Bombay High Court
Afzal Kalu Gavali vs The State Of Maharashtra on 7 November, 2025
2025:BHC-AUG:30470
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
63 CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 1575 OF 2024
Afzal Kalu Gavali,
Age : 31 years, Occupation: Labour,
R/o.: City Survey, 3873/32, Vakil Galli,
Municipal Park, Bhusawal,
District : Jalgaon. ... Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Maharashtra,
Represented through the police officers of
Bhusawal City Police Station, Bhusawal,
Taluka : Bhusawal, Dist.: Jalgaon.
2. Central Circuit Cine Association
Municipal Park, Bhusawal,
Though Sanjay Sureshchandra Surana,
Age : 59 years, Occupation: Business,
R/o.: Garud Plot, Bhusawal, Tal. Bhusawal,
Dist.: Jalgaon.
3. Shri. Jitendra Dinkar Patil,
Age : Major, Occupation: Sub-Divisional
Magistrate, Bhusawal,
Official Address: Office of Sub-Divisional
Officer/Sub-Divisional Magistrate,
Bhusawal, Taluka: Bhusawal,
Dist.: Jalgaon. ... Respondents
.....
Mrs. Rashmi S. Kulkarni, Advocate for the Petitioner.
Mr. G. O. Wattamwar, APP for Respondent No. 1.
Mr. Ravindra L. Khapre, Senior Advocate a/w. Mr. Sanjeev P.
Deshpande, Mr. V. S. Giramkar, Mr. K. R. Jain and Mr. A. S. Bayas,
Advocate for Respondent No.2.
.....
CORAM : SUSHIL M. GHODESWAR, J.
RESERVED ON : 13th OCTOBER, 2025
PRONOUNCED ON : 07th NOVEMBER, 2025
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JUDGMENT:
-
1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. By consent of the
parties, heard finally.
2. Apart from various prayers, the main prayer sought by the
Petitioner is for quashing and setting aside the proceedings in respect
of provisions of Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(Cr.P.C.), and the order dated 11.06.2024 pursuant to the proposal
bearing No.2 of 2024 dated 10th June 2024 pending on the file of
learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate (SDM) Bhusawal, District Jalgaon.
By way of amendment, the Petitioner has incorporated various prayer
clauses. However, for the purpose of adjudication, the aforesaid
prayers encompass all the reliefs sought by the Petitioner.
3. The brief facts of the present case can be summarized in
short as under :-
(i) The original owner of the property bearing CTS No.3873/32,
admeasuring 438.50 sq. metres, situated at Bhusawal, is one Mr.
Cawas Amroliwala, residing at Mumbai. On 29 th December 2023,
the said owner executed a registered Power of Attorney in favour
of one Mr. Iqbal Gavali for the purpose of execution and
registration of the sale deed.
(ii) Accordingly, on 2nd January 2024, the sale deed in respect of the
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said property came to be executed and registered in favour of
petitioner.
(iii) On the basis of aforesaid sale deed, on 7th February 2024, the
name of the Petitioner was duly mutated in the municipal records
in respect of the said property.
(iv) However, on 7th May 2024, Respondent No.2 - a society namely
Central Circuit Cine Association lodged a written complaint
before Respondent No.1 - City Police Station, Bhusawal, alleging
that the Association has been in possession of the said property
since 1992 and that same had been conveyed to it by a registered
sale deed executed in the year 2000. The Association claimed to
have been using the premises for its office and guest house.
(v) According to the Petitioner, thereafter, certain unknown persons
came to the property and they have abused and threatened them.
Consequently, on 19th May 2024, the Petitioner lodged a written
complaint before Respondent No.1- City Police Station,
Bhusawal, stating that around 15 to 20 persons had trespassed
into the premises and threatened them to vacate the same.
(vi) On 20th May 2024, the office bearer of Central Circuit Cine
Association, namely one Sandip Bhandari also gave written
complaint stating therein that on 19th May 2024, around 15 to 20
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persons came to the said property, created ruckus and restrained
them from entering the property. They claimed that the original
owner Mr. Cawas Amroliwala had sold the said property to them
in the year 2000 and they are in possession of the said property
and further that the said original Cawas Amroliwala had
accepted that he mistakenly sold the said property to the
Petitioner. Respondent No.2 - Association accordingly claimed
that the sale deed produced by the Petitioner is sham and bogus.
