Bombay High Court

Arpita Arvind Padwal vs Pushpa Chandrakant Patil And Anr on 16 June, 2025

Author: Madhav J. Jamdar

Bench: Madhav J. Jamdar

2025:BHC-AS:24115
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                                 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                     WRIT PETITION NO.2813 OF 2025
                    Arpita Arvind Padwal                             ...Petitioner
                          Versus
                    Pushpa Chandrakant Patil & Anr.                  ...Respondents
                    _______________________________________________________________
                    Mr. Ramesh Jadhav, for the Petitioner.
                    Ms. P. P. Bhosale, APP for the Respondent-State.
                    _______________________________________________________________
                                                             CORAM: MADHAV J. JAMDAR, J.

DATED: 16th JUNE 2025 JUDGMENT.:

1. Heard Mr. Ramesh Jadhav, learned Counsel appearing for the

Petitioner and Ms. Bhosale, learned APP for the Respondent-State.

2. The challenge in this Writ Petition filed under Article 227 of the

Constitution of India and under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik

Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 ("BNSS") is to the order dated 17th December,

2024 passed by the learned JMFC, Vasai below Exhibit-14 in S.S.C.

No.429 of 2023 directing the present Petitioner i.e. Accused in said

S.C.C. No.429/2023 to pay interim compensation of Rs.5,40,000/- to

the Complainant within 60 days from the date of the said order. The

said order has been challenged by the present Petitioner by filing

Criminal Revision Application No.1 of 2025 and the said Criminal

Revision Application is dismissed by the impugned order dated 1 st April,

2025 passed by the learned District Judge-1 & Additional Sessions

Judge, Vasai.

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3. The main contention raised by Mr. Jadhav, learned Counsel

appearing for the Petitioner is that the cheques were not issued for

recovery of legally enforceable debt and therefore the Court should not

have granted the relief. Learned Counsel submitted that the said

amount of Rs. 27,00,000/- and Rs.7,48,630/- has been given to ensure

that the Respondent No.1-Complainant's son gets admission in the

MBBS College either at Karad or at Kankavali. To substantiate the said

contention, he has pointed out paragraph no.1 of the complaint filed

under Section 138 r/w 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

("NI Act"). He therefore states that the amount claimed is not a legally

enforceable debt.

4. The learned Revisional Court has observed that whether the act

of issuance of cheques by accused comes within the ambit of legally

enforceable debt or not is the question to be decided on merits. It is also

observed by the learned Revisional Court that issuing directions for

making payment of 20% amount which comes to Rs.5,40,000/- for all

three cheques will not cause any prejudice to the accused.

5. For considering the contention raised by the learned Counsel

appearing for the Petitioner, it is necessary to set out paragraph no.1 of

the complaint which reads as under:-

ß1- fQ;kZnh lkS- iq"ik panzdkUr ikVhy vkjksih ;kauk vksG[krkr- vkjksih Hkkjrh; turk i{kkP;k dk;ZdR;kZ vlwu fQ;kZnhps irh ts O;olk;kus MkWDVj vlY;keqGs vkjksih R;kaps irh Jh- vjfoan iMoG lkscr fQ;kZnhP;k ?kjh ;sr vlr- ekpZ 2022 e/;s vkjksih fQ;kZnh ;kaP;k ?kjh vkY;k gksR;k- R;kosGh

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fQ;kZnh ;kapk eqyxk dq- vkdkj ;kl ,e-ch-ch-,l- djhrk psUUkbZ o /kqGs ;sFkhy esMhdy dkWyst e/;s vWMfe'ku ?ksrys vkgs vls fQ;kZnh ;kauh vkjksih ;kauk lkafxrys vlrk] vkjksih fQ;kZnh ;kauk Eg.kkY;k rqepk ,dqyrk ,d eqyxk vkgs R;kl rqEgh rqeP;k iklwu nwj djrk] eh Ckh-ts-ih- i{kkph dk;ZdrhZ vlwu ek>h pkaxY;k yksdk lkscr vksG[k vkgs- eh rqeP;k eqykph toGikl djkM fdaok d.kdoyh ;sFks vWMfe'ku d:u nsrs vls lkafxrys- vWMfe'ku djhrk 27]00]000@& o 7]48]630@& :- ok fM- fM- dk<kok ykxsy vls lkafxrys gksrs- fQ;kZnh ;kauh gksdkj nsowu vWMfe'ku djhrk ekpZ 2022 ;k ekfgU;kr nksu osGk jks+[k jDde 10]00]000@& vls ,dw.k 20]00]000@& o uarj 3]50]000@& vkf.k 4]00]000@& vls ,dw.k 27]00]000@& jks[khus vki.kkl fnysys vkgsr-Þ (Emphasis added) English translation is as follows:-

