Bombay High Court
Popat Uma Sandbhor vs Sadashiv Bhau Chavhan Deceased Throu. ... on 11 November, 2025
Author: N. J. Jamadar
Bench: N. J. Jamadar
2025:BHC-AS:48920
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SSP
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 5262 OF 2024
Popat Uma Sandbhor,
Age: 80 years, Occ.: Agriculturist
Residing at Rakshewadi, Taluka Khed,
District Pune ..Petitioner
Versus
1. Sadashiv Bhau Chavhan (deceased)
Through his Legal Representatives:
A) Chandrakant Sadashiv Chavhan,
Age: 66 years Occ.: Agriculture
B) Dnyaneshwar Sadashiv Chavhan,
Age: 63 years, Occ: Agriculture
Residing at Chavhan Mala, Taluka Khed
District Pune.
C) Nivrutti Sadashiv Chavhan
Age: 60 years, Occ: Agriculture
Residing at Chavhan Mala,
Taluka Khed, District Pune.
ARUN
RAMCHANDRA
SANKPAL
Digitally signed by
ARUN RAMCHANDRA
D) Kisan Sadashiv Chavhan
SANKPAL
Date: 2025.11.14
18:03:46 +0530
Age: 56 years, Occ: Agriculture
Residing at Chavhan Mala,
Taluka Khed, District Pune.
E) Gangubai Sadashiv Chavhan
Age: 80 years, Occ.: Agriculture
All residing at Chavhan Mala
Taluka Khed, District Pune.
F) Ujwala Fakkad Dhumal
Age: 52 years, Occ.: Agriculture
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Residing at Morachi Chincholi
Taluka Shirur, District Pune.
R/at: Chandan Nagar, Bhaji Market,
Near Sai Mandir, Taluka Haveli,
District Pune.
2. Hausabai Bhagwant Malghe
Age: 70 years, Occ.: Agriculture
3. Shankar Dagadu Chavhan
Age: 54 years, Occ.: Agriculturist
4. Vijay Dagadu Chavhan
Age: 46 years, Occ.: Agriculturist
5. Kamal Sonba Jaid
Age: 60 years, Occ.: Agriculturist
6. Vimal Dagadu Chavhan
Age: 58 years, Occ.: Agriculturist
7. Sanjivani Pandit Shete
Age: 55 years, Occ.: Agriculturist
8. Sunita Shantaram Arude
Age: 50 years, Occ.: Agriculturist
All R/at - Rakshewadi, Taluka Khed, ...Respondents
District Pune.
Mr. N. V. Walawalkar, Senior Advocate, with Vikram N. Walawalkar,
for the Petitioners.
Mr. Vaibhav V Ugle, for the Respondents.
CORAM: N. J. JAMADAR, J.
DATE : 11th NOVEMBER 2025
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JUDGMENT:
1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and, with the consent of
the learned Counsel for the parties, heard finally.
2. This Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India assails
the legality, propriety and correctness of a judgment and order dated
17th February 2024 passed by the learned District Judge, Rajgurunagar-
Khed, Pune in MCA No. 46 of 2023, whereby the Appeal preferred by
the Petitioners against an order dated 28 th July 2023 passed by the
learned Civil judge, thereby rejecting the Application preferred by the
Petitioner for grant of injunction to restrain the Defendants from
causing obstruction to the possession and cultivation of the suit land
bearing Gat No. 68/2 and the House Property situated at Mauje
Rakshewadi, Taluka Khed, District Pune ("the suit property"), came to
be dismissed.
3. Shorn of unnecessary details, the background facts can be stated
as under :
3.1 The Petitioner-Plaintiff instituted a Suit with the assertion that
late Bhau Haibati Chavhan , the predecessor-in-title of Defendant Nos. 1
to 8, was the owner of the land bearing Survey No. 68/2 (Old Survey
No. 1480/2). During the lifetime of the Bhau Chavhan, since 1956-57
late Uma Khandu Sandbhor, the predecessor-in-title of the Plaintiff, had
been in the possession and enjoyment of the suit property as a owner
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thereof. The predecessor-in-title of the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff have
thus been in uninterrupted possession and enjoyment of the suit
property since 1956 without any obstruction from the Defendants and
their predecessor-in-title.
