Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 8579 Bom
Judgement Date : 5 December, 2025
2025:BHC-AS:53174
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AGK
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.4578 OF 2013
Kamlesh Suryabhan Singh,
Aged 43 years, r/at: 701, Bldg. No.8,
Anita Nagar, Lokhandwala Complex,
Kandivali (East), Mumbai 400 101 ... petitioner
V/s.
1. Kandivali Education Society,
a registered Public Trust & Society,
ATUL through it's Secretary, having office
GANESH
KULKARNI at C/o. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
Digitally signed by
ATUL GANESH
KULKARNI
Date: 2025.12.05
Vividhlakshi Vidyalaya, Shantilal
11:32:06 +0530
Modi Road, Kandivali (West),
Mumbai 400 067.
2. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel Vividklakshi
Vidyalaya & Junior College,
a recognized and aided Secondary
English Medium School and Junior
College, through its Head Mistress
having address at Shantilal Modi Road,
Kandivali (West), Mumbai 400 067.
3. Mrs. Sangeeta Srivastava,
Head Mistress of Sardar Vallabhbhai
Patel Vividhalakshi Vidyalaya,
Shantilal Modi Road, Kandivali (West),
Mumbai 400 067 AND
residing at Flat No.B-121, 12th floor,
Mala Tower, Plot No.92/93, Off. New
Link Road, Lokhandwala Complex,
Andheri (West), Mumbai 400 053
1
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4. The Educational Inspector - West Zone,
Office of the Educational Inspector
(West Zone), Ismail Yusuf College
Campus, Jogeshwari (East),
Mumbai 400 062.
5. The Dy. Director of Education of Greater
Mumbai, having address at Jawahar
Bal Bhavan, Charni Road,
Mumbai - 400 004 ... Respondents
Ms. Kumud A. Bhatia for the petitioner.
Mr. S.C. Naidu with Mr. Manoj M. Gujar and Mr.
Pradeep Kumar i/by C.R. Naidu & Co., for respondent
Nos.1 to 3-Management.
Ms. Snehal S. Jadhav, AGP for respondent Nos.4 and 5-
State.
CORAM : AMIT BORKAR, J.
RESERVED ON : NOVEMBER 27, 2025
PRONOUNCED ON : DECEMBER 5, 2025
JUDGMENT:
1. By this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner, who is a teacher, challenges the legality and validity of the Judgment and Order dated 11 January 2013 passed by the School Tribunal in Appeal No. 4 of 2010. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal and held that the resignation tendered by the petitioner was not forced or involuntary.
2. The facts that led to the filing of the present petition can be stated briefly. The petitioner was appointed in 2003 as a Shikshan
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Sevak in the subject of physical education. After successful completion of the prescribed period, his services were confirmed and he was granted permanency on 7 August 2006. The petitioner alleges that respondent No. 3, who was the Head Mistress, misused her position and tried to compel him to maintain an illicit relationship with her. According to the petitioner, on 9 January 2010 he received a call from Smt. Kaur, Education Officer, directing him to meet her in the office of respondent No. 3 in respondent No. 2 school. The petitioner and his wife accordingly went to the school and entered the cabin of respondent No. 3 at about 6 p.m. on 9 January 2010. He states that several persons were present there. They included Mr. Kamlesh Yadav, Municipal Corporator, Mr. Mahesh Chandrana, Secretary to respondent No. 1, Mr. S. Vyas, Supervisor, Smt. Kaur from the Education Inspector's office, Vice Principal Mr. M. D. John, as well as one BJP leader, one MNS leader and respondent No. 3 herself.
3. The petitioner states that Mr. Kamlesh Yadav and respondent No. 3 demanded that he should resign immediately. He was told that if he refused, his reputation would be damaged before the media. Respondent No. 3 handed over blank papers to him. With the involvement of respondent No. 3 and Smt. Kaur, a resignation letter was dictated to him. The letter mentioned that he was resigning for personal reasons.
4. The petitioner states that his wife felt overwhelmed on seeing the scene inside the cabin. She suffered chest pain. A doctor was called. She was admitted to Baba Hanuman Maternity and Surgical Hospital at Borivali.