"1) The Complainant Sau. Pushpa Chandrakant Patil knows the Accused. The Accused is a worker of Bharatiya Janata Party. As Complainant's husband is a Doctor by profession, Accused along with her husband Shri Arvind Padval would visit the Complainant's house. In the month of March, 2022, Accused had visited Complainant's house. At that time, when the Complainant told the Accused that she had taken an admission to a Medical College at Chennai and Dhule for her son by name Master Aakar for his doing M.B.B.S., Accused said to the Complainant, "you have only one son and you are sending him away from you, I am a worker of B. J. P., I am acquainted with a number of good (influential) people, I can manage an admission for your son at a nearby place at Karad or Kanakavali". It was informed that Demand Drafts of Rs.27,00,000/- and Rs.7,48,630/- were required to be obtained.

The Complainant agreed to the same and had paid you twice, an amount of Rs.10,00,000/- in cash, thus a total sum of Rs.20,00,000/- in the month of March, 2022 and thereafter, a sum of Rs.3,50,000/- and Rs.4,00,000/-, thus a total amount of Rs.27,00,000/-, in cash, for the purpose of seeking an admission."

6. Thus, it is clear that what is set out in the complaint is that the

Complainant's son has obtained admission for MBBS at Chennai and

also in a Medical College at Dhule. The Petitioner claiming to be a party

worker of BJP has represented that she knows many influential people

and she would ensure that the son of the Respondent could get

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admission in the Medical College at Karad or Kankavali and for that

purpose amount of Rs.27,00,000/- have been paid by the Complainant

to the Petitioner.

7. It is further stated in paragraph no.2 of the said complaint that

the Petitioner-Accused took the complaint to Karad with a Demand

Draft of Rs.7,48,630/- and as the said Demand Draft was not encashed

for considerable period the Complainant came to know that the

Petitioner is cheating the Complainant and therefore, the Complainant

demanded back the said amount and therefore three cheques of

Rs.9,00,000/- each dated 20th August, 2022, 22nd August, 2022 and 22nd

August, 2022 had been handed over to the Complainant by the Accused.

The said cheques were presented in the bank and subsequently

dishonoured. Thereafter, statutory notice was issued and then the

complaint has been filed.

8. It is required to be noted that in the complaint it is specifically

stated that the Complainant's son had obtained admission for MBBS at

Chennai and also in a Medical College at Dhule. It was represented to

the Complainant that the Petitioner could get the admission in the

college at Karad or Kankavali and for that purpose Demand Drafts of

Rs.27,00,000/- and Rs.7,48,630/- would be required and therefore the

said payments were made. In fact a Demand Draft of Rs.7,48,630/- was

also obtained.

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9. Thus, it is clear that the Petitioner represented the Complainant

that said amount would be paid by Demand Draft to the concerned

college. It is also significant to note that the Petitioner has not denied

issuance of cheques and dishonour of the same. In this background of

the matter, it is stated by the learned District Judge while rejecting the

revision is whether the cheques issued by the accused are within the

ambit of legally enforceable debt would be decided on merit.

