Girish S/O Pesulal Dewani vs State Of Maharashtra Through Police ...
2026 Latest Caselaw 2910 Bom

Bombay High Court

Girish S/O Pesulal Dewani vs State Of Maharashtra Through Police ... on 23 March, 2026

2026:BHC-NAG:4908-DB



                                                             57 apl 849.25.odt..odt
                                            1


                       IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                 NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.

                        CRIMINAL APPLICATION (APL) NO. 849 OF 2025

                 1.    Girish    S/o.    Pesulal   Dewani,
                       Aged:57 years, Occ: Business, R/o             APPLICANTS
                       Plot No.461, New Colony, Nagpur,
                       Maharashtra- 440013.
                 2.    Kishor    S/o.    Pesulal   Dewani,
                       Aged: 69 years, Occ: Business
                       R/o-A-1 Ajanta, Byramji Town,
                       Chhindwara        Road,     Nagpur,
                       Maharashtra.
                 3.    Lokchand S/o. Sawaldas Dewani
                       Aged: 39 years, Occ: Business
                       R/o. A-1 Ajanta, Byramji Town,
                       Chhindwara        Road,     Nagpur,
                       Maharashtra.
                 4.    Anil S/o. Tirthadas Dewani
                       Aged: 52, years, Occ: Business
                       R/o. R/o. 60, Shah Dupare Layout,
                       Khushi nagar, Nagpur, Maharshtra-
                       440014.

                 5.    Sanjay S/o. Pandurang Abruk, Aged
                       about 48 years, R/o. Amba Colony,
                       Amravati.

                                         // V E R S U S //

                 1.    State of Maharashtra through
                       Police Station Officer,                 NON-APPLICANTS
                       Gadge Nagar Police Station,
                       Amravati
                 2.    The Collector,
                       Amravati, Maharashtra
                 3.    State Excise Department,
                       Amravati
                                                                 57 apl 849.25.odt..odt
                                      2


------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              -
Mr. Shyam Dewani, Advocate a/w Mr. Sahil S. Dewani, Advocate
for the applicants.
Mr. Nikhil Joshi, APP for non-applicants /State.
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


         CORAM : URMILA JOSHI PHALKE, J.

         DATED :23.03.2026

ORAL JUDGMENT :

1. Heard.

2. ADMIT. Taken up for final disposal with the consent

of learned counsel for the parties.

3. By this application by invoking the jurisdiction under

Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure applicants seeking

quashing of the First Information Report in connection with

crime No.124/2018 registered at Police Station Gadge Nagar

District Amravati for the offences punishable under Sections

77(b), 78(e), 79, 82, 83 and 90 of the Maharashtra Prohibition

Act, 1949 (for short, 'the Act of 1949') and the consequent

proceeding arising out of the same bearing SCC No.4489/2021 57 apl 849.25.odt..odt

which is pending in the Court of 5th Joint Civil Judge, Junior

Division and Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Amravati.

4. The FIR was lodged at the behest of the incharge

Sub Inspector State Excise Department, Amravati on an

allegation that liquor license holder i.e. M/s King Wine which has

FL-I license in their name had violated the condition of license.

The present applicants who are the partners in M/s. King Wine

had in fact stocked and also sold beer which was expired thereby

violating the condition of license and also committed an offence

under Maharashtra Prohibition Act, (for short, 'the Act of 1949')

therefore show cause notice issued by the Collector to the said

license holder and said show cause notice was duly served on the

company thereby seeking explanation as to why the action should

not be taken for stocking the expired liquor and as to why their

license should not be cancelled. Thereafter in response to the

show cause notice the applicants have given their explanation

and had admitted their fault and company has also deposited the

amount of fine of Rs.50,000/- imposed on them by applying

Section 104 of the Act of 1949 and after completion of the 57 apl 849.25.odt..odt

investigation the charge-sheet was submitted against the present

applicants.

5. Heard learned counsel for the applicants who

submitted that on perusal of the FIR and entire charge-sheet

nowhere it reveals that any specific role is attributed to the

present applicants. The vicarious liability is unknown to the

criminal law. No specific role is mentioned as far as the role of

the present applicants as the directors is concerned. He submitted

that in view of the settled law Directors cannot be held liable in

absence of any allegations against them. He further submitted

that the company has not been made a party and therefore, the

allegations are restricted to the extent of the company and

therefore, the present applicants cannot be held vicariously liable

for the acts committed by the company. In support of the his

contention he placed reliance on the decision of this Court in

Criminal Application No.716/2025 (Mukesh s/o Hari Butani vs.

