commercial Division
      DREDGING AND DESILTATION COMPANY PVT. LTD.
                            Vs.
   MACKINTOSH BURN AND NORTHERN CONSORTIUM & ORS.


 For the Petitioners            : Mr. Sakya Sen, Sr. Adv.
                                  Mr. Sankarsan Sarkar, Adv.
                                  Mr. Sunil Singhania, Adv.

 For the Respondent             : Mr. Debnath Ghosh, Adv.
 Nos. 1 & 2                     : Mr. Arnab Chakraborty, Adv.
                                : Ms. Pragya Bhattacharya, Adv.

 Respondent No. 3               : Mr. Jishnu Chowdhury, Adv.

 Hearing concluded on           : March 24, 2021
 Judgment on                    : April 07, 2021


 DEBANGSU BASAK, J. :-

1. Two applications have been heard analogously as they relate to the

same suit. By IA No. GA 7 of 2021. The defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have

applied for rejection of the plaint and revocation of leave granted under

clause 12 of the Letters Patent, 1865 and for other reliefs. By IA No. GA

6 of 2020 the plaintiff has sought leave to dispense with pre-institution

mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

2. Learned advocate appearing for the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 has

submitted that, the suit should be dismissed on the ground of non-

compliance with the provisions of Section 12A of the Commercial

Courts Act, 2015, failure to lodge fresh writ of summons after

amendment and for non-service of the notice under Section 80 of the

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

3. Learned advocate appearing for the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 has

submitted that, the suit was initially filed in the Commercial Division

without obtaining leave for dispensation of the pre-institution

mediation as contemplated under Section 12A of the Act of 2015. The

plaintiff has not pleaded anything regarding dispensation of the

provisions of Section 12 A nor has the plaintiff made any prayer to

such effect in the plaint as originally filed.

4. Relying upon 2020 SCC Online Cal 1591 (Terai Overseas

Private Ltd. and Others v. Kejriwal Sugar Agencies Private Ltd.

and Ors.). Learned advocate for the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 has

submitted that, since the plaintiff did not contemplate urgent interim

reliefs, prior leave for dispensation of pre-institution mediation and

settlement should have been obtained.

5. Relying upon 1997 Volume 9 Supreme Court Cases 132 (Mohan

Singh and Ors. v. International Airport Authority of India &

Ors.).Learned advocate appearing for the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 has

submitted that, the word "shall" appearing in Section 12A is

mandatory as it would be evident from the object of the Act of 2015. A

strict interpretation of the provisions of the Act of 2015 should be

adhered to. The user of the word "shall" gives the impression of the

same being mandatory in character.

6. Learned advocate appearing for the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 has

relied upon 2019 SCC Online SC 1311 (Ambalal Sarabhai v. K. S.

Infraspace) in support of the proposition that, the provisions of the

Act of 2015 have to be strictly construed.

7. The defendant No. 3 has supported the application of the

defendant Nos. 1 and 2. Learned advocate appearing for the defendant

No. 3 has submitted that, Section 12A of the Act of 2015 is mandatory.

According to him, the user of the word "shall" in the Section raises a

presumption that the provision is mandatory. In support of such

contention, he has relied upon 2018 volume 15 Supreme Court

Cases 99 (ITC Ltd v. Blue Coast Hotels Ltd. and Ors.) and All India

Reporter 1957 Supreme Court 912 (State of UP v. Manbodhan Lal

Srivastava). According to him, the onus is on the plaintiff to establish

that the Section is directory. He has referred to the objects of the Act of

2015 and submitted that, the intention of the legislature is an

expeditious disposal of commercial dispute. In support of his

contention, he has relied upon All India Reporter 1962 Supreme

Court 779 (State of West Bengal v. B K Mondal and Sons).

According to him, Section 12A of the Act of 2015 cannot be read as

directory. He has relied upon 2005 Volume 1 Supreme Court Cases

368 (State of Jharkhand and Ors. v. Ambay Cements and Anr.).

