[Cites 11, Cited by 0]
Bombay High Court
Gaurav Bidre vs State Of Goa Through Public Prosecutor ... on 8 January, 2026
2026:BHC-GOA:15
2026:BHC-GOA:15
CRMAB66 OF 2025
Vinita
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
CRIMINAL APPLICATION (BAIL) NO.66 OF 2025
GAURAV BIDRE ...APPLICANT.
VS
STATE OF GOA THROUGH
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
AND OTHER ...RESPONDENTS.
Mr. Sangram Desai, Mr Rohan Dessai, Ms Janhavi Dudhwadkar,
Ms Sanjana Desai, Ms Arya Parikar and Ms Ashwini Bandekar,
Advocates for the Applicant/Appellant.
Mr Shailendra G. Bhobe, Public Prosecutor for Respondent nos.1
and 2.
Mr L. Raghunandan, Advocate through VC for the Respondent no.3
under Legal Aid.
CORAM:- SHREERAM V. SHIRSAT, J.
DATED:- 8th January2026
P.C.:
1. This is the fourth application for Bail filed by the Applicant
before this Court, who has been charged for the offences under
section 365, 342, 302 and 201 of the IPC. The earlier bail
application has been rejected by this court on 6/11/2023 after
taking into consideration the material on record in the chargesheet.
The second bail application was filed on the ground that the trial is
CRMAB66 OF 2025
not progressing and no trial programme is fixed. The said
application was withdrawn vide order dated 23/4/2024 with
liberty to move the bail application before the trial court on the
aforestated grounds.
2. Thereafter the Applicant filed an application for bail before
the trial court and even the witnesses were being examined before
the trial court. It is informed to the Court that till date 4 witnesses
have been examined.
3. This Court vide order dated 6/11/23 has rejected the bail
application after taking into consideration the merits of the case
and therefore in the absence of any change in circumstances, as far
as merits of the case are concerned, this application cannot be
entertained on the same grounds.
4. The second contention raised by the Ld. Counsel for the
Applicant is that the Applicant is in custody since 24/6/22 and that
there is delay in conducting the trial, which infringes his
fundamental right to speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of
the Constitution of India and therefore on this count itself the
applicant deserves to be released on bail. The Ld. Counsel has
further submitted that expediting trial is not the option, but if the
trial is going to take a long time to conclude than the accused has
to be released on bail
CRMAB66 OF 2025
5. In support of the contention, the Ld. Counsel for the
applicant has relied upon the following authorities.
6. In Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh V/s State of
Maharashtra and another in Criminal Appeal No. 2787 of
2024, wherein it is observed as under:
"18 Criminals are not born out but
made. The human potential in everyone
is good and so, never write off any
criminal as " beyond redemption.
This humanist fundamental is often
missed when dealing with delinquents,
juvenile and adult. Indeed, every saint
has a past and every sinner a future.
When a crime is committed, a variety of
factors is responsible for making the
offender commit the crime. Those
factors may be social and economic,
may
be, the result of value erosion or
parental neglect; may be, because of the
stress of circumstances, or the
manifestation of temptations in a milieu
of affluence contrasted with indigence
or other privations."
"19 If the State or any prosecuting
agency including the court concerned
has no wherewithal to provide or
protect the fundamental right of an
accused to have a speedy trial as
enshrined under Article 21 of the
Constitution then the State or any other
prosecuting agency should not oppose
the plea for bail on the ground that the
crime committed is serious. Article 21 of
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the Constitution applies irrespective of
the nature of the crime."
Rup Bahadur Magar @ Sanki @
Rabin V/s State of West Bengal in
Criminal Appeal No. 4144 of 2024,
wherein it is held by the Apex Court that:
"We have repeatedly observed that while
rejecting bail applications, the High
Courts are passing the orders directing
disposal of trials within a time schedule.
Apart from the fact that such directions
are contrary to the law laid down by the
Constitution Bench in the case of High
Court Bar Association, Allahabad vs.
State of U.P. & Ors.1, such orders put
undue pressure on the Trial Courts which
are already flooded with a lot of work.
