[Cites 9, Cited by 0]
Bombay High Court
M/S. D Corp Agro Foods Pvt Ltd And Anr vs Bank Of Baroda And Ors on 27 March, 2026
Author: Manish Pitale
Bench: Manish Pitale
2026:BHC-AS:14887-DB
906-wp-10869-2025.doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 10869 OF 2025
M/s. D Corp Agro Foods Pvt Ltd and .. Petitioners
Anr
V/s.
Bank Of Baroda and Ors .. Respondents
-------------------
Dr. Abhinav Chandrachud i/by Ajit A. Kocharekar, for the Petitioners.
Ms. Asma Batatawala i/by Rathina Maravarman (VC), for Respondent
No. 1-Bank of Baroda.
--------------------
Digitally
signed by
CORAM : MANISH PITALE &
VARSHA
VARSHA DEEPAK
DEEPAK GAIKWAD
SHREERAM V. SHIRSAT, JJ.
GAIKWAD Date:
2026.03.27
19:16:25
+0530 DATE : 27TH MARCH 2026.
PC:
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. The Petitioners are aggrieved by the order dated 25/06/2025
passed by the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai (DRAT),
whereby an application seeking waiver of statutory deposit under
Section 18(1) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial
Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, has been
disposed of by directing the Petitioners to deposit 30% of the amount
due in two installments.
3. The order specifies that in the event the Petitioners fail to deposit
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the amount, the appeal itself shall stand rejected. It is an admitted
position that since the Petitioners have failed to deposit the said
amount, the appeal stood rejected before the DRAT.
4. The learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners submitted that
a proper reading of Section 18 of the Securitisation Act would show
that the insistence on pre-deposit would not be appropriate against any
and every order passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT). A
distinction was sought to be made between a mere procedural order
and an order that decides the inter-se rights of the parties. It was
submitted that when a Division Bench of this Court insisted on a pre-
deposit in the case of "M/s Sunshine Builders and Developers V/s
HDFC Bank Limited through the Branch Manager and Ors." 1, and
accordingly passed its order disposing of the Writ Petition No.3929 of
2024 by its judgment and order dated 19/03/2024 and the same was
challenged by way of Civil Appeal No. 5290 of 2025 arising from
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 10875 of 2025, the Supreme Court
had set aside the order of this Court and remitted the matter back by
framing a specific question.
5. It was submitted that although the Respondent-Bank is relying
upon the judgment and order dated 04/02/2026 passed by the
1 Civil Appeal No. 5290 of 25 (SLP (C) No. 10875/25)
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Coordinate Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 3929 of
2024 ("M/s Sunshine Builders and Developers V/s HDFC Bank Limited
through the Branch Manager and Ors) (supra), it can be demonstrated
that the Coordinate Bench had laid down the law and made certain
observations on the interpretation of Section 18 of the Securitisation
Act, in the light of the peculiar facts and circumstances of that
particular case.
6. It was submitted that in the said case, the Petitioners had
approached the DRT after considerable delay and this was the factor
that weighed with the Division Bench of this Court in holding against
the said Petitioner. It was submitted that, in any case, the question
specifically framed by the Supreme Court in its order dated
17/04/2025 disposing of Civil Appeal No. 5290 of 2025 is required to
be answered, and, therefore, this Court may consider entertaining the
present Writ Petition and passing appropriate orders.
7. Learned counsel for the Petitioners further sought to bring to the
notice of this Court the facts pertaining to the present case, indicating
that there was no delay on the part of the Petitioners in taking recourse
to the provisions of the Securitisation Act and that, as a matter of fact,
the Petitioners themselves had stated that they had a buyer available
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who was ready to offer amount for the factory premises, which was
higher than the debt due to the Respondent No.1-Bank. It was
submitted that in these circumstances the insistence on pre-deposit was
inappropriate and that the waiver application ought to have been
allowed by the DRAT.
8. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for
Respondent No1-Bank (secured creditor) relied upon the
aforementioned recent judgment of the Division bench in the case of
"M/s Sunshine Builders and Developers V/s HDFC Bank Limited
through the Branch Manager and Ors (supra). It was submitted that
the Special Leave Petition filed against the said judgment and order
was dismissed by the Supreme Court by order passed on 20/03/2026
in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 9823 of 2026. It was submitted
that since the Supreme Court had confirmed the said judgment and
order of the Division Bench of this Court, the present Writ Petition
deserves to be dismissed.
