Bombay High Court
Somnath Dattatraya Kanse vs Honble Minister For Rural Development ... on 17 September, 2025
Author: N.J. Jamadar
Bench: N.J. Jamadar
2025:BHC-AS:38708
Varsha wp-6254-2025.doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 6254 OF 2025
Somnath Dattatraya Kanse }
Age-44 years, Occu: Social Service }
Gram Panchayat, Jawalarjun, }
Taluka-Purandar, Dist-Pune. } .....Petitioner
V/s.
1. Hon'ble Minister for Rural }
Development, State of Maharashtra, }
having office at Mantralaya,
Mumbai.
2. Divisional Commissioner, Pune }
Division, Pune. }
3. Chief Executive Officer, }
VARSHA Zilla Parishad, Pune. }
DEEPAK
GAIKWAD 4. Appasaheb Maruti Rane }
Digitally signed by
VARSHA DEEPAK
GAIKWAD
Date: 2025.09.17
Age- Adult, Occu: Social Service }
19:25:47 +0530
Gram Panchayat, Jawalarjun, Tal- }
Purandar, Dist-Pune. }
5. Pratibha Nilesh Rane }
Age-Adult, Occu: Social Service, }
Gram Panchayat, Jawalarjun, }
Taluka-Purandar, Dist-Pune }
6. Sheetal Satish Salunkhe }
Age-Adult, Occu: Social Service, }
Gram Panchayat, Jawalarjun, }
Taluka-Purandar, Dist-Pune }
7. Sangita Shivaji Tekawade }
Age-Adult, Occu: Social Service, }
Gram Panchayat, Jawalarjun, } ......Respondents
Taluka-Purandar, Dist-Pune }
-------------------
Mr. Chetan Patil, for the petitioner.
1 of 22
::: Uploaded on - 17/09/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 17/09/2025 21:33:16 :::
Varsha wp-6254-2025.doc
Ms. Dhruti Kapadia, AGP, for the State/Respondent Nos. 1 and 2.
Mr. C.G. Gavnekar with Rohit Parab I.by Mr. Pratik Deshmukh, for the
respondent nos. 4, 5 and 6.
---------------------
CORAM : N.J. JAMADAR, J.
DATED : 17TH SEPTEMBER 2025
JUDGMENT:
1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and, with the consent
of the counsel for the parties, heard finally.
2. The petitioner takes exception to a judgment and order
dated 28th April 2025 passed by the Minister, Rural Development, in
Appeal No. 5 of 2023, whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner
under Section 39(3) of the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1959
(the Act, 1959) against the judgment and order passed by the
Divisional Commissioner, Pune Division, Pune, dated 30 th October
2024, thereby removing the petitioner from the office of the Sarpanch
of the Village Panchayat, Javalarjun, Tal-Purandar, District-Pune under
Section 39(1) of the Act, 1959, came to be dismissed by affirming the
said order of removal dated 30th October 2024.
3. The background facts necessary for the determination of
this petition can be stated, in brief, as under:
3.1 The petitioner was elected as a Sarpanch of the village
2 of 22
Varsha wp-6254-2025.doc
Javalarjun, on 10th February 2021, for a term of five years. The
respondent nos. 4 to 7 lodged a Village Panchayat dispute with
the Divisional Commissioner, Pune, purportedly under Section
39(1) of the Act, 1959 for removal of the petitioner from the
office of the Sarpanch of the Village Panchayat alleging various
acts of misconduct, disgraceful conduct or negligence in the
performance of duties.
3.2 In accordance with the provisions contained in the proviso
to sub-Section (1) of Section 39, the Chief Executive Officer was
directed to conduct an enquiry and submit a report to the
Divisional Commissioner. Accordingly, an inquiry report was
submitted on 29th October 2022.
3.3 The Divisional Commissioner, by a judgment and order
dated 13th January 2023, allowed the dispute filed by the
respondent nos. 4 to 7 and the petitioner was removed from the
post of Sarpanch. As the appeal thereagainst also failed, the
petitioner had filed a Writ Petition, being Writ Petition No. 9544
of 2023.