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5. On 10 January 2010, the petitioner telephoned Mr. Mahesh Chandrana and requested him to treat the resignation as cancelled since it was obtained by force. He received no reply. On the same day, the petitioner received another letter dated 9 January 2010 directing him to proceed on leave. On 13 January 2010, the petitioner addressed a letter to respondent No.1 withdrawing and cancelling the resignation dated 9 January 2010. He recorded the details of the force and coercion used upon him after office hours on 9 January 2010. A copy of the letter was sent by RPAD on 14 January 2010. The petitioner also lodged a written complaint at Kandivali Police Station on 13 January 2010 regarding the forced resignation. The complaint was submitted on 14 January 2010.
6. On 20 January 2010, respondent No. 1 sent a letter dated 19 January 2010 stating that the resignation of the petitioner was voluntary and denying the allegations made by him in his letter dated 13 January 2010.
7. On 17 January 2010, two students trained by the petitioner visited his residence. They informed him that respondent No. 3 was compelling them to issue letters against him.
8. On 5 January 2010, the petitioner filed Appeal No. 4 of 2010 before the School Tribunal under Section 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 challenging the alleged forced resignation. On 22 March 2010, the respondents filed their written statement contending that the petitioner had submitted his resignation voluntarily and without any pressure. They admitted that a meeting was held on 9
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January 2010 during which the petitioner submitted his resignation and that it was accepted on the same day. On 11 January 2013, the Presiding Officer, School Tribunal dismissed the appeal by the impugned Judgment and Award. The petitioner has therefore approached this Court.
9. The petition raises two narrow questions. First, was the resignation of the petitioner of 9 January 2010 voluntary? Second, if the resignation was not voluntary, did the School Tribunal err in law in holding that it was voluntary and in dismissing the appeal? I record the parties' primary contentions and test them against the evidence on record.
10. The petitioner submits that he was coerced to sign a resignation on 9 January 2010. He submits that the Head Mistress, respondent No.3, instigated others to obtain the writing. He submits that political persons and the local corporator were present in the school cabin after working hours. He submits that the Secretary of respondent No.1 dictated the words and obtained his signature. He points to his immediate letter of 13 January 2010 withdrawing the resignation. He points to the police complaint of 13 January 2010. He relies on the abnormal wording of the document produced by management and submits that the writing does not convey voluntary resignation. He explains the short delay between the incident and the complaint by reference to his wife's sudden illness and hospitalisation. He submits that mandatory steps under the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools Act and Rules were not followed; he relies on Section 4(6), Section 7 and Rule 40 and Rules 33 to 37 to say his service could not be
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terminated without due process.
11. The management submits that the petitioner wrote the resignation in his own hand. He signed duplicate copies and put the date. They produce a letter of acceptance. They say the resignation was tendered after the victim narrated the incident and after the petitioner admitted misconduct in the presence of several persons. They say Mrs. Kaur, the Assistant Deputy Education Inspector, advised resignation as a pragmatic step to avoid police proceedings. They point to the PTA involvement and to contemporaneous complaints by the victim and her classmate. They rely on the handwriting of the resignation, the acceptance, and the subsequent FIR and charge-sheet under Section 354 IPC to show the resignation was not coerced. They urge that the Tribunal's finding rests on evidence and is not liable to interference in writ jurisdiction. They rely on the settled principle that supervisory jurisdiction will not be used to reappreciate evidence unless the finding is unsupported by any evidence or is perversely wrong.
12. This Court exercises supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 to correct illegality and perversity. The Court does not normally re-weigh evidence. The test is narrow. Interference is justified where the finding of fact has no evidentiary basis or where the conclusion is so unreasonable that no sensible tribunal could have reached it.
Analysis of the primary factual material"
13. The resignation letter. The document placed on record by the
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management is in the petitioner's handwriting. It bears his signature and a date. The letter of acceptance contains an endorsement of "received" in the petitioner's handwriting. These facts are not seriously disputed. A writing in the employee's hand is a strong piece of contemporaneous evidence of his intention. Such a document carries a presumption of regularity. The law attaches weight to acts performed in writing, with signature and date, for these elements ordinarily reflect a conscious and deliberate act of the person executing it.