Unless the factual situation is extra
ordinary and exceptional, the High
Courts should refrain from passing such
orders, as held by the Constitution Bench
in the
aforesaid judgment."
7. The Ld. Counsel for the Intervener has submitted that the
offence is very serious and there is an apprehension that if the
Applicant is released on bail, he may coerce or pressurise the
witnesses and therefore prayed that the bail application be
rejected. He has further submitted that apart from the period of
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incarceration there are other factors such as gravity of the offence,
propensity of the offender which also needs to be taken into
consideration. The Ld. Counsel also submitted that there is one
another criminal case pending against the Applicant under section
354, 354(a) and 509 IPC. In support of the contention, the Ld.
Counsel has relied upon following judgments :
Kalyan Chandra Sarkar V/s Rajesh Ranjan alias
Pappu Yadav and another reported in (2004) 7
Supreme Court Cases 528, wherein it is held that:
"14. We have already noticed from the
arguments of learned counsel for the
appellant that the present accused had
earlier made seven applications for grant
of bail which were rejected by the High
Court and some such rejections have been
affirmed by this Court also. It is seen from
the records that when the fifth application
for grant of bail was allowed by the High
Court, the same was challenged before this
Court and this Court accepted the said
challenge by allowing the appeal filed by
the Union of India and another and
cancelled the bail granted by the High
Court as per the order of this Court made in
Criminal Appeal No. 745 of 2001 dated 25-
7-2001. While cancelling the said bail this
Court specifically held that the fact that the
present accused was in custody for more
than one year (at that time) and the further
fact that while rejecting an earlier
application, the High Court had given
liberty to renew the bail application in
future, were not grounds envisaged under
Section 437(1)(i) of the Code. This Court
CRMAB66 OF 2025
also in specific terms held that the condition
laid down under Section 437(1)(i) is sine
qua non for granting bail even under
Section 439 of the Code. In the impugned
order it is noticed that the High Court has
given the period of incarceration already
undergone by the accused and the
unlikelihood of trial concluding in the near
future as grounds sufficient to enlarge the
accused on bail, in spite of the fact that the
accused stands charged of offences
punishable with life imprisonment or even
death penalty. In such cases, in our opinion,
the mere fact that the accused has
undergone certain period of
incarceration (three years in this
case) by itself would not entitle the
accused to being enlarged on bail, nor
the fact that the trial is not likely to be
concluded in the near future either by
itself or coupled with the period of
incarceration would be sufficient for
enlarging the appellant on bail when
the gravity of the offence alleged is
severe and there are allegations of
tampering with the witnesses by the accused
during the period he was on bail."
"21. For the reasons stated above, we are of
the considered opinion that the High Court
was not justified in granting bail to the first
respondent on the ground that he has been
in custody for a period of 3 1/2 years or that
there is no likelihood of the trial being
concluded in the near future, without
taking into consideration the other factors
referred to hereinabove in this judgment of
ours."
CRMAB66 OF 2025
Rajesh Ranjan Yadav alias Pappu Yadav V/s
CBI through its Director, reported in (2007) 1
Supreme Court Cases 70, wherein it is held as under:
"10. In our opinion none of the aforesaid
decisions can be said to have laid down
any absolute and unconditional rule
about when bail should be granted by the
Court and when it should not. It all
depends on the facts and circumstances
of each case and it cannot be said that
there is any absolute rule that because a
long period of imprisonment has expired
bail must necessarily be granted."
8. The Ld. PP has submitted that this bail application should not
be entertained as earlier this court has rejected the bail application
on merits and that there is no inordinate delay in conducting the
trial. He submitted that the trial court is taking efforts to adhere to
the trial programme that has been fixed. He has relied upon the
following judgment to buttress his submissions that delay in trial
though regrettable is not by itself a ground for bail in cases
involving grave and serious offences, particularly where the
evidence links the accused to the commission of crime. The Ld. PP
has relied upon the following judgment in support of his
contention.