3.4 By a judgment and order dated 11th March 2024, in the
said Writ Petition and the connected matters, this Court set aside
3 of 22
Varsha wp-6254-2025.doc
the order passed by the Divisional Commissioner, and the matter
came to be remitted back to the Divisional Commissioner.
3.5 Post remand, the Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad,
Pune, conducted a fresh enquiry and submitted a report to the
Divisional Commissioner on 17th October 2024. Out of the four
heads of indictment, the Chief Executive Officer found that the
first count i.e. holding the meeting of the Gramsabha without a
proper quorum, and the fourth count i.e. failure of the petitioner
to spend the funds sanctioned for the development of the village,
were established.
3.6 On the first count, the Chief Executive Officer found that
the quorum for the Gramsabha was 100, and, yet, on 26 th
January 2022, Gramsabha was held by the petitioner and the
Secretary of the village panchayat though only 97 members
were present. Thus, the meeting of the Gramsabha and the
conduct of the business therein was in violation of the rules. On
the fourth count, the Chief Executive Officer noted that the
petitioner had declined to sign a cheque which was to be drawn
for the payment of the expenses incurred for repairs of the water
purifier. Explanation of the petitioner that he declined to put
4 of 22
Varsha wp-6254-2025.doc
signature on the cheque, as there was no sanction order of the
then Administrator of the Village Panchayat, was found
unacceptable.
3.7 After perusal of the aforesaid report and the material on
record, the Divisional Commissioner returned the finding that
the aforesaid acts and omissions amounted to misconduct within
the meaning of Section 39(1) of the Act, 1959 and, therefore,
the petitioner was required to be removed from the post of
Sarpanch of the village Panchayat. Thus, by the impugned order,
the petitioner was removed from the said post, and he was
declared ineligible for the election as Sarpanch during the
remainder of the term of the Village panchayat.
3.8 Being aggrieved, the petitioner preferred an appeal, being
Appeal No. 5 of 2023, before the State Government under
Section 39(3) of the Act, 1959. By the impugned order, the
Minister, Rural Development, was persuaded to dismiss the
appeal. The Minister concurred with the view of the Divisional
Commissioner.
4. Being further aggrieved, the petitioner has invoked the writ
jurisdiction.
5 of 22
Varsha wp-6254-2025.doc
5. On 7th May 2025, while issuing notice, this Court was
persuaded to grant ad-interim relief in terms of the prayer clause (d),
thereby restraining the respondent nos. 1 and 2 from holding election
to the post of member of the panchayat, on which the petitioner was
elected.
6. I have heard Mr.Chetan Patil, the learned counsel for the
petitioner, Ms. Dhruti Kapadia, learned AGP, for the respondent nos. 1
and 2, and Mr. Gavnekar, the learned counsel for the respondent nos. 4
to 6, at some length. With the assistance of learned counsel for the
parties, I have also perused the material on record.
7. Mr. Chetan Patil, the learned counsel for the petitioner,
took a slew of exceptions to the impugned order. First and foremost,
according to Mr. Patil, the impugned order suffer from the vice of non-
application of mind. The Appellate Authority has simply reproduced
the contentions of the parties and thereafter reiterated the view of the
Divisional Commissioner, without evaluating and analysing the legality
and correctness of the order passed by the Divisional Commissioner.
On this count alone, according to Mr. Patil, the impugned order
deserves to be quashed and set aside.
8. Secondly, Mr. Patil would urge, the perusal of the inquiry
6 of 22
Varsha wp-6254-2025.doc
report of the Chief Executive Officer dated 17th October 2024, indicates
that the Chief Executive Officer has recorded contradictory findings of
facts as regards the number of members who were present in the
Gramsabha held on 26th January 2022. An endeavour was made by Mr.
Patil to compare and contrast the said enquiry report dated 17 th
October 2024 with the earlier enquiry report dated 28 th October 2022.