8. Learned advocate appearing for the defendant No. 3 has contended

that, directory provisions are where the time is extendable and where

there is a public duty to be performed and where the concerned person

has no control over an authority which has to do the work within a

particular time. He has relied upon 2021 Volume 2 Supreme Court

Cases 392 ( C. Bright v. District Collector and Ors.) and 2018

Volume 9 Supreme Court Cases for 72 (State of Bihar and Ors. v.

Bihar Rajya Bhumi Vikas Bank Samiti) in this regard.

9. Relying upon 2020 volume 15 Supreme Court Cases 585

(Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. v. K S Infraspace LLP and

Anr.) learned advocate appearing for the defendant No. 3 has

submitted that, the provisions of the Act of 2015 are to be strictly

construed. According to him, it is a binding precedent. In support of

such contention, he has relied upon 2011 volume 9 Supreme Court

Cases 354 (Delhi Airtech Services Private Limited v. State of UP

and Ors.).

10. Learned advocate appearing for the plaintiff has submitted that,

when the suit was filed, the various provisions of Section 12 A of the

Act of 2015 were incapable of being implemented in the sense that, the

requisite infrastructure for the same were not in place. He has

contended that, the mediation Centre had become operational and

started accepting application for mediation and settlement under the

provisions of the Act of 2015 only after December 11, 2020. He has

referred to the notification dated December 11, 2020 in this regard.

According to him, the plaintiff cannot be non-suited for not availing of

a remedy which was not available to the plaintiff at the time of

institution of the suit or at the time of amending the plaint on January

7, 2020.

11. Learned advocate appearing for the plaintiff has contended that,

Section 12A does not contemplate inherent lack of jurisdiction of the

Court to entertain the suit. According to him, only the suit which does

not contemplate any urgent relief falls within the category of the

embargo envisaged under Section 12A of the Act of 2015. He has

contrasted the provisions of Section 11 of the Act of 2015 with that of

Section 12A of the Act of 2015. He has submitted that, the bar under

Section 11 of the Act of 2015 is absolute and is not contemplated

under Section 12A of the Act of 2015.

12. Learned advocate appearing for the plaintiff has submitted that the

requirement to exhaust the remedy of pre-institution mediation or

settlement is a procedural provision. In support of such contentions,

he has relied upon Rule 3 (2) of the mediation rules.

13. Relying upon 2021 SCC Online Cal 429 (Dhanbad Fuels Ltd v.

Union of India & Ors.) and 2021 SCC Online Bom 195 ( Ganga

Taro Vaziram v. Deepak Raheja) learned advocate appearing for the

plaintiff has submitted that, provisions of Section 12A of the Act of

2015 are directory and not mandatory.

14. Relying upon All India Reporter 1969 Supreme Court 439

(Mussamia Imam Haider Bax Razvi v. Rabari Gobindbhai

Ratnabhai & Ors.) learned advocate appearing for the plaintiff has

submitted that, the provisions of Section 12A is only an attempt to

encourage mediation and does not oust the jurisdiction of the Court if

recourse to mediation is not availed of. According to him, the bar of

jurisdiction must be expressed by necessary implication.

15. Relying upon 2006 Volume 2 Supreme Court Cases 777

(Vidyawati Gupta & Ors. v. Bhakti Hari Nayak & Ors.) learned

advocate appearing for the plaintiff has submitted that, if the pre-

condition prescribed under Section 12A of the Act of 2015 is not

complied with, the same will not render the plaint invalid since such

non-compliance is curable in nature and will date back to the

presentation of plaint.

16. On the issue of purposive interpretation learned advocate

appearing for the plaintiff has relied upon All India Reporter 1955

Supreme Court 661 (Bengal Immunity Company Ltd. v. State of

Bihar & Ors.).