10. The Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh 1

considered in detail the presumption under Section 118 and 139 of NI

Act when there is no dispute over execution of cheque. The relevant

discussion is to be found in Paragraph Nos. 33 to 44, which reads as

under:-

"33. The NI Act provides for two presumptions : Section 118 and Section 139. Section 118 of the Act inter alia directs that it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration. Section 139 of the Act stipulates that "unless the contrary is proved, it shall be presumed, that the holder of the cheque received the cheque, for the discharge of, whole or part of any debt or liability". It will be seen that the "presumed fact"

directly relates to one of the crucial ingredients necessary to sustain a conviction under Section 138.

34. Section 139 of the NI Act, which takes the form of a "shall presume" clause is illustrative of a presumption of law. Because Section 139 requires that the Court "shall presume"

the fact stated therein, it is obligatory on the Court to raise this presumption in every case where the factual basis for the raising of the presumption had been established. But this does not preclude the person against whom the presumption is drawn from rebutting it and proving the contrary as is clear 1 (2023) 10 SCC 148

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from the use of the phrase "unless the contrary is proved".

35. The Court will necessarily presume that the cheque had been issued towards discharge of a legally enforceable debt/liability in two circumstances. Firstly, when the drawer of the cheque admits issuance/execution of the cheque and secondly, in the event where the complainant proves that cheque was issued/executed in his favour by the drawer. The circumstances set out above form the fact(s) which bring about the activation of the presumptive clause.[Bharat Barrel & Drum Mfg. Co. v. Amin Chand Payrelal [Bharat Barrel & Drum Mfg. Co. v. Amin Chand Payrelal, (1999) 3 SCC 35] ].

36. Recently, this Court has gone to the extent of holding that presumption takes effect even in a situation where the accused contends that a blank cheque leaf was voluntarily signed and handed over by him to the complainant. [Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar [Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197 :

(2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40] ]. Therefore, mere admission of the drawer's signature, without admitting the execution of the entire contents in the cheque, is now sufficient to trigger the presumption.

37. As soon as the complainant discharges the burden to prove that the instrument, say a cheque, was issued by the accused for discharge of debt, the presumptive device under Section 139 of the Act helps shifting the burden on the accused. The effect of the presumption, in that sense, is to transfer the evidential burden on the accused of proving that the cheque was not received by the Bank towards the discharge of any liability. Until this evidential burden is discharged by the accused, the presumed fact will have to be taken to be true, without expecting the complainant to do anything further.

38.John Henry Wigmore [John Henry Wigmore and the Rules of Evidence : The Hidden Origins of Modern Law] on Evidence states as follows:

"The peculiar effect of the presumption of law is merely to invoke a rule of law compelling the Jury to reach the conclusion in the absence of evidence to the contrary from the opponent but if the opponent does offer evidence to the contrary (sufficient to satisfy the Judge's requirement of some evidence), the presumption 'disappears as a rule of law and the case is in the Jury's hands free from any

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rule'."

39. The standard of proof to discharge this evidential burden is not as heavy as that usually seen in situations where the prosecution is required to prove the guilt of an accused. The accused is not expected to prove the non-existence of the presumed fact beyond reasonable doubt. The accused must meet the standard of "preponderance of probabilities", similar to a defendant in a civil proceeding. [Rangappa v. Sri Mohan [Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 477 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 184 : AIR 2010 SC 1898] ].

40. In order to rebut the presumption and prove to the contrary, it is open to the accused to raise a probable defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. The words "until the contrary is proved"

occurring in Section 139 do not mean that the accused must necessarily prove the negative that the instrument is not issued in discharge of any debt/liability but the accused has the option to ask the Court to consider the non-existence of debt/liability so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the case, to act upon the supposition that debt/liability did not exist. [Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa [Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa, (2019) 5 SCC 418 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 571 : AIR 2019 SC 1983] ; see also Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets [Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC 513 : (2009) 1 SCC (Civ) 629 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 823] ].

41. In other words, the accused is left with two options. The first option--of proving that the debt/liability does not exist-- is to lead defence evidence and conclusively establish with certainty that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt/liability. The second option is to prove the non-existence of debt/liability by a preponderance of probabilities by referring to the particular circumstances of the case. The preponderance of probability in favour of the accused's case may be even fifty-one to forty-nine and arising out of the entire circumstances of the case, which includes : the complainant's version in the original complaint, the case in the legal/demand notice, complainant's case at the trial, as also the plea of the accused in the reply notice, his Section 313CrPC statement or at the trial as to the circumstances under which the promissory note/cheque was executed. All of

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them can raise a preponderance of probabilities justifying a finding that there was "no debt/liability". [Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets [Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC 513 : (2009) 1 SCC (Civ) 629 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 823] ].