9. Thirdly, Mr. Patil would submit that even if the report of the
Chief Executive Officer is taken at par, yet, no case of misconduct or
disgraceful conduct warranting the removal of an elected
representative from the office of the Sarpanch can be said to have been
made out.
10. On the first count of holding the meeting of the
Gramsabha, without the requisite quorum, Mr. Patil would urge, the
report would indicate that there were more than 100 members present,
and, even otherwise, the said act can be termed as a mere irregularity
and not misconduct. In regard to the second count failure to spend the
funds for the development work, especially the refusal of the petitioner
to sign the cheque for the work sanctioned while the Village Panchayat
was under control of the Administrator, the Chief Executive Officer
found the explanation to be sustainable, and, yet, the petitioner was
7 of 22
Varsha wp-6254-2025.doc
removed from the post of Sarpanch, submitted Mr. Patil.
11. Ms. Dhruti Kapadia, the learned AGP, stoutly supported the
impugned order. It was submitted that, in Para No. 7 of the impugned
order, the Minister has ascribed justifiable reasons. Therefore, it cannot
be said that the impugned order is bereft of reasons. As the petitioner
was provided an effective opportunity of hearing by both the Divisional
Commissioner as well as the Minister and the authorities have passed
the reasoned orders, according to Ms. Kapadia, those orders are not
amenable for interference in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction.
12. Mr. Gavnekar, the learned counsel for the respondent nos. 4
to 7, supplemented the submissions of Ms. Kapadia. Mr. Gavnekar
would urge with tenacity that, this Court is called upon to exercise
corrective jurisdiction. The scope of interference in the exercise of the
supervisory jurisdiction is extremely limited. An incorrect decision on
facts cannot be corrected by this Court in exercise of the writ
jurisdiction. Since the authorities under the Act, 1959 have recorded
concurrent findings of facts against the petitioner, and those orders
cannot be said to be sans material or perverse, this Court would not be
justified in interfering with the impugned orders, was the thrust of the
submission of Mr. Gavenekar.
8 of 22
Varsha wp-6254-2025.doc
13. Mr. Gavnekar would further urge that the endeavour of Mr.
Patil to compare and contrast the enquiry report submitted by the
Chief Executive Officer on 17th October 2024 and 28th October 2022, in
the first round, cannot be countenanced, as the matter was remitted
back to the Divisional Commissioner for a fresh decision by order
passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 9544 of 2023 and the
connected matters. Earlier report thus stood completely effaced for all
intent and purpose.
14. Mr. Gavnekar would urge that, in the peculiar facts of the
case, the acts and omissions attributed to the petitioner do constitute
misconduct within the meaning of Section 39 (1) (i) of the Act, 1959
as the said concept takes colour from the context. To this end, Mr.
Gavnekar, placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in the case of
'Sandip Ramesh KhidbideVs Pratima Prakash Gaikar and Ors' 1.
15. The aforesaid submissions now fall for consideration.
16. Before adverting to appreciate the submissions, it may be
opposite to note the provisions contained in Section 39 of the Act
1959, which envisage the removal of any member, Sarpanch or Upa-
Sarpanch of Village Panchayat. It reads as under:
9 of 22
Varsha wp-6254-2025.doc
39. Removal from office. - [(1) The Commissioner may,-
(i)remove from office any member or any Sarpanch or Upa-
Sarpanch who has been guilty of misconduct in the discharge of
his duties, or of any disgraceful conduct, or of neglect of or
incapacity to perform his duty, or is persistently remiss in the
discharge thereof. A Sarpanch or an Upa-Sarpanch so removed
may at the discretion of the Commissioner also be removed from
the panchayat', or
............
Provided that, no such person shall be removed from office
unless, in case of clause (i), the Chief Executive Officer or in
case of clause (ii), the Deputy Chief Executive Officer as directed
by the Chief Executive Officer; under the orders of the
Commissioner, holds an inquiry after giving due notice to the
panchayat and the person concerned; and the person concerned
has been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard and
thereafter the Chief Executive Officer or, as the case may- be, the
Deputy Chief Executive Officer concerned, through the Chief
Executive Officer, submits his report to the Commissioner. The
inquiry officer shall submit his report within a period of one
month:
Provided further that, the Commissioner shall, after giving the
person concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard, take
a decision on the report submitted by the Chief Executive Officer
or, as the case may be, the Deputy Chief Executive Officer,
within a period of one month from the date of receipt thereof.]