State of Maharashtra thr. the Inspector) decided on 03.02.2026

and in Liladevi Santoshkumar Bhoot vs. State of Maharashtra

reported in Law Finder Doc. ID No.2858661.

57 apl 849.25.odt..odt

6. Per contra learned APP strongly opposed the said

contention and submitted that merely because the fine amount is

deposited is not sufficient to exonerate the applicants from the

liability which is a criminal liability. He submitted that considering

the recitals of the FIR present applicants are the directors of the

said company are liable for the violation of the Rules and the

provisions of sections 77 (b), 78(e), 79, 82, 83 and 90 of the Act

of 1949 and therefore, application deserves to be rejected.

7. Before entering into the merits of the matter it is

necessary to refer Section 77(b) which deals with the penalty for

misconduct by licensee which reads as under:-

Whoever, being the holder of a licence, permit,

pass or authorisation granted under this Act or a

person in the employ of such holder or acting with

his express or implied permission on his behalf-

(b) wilfully does or omits to do anything in

contravention of any rule regulation or order made

under this Act.

On conviction, be punished for each offence with

imprisonment for a term which may extend to six 57 apl 849.25.odt..odt

months or with fine which may extend to five

thousand or both.

Section 78 (e) also deals with penalty

for misconduct by licensed vendor or manufacturer which

reads as under:-

Whoever, being the holder of a licence

for the sale or manufacture of any intoxicant under this

Act, or a person, in the employ of such holder or acting

with his express or implied permission on his behalf

(e) sells any intoxicant which is not of

the nature, substance and quality demanded by the

purchaser or keeps or exposes for sale any intoxicant

which is not of the nature, substance and quality

authorized by the terms of the licence to be kept for sale

by the holder of the licence shall or conviction be

punished for each such offence with imprisonment for a

term which may extend to one year and with fine which

may extent to ten thousand rupees.

57 apl 849.25.odt..odt

Section 82 deals with breach of licence,

permit, etc. to be an offence which is reproduced for the

reference.

(1) In the event of any breach by the holder

of any licence, permit, pass or authorization granted

under this Act or by his servants or by any person acting

with his express or implied permission on his behalf of

any of the terms or conditions of such licence, permit,

pass or authorization such holder shall, in addition to the

cancellation or suspension of the licence, permit, pass or

authorization granted to him be punished, on conviction,

with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six

months or with fine which may extend to [five thousand

rupees] or with both, unless it is proved that all due and

reasonable precautions were exercised by him to prevent

any such breach.

(2) Any person who commits any such breach shall,

whether he acts with or without the permission of the

holder of the licence, permit, pass or authorization be

liable to the same punishment.

57 apl 849.25.odt..odt

And 83 deals with Penalty for conspiracy, whereas

section 90 deals with penalty for offence not otherwise

provided for which reads as under:-

Whoever is guilty of any wilful act or intentional

omission in contravention of the provisions of this Act,

or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder or of any

licence, permit, pass or authorization granted under

this Act, and if such act or omission is not otherwise

made an offence under this Act shall, on conviction, be

punished with the imprisonment for a term which may

extend to six months or with fine which may extend to

[five thousand rupees] or with both.

8. Admittedly, the show cause notice was given to M/s

King Wine, whereas the offence is registered against only the

applicant No.5 i.e. Sanjay Pandurang Abruk who is the employee

of the company. He was looking after the day to day affairs of the

said company. Thus, admittedly the crime was not registered

against the present applicant Nos.1 to 4 but the charge-sheet was

filed against the present applicants. On perusal of the entire

recitals of the FIR admittedly no specific role is attributed by the 57 apl 849.25.odt..odt

present applicants or nature of their work is not mentioned in the

said FIR. The entire charge-sheet on perusal nowhere reveals any

specific role attributed by the present applicant Nos.1 to 4. Even

considering the role of the applicant No.5. Section 79 would

come into play which reads as liability of licensee for acts of

servants it clarify that the the holder of a licence, permit, pass or

authorisation granted under this Act shall be responsible, as well

as the actual offender, for any offence committed by any person in

his employment or acting with his express or implied permission

on his behalf under the provisions of this Act as if he himself had

committed the same, unless he shall establish that all due and

reasonable precautions were exercised by him to prevent the

commission of such offence. Thus, even if any act is committed by

the servant or the employee the responsibility or the liability is of

the company.

9. Learned counsel for the applicants rightly pointed out

that in catena of decisions it is held that the vicarious liability is

unknown much less criminal liability. This aspect is also

considered in the case of Mukesh Hari Butani vs. State of

Maharashtra thr. the Inspector by this Court and while addressing 57 apl 849.25.odt..odt

this issue it is held that "the company itself is not made accused.