(vii) On 3rd June 2024, FIR No.120 of 2024 came to be registered
against the Petitioner and his family members for the offences
punishable under Sections 141, 143, 147, 452, 448, 341, 427,
504 and 506 of Indian Penal Code (IPC).
(viii) Accordingly, on 4th June 2024, the Petitioner and his family
members came to be arrested.
(ix) In the meantime, on 10th June 2024, the concerned police station
of Bhusawal submitted the proposal bearing No.2 of 2024 for
initiation of proceedings under Section 145 of Cr.P.C.
(x) On 11th June 2024, Respondent No.3 - SDM has passed an order
of issuing notice to the concerned parties.
(xi) In the meantime, on 12th June 2024, learned J.M.F.C., Bhusawal
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was pleased to grant regular bail to the Petitioner and his family
members, subject to the condition that they shall not enter the
disputed property until filing of the charge-sheet.
(xii) On 24th June 2024, after being released on bail, the Petitioner
collected relevant documents and filed Special Civil Suit No.103
of 2024 before the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division),
Bhusawal, seeking a declaration that the sale deed dated 4 th
December 1992 executed on 30th December 2000 in favour of the
Association is null and void.
(xiii) The Petitioner also filed Criminal Revision Application No.37 of
2024 challenging the order dated 11 th June 2024 passed by the
SDM, Bhusawal.
(xiv) In the meantime, it is also found that on 18 th July 2024, the
original vendor Cawas Amroliwala also filed Special Civil Suit
No.86 of 2024 before the learned C.J.S.D. Bhusawal seeking
cancellation of Power-of-Attorney dated 28 th December 2023 and
also cancellation of sale deed dated 2nd January 2024.
(xv) While dealing with Criminal Revision No.37 of 2024, learned
Sessions Judge, vide order dated 23rd July 2024 was pleased to
allow the stay application thereby granting stay to the
proceedings before Respondent No.3-SDM, Bhusawal pertaining
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to Section 145 of the Cr.P.C.
(xvi) It is also found that Respondent No.2 also filed Special Civil Suit
No.83 of 2024 before the learned C.J.S.D Bhusawal seeking
declaration, injunction and possession on 21st August 2024.
(xvii) Again on 22nd August 2024, after hearing the parties in Criminal
Revision No.37 of 2024, learned Additional District Judge was
pleased to dismiss the said criminal revision on the ground that
order under challenge was not passed under Section 145(1) of
Cr.P.C. but was merely an order for collecting information to
enable the Magistrate to satisfy himself about the existence of a
dispute.
(xviii)Consequently, on 23rd August 2024, Respondent No.3-SDM
Bhusawal immediately initiated the proceedings and directed the
parties to submit their arguments on or before 3rd September
2024.
(xix) On 3rd September 2024, the proceedings before the SDM,
Bhusawal, were concluded after hearing both sides, and the
matter was closed for orders.
(xx) However, on 6th September 2024, the Petitioner approached this
Court seeking a stay to the impugned proceedings. Hence, the
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matter is listed today for further hearing.
4. According to Mrs. Rashmi Kulkarni, learned Advocate for the
Petitioner, the impugned order dated 11 th June 2024 passed by the
learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Bhusawal, is totally erroneous and
has been passed without application of mind. The said order merely
records that "notice be issued to the concerned." Learned Advocate
further invited my attention to the noting preceding the impugned
order, made by the Tehsildar, wherein it is stated that he has gone
through the proposal and for the purpose of hearing, notices to all
concerned be issued. It is, therefore, submitted that the learned SDM,
who is a quasi-judicial authority, has acted on the instructions of his
subordinate officer, thereby rendering the impugned order grossly
illegal and unsustainable in law and hence, liable to be quashed and
set aside.
5. Mrs. Kulkarni further submitted that the powers conferred
upon the Executive Magistrate under Chapter X of the Code of Criminal
Procedure are preventive in nature and are to be exercised only with
the object of preventing breach of public peace or tranquility likely to
arise due to a dispute concerning land, water or boundaries. Before
invoking such powers under Section 145 of the Cr.P.C., it is mandatory
for the Magistrate to peruse the police report or other information
received and to record his subjective satisfaction as to the likelihood of
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breach of peace. Only upon such satisfaction, the Magistrate may pass
an order setting out reasons for invoking the extraordinary preventive
jurisdiction. In the present case, according to the learned Advocate, a
bare perusal of the impugned order dated 11th June 2024 reveals that
there is no recording of any satisfaction on the part of the learned SDM
regarding the existence of a dispute likely to cause breach of peace.