[(1A) Where a person is removed from office of the Sarpanch or
Upa-Sarpanch, he shall not be eligible for re-election as
Sarpanch or Upa-Sarpanch during the remainder of the term of
office of members of the panchayat.]
[(2) The Commissioner may subject to like condition disqualify
for a period of not exceeding [six years], any person who has
resigned his office as a member, Sarpanch or Upa-Sarpanch and
has been guilty of the acts and omissions specified in sub-section
(1).
(3) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Commissioner
under sub-section (1) or (2) may, within a period of fifteen days
from the date of the receipt of such order, appeal to the State
Government and the Government shall decide the appeal within
a period of one month from the date of receipt thereof.]
10 of 22
Varsha wp-6254-2025.doc
17. The phraseology of aforesaid Section indicates that the
Commissioner is empowered to remove from office a member or
Sarpanch or Upa-Sarpanch, who has been found guilty of misconduct
in the discharge of his duties, or of any disgraceful conduct, or of
neglect of or incapacity to perform his duty, or is persistently remiss in
the discharge thereof. After specifying the grounds on which a member,
Sarpanch or Upa-Sarpanch can be removed from the office, the first
and second proviso to sub-Section (1) envisage a two-stage inquiry.
Under the first proviso, the Chief Executive Officer or the Deputy Chief
Executive Officer, as the case may be, has to hold an inquiry after
giving due notice to the Panchayat and the person concerned; the
latter is entitled to a reasonable opportunity of hearing. Post such
inquiry, the Chief Executive Officer has to submit a report to the
Divisional Commissioner.
18. Under the second proviso, the Divisional Commissioner, in
turn, is enjoined to again afford a reasonable opportunity of hearing to
the person to whom the notice of removal was given and against
whom a report has been submitted by the Chief Executive Officer. Only
after such inquiry, the Divisional Commissioner is empowered to take a
decision on the report submitted by the Chief Executive Officer.
11 of 22
Varsha wp-6254-2025.doc
19. Sub Section (1-A) prescribes the disqualifications which
the order of removal may entail. Sub Section (2) empowers the
Commissioner to disqualify the person who has resigned from the
office as a member, Sarpanch or Upa-Sarpanch for a period not
exceeding six years if such person has been found guilty of acts and
omissions specified in Sub Section (1). Under sub Section (3) of
Section 39, any person aggrieved by an order passed by Commissioner
under Sub Sections (1) and (2) may prefer an Appeal to the State
Government.
20. In a sense, Section 39 of the Act, 1959 is a self contained
Code in the matter of removal of a person from the office of member,
Sarpanch or Upa-Sarpanch of Village Panchayat. Grounds on which a
person can be removed from those offices have been specified. A
mechanism of holding an inquiry after affording a reasonable
opportunity of hearing has been prescribed. Decision of the Divisional
Commissioner is amenable to an Appeal before the State Government.
21. The Act, however, does not define the terms, "misconduct",
"disgraceful conduct", or "neglect", which are used in Clause (I) of Sub
Section (1) of Section 39 of the Act, 1959. These expressions take color
from the context of the duties which a member, Sarpanch or Upa-
12 of 22
Varsha wp-6254-2025.doc
Sarpanch has to perform under the provisions of the Act, 1959.
Whether a particular act or omission would amount to misconduct,
disgraceful conduct or neglect would turn upon the facts of a given
case.
22. A profitable reference in this context can be made to the
three bench judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of 'State of
Punjab and Ors Vs. Ram Singh Ex. Constable 2, wherein the import of
the term "misconduct" was expounded with reference to the definition
in the Black's Law Dictionary and P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Law Lexi-con.