42. The nature of evidence required to shift the evidential burden need not necessarily be direct evidence i.e. oral or documentary evidence or admissions made by the opposite party; it may comprise circumstantial evidence or presumption of law or fact.

43. The accused may adduce direct evidence to prove that the instrument was not issued in discharge of a debt/liability and, if he adduces acceptable evidence, the burden again shifts to the complainant. At the same time, the accused may also rely upon circumstantial evidence and, if the circumstances so relied upon are compelling, the burden may likewise shift to the complainant. It is open for him to also rely upon presumptions of fact, for instance those mentioned in Section 114 and other sections of the Evidence Act. The burden of proof may shift by presumptions of law or fact. In Kundan Lal case [Kundan Lal Rallaram v. Custodian (Evacuee Property), 1961 SCC OnLine SC 10 : AIR 1961 SC 1316] when the creditor had failed to produce his account books, this Court raised a presumption of fact under Section 114, that the evidence, if produced would have shown the non-existence of consideration. Though, in that case, this Court was dealing with the presumptive clause in Section 118 NI Act, since the nature of the presumptive clauses in Sections 118 and 139 is the same, the analogy can be extended and applied in the context of Section 139 as well.

44. Therefore, in fine, it can be said that once the accused adduces evidence to the satisfaction of the Court that on a preponderance of probabilities there exists no debt/liability in the manner pleaded in the complaint or the demand notice or the affidavit-evidence, the burden shifts to the complainant and the presumption "disappears" and does not haunt the accused any longer. The onus having now shifted to the complainant, he will be obliged to prove the existence of a debt/liability as a matter of fact and his failure to prove would result in dismissal of his complaint case. Thereafter, the presumption under Section 139 does not again come to the

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complainant's rescue. Once both parties have adduced evidence, the Court has to consider the same and the burden of proof loses all its importance. [Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa [Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa, (2019) 5 SCC 418 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 571 : AIR 2019 SC 1983] ; see also, Rangappa v. Sri Mohan [Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 477 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 184 :

AIR 2010 SC 1898] ]"

11. The following principles emerge from the analysis of the above

decision of the Supreme Court:-

(i) Section 118 of the Act inter alia directs that it shall be

presumed, until the contrary is proved, that every negotiable

instrument was made or drawn for consideration. Section 139 of

the Act stipulates that "unless the contrary" is proved, it shall be

presumed, that the holder of the cheque received the cheque, for

the discharge of, whole or part of any debt or liability.

(ii) As Section 139 requires that the Court "shall presume" the

fact stated therein, it is obligatory on the Court to raise this

presumption in every case where the factual basis for the raising of

the presumption had been established. But this does not preclude

the person against whom the presumption is drawn from rebutting

it and proving the contrary as is clear from the use of the phrase

"unless the contrary is proved".

(iii) The Court will necessarily presume that the cheque had

been issued towards discharge of a legally enforceable debt/liability

in two circumstances. Firstly, when the drawer of the cheque

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admits issuance/execution of the cheque and secondly, in the event

where the complainant proves that cheque was issued/executed in

his favour by the drawer. The circumstances set out above form the

fact(s) which bring about the activation of the presumptive clause

(iv) The effect of the presumption, in that sense, is to transfer

the evidential burden on the accused of proving that the cheque

was not received by the Bank towards the discharge of any liability.

Until this evidential burden is discharged by the accused, the

presumed fact will have to be taken to be true, without expecting

the complainant to do anything further.

(v) In order to rebut the presumption and prove to the

contrary, it is open to the accused to raise a probable defence

wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can

be contested. The words "until the contrary is proved" occurring in

Section 139 do not mean that the accused must necessarily prove

the negative that the instrument is not issued in discharge of any

debt/liability but the accused has the option to ask the Court to

consider the non-existence of debt/liability so probable that a

prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the case, to act

upon the supposition that debt/liability did not exist.