Further facts and circumstances of the record shows that the

Glaxo Smithkline Consumer Healthcare Limited in view of the

order passed by the National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai

was merged and amalgamated with another company. The

present applicant is made an accused in his capacity as an

independent Director of Glaxo Smithkline Consumer Healthcare

Limited without specifying his role or without specifying how he

is concerned with the day-to-day affairs of the said company."

10. This aspect is more and in detail dealt with in the

case of Liladevi Santoshkumar Bhoot vs. State of Maharashtra

wherein there is reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex

Court in the case of Sanjay Dutt vs. State of Haryana in Criminal

Appeal No.11/2025 decided on 02.01.2025 wherein the Hon'ble

Apex Court has observed that mere authorization of an act at the

behest of the company or the exercise of a supervisory role over

certain actions or activities of the company is not enough to

render a director vicariously liable. There must exist something to

show that such actions of the director stemmed from their

personal involvement and arose from actions or conduct falling 57 apl 849.25.odt..odt

outside the scope of its routine corporate duties. Thus, where the

company is the offender, vicarious liability of the Directors cannot

be imputed automatically, in the absence of any statutory

provision to this effect. There has to be a specific act attributed to

the director or any other person allegedly in control and

management of the company, to the effect that such a person was

responsible for the acts committed by or on behalf of the

company.

11. Similarly, in Special Leave Petition (Criminal)

No.12390/12391/2022 (Susela Padmavathy Amma v. M/s Bharti

Airtel Limited) decided on 15.3.2024 the Hon'ble Apex Court by

referring catena of decisions in the cases of State of Haryana v.

Brij Lal Mittal and others (1998)5 SCC 343; SMS Pharmaceuticals

Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla and another (2007)9 SCC 481, Pooja

Ravinder Devidasani v. State of Maharashtra and another (2014)

16 SCC 1, and State of NCT of Delhi, through Prosecuting Officer,

Insecticides, Government of NCT, Delhi v. Rajiv Khurana, reported

in (2010)11 SCC 469 wherein it has been held that, "every person

connected with the Company will not fall into the ambit of the

provision. Time and again, it has been asserted by this Court that 57 apl 849.25.odt..odt

only those persons who were in charge of and responsible for the

conduct of the business of the Company at the time of commission

of an offence will be liable for criminal action. A Director, who

was not in charge of and was not responsible for the conduct of

the business of the Company at the relevant time, will not be

liable for an offence under Section 141 of the N.L. Act.

12. In the case of Sunil Bharti Mittal v. Central Bureau of

Investigation supra, also the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that,

"when the company is offender, vicarious liability of the Directors

cannot be imputed automatically in the absence of any statutory

provisions to this effect. When the company is the offender,

vicarious liability of the Directors cannot be imputed

automatically, in the absence of any statutory provision to that

effect. One such example is Section 141 of the Negotiable

Instruments Act, 1881. In Aneeta Hada v. M/s. Godfather Travels

& Tours Pvt.Ltd., reported in 2008 AIR SCW 3608 the Court noted

that if a group of persons that guide the business of the company

have the criminal intent, that would be imputed to the body

corporate and it is in this backdrop, Section 141 of the Negotiable

Instruments Act has to be understood. Such a position is, 57 apl 849.25.odt..odt

therefore, because of statutory intendment making it a deeming

fiction. Here also, the principle of "alter ego", was applied only in

one direction namely where a group of persons that guide the

business had criminal intent, that is to be imputed to the body

corporate and not the vice versa. Otherwise, there has to be a

specific act attributed to the Director or any other person

allegedly in control and management of the company, to the effect

that such a person was responsible for the acts committed by or

on behalf of the company."

13. Thus, question requires to be answered is that, when

a company is liable for criminal offences committed by its

Directors/Managers/Officers and other employees, while

conducting business, whether vicarious liability is attributable to

all. It has been consistently held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that

in absence of any specific allegation of vicarious liability against

any Director or Managing Director or such other official of

comapny and in absence of company being arrayed as party,

proceeding initiated against such Director of Managing Director

or any Officer of the company is liable to be quashed.

57 apl 849.25.odt..odt

14. Thus, it is a trite law that commission of offence by

the company is sine qua non to attract the vicarious liability of

others involved in the company. Thus, so-called vicarious liability

of the Directors cannot be imputed automatically. Whether such

liability is statutorily prescribed in a particular statute or not and

or in absence of any statutory provision to this effect if it is to be

included under the IPC either way, the prosecution would have to

weigh averments with regard to the specific role played by the

accused director or partner and demonstrate that such director or

partner was in-charge of the affairs of the company and directly

impredecible connected to the crime alleged.