3.2 After the demise of Bhau Chavhan, the Defendant Nos. 1 to 8
made an effort to get their names mutated to the Record of Rights of
the suit property and also cause obstruction to possession and
cultivation of the Plaintiff over the suit land. Hence the Suit for a
declaration that the Plaintiff is the owner and in possession of the suit
property and the consequential relief of injunction to restrain the
Defendants from causing obstruction to the peaceful possession and
enjoyment of the Plaintiff.
3.3 In the said suit, the Plaintiff preferred an application for
temporary injunction (Exh.45). By an order 28 July 2023, the Trial
Court rejected the application observing, inter alia, that the Plaintiff
failed to establish prima facie possession over the suit property and the
alleged acts of obstruction on the part of the Defendants. Nor the
element of balance of convenience and irreparable loss lay in favour of
the Plaintiff.
3.4 Being aggrieved, the Petitioner preferred an appeal before the
learned District Judge, Khed-Rajgurunagar. By the impugned order,
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learned District Judge dismissed the appeal finding no reason to
interfere with the discretion exercised by the trial Court.
4. Mr. Walawalkar, learned Senior Advocate for the Petitioner,
canvassed two fold submissions. Firstly, both the Courts committed a
grave error in law in not appreciating the evidentiary value of the
entries in the record of rights of the suit land since the year 1956-57.
The fact that the courts below sustained the claim of ownership of the
predecessor-in-title of the Defendant Nos.1 to 8 on the basis of the
entries in the record of rights, and, at the same time, discarded the
entry in the cultivator's column of the record of rights, which indicated
that the predecessor-in-title of the Plaintiff has been in possession and
cultivation of the suit land since 1956-57, rendered the orders perverse.
An endeavour was also made by Mr. Walawalkar to urge that the
material on record, prima facie, indicates that the predecessor-in-title of
the Plaintiff was in the occupation of the suit land on the Tiller's day,
and, thus, no other material was required to be produced to claim
tenancy rights in the suit land.
5. Secondly, learned Judge unjustifiably discarded the affidavits in
lieu of examination-in-chief of the adjoining land holders on technical
and flimsy ground. Even if the claim of ownership of the Plaintiff is
disputed, yet, the fact remains that the Plaintiff has been in settled
possession of the suit land and, therefore, the Defendants ought to have
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been restrained, in the least, from causing obstruction to the possession
and enjoyment of the Plaintiff over the suit land.
6. In opposition to this, Mr Vaibhav Ugle, learned Counsel for the
Respondents, would submit that the Courts below have recorded
concurrent findings of fact that the Defendants are in prima facie
possession of the suit property. These concurrent prima facie findings
are not open for interference in exercise of the writ jurisdiction.
Attention of the Court was invited to the documents on record, which
indicate that Defendant Nos.1 to 8 have been in possession of the suit
land. Thus, the Defendants who are the owner and in lawful possession
of the suit land cannot be deprived of the right of enjoyment, submitted
Mr. Ugle.
7. At the outset, it is necessary to note that the material averments
in the plaint are materially distinct from the case sought to be canvassed
by Mr. Walawalkar. The thrust of the submission of Mr. Walawalkar was
that the predecessor-in-title of the Plaintiff was a protected tenant of the
suit land. The fact that a proceeding under Section 32G of the
Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 was not
initiated by the predecessor-in-title of the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff, does
not detract materially from the claim of the Plaintiff.
8. Suffice to note that, the case that was sought to be canvassed
before this Court was not at all pleaded in the suit. As noted above, the
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suit proceeds on the premise that the predecessor-in-title of the Plaintiff
had been in the occupation and cultivation of the suit land in the
capacity of its owner. The plaint is, however, conspicuously silent about
the mode through which the Plaintiff claimed to have acquired
ownership over the suit property. There is no reference, much less
positive assertion, as regards the tenancy rights of the predecessor-in-
title of the Plaintiff in the suit property.
9. Mr. Walawalkar was at pains to clarify that the Plaintiff was not
setting up a case for acquisition of title over the suit property by way of
adverse possession. An endeavour was made to draw home the point
that the aspect of the ownership can be adjudicated at the trial.
However, the possession of the Plaintiff ought to have been protected.