(vi) The accused is left with two options. The first option--of

proving that the debt/liability does not exist--is to lead defence

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evidence and conclusively establish with certainty that the cheque

was not issued in discharge of a debt/liability. The second option is

to prove the non-existence of debt/liability by a preponderance of

probabilities by referring to the particular circumstances of the

case.

(vii) The nature of evidence required to shift the evidential

burden need not necessarily be direct evidence i.e. oral or

documentary evidence or admissions made by the opposite party; it

may comprise circumstantial evidence or presumption of law or

fact. The accused may adduce direct evidence to prove that the

instrument was not issued in discharge of a debt/liability and, if he

adduces acceptable evidence, the burden again shifts to the

complainant. At the same time, the accused may also rely upon

circumstantial evidence and, if the circumstances so relied upon are

compelling, the burden may likewise shift to the complainant.

12. If on the touchstone of the above principles laid down by the

Supreme Court this case is considered then it is clear that the

Complainant's son has already secured admission for medical course in

a college at Chennai and also in a college at Dhule, Maharashtra. What

is represented by the Petitioner to the Respondent No.1-Complainant

that Rs.27,00,000/- and Rs. 7,48,630/- are required to be paid inter alia

by Demand Drafts. In Maharashtra 15% seats are reserved for private

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Medical Colleges. The private colleges or the institutions conducting

these private colleges are registered Public Trusts registered under

Maharashtra Public Trust Act, 1950. They give the admission with

respect to said reserved seats on the basis of merits. Some of the

colleges also take donations and issues receipts for the same.

Admittedly, the Petitioner-Accused has returned the said amount by

three cheques each of Rs.9,00,000/- dated 20th August, 2022, 22nd

August, 2022 and 22nd August, 2022. It is not even the case of the

Petitioner that said amount is given to the management of the said

Medical College or any person as illegal gratification for securing

admission for the son of the Respondent in Medical College. In fact

admittedly the Petitioner has returned back the said amount by cheques

which have been dishonoured. As per the settled legal position in the

facts and circumstances it can be presumed until the contrary is proved

that every negotiable instruments was made or drawn for consideration.

Section 118 of the Act inter alia provides that it shall be presumed, until

the contrary is proved, that every negotiable instrument was made or

drawn for consideration. Section 139 of the Act stipulates that "unless

the contrary is proved, it shall be presumed, that the holder of the

cheque received the cheque, for the discharge of, whole or part of any

debt or liability. Thus, in the facts and circumstances it can not be said

that said presumption is rebutted.

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13. In any case the Respondent No.1 has been directed to deposit

under Section 143-A of the NI Act only amount of Rs.5,40,000/- i.e.

20% of the cheque amount. Obviously, said amount is subject to the

result of said S.S.C. No. 429 of 2023. Thus, no prejudice is caused to the

Petitioner as observed by the learned Sessions Court while passing

impugned order in revision.

14. Learned Counsel of the Petitioner has relied on the judgment of

the Supreme Court in the case of Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava v. State of

Jharkhand 2 and more particularly on paragraph no.19(c)(iii) wherein,

Supreme Court has held that if the defence of the Accused is found to

be prima facie plausible, the Court may exercise discretion in refusing to

grant interim compensation. However, as already discussed hereinabove

this is a case where the representation made by the Petitioner was that

amount was required to be paid by the Demand Drafts of

Rs.27,00,000/- and Rs.7,48,630/- to the concerned college. Thus, prima

facie the case of the Petitioner-Accused is not found to be plausible.

Even if it is assumed that the said amount is paid by cash then also as

noted hereinabove private Medical College are run by Public Trust

registered under the provision of Maharashtra Public Trust Act, 1950

and are duty bound to issue receipts of the amount taken. It is not even

the case of the Petitioner that said amount is paid in cash to any person

as illegal gratification. Thus, in the facts and circumstances, discretion 2 AIR OnLine 2024 SCC 174

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exercised by the learned trial Court as confirmed by the learned

Revisional Court in directing payment of compensation is proper. No

case is made out for interference in the said discretion particularly

under jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of

India.

15. Learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner has also pointed out

a FIR bearing No.899 dated 30 th September, 2022 lodged by the

Respondent No.1 i.e. present Complainant against Petitioner, her

husband and one Jayram Madhukar Patil. Learned Counsel of the

Petitioner relied more particularly on last paragraph of the

supplementary statement dated 1st October, 2022. The said last

paragraph reads as under:-

ßekpZ@,izhy&2022 e/;s vihZrk iMoG o vjfoan iMoG ;kauh ek÷;k eqykps vWMeh'kups ea´ky;krqu ckGk dkusdj ;kaP;kdMqu ysVj feG.kkj vkgs vls lkaxqu ek÷;kdMqu ,dnk 1]50]000/- :- ¼fnM yk[k :-½ o nqlÚ;kank 2]00]000/- :- ¼nksu yk[k :-½ vls ,dq.k 3]50]000/- :- ?ksrys gksrs- lnjps iSls ea=ky;kr ns.;klkBh vjfoan iMoG ;kP;klkscr nqxsZ'k ikVhy ;kl ikBfoys gksrs- R;k njE;kus ekÖ;k eqykps vWMeh'kups lanHkkZr vjfoan ikVhy ;kauh eyk] ek>k eqyxk vkdkj ikVhy vls nqxsZ'k ikVhy ;kP;k ;quksOgk dkj e/;s lkrkjk ;sFkhy fVªcks VªsaM xqycgkj ukokpk gkWVsy ;sFks usys gksrs- vkEgkyk gkWVsy e/;s cloqu vjfoan iMoG ;kauh vkeP;kdMqu ?ksrysY;k iS';kae/kqu dkgh jDde ?ksÅu gkWVsyP;k ikdhZxa e/;s tkÅu rsFks ,dk blekl iSls fnysys vkgsr vls ;sÅu vkEgkyk lkaxk;pk- vjfoan iMoG gk R;kfBdk.kh dks.kk blekl HksVk;pk o R;k blekl fdrh iSls |ko;kpk ;kckcr eyk lkaxrk ;s.kkj ukgh-Þ

(Emphasis added) English translation is as follows:

"In the month of March / April, 2022, Arpita Padval and Arvind Padval had obtained from me a sum of 1,50,000/- (Rs. One Lakh Fifty thousand only) on one occasion and Rs.2,00,000/- (Rs. Two Lakhs) on another occasion, thus a total sum of Rs.3,50,000/-, by telling me that a letter for admission of my

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son would be received from Bala Kanekar, from Mantralaya. Durgesh Patil was sent along with Arvind Padval to pay the said money in Mantralaya. In the meantime, in connection with the admission of my son, Arvind Patil had taken me and my son Aakar Patil to a Hotel viz. Tribo Trend Gulbahar, at Sarara by making us to sit in the Innova Car of Durgesh Patil. Arvind Padval would make us to sit in the hotel and then by coming to us, he would tell us that he had taken some money from out of the monies that he had received from us and had paid the said money to one person in the parking area of the Hotel. I cannot say as to whom Arvind Padval would meet at the said place and as to how much money he would pay to the said person."

16. Thus, what is set out in the said paragraph is that the Petitioner

and her husband had taken an amount of Rs.1,50,000/- and

Rs.2,00,000/- for giving the same to the Mantralaya for getting some

letter. Perusal of the above paragraph shows that the amounts which are

mentioned hereinabove are totally different than the subject matter of

S.C.C. No.429 of 2022 filed under Section 138 r/w 142 of the NI Act.

17. Although, learned Counsel for the Petitioner has not pointed out

contents of the said FIR which states that said amount of

Rs.27,00,000/- was required to be paid by cash. However, as set out

hereinabove these private Medical Colleges are run by Public Trusts

registered under the provisions Maharashtra Public Trust Act, 1950 are

duty bound to issue receipts for the amounts paid. As the son of the