17. Referring to Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,

learned advocate appearing for the plaintiff has submitted that, no

notice is required to be served upon the defendant Nos. 1 to 3. No relief

has been prayed for and against the defendant Nos. 4 and 5. He has

relied upon 2011 volume 12 Supreme Court Cases 695 (National

Textile Corporation Ltd. v. Nareshkumar Badrikumar Jagad &

Ors.) and 1994 volume 2 Law Weekly (Madras) 96 (Hindustan

Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Mr. A.K. Annadurai & Anr.) in this

regard.

18. The plaintiff has filed the present suit against five defendants. The

plaintiff has claimed money decree against the first three defendants in

the suit. The plaintiff has no claim against the fourth and the fifth

defendant in the suit. The fifth defendant is the government of West

Bengal. The fifth defendant has been mis-described. The fifth

defendant ought to have been the State of West Bengal.

19. The defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have urged primarily two grounds for

rejection of the plaint and for revocation of leave granted under Clause

12 of the Letters Patent, 1865. One of the grounds that the defendant

Nos. 1 and 2 have urged is lack of notice under Section 80 of the Code

of Civil Procedure, 1908. The plaintiff has admittedly not issued a

notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

20. In International Textile Corporation Ltd. (supra) the Supreme

Court has held that, the identity of a government company remains

distinct from the government. The Madras High Court in Hindustan

Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (supra) has noted that, a government

company is not a government within the meaning of Section 80 of the

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

20. None of the defendants apart from the fifth defendant is a legal

entity in respect of which, a notice under Section 80 of the Code of

Civil Procedure, 1908 is required to be issued prior to filing of the suit

or the rigours of Section 80(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are

to be followed. Since the plaintiff has not claimed any relief as against

the fifth defendant, and the State of West Bengal or its officers are not

required to redress any grievance of the plaintiff, Section 80 of the

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is not attracted in the facts and

circumstances of the present case. Non issuance of notice under

Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is therefore not fatal to

this suit.

21. The plaintiff had presented the instant suit on December 7, 2018

when leave under clause 12 of the Letters Patent, 1865 was granted.

The plaintiff had caused issuance of the writ of summons on February

22, 2019. The defendant No. 2 had received the writ of summons on

April 4, 2019. The defendant had entered appearance on April 17,

2019. The defendant Nos. 1and 2 had taken out an application for

extension of time to file written statement. The plaintiff had filed an

application under Chapter XIIIA of the Calcutta High Court Original

Side Rules. The plaintiff had thereafter filed an application for

amendment of the plaint. The first application for amendment was

allowed on November 20, 2019. The plaintiff thereafter had withdrawn

the application under chapter XIIIA. The application of the defendant

Nos. 1 and 2 for extension of time to file written statement was

disposed of with direction that the defendants would be at liberty to file

the written statement within a fortnight from the date of receipt of the

writ of summons of the amended plaint. The application for

amendment and the order passed therein was mentioned subsequently

when, by an order dated December 6, 2019, the order dated November

20, 2019 was recalled with the liberty to the plaintiff to apply afresh if

it was so entitled to in law. The plaintiff had filed the second

application for amendment by a Master Summons dated December 20,

2019. Such application for amendment was allowed by the order dated

January 7, 2020. The plaintiff had served a copy of the amended plaint

on the defendants on February 12, 2020. However, the plaintiff did not

take any steps for issuance of fresh writ of summons for the amended

plaint. The defendants have prayed for rejection of the plaint and for

extension of time to file written statement if the plaint is not rejected.

22. Admittedly, the plaintiff has not undertaken pre-institution

mediation as envisaged under Section 12A of the Act of 2015. Section

12A of the Act of 2015 has come into the statute book with

retrospective effect from May 3, 2018. Section 12A of the Act of 2015

has been introduced to the Act of 2015 through the Commercial

Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of

High Courts (Amendment) Act, 2018. The Amendment Act of 2018 has

been published in the Gazette of India on August 21, 2018.