The observations in Paragraph Nos. 5 and 6 are material and hence
extracted below:
5. Misconduct has been defined in Black's Law, Dictionary, Sixth
Edition at page 999 thus :
.. "A transgression of some established an definite rule
of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful
behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior, its
synonyms are misdemeanor, misdeed, misbehavior, delinquency,
impropriety, mismanagement, offence but notnegligence or care-
lessness."
Misconduct in office has been defined as :
.."Any unlawful behavior by a public officer in relation to the
duties of his office, willful in character. The term embraces acts
which the office holder had no right to perform, acts performed
improperly, and failure to act in the face of an affirmative duty
to act."
2 JT 1992 (4) S.C. 253
13 of 22
Varsha wp-6254-2025.doc
P. Ramanatha Aiyar's the Law Lexicon, Reprint Edition
1987 at p.821 `misconduct' defines thus:-
"The term misconduct implies a wrongful intention, and
not a mere error of judgment. Misconduct is not necessarily the
same thing as conduct involving moral turpitude. The word
misconduct is a relative term, and has to be construed with
reference to the subject matter and the context wherein the term
occurs, having regard to the scope of the Act or statute which is
being construed. Misconduct literally means wrong conduct or
improper conduct. In usual parlance, misconduct means a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
where no discretion if left, except what necessity may demand
and carelessness, negligence and unskilfulness are transgressions
of some established, but indefinite, rule of action, where some
discretion is necessarily left to the actor. Misconduct is a
violation of definite law; carelessness or abuse of discretion
under an indefinite law. Misconduct is a forbidden act;
carelessness, a forbidden quality of an act, and is necessarily
indefinite. Misconduct in office may be defined as unlawful
behaviour or neglect by a public officer, by which the rights of a
party have been affected."
6. Thus it could be seen that the word `misconduct' though not
capable of precise definition, on reflection receives its
connotation from the context, the delinquency in its
performance and its effect on the discipline and the nature of
the duty. It may involve moral turpitude, it must be improper or
wrong behaviour; unlawful behaviour, willful in character;
forbidden act, a transgression of established and definite rule of
action or code of conduct but not mere error of judgment,
carelessness or negligence in performance of the duty; the act
complained of bears forbidden quality or character. Its ambit has
to be construed with reference to the subject matter and the
context wherein the term occurs, regard being had to the scope
of the statute and the public purpose it seeks to serve........"
(emphasis supplied)
23. While appreciating the crucial aspect as to whether the acts
14 of 22
Varsha wp-6254-2025.doc
and omissions attributed to the petitioner constitute "misconduct"
within the meaning of Section 39(1) (i) of the Act, 1959, the Court
has to be also sensitive to the fact that an elected representative cannot
be permitted to be removed from the office on tenuous grounds. The
statutory requirement must be strictly fulfilled. Undoubtedly, if
misconduct or disgraceful conduct is proved, an elected representative
must be removed from the office lest public interest would be severely
jeopardized. At the same time, it is necessary to bear in mind that the
removal of an elected office bearer not only entails civil consequences
for the said person but the electoral college such person represents is
also deprived of representation in the local self governing body /
legislature by a person of their choice. It is, therefore, imperative that
the grounds of removal or disqualification are clearly established and
the procedure prescribed in the governing statute is scrupulously
followed before an elected office bearer is removed from his office. The
decision making process has to be in conformity with the principles of
natural justice and the person concerned must get an efficacious
opportunity to meet the indictment.
24. A profitable reference in this context can be made to a
three Judge bench judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of 'Nisar
15 of 22
Varsha wp-6254-2025.doc
Ahmad Ibrahim Khan Vs. Deolali Cantonment Board and Ors' 3.
wherein the Supreme Court postulated the law as under:
"14. There is no common law of elections. The proceedings calling
in question the validity of an election are purely statutory
proceedings. An election contest is not an action at law or a suit in
equity, but is purely a statutory proceeding unknown to the
common law and that the Court possess no common law power. It
is trite proposition that in such proceedings statutory requirements
must strictly be established. It is also well settled that the success
of a candidate who has won at an election should not be lightly
interfered with."