CRMAB66 OF 2025
Vishan Singh V/s State of NCT of Delhi in Bail
Application No. 2100/2025, wherein it is observed as under:
" 4. The right to speedy trial, though a valuable
constitutional protection under Article 21, cannot be
stretched to a point where it overshadows the overwhelming
circumstances of guilt that stand against the accused at this
stage. Delay in trial, though regrettable, is not by itself a
ground for bail in cases involving grave and heinous
offences, particularly where the evidence links the accused
to the commission of the crime. It is well settled that though
bail is the rule and jail an exception, the nature and gravity
of the offence, the role attributed to the accused and the
societal impact of releasing an accused charged with
heinous offences are relevant considerations which cannot
be overlooked."
9. I have heard respective counsels and have also gone through
the authorities relied upon by them.
10. There cannot be any doubt about the authorities relied and
the propositions canvased by the applicant, that there is right to
speedy trial which is a fundamental right. However, here it is not
the case where trial has not commenced at all and that there is no
CRMAB66 OF 2025
possibility of trial concluding in the near future. The trial court,
with other matters on the board to deal with, is making a steady
headway in the trial and has so far examined 4 witnesses and a trial
program is also on record now, which is filed with the consent of
the Ld. Counsel for the Applicant, Ld. Public Prosecutor and under
the guidance of and in consultation with the presiding judge of trial
court where the trial is pending. The trial programme mentions the
schedule of dates as to when the witnesses would be examined and
how many witnesses will be examined. Therefore, now there is a
definitive trial program outlined.
11. The Ld. Counsel for the applicant is apprehensive that there
would be an inordinate delay in concluding the trial and the trial
may not proceed as per the schedule mentioned in the trial
program. However, such presumptions need not be made now at
this stage when the trial court is taking pains to examine the
witnesses and proceed with the trial. No doubt as per the roznama,
earlier the trial was not progressing at a fast pace and there was no
clarity as to when the trial would get over. However, without going
into the details of the roznama to find out who is responsible for the
delay, now with the trial programme placed on record, there is a
fair assessment as to when the trial is likely to get over considering
the number of witnesses required to be examined.
CRMAB66 OF 2025
12. It also needs to be mentioned that sufficient and proper
opportunity is also required to be given to the trial court to conduct
trial in a fair manner and not to put fetters and hasten up just to
conclude the trial which can be detrimental, both to the prosecution
as well as to the defence. The offence with which the applicant is
charged is a serious offence and therefore adequate opportunity
needs to be given to the trial court as well, to conduct the trial in a
proper manner. It would have been a different case, if the trial
would not have commenced till date and no witnesses would have
been examined, which is not the case, as the prosecution has
examined 4 witnesses, albeit delay. It cannot be said that there is
an absolute rule that because there is a long period of incarceration,
bail must necessarily be granted, especially in a serious offence like
the present one with which the applicant has been charged.
13. I have also gone through the authorities relied upon by the
respective counsels. In the case of Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v
State of Maharashtra, (supra) the facts were such that the
appellant in that case was in jail for a period of 4 years and even the
charge was not framed and there were not less than 80 witnesses
which were cited by the prosecution to be examined. It was on this
backdrop that the Hon'ble Apex Court had expressed concerned as
to when the trial would be concluded. The facts of the present case
CRMAB66 OF 2025
are different as here the trial has commenced and there is a trial
schedule fixed and therefore this ruling will not be of any avail to
the Applicant. The other judgment relied by the Ld. Counsel for the
Applicant can also be distinguished on the facts of the case where
the Apex court was inclined to grant bail as there were no
antecedents. The authorities relied upon by the Ld. Counsel for the
Intervener and the Ld. Prosecutor are apt to the facts of the case.
14. In view of the above, the bail application stands rejected and
the trial court is directed to adhere to the trial program, which has
been filed on record with the consent of the Ld. Counsel for the
Applicant, Ld. PP and the trial court. The Applicant as well the
Prosecution is directed to co-operate with the trial court to adhere
to the trial programme and if there is proper co-operation from the
parties there is no reason why the trial will not proceed as per the
trial program and conclude within stipulated period.
15. Bail application is disposed of.
SHREERAM V. SHIRSAT,J.
