Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 7155 Bom
Judgement Date : 6 November, 2025
IAL-722-2025(J).docx
Sbw
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
INTERIM APPLICATION (L) NO.722 OF 2025
IN
MISC. APPLICATION (L) NO.717 OF 2025
IN
PARSI SUIT (L) NO.38137 OF 2024
Daisy Rohaan Bhathena ] ... Applicant
In the matter between
Daisy Rohaan Bhathena ]
Nee Daisy Mehernosh Daruwala ]
Age:39 Occ: Service ]
And Child Counsellor ]
Adult Indian Inhabitant ]
Residing At: F-43, Cusrow Baug ]
Electric House Colaba ]
Mumbai-400005. ] ... Applicant
Versus
Rohaan Plasi Bhathena ]
Age : 39 Occ : Business ]
Adult Indian Inhabitant ]
Residing At: F-43, Cusrow Baug ]
Electric House Colaba ]
Mumbai-400005. ] ... Respondent
Ms. Tauban F. Irani a/w Ms.Moksha Kothari for the Applicant.
Mr. Rustom Pardiwala i/by Adeeba Khan for the Respondent.
Applicant and Respondent, present.
CORAM : KAMAL KHATA, J.
RESERVED ON : 23RD SEPTEMBER 2025
PRONOUNCED ON : 6TH NOVEMBER 2025
1/13
SANDHYA Digitally
SANDHYA
signed by
BHAGU BHAGU WADHWA
WADHWA Date: 2025.11.06
15:28:38 +0530
::: Uploaded on - 06/11/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 06/11/2025 21:37:08 :::
IAL-722-2025(J).docx
ORDER:
1) Ms. Taubon Irani, learned Advocate appearing for the
Applicant, seeks interim relief restraining the Respondent from
entering the Applicant's flat situated at F-43 Cusrow Baug, Electric
House, Colaba, Mumbai-400005, under Section 19(1)(b) and (c) of the
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act).
2) Ms. Irani submits that the Applicant has instituted
proceedings under Section 32 (dd) and (e) of the Parsi Marriage and
Divorce Act, 1936, being Suit (St) No. 38137 of 2024, as well as an
Application under Sections 18 to 20, 22, 23 and 26 of the DV Act. The
present Application, she clarifies, is filed under Section 23 of the DV
Act seeking interim protection.
3) It is submitted that the parties were married on 16 th
December 2011 at Albless Baug, Mumbai, in accordance with Parsi
rites and customs. Two children have been born from the wedlock - a
son aged 6 ½ years and a daughter aged 2 years. Throughout the
marriage, the Applicant has allegedly been subjected to continuous
cruelty - physical, mental, emotional and financial. The Respondent is
stated to have physically assaulted the Applicant on several occasions
and abused her family members in offensive language. Despite
repeated interventions by relatives, the Respondent's behaviour did
IAL-722-2025(J).docx
not improve. The Applicant, as a last resort, filed two police complaints
at Colaba Police Station in 2024. Upon continued misconduct, she has
now sough to dissolve the marriage.
4) It is further contended that the Respondent's aggressive
conduct is having an adverse impact on the children. The son,
diagnosed with autism, has developed fear and anxiety due to the
Respondent's aggression and verbal abuse. The Applicant submits that
the son has even witnessed incidents of physical violence. She has
sought interim custody of both children and protection against the
Respondent forcibly taking away the minor daughter. It is also alleged
that, despite having substantial income, the Respondent contributes to
household expenses arbitrarily and inconsistently.
5) Referring to table in paragraph 8 of the Application, Ms.
Irani submits that the Applicant incurs monthly expenses of
approximately Rs.61,000/- for her daughter, Rs.1,07,000/- for the son
and around Rs.30,000/- towards general household costs. Accordingly,
the relief sought include:
(a) Appointment of a protection officer under
Section 18 of the DV Act,
(b) Continuation of the interim custody of the minor
children under Section 21 of the DV Act,
IAL-722-2025(J).docx
(c) Restraining the Respondent from forcibly taking
the children from the Applicant's custody; and
(d) Restraining the Respondent from entering the
Applicant's flat.
Additionally, the Applicant seeks monthly maintenance of
Rs.1,10,000/- for the son, Rs.60,000/- for the daughter, and
Rs.30,000/- towards household expenses, as well as a direction
requiring the Respondent to disclose his assets and liabilities in terms
of the Supreme Court's decision in Rajneesh vs. Neha1.
6) Ms. Irani further submits that the Applicant has filed an
additional affidavit dated 23rd January 2025 detailing incidents
between 14th and 21st January 2025 to illustrate the Respondent's
conduct. It is submitted that the Respondent has his parental home
available for residence and that the present flat exclusively belongs to
the Applicant. Apart from the minor furniture and renovation work,
the Respondent has not contributed materially to the household.