23. Section 12A of the Act of 2015 contemplates pre institution

mediation in accordance with such manner and procedure as may be

prescribed by the rules made by the central government. The Standard

Operating Procedure had been made and published rules on December

11, 2020. The mechanism stipulated under Section 12A of the Act of

2015 was not complete till December 11, 2020. The plaintiff had

presented the present suit on December 7, 2018. On such date of

presentation of the plaint of the present suit, the mechanism under

Section 12A of the Act of 2015 was not complete. Therefore, on the date

of presentation of the plaint of the instant suit, the plaintiff cannot be

held responsible for a mechanism which the statute contemplated to be

in place and was not so.

24. Section 12A of the Act of 2015 has stipulated pre-institution

mediation. Post institution mediation is possible under Section 89 of

the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Mediation post institution of the suit

cannot be said to be mediation within the meaning of Section 12A of

the Act of 2015.

25. The parties have raised the issue as to whether Section 12A of the

Act of 2015 is mandatory or not. Section 12A of the Act of 2015

prohibits institution of a suit by a plaintiff without the plaintiff

undertaking a pre-institution mediation, unless such plaintiff seeks

urgent interim relief. Section 12 A of the Act of 2015 has specified an

embargo in the institution of a suit without the plaintiff undertaking a

pre-institution mediation in such case where the plaintiff is not seeking

urgent interim relief.

26. The object of the Act of 2015 is to expedite the disposal of a

commercial dispute. Such object is achieved through compulsory pre-

institution mediation. The time frame provided under the compulsory

pre-institution mediation allows a commercial dispute to be

successfully resolved consuming such a time span within which it is

not possible for the Court to finally adjudicate the suit.

27. In Terai Overseas Private Limited (supra) the plaintiff therein

did not plead anything about Section 12A of the Act of 2015 in the

plaint. There the plaintiff did not seek urgent interim relief for

dispensation with pre-institution mediation.

28. Section 12A of the Act of 2015 has used the word "shall". Mohan

Singh (supra) has held that the word "shall" is not always decisive as

to whether the provision is mandatory or directory. It has observed

that, regard must be had to the context, subject matter and object of

the statutory provision in question in determining whether the same is

mandatory or directory.

29. In Haridwar Singh (supra) the Supreme Court has observed that

prohibitive or negative words can rarely be directory and are indicative

of the intent that the provision is mandatory. ITC Ltd. (supra) has

observed that the word "shall" invariably raises a presumption that the

particular provision is imperative. In Manbodhan Lal Srivastava

(supra) the Supreme Court has construed the provisions of Article 320

(3)(c) of the Constitution not to be mandatory and that non-compliance

of such provisions does not afford a cause of action to approach a

Court of law. In B. K. Mondal (supra) the Supreme Court has observed

that in dealing with the question as to whether any provision is

mandatory or directory, no general or inflexible rule can be laid down.

In Ambay Cements (supra) the Supreme Court has observed that, the

conditions prescribed by the authorities for grant of exemption under

the Bihar Industrial Promotion Policy, 1995 are mandatory. In C.

Bright (supra) the Supreme Court has held that, when the provisions

of the statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is

such that to hold acts done in neglect of this duty as null and void,

would cause serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who

have no control over those entrusted with the duty, the practice of the

Courts should be to hold such provisions as directory. In Bihar Rajya

Bhumi Vikas Bank Samiti (supra) the Supreme Court has observed

that, the rules of procedure are made to advance the cause of justice

and not to defeat it. Construction of the rule or procedure which

promotes justice and prevents miscarriage has to be preferred. In

Delhi Airtech Services Private Limited and others (supra) the

Supreme Court has observed that, the word "shall" would normally be

mandatory while the word "may" would be directory.