15. Thus, in the case of Sanjay Dutt and ors v. The State

of Haryana and anr supra, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that "at

the same time, wherever by a legal fiction the principle of

vicarious liability is attracted and a person who is otherwise not

personally involved in the commission of an offence is made liable

for the same, it has to be specifically provided in the statute

concerned. When it comes to penal provisions, vicarious liability

of the managing director and director would arise provided any

provision exists in that behalf in the statute. Even where such 57 apl 849.25.odt..odt

provision for fastening vicarious liability exists, it does not mean

that any and all directors of the company would be automatically

liable for any contravention of such statute. Vicarious Liability

would arise only if there are specific and substantiated allegations

attributing a particular role or conduct to such director, sufficient

enough to attract the provisions constituting vicarious liability

and by extension the offence itself."

It has further been held that, "it is the cardinal principle of

criminal jurisprudence that there is no vicarious liability unless

the statute specifically provides so. Thus, an individual who has

perpetrated the commission of an offence on behalf of a company

can be made an accused, if the statute provides for such liability

and if there is sufficient evidence of his active role coupled with

criminal intent. The primary responsibility is on the complainant

to make specific averments as are required under the law in the

complaint so as to make the accused vicariously liable. For

fastening criminal liability on an officer of a company, there is no

presumption that every officer of a company knows about the

transaction in question.

57 apl 849.25.odt..odt

16. In the light of the above settled principles of law, the

facts of the present case are to be considered.

17. As per the allegations in the FIR the applicant Nos. 1

to 4 are the Directors and applicant No.5 is the employee. The

FIR came to be lodged against the applicant No.5 who was found

in the premises when the raid was conducted and the stock of

expired liquor was found in the premises of the company. A plain

reading of the FIR reveals that the allegations are made against

the company whereas company is not made an accused in the said

FIR. The case of the prosecution is that applicant No.1 was

found when the raid was conducted. However, in the absence of

averments that the present applicants were the active Directors of

the company and looking after the day to day affairs of the

company, no vicarious liability can be attracted against them. The

vicarious criminal liability of Directors/Partners of the company

would arise provided any provision exists in that behalf in the

statute. The statute must contain provision fixing such vicarious

liability. Even for the said purpose, it would be obligatory on the

part of the prosecution and the investigating agency to make

requisite allegation and collect evidence in support thereof, which 57 apl 849.25.odt..odt

would attract provision constituting vicarious liability. The

question of making a company liable for criminal offences

committed by its Directors and other employees while conducting

business is of utmost importance in criminal law jurisprudence.

18. Thus, in view of the settled law the applicants have

made out the case for quashing of the FIR as well as quashing of

the entire proceeding as company is not made an accused.

Admittedly, while exercising powers under Section 482 of the

Code, the Court does not function as a court of appeal or revision.

Inherent jurisdiction under the Section though wide has to be

exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when

such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the

Section 482 of the Code itself. It is to be exercised to do real and

substantial justice for the administration of which alone it exists.

Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this

power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should

not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution.

19. By applying the above test, admittedly, the

allegations made in the FIR, nowhere disclose that the applicants 57 apl 849.25.odt..odt

were incharge of the business entity and looking after day-to-day

business and they were actively participated in the business

activities. In absence of any material against them, vicarious

liability would not be attracted against them merely because they

are the Directors or the employee as the vicarious liability of the

Director cannot be impugned automatically.

20. In view of that this is a fit case wherein the powers

under Section 482 of the Code can be exercised.

21. Hence, I proceed to pass the following order:-

ORDER

(i) The Criminal Application is allowed.

(ii) The First Information Report in connection with

crime No.124/2018 registered at Police Station Gadge Nagar

District Amravati for the offences punishable under Sections

77(b), 78(e), 79, 82, 83 and 90 of the Maharashtra

Prohibition Act, 1949 (for short, 'the Act of 1949') and the

consequent proceeding arising out of the same bearing SCC

No.4489/2021 pending in the Court of 5th Joint Civil Judge,

Junior Division and Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, 57 apl 849.25.odt..odt

Amravati is quashed and set aside against the present

applicants.

22. The criminal application stands disposed of in

the above said terms.

Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

(URMILA JOSHI PHALKE, J.)

manisha

Signed by: Mrs. Manisha Shewale Designation: PA To Honourable Judge Date: 27/03/2026 14:43:48