7) She also draws attention to Protection Officer report dated
3rd April 2025, submitting that it is not in the format prescribed under
the DV Act. Nonetheless, the report acknowledges frequent quarrels
between the parties, which have caused emotional distress to the
children.
AIR 2021 SC 569
IAL-722-2025(J).docx
8) Mr. Pardiwala, learned Advocate for the Respondent, relies
on the affidavit in reply dated 5th March 2025 and the affidavits of two
domestic servants to contend that the couple shares cordial relations.
9) Mr. Pardiwala submits that the present Application is an
misuse of the legal process. The allegations are described as false,
reckless, and motivated to build a false narrative of cruelty. He denies
all acts of domestic violence and attributes the material discord to
excessive interference by the Applicant's parents. He contends that
the Respondent undertook substantial renovation work and paid 50%
of the occupation charges to the trustees. Relying on bank statements
and receipts, he submits that the Respondent has regularly paid
electricity bill and outgoings. He argues that the Applicant, a
postgraduate in child psychology, would not have remained silent if
genuine acts of domestic violence had occurred.
10) The Respondent claims to have borne all travel expenses
for family holidays to Goa, Sydney, Gold Coast, Melbourne, Singapore,
Bangkok, Panchgani, Lonavala and Daman. He contends that the
Applicant's allegations are inconsistent with her decision to have a
second child in 2022. He further submits that despite CCTV cameras
installed in the residence, the Applicant has not produced any footage
supporting her claims of assault.
11) Referring to the affidavits of the domestic staff - the two
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maids who are employed at their residence, he points out that neither
has ever witnessed any act of violence by the Respondent. He contends
that the Applicant fabricated a case of domestic violence solely to
deprive him of residence and parental access. Relying on the Bank
Statements annexed to the Affidavit it is submitted that the
Respondent is incurring all expenses of the minor children, including
the school fees, tuition fees and other day to day expenses and also
takes utmost care of both the children. Therefore, there is no reason to
grant any custody of the minor children to the Applicant alone.
Despite his financial constraints, he asserts that he was compelled by
the Applicant to maintain a high-cost lifestyle in South Mumbai. He
also disputes the certificate issued by Ummeed Child Development
Centre, arguing that it is unreliable since the Applicant is an Associate
Director with the same institution and has procured the same using
her good offices. Relying upon the Protection Officer's report dated
April 2025 it is submitted that even the report does not mention about
any act of cruelty inflicted by the Respondent on the Applicant.
12) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Samir Vidyasagar Bhardwaj
vs Nandita Samir Bhardwaj2 held that once a Family Court prima facie
accepts the wife's allegations of domestic violence, an order directing
the husband's removal from the shared household cannot be termed
(2017) 14 SCC 583
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perverse or unwarranted.
13) In the present case, the Applicant - an educated woman
with independent income - has, after fourteen years of marriage and
having borne two kids with the Respondent, filed police complaints and
produced photographs evidencing physical abuse. There is no reason to
disbelieve either the photographs or the police complaints. A prima
facie case granting protection and restraining the Resp from the
shared household is thus established.
14) This Court in Ishpal Singh Kahai v/s. Ramanjeet Kahai 3
held that the right to reside under Section 19 of the DV Act necessarily
implies protection from wife's dispossession but statutorily follows a
matter of corollary - the order of injunction of the Court for removal of
the violator from such household and thereafter restraining him from
entering their upon. The order of removal of the violator and restrain
the husband from re-entering upon the shared household is, therefore,
conditioned upon his abusive behavior, violating the personal rights of
his wife or any other woman in domestic relationship and not upon his
proprietary rights in the shared household.
15) Section 19(1)(b) of the DV Act empowers the Court to
direct removal of the husband from the shared household where the
woman seeks such relief. Given the prima facie material before this
2011 (3) Mh.L.J. 849
IAL-722-2025(J).docx
Court, such a direction is warranted. The High Court of Madras in the
V. Anusha v/s. B. Krishnan4 in paragraph 13 observed as under:
"13. If the removal of the husband from home alone is the only way to ensure domestic peace, the court needs to pass such orders irrespective of the fact whether the respondent has or has not an other accommodation of his own. If the husband has got an alternate accommodation, it is fine that he can be asked to accommodate himself in that alternate premises. If he does not have any other accommodation, it is upto him to secure an alternate accommodation. In this case, the petitioner has filed a memo stating the details about the possibility of accommodating the respondent in the alternate accommodation possessed by him. But the same was not considered by the court below."
16) Applying the above principle, I am satisfied that the
Applicant has made out a prima facie case justifying interim
protection. The Respondent's proprietary or residential interests
cannot override the Applicant's right to a peaceful and secure
environment.