14. When the employee himself writes the document, signs it, prepares it in duplicate, and places a date on it, the Court is expected to begin its inquiry from the position that the employee acted with awareness of the consequences. This presumption is not absolute. It may be displaced if the employee demonstrates that the writing does not reflect his free will. However, the burden then lies squarely on the person challenging the writing. He must show by clear facts that the act was not the product of his volition.
15. Here, the petitioner has not questioned that the writing is his. He has not alleged fabrication of handwriting or signature. He has not disputed the endorsement "received" written by him on the acceptance letter. These admissions narrow the scope of inquiry. The question then is not whether the document came from him, but whether something occurred at the moment of writing that robbed him of free choice.
16. On this issue, the petitioner has relied on general allegations of pressure and presence of outsiders. He has not shown that he
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was prevented from refusing to write. He has not placed medical evidence or independent statements to show that his mental or physical condition was impaired at the time. The resignation was produced in duplicate, which indicates that the petitioner had the time and opportunity to write it twice. When a person is under immediate physical threat or extreme intimidation, it is unlikely that he would proceed to write two identical documents, sign both, put dates, and then add an endorsement on the acceptance letter.
17. The Tribunal was conscious of these circumstances when it formed its view. It observed that the petitioner's plea of coercion did not match the strong evidentiary value of a handwritten, signed, dated document and the endorsement on the acceptance. The reasoning of the Tribunal is in line with the settled principle that contemporaneous documentary evidence outweighs later self- serving allegations unless cogent reasons are shown to treat the writing as involuntary.
18. Thus, on a proper scrutiny, the writing in the petitioner's hand, carrying his signature, date, and acknowledgement of receipt, stands as a significant indicator of voluntary conduct unless convincingly displaced, which has not been done in the present case.
19. The content and form of the writing. The petitioner attacks the grammatical quality and wording of the resignation. He points to one line in the record and argues that it does not convey resignation. He relies on this to say that there was no clear intention to quit service. The submission has been carefully
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considered.
20. On perusal of the complete resignation, it is evident that the petitioner clearly states that he was resigning with immediate effect. The document contains a direct request that the Management accept his resignation from 9 January 2010. The wording is plain. It leaves no uncertainty about the nature of the act. The Tribunal has rightly looked at the document as a whole and not in isolation.
21. It is common experience that an employee may not always use perfect grammar or polished language while writing a resignation. The law does not insist on technical precision. What matters is the intention that emerges from the writing. The intention must be gathered from the entire text, the signature, the date, and the surrounding circumstances. When the writing taken as a whole expresses a desire to leave service, the Court cannot treat grammatical weakness as creating doubt where none exists.
22. The petitioner's submission overlooks the fact that he wrote the resignation in duplicate, signed both copies, dated them, and also acknowledged receipt of the acceptance letter. These actions reinforce the meaning of the document. They show that the petitioner understood what he was writing and took steps consistent with a voluntary resignation.
23. The Tribunal applied this settled approach. It read the document in its true context. It found that the wording, though not elaborate, was clear. The Tribunal held that the petitioner expressed an intention to resign and that the Management
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accepted it on that basis. This reasoning is sound. There is nothing on record to show that the language of the resignation creates ambiguity or supports the petitioner's theory that the writing was something other than a resignation.
24. Thus, the challenge based on grammatical or linguistic defects is without merit. The document, read as a whole, conveys resignation in clear terms.
25. Presence of third parties and coercion. The petitioner stresses the presence of political persons and their entry after office hours. Presence of outsiders in the school office after hours is a relevant circumstance.
26. Coercion must, however, be proved with convincing material. A plea of coercion is not established by a mere assertion, howsoever emphatic. The law expects the party alleging coercion to place before the adjudicating authority facts of a definite character, supported either by contemporaneous conduct, independent material, or surrounding circumstances of a nature that reasonably exclude the possibility of a voluntary act. The standard is not one of mathematical certainty, yet the evidence must be such that a prudent mind can safely conclude that the person's free will stood displaced at the relevant time.
