[Cites 17, Cited by 0]
Bombay High Court
The State Of Maharashtra vs Maruti Bhikaji Borkar And Ors on 1 December, 2025
2025:BHC-AS:52260 1-APEAL-716-2009.DOC
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 716 OF 2009
The State of Maharashtra
(Through Anti-Corruption Bureau, Pune) ...Appellant
(Orig. Complainant)
Versus
1. Maruti Bhikaji Borkar
Age Adult, Occu-Service,
R/at- Tahsildar Niwas,
Indapur, Dist.-Pune.
2. Shri Ramesh Dhondiba Ware
Age Adult, Occu.-Service,
R/at- Shitole Vasti,
Indapur, Dist-Pune.
3. Shri Shrikant Sopan Gaikwad
Age Adult, Occu.-Nil,
R/at.-Savata Mali Nagar,
Tembhurni Naka, Indapur,
Dist-Pune. ...Respondents
(Orig. Accused Nos.1 to 3)
Ms. Anuja Sunil Gotad, APP for the Appellant-State.
Mr. Uday Dube, Senior Advocate, with Balwant Salunkhe, for
the Respondent Nos.1 and 2.
Mr. Saurabh Butala, for the Respondent No.3.
CORAM Dr. Neela Gokhale, J.
RESERVED ON: 21st November 2025
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PRONOUNCED ON: 1st December 2025
JUDGMENT :
-
1. This Appeal assails the Judgment and Order dated 2nd
September, 2008, passed by the Special Judge at Baramati,
District Pune, acquitting the Respondents herein (Original
Accused Nos.1 and 2) from the offences punishable under
Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short 'PC Act') and
acquitting the Respondent No.3 (Original Accused No.3) from
the offence punishable under Section 12 of the PC Act.
2. By an order dated 18th June 2009, this Court, by a
reasoned order opined that a triable issue was made out by
the Appellant-State of Maharashtra, to be dealt with in this
Appeal, to ascertain the correctness and legality of the
impugned Judgment and Order. Hence, this Court allowed the
Leave Petition and admitted the Appeal.
3. The facts of the case, in brief, are as under:
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3.1 The Respondent No. 1/Accused No.1 (A/1) was a
Tahsildar posted at Indapur. The Accused No.2/Respondent
No.2 (A/2) was working as a clerk in the Tahsildar's office,
and the Accused No.3/Respondent No.3 (A/3) was another
person in the office of the Tahsildar.
3.2 The Informant's father died on 19th June 2005 and he
thus, made an application before the Talathi, seeking to enter
the names of his father's legal heirs on the revenue records of
the agricultural land owned by his father. The Talathi carried
out the mutation entry. The same was challenged by one Vijay
Gulumkar, a cousin brother of the Informant. Hence, the
Application was forwarded to the A/1 for decision. Notices
were issued to the parties calling upon them to appear before
the Tahsildar on 31st October 2005. Written statements were
submitted, and the matter was closed for orders.
3.3 On 22nd December 2007, the Informant (PW/1) went to
the office of the Tahsildar to enquire about the pending case.
The Tahsildar demanded Rs.3,000/- in lieu of clearing the file
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and passing an order in favour of the Informant. The
Informant indicated his inability to pay the said amount
prompting the Tahsildar to reduce the demand to Rs.1,000/-.
The Informant met A/2 who also conveyed the demand of
'Saheb' to him. Again at 05:00 pm. on the same date, the
Informant met the Tahsildar and his clerk in his office, who
asked him as to whether he had brought the amount with
him. They told him that he should pay the money and collect
the order. The Informant assured the A/1 and A/2 that he will
come on the following day with his brother and bring the
money.