17) This Court in Vijay Jagdish Chheda v/s. Dimple Vijay
Chheda5, observed that the very object and intention of the protection
2022 SCC OnLine Mad 4078
2018 SCC OnLine Bom 5522
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under DV Act would be frustrated if relief were denied to a woman and
her children facing domestic distress merely because the husband
asserts residential or financial claims.
18) Reliance is placed on Sabita Mark Burges v/s. Mark Lionel
Burges6. Laying emphasis on paragraph 12 of the said judgment it is
argued that based on mere allegations of physical abuse and violence,
the husband cannot be restrained from entering upon the matrimonial
home. These allegations would have to be tested in the Petition. The
wife would have to withstand cross-examination.
19) Having heard both the learned Advocates and upon perusal
of the material on record, the following conclusions arise.
(i) The matrimonial home in which the couple
presently reside along with their kids is in the
name of the Applicant.
(ii) It is, however, undisputed that the interiors of
the said home were undertaken at the
expense of the Respondent. The Respondent
also contributes towards the household
expenses and children's needs.
20) The Suit filed by the Applicant is premised on the
2013(5) Bom.C.R. 387
IAL-722-2025(J).docx
allegations of cruelty and physical abuse by the Respondent. This
Court, by its order dated 18th March 2025, had directed the Protection
Officer to assist the Applicant. The Protection Officer's report does not
disclose any incidence of physical violence between the parties. It does,
however, record persistent quarrels and a strained relationship, noting
further that the Applicant has exhibited a degree of inflexibility in her
behaviour. It is also a matter of record that the Applicant has filed a
Petition for divorce after fourteen years of marriage and has sought
protection from the Respondent on grounds of physical abuse.
21) Without delving into the detailed reasons for the Applicant
seeking restraint against the Respondent's entry into the matrimonial
home, it is evident that the parties are unable to cohabit. The
Applicant, therefore, deserves her own space along with her minor
children. The Respondent, being the husband, cannot insist on residing
in the matrimonial home or dictate terms to the wife, particularly
when she has sought protection and restraint against him. No
prejudice will be caused to the Respondent if he is restrained from
entering the Applicant's residence without her prior consent, at least
for a limited period of one month from the date of this order. This
temporary separation may also provide both parties an opportunity to
introspect and attempt reconciliation, keeping in mind not only their
own interests but also those of their children, who require the presence
IAL-722-2025(J).docx
and affection of both parents for their well-being. The Respondent shall
vacate the house within four days from the date of uploading of this
order.
22) The Respondent shall, however, be permitted to meet the
children three times a week, after obtaining prior appointment from
the Applicant through electronic communication. Such meetings may
take place at the matrimonial home for a duration of up to four hours
on each occasion, subject to the Applicant's convenience and
availability. The Applicant shall cooperate and not unreasonably deny
access to the Respondent. In the event of non-co-operation or
obstruction, the Respondent will be at liberty to move this Court for
appropriate directions, including modification or enhancement of
visitation rights.
23) The Applicant would be entitled to seek protection from the
police officer on the dates when the Husband chooses to visit the minor
children and concerned police station will assign for the visit the
residence of the wife and minor children.
24) The Protection Officer shall resubmit the report in the
prescribed format under the DV Act within one week from the date of
this order. This present arrangement is purely pro tem in nature and
intended to facilitate monitoring of the parties' conduct pending the
final adjudication of the proceedings.
IAL-722-2025(J).docx
25) The Respondent is further directed to pay all necessary
fees, charges and expenses relating to the children's education and
welfare to the Applicant within one week of receipt of the relevant
invoices from the Applicant.
26) I find that the decision in Sabita Mark Burges (supra) will
not be of any assistance to Mr. Pardiwala, in view of the material before
this Court, namely, the photographs that prima facie evince physical
abuse followed by the police complaints against the Applicant.
27) On the prima facie case being made out by the Applicant,
for her own and her minor children's protection, as a pro tem measure,
I deem it fit to pass the following order:-
(i) The Respondent shall vacate the house within 4 days
from the date of uploading of this order on the website of
High Court of Bombay.
(ii) The Respondent shall be permitted to meet the
children 3 times a week after obtaining prior
appointment/permission from the Applicant through
electronic communication.
(iii) The Applicant shall be entitled to seek police
protection as per order dated 18th March 2025 from the
concerned police station.
IAL-722-2025(J).docx
(iv) The Protection Officer is directed to resubmit the
report in the prescribed format under the D.V. Act, within
one week from the date of uploading of this order on the
website of High Court of Bombay.
(iv) The Respondent is directed to pay all necessary fees,
charges relating to the children education and welfare to the
Applicant within one week of receipt of the relevant
invoices from the Applicant.
28) List the Application on 9th December 2025 under the
caption 'for directions'.
(KAMAL KHATA, J.)
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