9. It was further submitted that the DRAT had applied law in the
correct perspective and on a proper reading of Section 18 of the
Securitisation Act.
10. We have heard learned counsel for the rival parties.
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11. Section 18 of the Securitisation Act reads as follows:
18. Appeal to Appellate Tribunal -
"(1) Any person aggrieved, by any order made by the Debts
Recovery Tribunal under section 17, may prefer an appeal
alongwith such fee, as may be prescribed to the Appellate
Tribunal within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order
of Debts Recovery Tribunal:
PROVIDED that different fees may be prescribed for filing
an appeal by the borrower or by the person other than the
borrower:
PROVIDED FURTHER that no appeal shall be entertained
unless the borrower has deposited with the Appellate
Tribunal fifty per cent. of the amount of debt due from him,
as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the
Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever is less:
PROVIDED ALSO that the Appellate Tribunal may, for the
reasons to be recorded in writing, reduce the amount to not
less than twenty-five per cent. of debt referred to in the
second proviso.
(2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Appellate
Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of the appeal in
accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts
Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of
1993) and rules made thereunder."
12. The Division Bench of this Court in the recent judgment in the
case of "M/s Sunshine Builders and Developers V/s HDFC Bank
Limited through the Branch Manager and Ors (supra) took into
consideration earlier judgments of this Court as well as the Delhi High
Court and the Supreme Court, concerning the interpretation of
requirement of pre-deposit under Section 18(1) of the Securitisation
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Act. Thereupon the Division Bench of this Court in the said recent
judgment interpreted the provision specifically to hold that the
requirement of pre-deposit would apply to "any order" passed under
Section 17(1) of the Securitisation Act. The relevant observations in
the said judgment in the case of "M/s Sunshine Builders and
Developers V/s HDFC Bank Limited through the Branch Manager and
Ors (supra) are found in the following paragraphs:
"45. In any event, as more particularly held by the Division
Bench of this Court in Vinay Container Services (supra), the
requirement of pre-deposit under sub-section (1) of Section 18 of
the SARFAESI Act would also apply where an appeal is filed before
the DRAT against an interlocutory order passed by the DRT under
Section 17 of the Act since the power of the DRT to pass an
interlocutory order in ancillary to its jurisdiction under Section 17
and the provisions of Section 18(2) cannot be so interpreted to
mean that an interlocutory order passed by the DRT is not
referrable to the provisions of Section 17. A similar view has also
been taken by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Satnam
Agri Products (supra), which goes on to hold that there is no reason
to exempt the appeals arising out of the orders passed by the DRT
on interlocutory applications merely on the ground that the said
orders do not have the effect of staying the action or measures
taken by the secured creditor under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of
the SARFAESI Act for enforcement of security interest. In Rajat
Infrastructure (supra), the Supreme Court after relying on past
judicial pronouncements has held that the right of appeal under
Section 18(1) is only subject to the condition of deposit laid down
in the second proviso therein.
46. Moreover, the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 18 are
very clear inasmuch as, they clearly include the words, "Any person
aggrieved, by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under
Section 17, may prefer an appeal...". There is no qualification
provided by the legislature restricting the applicability of this sub-
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section to only some class or category of orders, whether a
procedural one or otherwise, a final order which determines the
liability of the borrower or any other person. Instead, the only
prescribed requirement is that the order must be one that is passed
by the DRT under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act and as discussed
above, if any person is aggrieved with the measures undertaken by
a secured creditor under Sections 13 and 14 of the SARFAESI Act,
an application can be made to the DRT challenging the same and
the various provisions relating thereto, are contained in Section 17
of the Act. Here again, there is no qualification provided by the
legislature restricting the applicability of invoking this Section only
against some class or category of measures that may be undertaken
under Sections 13, 14 and instead, Section 17 can be availed by any
person, not merely a borrower, to challenge any and all measures
undertaken by the secured creditor.
47. In this background, when we consider the words, "any order"
found in sub-section (1) of Section 17, it is difficult to restrict its
applicability to only a final order which determines the liability of
the borrower or other person, as urged by Mr. Purohit. There are
several judicial pronouncements which have been relied upon by
the Respondents, including inter alia Lucknow Development
Authority (supra), Man Global (supra) and Raj Kumar Shivhare
(supra) which interpret the word, 'any' as contained in several
statutes to mean the word, 'all'. Similarly, even the Black's Law
Dictionary does not restrict the meaning of the word 'any' and
describes it thus - "Any does not necessarily mean only one person,
but may have reference to more than one or to many". Merrium
Webster's Dictionary explains the pronoun 'any' to be either,
singular or plural in construction."