27. In matters relating to resignation, this requirement assumes particular importance. A written resignation, especially one in the employee's own handwriting, usually reflects an intention to relinquish service. To disturb that presumption, the employee must bring forward material that shows pressure, threat, or influence of
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such intensity that the writing loses its voluntary nature. Mere inconvenience, emotional strain, or regret does not amount to coercion. The allegation must be supported by objective indicators. These may include immediate protest, contemporaneous complaint to authorities, medical records showing physical harm, or credible material of persons present at the time of the alleged compulsion.
28. In the present matter, the petitioner indeed lodged a complaint and addressed a letter withdrawing the resignation. These acts deserve due consideration. At the same time, the writings came after the event. They represent the petitioner's version, and while they are relevant, they cannot replace clear proof of coercive conduct. The petitioner relies on the presence of political persons in the school premises. Presence alone does not establish coercion. There must be a clear link between their presence and a threat or act that compelled the petitioner to sign the document. The petitioner has not produced any person who can attest to threats having been issued. His version also contains internal inconsistencies, particularly regarding alleged assault, which reduces the degree of reliability that the Court may normally attach to such a plea.
29. Thus, when one applies the settled principle that coercion must rest on convincing material, it becomes clear that the petitioner has not discharged the burden that the law places upon him. The Tribunal noted this aspect and found no basis to conclude that the resignation was the result of coercion. That finding, viewed against the record, cannot be lightly displaced.
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30. The petitioner relied primarily on his 13 January 2010 letter and on his later pleadings. The 13 January letter records the petitioner's version. The petitioner also made a police complaint on 13 January 2010. These acts are contemporaneous steps and carry weight. At the same time the record shows that the petitioner, when called, went to the school chamber with his wife. The victim narrated the incident in the presence of the petitioner and his wife. The petitioner is recorded to have made admissions to persons present. The management's witnesses and the presence of other senior persons including supply an evidentiary basis for the Tribunal's acceptance of the management's account.
31. Delay and hospitalisation. The petitioner explains the gap between 9 and 13 January on account of his wife's chest pain and hospitalisation. If proved, the wife's illness explains why the petitioner delayed formal action. The petitioner submits that he sent his withdrawal by RPAD on 14 January 2010 and lodged a complaint on 13 January 2010. The documentary endorsements show prompt steps within a short span. The explanation for the delay is therefore plausible. Plausibility alone, however, does not displace the contemporaneous evidence which shows the petitioner's active presence at the school and a signed resignation.
32. Management procedure under the Act and Rules. The petitioner points to Section 7 and Rule 40 which guard the conditions of service in private schools. Those provisions regulate termination and protect service rights. The relevancy of those provisions to a case of voluntary resignation is limited. Where an employee voluntarily tenders resignation, the employer may accept
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it and bring the relationship to an end in accordance with the terms of the engagement. Procedural safeguards intended for disciplinary or termination action do not automatically save a resignation which the employee freely gives. If, however, the resignation is procured by coercion, the employer's singleness of purpose and procedural lacunae may assume importance. Here the primary question remains factual.
33. The Tribunal found no coercion and reached the conclusion that the resignation was voluntary. I have examined this finding with the care that the record demands. The Tribunal has not arrived at its conclusion in a casual manner. It assessed the contemporaneous material, including the resignation written in the petitioner's own hand, the acceptance bearing his endorsement, and the sequence of events as reflected in the documents placed before it. The Tribunal noted that the petitioner, when called, came to the school with his wife. He remained present in the chamber of the Head Mistress and interacted with those assembled. The Tribunal found that the petitioner did not produce any independent witness who could vouch for the alleged acts of force. It also found that the allegations of threat and assault were not consistently set out in all pleadings. These are relevant considerations.