Hence, the impugned order reflects non-application of mind and failure
to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 145(1) of the
Code.
6. It is further submitted on behalf of the Petitioner that since
both parties have already approached the Civil Court seeking
declarations concerning the validity of the respective sale deeds and
their rights, title, and interest in the disputed property, the Civil Court
is already seized of the matter. Therefore, the parallel proceedings
before the learned SDM are wholly unwarranted and deserve to be
quashed.
7. In support of her above submissions, Mrs. Kulkarni relied
upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amresh Tiwari vs.
Lata Dubey & Anr.1, wherein it has been held that when the issue of
possession is under adjudication before a competent Civil Court, the
proceedings under Section 145 of the Cr.P.C. should not continue
1 (2000) 4 SCC 440
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simultaneously. She also placed reliance on the judgment of the
Hon'ble Apex Court in Mohd. Abid vs. Ravi Naresh2, wherein it has
been observed that once the Civil Court is seized of the subject matter,
the proceedings under Sections 145/146 of the Cr.P.C. cannot continue
and must come to an end.
8. Learned Advocate for the Petitioner further invited attention
to paragraph No.XIII of the amended petition, wherein it has been
specifically averred that Respondent No.3-SDM, Bhusawal, who passed
the impugned order dated 11th June 2024, though being a quasi-
judicial authority and not an original party to the proceedings, has
nevertheless filed an affidavit before this Court seeking dismissal of the
writ petition. It is contended that such conduct on the part of the SDM
indicates bias and lack of judicial impartiality, thereby violating the
Petitioner's fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India. She further pointed out that by way of
amendment, Respondent No.3-SDM, Bhusawal, has been impleaded by
name as a party Respondent in the present petition. It is strongly urged
that when an adjudicating authority exhibits bias towards one of the
parties to a lis, such conduct frustrates the guarantee of fair procedure
implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, according to Mrs.
Kulkarni, the act of Respondent No.3 in filing an affidavit seeking
dismissal of the writ petition amounts to manifest bias, and hence, the
2 (2022) SCC OnLine SC 1051
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entire proceedings initiated under Section 145 of the Cr.P.C. are liable
to be quashed and set aside. In support of this submission, she relied
upon the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Apex Court through
Justice P. D. Dinakaran (Retd.) Vs. Hon'ble Judges Inquiry Committee 3,
wherein it is held that the proceedings shall be vitiated if the judge is
shown to have bias in favour of or against either party to the dispute
and, therefore, he is disqualified to act as a judge. Accordingly, Mrs.
Kulkarni strongly prayed for quashing of the said proceedings before
the SDM Bhusawal under Section 145 of the Cr.P.C.
9. Mr. Ravindra L. Khapre, learned Senior Advocate, duly
assisted by Mr. Sanjeev P. Deshpande and Mr. V. S. Giramkar, appeared
on behalf of Respondent No.2. He submitted that Respondent No.2-
Central Circuit Cine Association had purchased the property in
question from the original owner, Mr. Cawas Amroliwala, as far back as
in the year 1992 and the said sale deed came to be executed and
registered in the year 2000. According to him, Respondent No.2 has
been in continuous possession of the property since then and has
established its guest house and office on the said premises. Learned
Senior Advocate invited my attention to Proposal No.2 of 2024
submitted by Police Sub-Inspector, Mr. Mohammad Ali Syed, Police
Station Bhusawal, to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Bhusawal, seeking
initiation of proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal
3 (2011) 8 SCC 380
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Procedure. He took the Court through the contents of the said
proposal, which refers to the complaint made by the Secretary of
Respondent No.2, Mr. Ashok Kolvankar, to Police Station Bhusawal. In
the said complaint, it is alleged that on 6 th May 2024, at about 11:00
a.m., seven to eight unknown persons entered the office premises and
threatened the staff, claiming ownership over the property. Pursuant to
the said complaint, the statements of certain neighbours were
recorded, who confirmed that Respondent No.2 was in possession of
the premises and was operating its office from the said property. It is
further stated that on 19th May 2024, a quarrel ensued near the office
of the Central Circuit Cine Association, and upon reaching the spot, it
was found that persons from the Petitioner's side had restrained the
members and office bearers of the Association from entering the
property. Accordingly, it is the contention of learned Senior Advocate
that Respondent No.2 is the original and lawful possessor of the
property in question. During the course of investigation, spot
panchanama was conducted, wherein certain documents were
recovered, including speed post letters addressed to the Central Circuit
Cine Association, the 17th Annual Journal of the Association showing
the address of the disputed property and the Association's savings bank
passbook seized from the said premises, all of which, according to him,
clearly establish Respondent No.2's possession. It was further pointed
out by Mr. Khapre, learned Senior Advocate, that the Petitioner has a
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history of involvement in land-related disputes and land-grabbing cases
and had previously initiated similar proceedings before the authorities,
which were disposed of by the SDM.
