Anjuman Tarraqui-E-Ttaleem, Through ... vs The State Information Commissioner, ...
2026 Latest Caselaw 2532 Bom

Bombay High Court

Anjuman Tarraqui-E-Ttaleem, Through ... vs The State Information Commissioner, ... on 11 March, 2026

Author: Amit Borkar

Bench: Amit Borkar

2026:BHC-AS:11989
                                                                                         59-wp-11447-2012.doc


                              Shabnoor
                                         IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                                 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                                    WRIT PETITION NO.11447 OF 2012

                              Anjuman Tarraqui - E - Taleem,
                              Through Secretary
                              Ansari Md. Ibrahim Abdul Khalique             ... Petitioner
                                          V/s.
                              The State Information Commissioner,
                              Nashik Bench Ors.                             ... Respondents
      SHABNOOR
      AYUB
      PATHAN
       Digitally signed by
       SHABNOOR AYUB
       PATHAN
                              Mr. Sandeep Waghmare, for the Petitioner.
       Date: 2026.03.11
       19:08:22 +0530
                              Mr. A. I. Patel, Addl. GP with Ms. V. S. Nimbalkar, AGP,
                              for the State - Respondent Nos.1, 2 and 4.


                                                             CORAM    : AMIT BORKAR, J.

                                                             DATED    : MARCH 11, 2026
                              P.C.:

                              1.      Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith.

2. The challenge raised in the present petition arises from an order passed by the authorities functioning under the provisions of the Right to Information Act, 2005. By the said order, the concerned authority has directed the petitioner-Trust to furnish certain information which had been sought by respondent No. 3 by invoking the provisions of the said enactment. The petitioner has approached this Court questioning the legality and correctness of that direction.

3. It is not in dispute that respondent No. 3 had submitted an application seeking certain information relating to the affairs and

59-wp-11447-2012.doc

functioning of the petitioner-Trust. The request was made under the mechanism provided by the Right to Information Act. The authority dealing with the application proceeded on the assumption that the petitioner-Trust was amenable to the provisions of the said Act. On that basis, the authority concluded that the information demanded by respondent No. 3 was liable to be furnished and accordingly issued directions to the petitioner to supply the said information.

4. The petitioner, however, contends that such a direction proceeds on an incorrect legal premise. According to the petitioner, before directing disclosure of information, it was necessary for the authority to first determine whether the petitioner-Trust falls within the category of entities which are subject to the obligations created by the Right to Information Act. The grievance of the petitioner is that this basic jurisdictional issue was not properly appreciated by the authority while passing the impugned order.

5. The principal contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that the petitioner-Trust cannot be treated as a "public authority" within the meaning of the provisions of the Right to Information Act. It is urged that the scheme of the Act makes its obligations applicable only to those bodies which satisfy the statutory definition of "public authority". Unless an institution answers that description, the authorities functioning under the Act would have no jurisdiction to compel such an institution to disclose information.

59-wp-11447-2012.doc

6. In support of this submission, reliance has been placed upon the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in People Welfare Society vs. State Information Commissioner, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 716. Learned counsel for the petitioner has invited attention to paragraph 35 of the said judgment, where the Full Bench has examined in detail the scope of the expression "public authority" occurring in the Right to Information Act. The Full Bench has clarified that merely because an institution governed by a Trust receives grants or financial assistance from the State, such circumstance by itself would not automatically render the Trust a "public authority" within the meaning of the Act.

7. The Full Bench has emphasized that the definition contained in the Act requires the existence of certain specific elements such as ownership, control, or substantial financing by the appropriate Government. Unless those requirements are clearly satisfied, a private Trust cannot be compelled to act as a public authority under the Act. The principle emerging from the said decision is that the mere receipt of grants or aid does not alter the essential character of a private Trust so as to bring it within the statutory framework of the Right to Information Act.

8. Applying the above principle to the facts of the present case, it becomes necessary to examine whether the petitioner-Trust satisfies the statutory requirements which would bring it within the fold of a "public authority". On the material placed before this Court, it is not shown that the petitioner-Trust is owned or controlled by the Government. There is also no material indicating that the Trust is substantially financed in such a manner that it

59-wp-11447-2012.doc

would fall within the statutory definition. In absence of such foundational elements, the petitioner-Trust cannot be compelled to discharge obligations which the statute imposes only upon public authorities.

9. Once the legal position clarified by the Full Bench is kept in view, the impugned order passed by the authorities under the Right to Information Act cannot be sustained. The direction requiring the petitioner-Trust to furnish information is founded upon the assumption that the petitioner is a public authority. As discussed above, such an assumption is not supported by the legal principles laid down by the Full Bench of this Court.

10. When a binding precedent of this Court clearly explains the scope of the statutory definition, the authorities exercising powers under the Act are expected to apply that principle while determining whether the Act is applicable to a particular institution. If the institution does not fall within the statutory definition, the authorities cannot extend the reach of the Act by issuing directions which the statute itself does not contemplate.

11. In the present matter, the impugned order overlooks the limitation placed by the statutory scheme as interpreted by the Full Bench. Consequently, the order suffers from a fundamental legal infirmity. In such circumstances, interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction becomes necessary in order to correct the error apparent on the face of the record. For these reasons, the impugned order cannot be sustained in law.

12. Rule is therefore made absolute in terms of prayer clause (a).

59-wp-11447-2012.doc

13. In view of the above discussion and findings, the writ petition stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

14. There shall be no order as to costs.

(AMIT BORKAR, J.)