(emphasis supplied)
25. In the case of 'Ravi Yashwant Bhoir Vs. District Collector,
Raigad and Ors' 4, the Supreme Court highlighted the care and caution
that is required to be observed while removing an elected office bearer
from the office and the jurisprudential foundation for such
circumspection, in the following words :
...." 34. In a democratic institution, like ours, the incumbent is
entitled to hold the office for the term for which he has been
elected unless his election is set aside by a prescribed procedure
known to law or he is removed by the procedure established
under law. The proceedings for removal must satisfy the
requirement of natural justice and the decision must show that
the authority has applied its mind to the allegations made and the
explanation furnished by the elected office bearer sought to be
removed.
35. The elected official is accountable to its electorate because he
is being elected by a large number of voters. His removal has
serious repercussions as he is removed from the post and declared
disqualified to contest the elections for a further stipulated period,
3 1987 (Supp) SCC 562
4 (2012) 4 SCC 407
16 of 22
Varsha wp-6254-2025.doc
but it also takes away the right of the people of his constituency to
be represented by him. Undoubtedly, the right to hold such a post
is statutory and no person can claim any absolute or vested right
to the post, but he cannot be removed without strictly adhering to
the provisions provided by the legislature for his removal (Vide:
Jyoti Basu & Ors. v. Debi Ghosal & Ors., AIR 1982 SC 983; Mohan
Lal Tripathi v. District Magistrate, Rai Barelly & Ors., AIR 1993 SC
2042; and Ram Beti etc. etc. v. District Panchayat Rajadhikari &
Ors., AIR 1998 SC 1222).
36. In view of the above, the law on the issue stands crystallized
to the effect that an elected member can be removed in
exceptional circumstances giving strict adherence to the statutory
provisions and holding the enquiry, meeting the requirement of
principles of natural justice and giving an incumbent an
opportunity to defend himself, for the reason that removal of an
elected person casts stigma upon him and takes away his valuable
statutory right. Not only the elected office bearer but his
constituency/electoral college is also deprived of representation
by the person of his choice.
37. A duly elected person is entitled to hold office for the term
for which he has been elected and he can be removed only on a
proved misconduct or any other procedure established under law
like `No Confidence Motion' etc. The elected official is
accountable to its electorate as he has been elected by a large
number of voters and it would have serious repercussions when
he is removed from the office and further declared disqualified to
contest the election for a further stipulated period."....
(emphasis supplied)
26. In the light of the aforesaid position in law, reverting to the
facts of the case, at the outset, I find substance in the submissions of
Mr. Chetan Patil that the impugned order passed by Minister, Rural
Development, is bereft of reasons. A bare perusal of the impugned
order would indicate that the Minister, Rural Development has
17 of 22
Varsha wp-6254-2025.doc
encapsulated the complaint of respondent nos. 4 to 7, the response of
the petitioner thereto, the substance of the enquiry conducted by the
Chief Executive Officer and the findings returned by the Divisional
Commissioner and thereafter proceeded to simply observe that the
petitioner had not urged any new ground other than the one urged
before the Divisional Commissioner and, thus, there was no reason to
interfere with the order passed by the Divisional Commissioner.
27. The impugned order singularly lacks analysis of the legality
and correctness of the findings recorded by the Divisional
Commissioner. It is well recognized that even the administrative orders
are required to be supported by reasons. A reason is said to be the
heartbeat of every conclusion. The absence of reason renders an order
indefensible. Since it was a statutory appeal before the State
Government, it was incumbent upon the Minister to record reasons in
support of the ultimate findings. A bald observation that there was no
reason to interfere with the order passed by the Divisional
Commissioner is not a substitute for recording reasons for the decision
either way.
28. Nonetheless, having regard to the time sensitivity of the
matte; as the term of the village panchayat expires in February 2026,
18 of 22
Varsha wp-6254-2025.doc
this Court considered it appropriate to delve into the merits of the
matter rather than remit the matter back to the Appellate Authority for
a fresh decision.