10. According to Mr. Ravindra L. Khapre, learned Senior
Advocate appearing for Respondent No.2, the contention raised by the
Petitioner has already been considered and dealt with by this Court in
the case of Abdul Gaffar s/o. Abdul Sadam Vs. Ramratan Khandelwal
Ramkishore Khandelwal & Anr.4. Referring to paragraph No.10 of the
said judgment, learned Senior Advocate submitted that the Executive
Magistrate is empowered to pass an order under Section 145 of the
Cr.P.C. if, upon being satisfied from the report of a police officer or
upon other information, it appears to him that a dispute likely to cause
breach of peace exists concerning immovable property. Upon such
satisfaction, the Magistrate is required to make an order in writing
setting forth the grounds of his satisfaction. Merely because, in a given
case, the Executive Magistrate has not elaborately recorded the
grounds in the proceedings under Section 145 of the Cr.P.C., it cannot
automatically be inferred that the initiation of proceedings is illegal or
without jurisdiction. He further drew attention to paragraph No.12 of
the said judgment, wherein it has been held that proceedings under
Section 145 of the Cr.P.C. ought to be permitted to continue in view of
the clarification rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ram Sumer Vs.
4 2005 All MR (Cri) 1260
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State of U.P.5. In the said decision, the Supreme Court has observed
that whether or not proceedings under Section 145 of the Cr.P.C. should
be stayed depends upon the facts and circumstances of each individual
case, and there is no universal rule that such proceedings must
necessarily be stayed merely because a civil suit involving the same
property is pending. Mr. Khapre also placed reliance on the judgment
of this Court in Jayantilal Padamshee Shah Vs. Chandu Khushhandu
Udhwani & Ors.6, wherein it was observed that under Section 145(1)
of the Cr.P.C., the Magistrate can arrive at his satisfaction either on the
basis of a police report or upon other information, and that the
expression "other information" includes even an application made by a
dispossessed party. It was further held that it is open to the Magistrate
to call upon the parties to produce material enabling him to determine
whether a dispute likely to cause breach of peace exists. He further
relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Prakash
Chand Sachdeva Vs. The State & Anr.7, wherein it has been held that
when the dispute between the parties pertains to possession and not to
ownership or title, the Magistrate is competent to invoke the
jurisdiction under Section 145 of the Cr.P.C. The provision deals
exclusively with disputes relating to possession and, therefore,
proceedings under Section 145 cannot be dropped merely on the
ground of pendency of a civil suit. On similar lines, learned Senior
5 AIR 1985 SC 472
6 1986 Mh.L.J. 855
7 AIR 1994 SC 1436
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Advocate invited attention to several other authorities, including the
decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhinka & Ors. Vs. Charan
Singh8, wherein it has been held that Section 145 of the Cr.P.C. does
not empower the Magistrate to direct delivery of possession to a person
who was not in possession on the date of the preliminary order passed
under that provision. It was further observed that even in cases where
a party has been forcibly or wrongfully dispossessed within two months
preceding the date of the preliminary order, the Magistrate is
authorised only to treat such party as if he had been in possession on
the relevant date. Paragraphs 13 and 14 of the said judgment read
thus:-
"13. Can it be said that the appellants had taken possession in
accordance with the provisions of S. 145 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure? The short answer is that S. 145 of the said Code does
not confer on a Magistrate any power to make an order directing
the delivery of possession to a person who is not in possession on
the date of the preliminary order made by him under S. 145 (1) of
the Code. Under S. 145 (1) of the Code, his jurisdiction is
confined only to decide whether any and which of the parties was
on the date of the preliminary order in possession of the land in
dispute. The order only declares the actual possession of a party
on a specified date and does not purport to give possession or
authorise any party to take possession. Even in the case of any
party who has been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed within
two months next before the date of the preliminary order, the
Magistrate is only authorised to treat that party who is
dispossessed as if he had been in possession on such date. If that
be the legal position, the appellants could not have taken
possession of the disputed lands by virtue of an order made under
the provisions of S. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. They
were either in possession or not in possession of the said lands on
the specific date, and, if they were not in possession on that date,
their subsequent taking possession thereof could not have been
under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
8 AIR 1959 SC 960
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14. If the appellants did not take possession of the disputed
lands, did they retain possession of the same in accordance with
the provisions of the law for the time being in force? The
dichotomy between taking and retaining indicates that they are
mutually exclusive and apply to two different situations. The word
"taking" applies to a person taking possession of a land otherwise
than in accordance with the provisions of the law, while the word
"retaining" to a person taking possession in accordance with the
provisions of the law but subsequently retaining the same illegally.