10. As the claim of the petitioner-Plaintiff revolves around the
possessory title over the suit property, it would be necessary to note that
both the Courts have recorded concurrent findings of fact that, prima
facie, the Defendants appeared to be in possession and enjoyment of the
suit land. Incontrovertibly, the record of rights of the suit land bearing
No.62/2 indicates that Bhau Chavhan, predecessor-in-title of the
Defendant Nos.1 to 8, was the holder of the suit land. The name of
Uma Khandu Sandbhor is recorded in the cultivator's column. However,
since the year 1999-2000, the cultivation of the suit land is shown by
the holder himself.
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11. In this view of the matter, learned Civil Judge as well as the
learned District Judge were not inclined to bank upon the affidavits of
witnesses tendered on behalf of the Plaintiffs. Apart from the entries in
the revenue records, the fact that there was material to show that the
Defendants were in possession and enjoyment of the suit property and
the notices under the National Highways Act, 1956, in the wake of
acquisition of the portion of the suit land were issued to the original
holders, were taken into account to draw a prima facie inference that
the Plaintiff failed to establish his possession over the suit land. The
aforesaid findings of fact cannot be said to be based on no material.
12. At this juncture, the nature of the supervisory jurisdiction
exercised by the High Court, assumes importance. Though the powers
of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 are wide and extensive,
yet the High Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction is not
expected to act as the Court of Appeal. The High Court can neither
review, nor re-appreciate, nor reweigh the evidence. The High Court
cannot correct the errors of fact or even of law and substitute its own
decision for the one arrived at by the Court below. The avowed object
of conferring the supervisory jurisdiction on the High Court is to keep
the courts and tribunals within the limits of law.
13. In the case of Krishnanand V/s. State of U.P.1, the Supreme Court
enunciated that, it is well settled that the writ jurisdiction cannot be
1 (2015) 1 SCC 553
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exercised for re-appreciating the evidence and arrival of finding of facts
unless the authority which passed the impugned order does not have
jurisdiction to render the finding or has acted in excess of its jurisdiction
or the finding is patently perverse.
14. In the case of Shamshad Ahmad V/s. Tilak Raj Bajaj2, the limit of
the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction was expounded in the following
words :
"38. Though powers of a High Court under Articles
226 and 226 are very wide and extensive over all courts
and tribunals through out the territories in relation to
which it exercises jurisdiction, such powers must be
exercised within the limits of law. The power is supervisory
in nature. The High Court does not act as a court of appeal
or a court or error. It can neither review nor reappreciate,
nor reweigh the evidence upon which determination of a
subordinate court or inferior tribunal purports to be based
or to correct errors of fact or even of law and to substitute
its own decision for that of the inferior court or tribunal.
The powers are required to be exercised most sparingly and
only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate
courts and inferior tribunals within the limits of law."
(emphasis supplied)
15. In a recent pronouncement in the case of Ajay Singh Vs Khacheru
& Ors3 the Supreme Court enunciated that:
2 (2008) 9 SCC 1
3 (2025) 3 SCC 266.
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"16. It is a well-established principle that the
High Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot
reappreciate the evidence and arrive at a finding of
facts unless the authorities below had either
exceeded its jurisdiction or acted perversely."
16. Reverting to the facts of the case, evidently the Plaintiff has not
spelled out the source of acquisition of ownership over the suit land in
the plaint. Instead, it was pleaded that since the lifetime of late Bhau
Haibati Chavhan, the predecessor-in-title of the Plaintiff has been in
possession and enjoyment of the suit land as a owner thereof. Neither a
case of the predecessor-in-title of the Plaintiff having become a deemed
purchaser, nor acquisition of title over the suit land by way of
prescription has been specifically pleaded.
17. Conversely, the name of the predecessor-in-title of Defendant
Nos.1 to 8 has been shown as the holder of the suit land continuously.
This fact coupled with other material on record to show that the
Defendants had exercised possessory rights over the suit land, render
the prima facie findings recorded by the learned Civil Judge
unassailable.
18. In exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction, this Court does not find
any justifiable reason to interfere with the prima facie concurrent
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findings of fact. Resultantly, no interference is warranted in the
impugned order. The Writ Petition, therefore, deserves to be dismissed.
19. Hence, the following order :
ORDER
(i) The Writ Petition stands dismissed.
(ii) Rule discharged.
(iii) No costs.
[N. J. JAMADAR, J.]