29. As regards the first count of holding of the meeting of the
Gramsabha on 26th January 2022 in the absence of quorum, from the
perusal of the report of the Chief Executive Officer, which is the
foundation of the order passed by the Divisional Commissioner, it
becomes evident that the Chief Executive Officer has drawn an
inference about the members who attended the said Gramsabha
online. It appears that when the Gramsabha meeting commenced, 68
members joined the same Online, yet, in the document which was
generated names of only 57 members, who attended the meeting
Online, were found. Therefore, the CEO drew an inference that 97
members attended the said Gramsabha and, thus, the quorum (of 100)
was not complete.
30. These factual findings are completely in contrast with the
earlier report of the Chief Executive Officer, wherein the Chief
Executive Officer had reported that 109 members were present for the
said Gramsabha. The submission of Mr. Gavnekar that the first report is
required to be totally eschewed from consideration does not merit
19 of 22
Varsha wp-6254-2025.doc
acceptance unreservedly. To the extent that the first report refers the
factual findings, the petitioner would be justified in canvassing a
submission that, on the same set of facts, in the subsequent report, the
Chief Executive Officer has drawn unsustainable inferences.
31. In any event, the number of members who allegedly
attended the meeting of the Gramsabha was marginally short of the
quorum. The material on record would indicate that the petitioner and
the Gramsevak had submitted documents to show that the number of
members present had exceeded the quorum of 100. It is quite possible
that some members, who were initially present Online, might not have
marked their attendance, and there might have been some duplication
in marking the attendance or counting the number of members or an
error in counting the number of members who were present, for the
purpose of completion of quorum. Yet, at best, the said lapse on the
part of the petitioner can only be said to be an irregularity. It does not
fall within the dragnet of misconduct.
32. I am, therefore, inclined to hold that the holding of the
meeting of the Gramsabha without verifying the fact as to whether the
quorum was complete, even if taken at face value, in the circumstances
of the case, did not amount to misconduct within the meaning of
20 of 22
Varsha wp-6254-2025.doc
Section 39 (1) (i) of the Act, 1959.
33. The second count of the alleged misconduct appears to be
even more fragile. The Chief Executive Officer has categorically
recorded that the petitioner had offered an explanation that he
declined to sign the cheque drawn towards the payment of charges for
the repairs of water purifier as the then Administrator had not signed
the Note to sanction the said expenditure. The Chief Executive Officer
records that the said Administrative Note was verified and there was
no signature of the then Administrator according sanction for the said
expenditure. In such circumstances, the refusal of the petitioner to put
signature on the cheque drawn towards payment for the expenditure
incurred while the Administrator was in-charge of the aforesaid Village
Panchayat, on the ground that there was no proper sanction order,
could not have been construed as a misconduct. Had the petitioner
blindly signed the cheque, the petitioner could have been hauled up for
dereliction of duty in signing the cheque without verifying the
legitimacy of the payment. The refusal of the petitioner to sign the
cheque, in the circumstances of the case, would neither amount to
misconduct nor negligence of his duties as a Sarpanch of the Village
Panchayat.
21 of 22
Varsha wp-6254-2025.doc
34. If the aforesaid nature of the acts and omissions attributed
to the petitioner is appreciated through the prism of imperativeness of
establishing the grounds of removal firmly, before an elected
representative is unseated, the impugned orders of removal of the
petitioner from the post of Sarpanch become clearly unsustainable.
Consequently, the impugned orders deserve to be quashed and set
aside. For the forgoing reasons, the petition deserves to be allowed.
35. Hence, the following order:
ORDER
i) The petition stands allowed
ii) The impugned order as well as the order dated 30 th
October 2024 passed by the Divisional Commissioner,
removing the petitioner from the post of Sarpanch of Village
Panchayat, Jawalarjun, Tal-Purandhar, Dist-Pune, stand
quashed and set aside.
iii) Rule made absolute to the aforesaid extent.
No costs.
(N.J. JAMADAR, J)
22 of 22