So construed, the appellants' possession of the lands being illegal
from the inception, they could not be described as persons
retaining possession of the said lands in accordance with the
provisions of any law for the time being in force, so as to be
outside the scope of S. 180 of the Act."
11. He further invited my attention to the fact that the
Petitioner's claim of having purchased the property by virtue of a sale
deed dated 2nd January 2024 is based on a bogus and fabricated
document. According to him, the said transaction is highly doubtful as
the property in question is purported to have been sold for a meagre
consideration of Rs.6,00,000/-, whereas the stamp duty paid thereon
amounts to Rs.4,48,000/-. The original owner, Mr. Cawas Amroliwala,
has already initiated proceedings for cancellation of the said sale deed
and has also executed an affidavit in favour of Respondent No.2,
stating that the sale deed was executed by mistake. In the said
affidavit, he has further declared that he has taken necessary steps for
revocation of the Power of Attorney and for cancellation of the
impugned sale deed. On these grounds, Mr. Khapre, learned Senior
Advocate appearing for Respondent No.2, submitted that the order
dated 6th September 2024 passed by this Court, whereby the
proceedings before the learned SDM, Bhusawal, under Section 145 of
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the Cr.P.C. were stayed, deserves to be vacated and that the learned
SDM, Bhusawal, be directed to proceed with the matter and pass
appropriate orders in accordance with law.
12. Mr. G. O. Wattamwar, learned APP appearing for Respondent
No.1-State submitted that the Petitioner had initially failed to implead
Respondent No.3-SDM, Bhusawal as a necessary party, despite the fact
that the order impugned in the present proceedings has been passed by
him. However, pursuant to the directions issued by this Court, the
Petitioner has now added the said officer as a necessary party to the
proceedings. She further submitted that the learned SDM, Bhusawal,
was directed by this Court to file his affidavit in response and in
compliance with the said directions, he has accordingly filed the same.
13. This Court by order dated 6 th September 2024 was pleased to
issue notices to the Respondents and further directed the SDM,
Bhusawal not to pronounce the judgment till the next date of hearing.
Consequently, the proceedings before the learned SDM, Bhusawal have
remained stayed and have come to a halt since then.
14. Upon considering the rival submissions and carefully
scrutinizing the entire record placed before me, the foremost question
that arises for consideration is whether there existed a situation
warranting initiation of proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of
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Criminal Procedure. The various complaints and events on record
indicate that the Petitioner under the guise of the impugned sale deed
dated 2nd January 2024, attempted to claim possession over the
disputed property. However, the material on record reveals that the
Petitioner has merely sought to project that he is in possession of the
said property. Since civil suits concerning the ownership and title of
the property are already pending before the competent Civil Court,
learned Advocate for the Petitioner contended that there was no
necessity to invoke the provisions of Section 145 of the Cr.P.C. However,
this submission does not find support from the record of the
proceedings before the authorities. The office bearers of Respondent
No.2-Association had lodged complaints with the police authorities
regarding incidents wherein the Petitioner allegedly attempted to take
possession of the premises on the basis of the said sale deed dated 2 nd
January 2024. Acting upon such complaints, the police carried out an
inquiry and recorded statements of several neighbouring persons, who
unequivocally stated that Respondent No.2 - Association is in
possession and is running its office from the disputed premises.