13. We find that since a Coordinate Division Bench of this Court has
laid down the law specifically with regard to the interpretation of
Section 18(1) of the Securitisation Act and particularly in the light of
the requirement of pre-deposit specified therein, the said position of
law would be binding on us. It is also relevant to note that the Special
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Leave Petition (Civil) No. 9823 of 2026 filed to challenge the said
recent judgment and order of the Division Bench of this Court was
dismissed by the order dated 20/03/2026 passed by the Supreme
Court.
14. We are unable to agree with the learned counsel appearing for
the Petitioners that the above-quoted observations in the case of "M/s
Sunshine Builders and Developers V/s HDFC Bank Limited through the
Branch Manager and Ors (supra) were made in the peculiar facts of
the said case, inasmuch as there was inordinate delay on the part of
the Petitioners in taking recourse to remedies under the Securitisation
Act.
15. We find that the dictum laid down in the above-quoted
paragraphs of the judgment of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in
the case of "M/s Sunshine Builders and Developers V/s HDFC Bank
Limited through the Branch Manager and Ors (supra) is based on
interpretation of the language and words used since under Section
18(1) of the Securitisation Act. It cannot be said that the interpretation
of the provision was necessarily coloured by any factual position.
16. We are unable to agree with the learned counsel for the
Petitioners that the question framed in Paragraph No. 15 of the order
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dated 17/04/2025 passed by the Supreme Court in Special Leave
Petition No. 5290 of 2025 is still unanswered.
17. We are of the opinion that the Coordinate Bench of this Court in
the case of "M/s Sunshine Builders and Developers V/s HDFC Bank
Limited through the Branch Manager and Ors (supra) has considered
the question and answered it in a particular manner.
18. In such a situation, the only alternative available to this bench
would be to refer the issue to a larger bench, if at all there is any
disagreement with the position of law laid down by the Coordinate
Bench in the case of "M/s Sunshine Builders and Developers V/s HDFC
Bank Limited through the Branch Manager and Ors (supra).
19. We are not inclined to take a different view in the matter and
therefore, we are of the opinion that the present Petition is also
covered as per the judgment of this Court in the case of "M/s Sunshine
Builders and Developers V/s HDFC Bank Limited through the Branch
Manager and Ors (supra).
20. In the light of the said position of law laid down by this Court,
we do not find any error committed by the DRAT in passing the
impugned order. As per Section 18(1) of the Securitisation Act pre-
deposit of amount between 25% to 50% of the debt due can be
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imposed as a pre-condition for entertaining the appeal.
21. The DRAT has directed the deposit of 30% of the amount and we
do not find any error in the view adopted by the DRAT, in the facts and
circumstances of the present case.
22. In view of the above, the Writ Petition is dismissed.
23. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
24. At this stage, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners
submits that since the secured asset has been the residence of
Petitioner No.2 for almost two decades, this Court may consider
granting reasonable time for the Petitioners to vacate the subject
property, as the Respondent No.1-Bank (secured creditor) intends to
take possession on 30th March 2026, as per a notice for possession
issued to the Petitioners. The said prayer is vehemently opposed on
behalf of the Respondent No.1.
25. Considering the fact that the subject property has been used as
residence, we are inclined to grant reasonable time, subject to an
appropriate undertaking being filed by Petitioner No. 2.
26. In view of the above, the Petitioners are granted time till 30th
April 2026 to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the subject
property to the Respondent No.1-Bank.
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27. An undertaking shall be filed before this Court by Petitioner
No. 2 that vacant and peaceful possession of the subject property shall
be handed over to Respondent No.1-Bank on or before 30th April
2026. No further extension of time shall be granted. The undertaking
shall be filed on or before 30th March 2026.
28. The DRAT is directed to dispose of the Pending Securitisation
Application No. 219 of 2025 and Securitisation Application No. 267 of
2025 as expeditiously as possible and, preferably, on or before 15th
June 2026.
29. Parties to act on an authenticated copy of this order.
(SHREERAM V. SHIRSAT, J.) (MANISH PITALE, J.)
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