[Cites 12, Cited by 0]
Bombay High Court
Sunita Ashok Jadahv vs State Of Maharashtra on 15 December, 2025
Author: Bharati Dangre
Bench: Bharati Dangre
2025:BHC-AS:55128-DB
WAKLE
MANOJ
JANARDHAN
Digitally signed by
Manoj 903-WP-2563-2024.doc
WAKLE MANOJ
JANARDHAN
Date: 2025.12.16
11:20:58 +0530
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.2563 OF 2024
Sunita Ashok Jadhav & Anr. ...Petitioners
V/s.
The State of Maharashtra & Anr. ...Respondents
Mr. Siddharth A. Mehta a/w. Mr. Sanket Chorghe, Ms. Harshada
Shrikhande and Mr. Vaibhav, for the Petitioners.
Mr. S.R. Agarkar, APP for the Respondent No.1 - State.
Mr. Shantanu Katkar, for Respondent No.2.
Mr. Ganesh Zinjurde, PSI, Chinchwad Police Station, present.
CORAM: BHARATI DANGRE, &
SHYAM C. CHANDAK, JJ.
DATED : 15th DECEMBER, 2025.
JUDGMENT :
- (PER BHARATI DANGRE J.)
1) The two Petitioners, being the mother of the Accused No.1 and
the Petitioner No.2 being the maternal uncle of Accused No.1, have
approached this Court for quashing and setting aside of the FIR registered
on 30th April, 2024 at the instance of Respondent No.2 resulting it being
numbered as CR No.189 of 2024 as well as the charge-sheet which is filed
subsequent to the investigation being completed.
2) Heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioners, the learned APP
for Respondent No.1 - State and the learned Counsel for Respondent No.2.
3) With the assistance of the respective Counsel, we have perused
the charge-sheet which has leveled accusations against three accused, two
of them being Accused Nos.2 and 3 are before us.
Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith.
Manoj 903-WP-2563-2024.doc
The charge-sheet is filed under Sections 354, 376, 376(2)(n),
504, 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and under
Sections 3(1)(w)(i), 3(1)(w)(ii), 3(2), 3(V), 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(va) of
the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
Act, 1989 (for short 'SC & ST Act')
4) It is urged by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners, who
being arraigned as the Accused Nos.2 and 3 that the only allegation
levelled against them is that from December, 2023 onwards when she
insisted the Accused No.1 to enter into a marital tie, she realized that he
was avoiding any conversation and specifically told that he will discuss it at
home and respond to her. On 01/03/2024, the Accused No.1 informed her
that his mother is not in favour of the alliance. Thereafter, on due
consideration she decided to meet his mother and accordingly, visited his
residential premises. While it was being discussed that her son was
carrying an affair with her and they are desirous to get married, his mother
along with his uncle - Daji Sushant Londhe, flatly refused to accept their
alliance and it is alleged that they also pointed out to her that she belongs
to a lower caste and for this precise reason, they don't want to establish
any relationship with her. The FIR also alleged that she was hurled abuses
in the name of caste and was driven out of their home.
5) With this allegation, we have also referred to the material in
the charge-sheet to find that except this statement coming in the
Manoj 903-WP-2563-2024.doc
complaint, there is no other material that has been collated, to establish
that the abuses which were hurled by the two accused persons in the name
of caste, were overheard by someone.
The learned Counsel for the Petitioners urged that the
necessary ingredient to attract Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC & ST
Act, it is necessary that the intentional insult or intimidation must with an
intent to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe "in
any place within public view". Similarly, in terms of clause (s) of Section
3(1), the abuses in the name of caste must also necessary be "in any place
within public view". In this context, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners
has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in case of Hitesh Verma v/s.
State of Uttarakhand and another1 which has thrown light on the term
"place in public view" distinguished from the word "public place".
Reiterating that the offence under the Act can be made out if it was only
committed in public view and not public place, the Apex Court, in
paragraph nos.13 and 14 has recorded thus :-
" 13. The offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act would indicate the
ingredient of intentional insult and intimidation with an intent to
humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. All
insults or intimidations to a person will not be an offence under the
Act unless such insult or intimidation is on account of victim belonging
to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The object of the Act is to
improve the socio-economic conditions of the Scheduled Castes and
the Scheduled Tribes as they are denied number of civil rights. Thus,
an offence under the Act would be made out when a member of the
vulnerable section of the Society is subjected to indignities,
1 (2020) 10 SCC 710
Manoj 903-WP-2563-2024.doc
humiliations and harassment. The assertion of title over the land by
either of the parties is not due to either the indignities, humiliations or
harassment. Every citizen has a right to avail their remedies in
accordance with law. Therefore, if the appellant or his family members
have invoked jurisdiction of the civil court, or that respondent No.2
has invoked the jurisdiction of the civil court, then the parties are
availing their remedies in accordance with the procedure established
by law. Such action is not for the reason that respondent No.2 is a
member of Scheduled Caste.
14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in
"any place within public view". What is to be regarded as "place in
public view" had come up for consideration before this Court in the
judgment reported as Swaran Singh v. State (2008) 8 SCC 435. The
Court had drawn distinction between the expression "public place"
and "in any place within public view". It was held that if an offence is
committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the
lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the
boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the
public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building,
but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or
friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public
view. The Court held as under:
"28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first
informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a
"chamar") when he stood near the car which was parked at the
gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place
within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place
within public view. It could have been a different matter had the
alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was
not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed
outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn
can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the
boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the
public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but
some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or
friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public
view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression "place within
public view" with the expression "public place". A place can be a
private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a
public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or
leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local
body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by
private persons or private bodies."
Manoj 903-WP-2563-2024.doc
6) We deem it appropriate to refer to the said observations of the
Apex Court.
Since we find that in the complaint, the Complainant had
alleged that she went to the house of Accused No.1 and she was there for a
considerable long period of time, when she was made to face humiliation
on the basis of her caste.
The learned Counsel for the Respondent No.2 has placed
reliance upon her statement under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. which find an
improvised version to the effect that after she was subjected to humiliation
in the house, the Accused Nos.2 and 3 had driven her out of the house and
therefore, when she came out of the house, the abuses in the name of caste
still continued.
The aforesaid version cannot be accepted for the reason that
this do not find mention in the complaint nor has the Complainant got any
supplementary statement recorded. Apart from this, it was her version that
after she was thrown out of the house, the abuses continued, it must have
been overheard by some member of the public other than the member of
the family including the Accused Nos.2 and 3 who were present in the
house. In absence thereof, we are satisfied that no case is made out against
the Accused Nos.2 and 3, the present Petitioners before us under the
provisions of SC & ST Act and in any case, as far as the accusations under
Section 376 of IPC are concerned, they are against the Accused No.1 i.e.,
Manoj 903-WP-2563-2024.doc
the son of the Petitioner No.1.
7) Since this is a fit case where on reading of the FIR as well as
the material collected in the charge-sheet in the manner as it is, no offence
has been made out from the SC&ST Act, the Petition is allowed by
quashing and setting aside the subject FIR i.e., CR No.189 of 2024
registered with Chinchwad Police Station, Pimpri-Chinchwad, Dist. Pune
as well as the consequent charge-sheet arising therefrom.
Writ Petition is made absolute.
(SHYAM C. CHANDAK, J.) (BHARATI DANGRE, J.)