30. Mussamia Imam Haider Bax Razvi (supra) the Supreme Court

has considered the provisions of Sections 70 and 85 of the Bombay

Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 and held that the same did

not bar the jurisdiction of the civil Court to decide the issue as to

whether the defendants were tenants. In Vidyawati Gupta (supra)

Supreme Court has noted that, the requirements of Order 6 and Order

7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was procedural and that any

omission in respect thereof will not render the plaint invalid. The defect

can be cured and that the same shall relate back to the date of

presentation of the plaint. In Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. (supra) the

Supreme Court has noted that purposive interpretation of the statute

can be made.

31. The Supreme Court in 1977 Volume 1 Supreme Court Cases 379

(Seth Loonkaran Sethiya and Ors. v. Mr. Ivan E. John and Ors.)

has held that Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 although

procedural is mandatory. The Supreme Court in 1977 Volume 1

Supreme Court Cases 257 (State of Maharashtra v. Chandrakant)

has held that, Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is

mandatory. In 2013 Volume 10 Supreme Court Cases 178 (State of

Kerala v. Sudhir Kumar) the Supreme Court has held that, a suit

filed without complying with the provisions of Section 80(1) of the Code

of Civil Procedure, 1908 cannot be regularised by filing an application

under Section 80(2). The Supreme Court in 2019 Volume 12

Supreme Court Cases 210 (SCG Contracts (India) Private Ltd. v.

K.S. Chamankar Infrastructure Private Ltd. and Ors.) has held

that, the time to file written statement as prescribed by the Act of 2015

is mandatory.

32. In Dhanbad Fuels Ltd. (supra) the Court had noted the fact that

the suit in that case was filed in August 2019 and that the Standard

Operating Procedure for Pre-institution Mediation and Settlement was

prescribed on December 11, 2020. The fact scenario in the present

case is different. In the Ganga Taro Vazirani (supra) the Bombay

High Court has held that, Section 12A of the Act of 2015 is a

procedural provision and if there is a substantial compliance, the

plaintiff cannot be non-suited.

33. Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 and Section 80 of

the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 have prohibition against institution

of a suit without satisfaction of the parameters laid down therein. Both

provisions have been held to be procedural but mandatory. Similarly,

Section 12A of the Act of 2015 prohibits institution of a suit where the

plaintiff does not undertake pre-institution mediation in a case where

the plaintiff does not require urgent interim relief. The bar is on the

institution of the suit, keeping in mind the distinction between "filing"

and "institution" of a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. To

my mind, the bar under Section 12A of the Act of 2015 is absolute

when the plaintiff has failed to comply with the parameters laid down

therein. Section 12A of the Act of 2015 has to be held to be mandatory

with effect from December 12, 2020 being the date immediately

subsequent to the date when the Standard Operating Procedure for

undertaking pre-institution mediation in terms of Section 12A of the

Act of 2015 was available from. This view has been garnered from C.

Bright (supra) were the Supreme Court has held that when the

obligation to perform a public duty rest upon a public servant, the

plaintiff cannot be faulted for it. Subsequent to December 11, 2020 the

entire mechanism under section 12A of the Act of 2015 has been fully

operational. Therefore, on and from December 12, 2020 a plaintiff

cannot take the shelter of absence of infrastructure to forego a pre-

institution mediation when it seeks no urgent relief.

34. The defendants and in fact the parties had concentrated on Section

80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Section 12A of the Act of

2015 in the course of their respective submissions. No other points

have been raised by the parties.

35. The defendants and in fact the parties had concentrated on Section

80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Section 12A of the Act of

2015 in course of their submissions. No other points have been raised

by the parties.

36. In view of the discussions above no order need be passed in IA GA

No. 6 of 2020 as the plaintiff cannot be non-suited due to the absence

of the infrastructure under Section 12A of the Act of 2015 at the time

of institutions of the suit. IA GA No. 7 of 2020 is dismissed without any

order as to costs.

[DEBANGSU BASAK, J.]

 
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