34. The Tribunal also considered the fact that the resignation was drawn up in duplicate, was signed by the petitioner on both copies, and bore the date. The Tribunal treated this as a circumstance pointing to conscious and deliberate conduct. The Tribunal did not accept the petitioner's contention that the
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wording of the letter was incapable of conveying resignation. It treated the wording in the context of the surrounding events and the immediate acceptance by the Management.
35. The Tribunal took note of the petitioner's letter dated 13 January 2010 withdrawing the resignation. It weighed this against the signed document already accepted by the Management and against the fact that the withdrawal came after the matter had escalated. The Tribunal also examined the police complaint lodged by the petitioner. The Tribunal found that the complaint reproduced the petitioner's version but that it lacked independent corroboration. The Tribunal also noticed that the girl student subsequently lodged an FIR which led to filing of a charge sheet. The Tribunal viewed this as a circumstance that lent credibility to the Management's case that the petitioner's conduct had caused concern among the parents and the school authorities.
36. The Tribunal's approach shows that it applied correct principles. It did not proceed on suspicion or assumption. It took into account the fact that a resignation, being an act which ends the employment relationship, must be scrutinised carefully. It examined the circumstances preceding the writing, the nature of the writing, the actions that followed, and the conduct of both sides. On this cumulative assessment, the Tribunal held that the petitioner failed to prove coercion. The Tribunal's reasoning cannot be said to be either perverse or unsupported by evidence. The conclusion that the resignation was voluntary therefore stands fortified by a proper and balanced analysis of the record.
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37. That finding does not fall for interference merely because some Rules were not read out or some formalities were not followed after the event.
38. Admission and subsequent criminal proceedings. The record records that after the matter matured the student lodged an FIR and a charge-sheet was filed under Section 354 IPC. The existence of criminal proceedings does not, by itself, prove coercion. It does show that the allegations against the petitioner had substance and that third parties were concerned enough to initiate action. The existence of a charge-sheet supports the view that the management and others could reasonably have been motivated to secure a prompt removal of the petitioner from active duty. That motive does not establish coercion. It explains the circumstances which led to a meeting and to the resignation.
39. The burden of proof lay on the petitioner to show that the writing of resignation was not voluntary. He produced a contemporaneous withdrawal and a police complaint. He produced explanations about delay. He pointed to the presence of political persons. These factors merit careful consideration. The management produced the resignation in the petitioner's hand, duplicate copies, signatures, date and an acceptance. The management produced witnesses and a version which places the petitioner at the centre of events and accepts culpability in the presence of senior persons. The existence of a contemporaneous signed resignation and an acceptance by the management is weighty and is supported by other contemporaneous actions of the parties.
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40. The School Tribunal examined the materials. It noted the handwriting, the acceptance and the sequence of events. It found that the resignation was voluntary. The Tribunal also noticed the inconsistencies and dealt with the petitioner's allegations of coercion and forgery. The record does not disclose that the Tribunal ignored relevant material. Nor does it show that the Tribunal reached a conclusion without any evidence. The conclusion is one that a reasonable tribunal could reach on the material before it.
41. An employee may always challenge a resignation shown to be obtained by coercion. The courts will set aside a resignation if proved to have been given under undue influence, fraud or coercion. The standard of proof is not of the highest criminal standard. It is, however, the burden of the person who alleges coercion to produce cogent evidence beyond mere assertion. Contemporaneous documents, independent witnesses present at the relevant time, clear medical evidence in support of claimed shock, or immediate and believable external corroboration usually tip the balance. In the present case the petitioner has not produced such corroboration in a measure sufficient to displace the clear contemporaneous writing and its acceptance.
42. It is well settled that this Court will not interfere with findings of fact where those findings are supported by evidence. The Court will interfere only where the findings are perverse, built on no evidence, or are illegal. The present case does not attract interference. The Tribunal's view is based on material on record. The Court must respect that view.
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43. For these reasons the writ petition fails. The petitioner has not discharged the burden to show that the resignation of 9 January 2010 was obtained by coercion or duress in a manner that would render it void in law. The School Tribunal examined the record and arrived at a view which a reasonable tribunal could take.
44. The petition is accordingly dismissed.
45. No order as to costs.
(AMIT BORKAR, J.)
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