Furthermore, during the spot panchanama, the police discovered and
seized several documents belonging to Respondent No.2-Central Circuit
Cine Association. The evidence collected from these independent
witnesses suggesting the Respondent No.2 to be in possession of the
said property.
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15. Another aspect to be considered in the present matter is that
the Civil Courts, which are seized of the dispute, have not passed any
injunction orders restraining the parties from entering or occupying the
property. Consequently, there is no legal impediment for the learned
SDM, Bhusawal, to initiate proceedings under Section 145 of the Cr.P.C.
It is the duty of the learned SDM to pass appropriate orders to maintain
public peace in the locality, including protecting the possession of the
party who has satisfactorily established that he was/is in lawful
possession of the property. It is well settled that proceedings under
Section 145 Cr.P.C. are preventive in nature and are intended to
maintain public peace and not to adjudicate upon title or ownership.
However the procedure for initiating action is prescribed under section
145 of the CrPC. The words appearing in sub-section (1) as "he shall
make an order in writing, stating the grounds of his being so satisfied,
and requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his
court...." are very important. Thus the section itself provides that the
Learned SDM is required to record the reasons of being satisfied before
passing preliminary order. As the learned SDM on 11.06.2024 has
passed just three words order of "issue notices to concerned", is,
therefore, in clear violation of section 145 as there are no grounds of
his satisfaction have been provided while passing the said order. When
the procedure itself contemplates of doing certain exercise in particular
mandatory manner, the non compliance of the same therefore would
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cause serious failure. The reasoning of the Revisional Court to the
extent that if the magistrate is satisfied by reading the police report or
the application, it is not obligatory on the Magistrate to record the
grounds separately is also not appropriate as the Magistrate has not, in
his order dated 11.06.2024, even said that he has gone through or read
the police report. Thus, while the jurisdiction of the Magistrate under
Section 145 cannot be doubted, but the impugned order suffers from
procedural infirmity owing to non-recording of satisfaction.
16. In view of above submissions the pendency of the civil
disputes between the parties is, therefore, not a ground to drop the
proceedings under section 145 of the Cr.P.C. The Learend Magistrate
can decide the proposal of police in accordance with law.
17. The submissions of the learned Advocate for the Petitioner
regarding the alleged bias of the learned SDM also needs
consideration. It is pointed out that the said SDM had earlier dealt with
a matter involving allegations against the Petitioner in earlier case and
being a statutory authority, is expected to decide matters in an
impartial manner. Notwithstanding this, the fact that the learned SDM
has filed an affidavit before this Court praying for dismissal of the
present writ petition indicates a potential conflict of interest or
perceived bias. In view of this, the same learned SDM, i.e., Respondent
No.3, cannot be directed to adjudicate the present proceedings under
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Section 145 of the Cr.P.C.
18. In that view of the matter, Mr. Khapre, learned Senior
Advocate, suggested that in order to avoid any perceived bias on the
part of Respondent No.3-SDM, Bhusawal, this Court may direct the
Collector, Jalgaon or any other competent SDM to adjudicate the
matter.
19. The impugned order dated 11th June 2024 on police proposal
no. 02/2024 passed by the Learned SDM (respondent No. 3) is
quashed and set aside.
20. Accordingly, it is hereby directed that the Collector, Jalgaon,
shall either personally decide the case arising out of the proposal
bearing No.2 of 2024 dated 10th June 2024 or assign the said matter to
any other SDM in his district, but excluding Respondent No.3 Shri.
Jitendra s/o Dinkar Patil. The Collector shall ensure that the matter is
decided independently and uninfluenced by any observations made in
this order.
21. The order dated 6th September 2024, whereby the
proceedings before the learned SDM, Bhusawal, were stayed, is hereby
continued till passing of preliminary order under section 145 of CrPC.
The designated authority, whether the Collector or the assigned SDM is
directed to pass preliminary order under section 145 of CrPC on
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proposal bearing No.2 of 2024 dated 10 th June 2024, within a period of
one month from the date of this order as per the requirements of
Section 145.
22. In view of the above, Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid
terms. Accordingly, the writ petition is partly allowed. No order as to
costs.
(SUSHIL M. GHODESWAR, J.)
Tauseef