3.4 The Informant then, made a complaint with the Anti-
Corruption Bureau, Pune ('ACB') on 28th December 2005,
(Exhibit-30) narrating the demand of the A/1 and A/2. The
ACB Pune laid a trap on the same day. The amount of
Rs.1,000/- (10 currency notes of Rs.100/- denomination) was
taken from the Informant and the numbers of the currency
notes were noted; anthracene powder was applied on the
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currency notes on both sides; and these notes were returned
to the Informant to be given to A/1 - Tahsildar. A pre-trap
panchanama was recorded (Ex.33). One panch, Shri Ganesh
Krishna Chillal (PW/2) accompanied the Informant in the
office of the Tahsildar. The Tahsildar informed him that a copy
of the order was sent to the Talathi and also inquired about
the bribe money. On the instructions of the Tahsildar, the
Informant met A/2 - clerk who pointed to the A/3, namely
Shrikant Gaikwad, who accepted the money on behalf of the
A/1. Two copies of the order were handed over to the
Informant. After paying the money to A/3, the Informant
signaled the officers as per their instructions and he came out
of the room. The pancha accompanying the Informant
remained in the room as per predetermined plan. The
members of the raiding party went in the room on a
predetermined signal and caught A/3 red handed. The
amount was recovered from the drawer of the computer room
in A/2's cabin, where the A/3 had kept the same.
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3.5 The numbers of the currency notes recovered from the
computer room were tallied with the numbers noted by the
ACB officials. Anthracene powder was found on the said
currency notes and on A/3's hand and the drawer of the
computer room. The documents of the mutation entry case
were collected from the Tahsildar's office, a panchanama was
recorded (Exhibit-34). Shri Sudam Darekar (PW/4), Deputy
SP, ACB, conducted the investigation. A sanction for
prosecution of the A/1 and A/2 was sought and granted by
the sanctioning authority (Sanction Order at Ex.40) and upon
completion of the investigation, the charge-sheet was filed
before the JMFC, Indapur. The offence punishable under
Sections 7 and 13 of the PC Act, being exclusively triable by
the Sessions Court, was committed by the JMFC, Indapur, to
the Court of Sessions, for trial.
3.6 By an order dated 26th March 2008, the Special Judge,
Baramati, framed charges against the A/1 and A/2 for
offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w
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Section 13(2) of the PC Act, and against A/3 for offence
punishable under Section 12 of the PC Act.
3.7 After framing of the charges, the Accused pleaded not
guilty and sought to be tried.
3.8 During the course of the trial, the prosecution examined
four witnesses. The witnesses examined are as follows:
PW/1 Sukhdeo Rangnath Gulumkar (First Informant)
PW/2 Ganesh Krishna Chillal (Panch No.1)
PW/3 Shantaram Sitaram Kudale
(Under Secretary Forest Section- Proposal for
sanction received by his office).
PW/4 Sudam Vitthal Darekar
(ACP of the Anti -Corruption Bureau)
3.9 Thereafter, the Trial Court recorded the statements of
the Respondents (Accused Nos.1, 2 and 3) under Section 313
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ('Cr.P.C.'). The
defence of the accused was that of false implication. The
learned Special Judge, Baramati, by its Judgment and Order
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dated 2nd September 2008 acquitted A/1 and A/2 for the
offences punishable under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with
Section 13(2) of the PC Act and acquitted A/3 for the offence
punishable under Section 12 of the PC Act. Aggrieved by the
acquittal, the State of Maharashtra has filed the present
Appeal. By an order dated 18th June 2009, Leave Petition was
allowed, and the Appeal was admitted. The Record and
Proceedings were called and received.
4. Notice was duly served on all the Respondents and Mr.
Balwant Salukhe represented the Respondent Nos.1 and 2.
None appeared for the Respondent No.3.
5. Before adverting to the rival submissions, it is necessary
to discuss the principles laid down by the Supreme Court
governing the scope of interference by the High Courts in an
appeal filed by the State, assailing the finding of acquittal of
the accused by the Trial Court. The Supreme Court in its
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decision in the matter of Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar &
Anr.1 held as below:-
"29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court
culled out the following general principles regarding the
powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal
against an order of acquittal in the following words:
(Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka,
(2007) 4 SCC 415]
"42. From the above decisions, in our considered view,
the following general principles regarding powers of
the appellate court while dealing with an appeal
against an order of acquittal emerge:
(1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-
appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which
the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no
limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of
such power and an appellate court on the evidence
before it may reach its own conclusion, both on
questions of fact and of law.
1 (2022) 3 SCC 471
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(3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and
compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds",
"very strong circumstances", "distorted
conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not
intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate
court in an appeal against acquittal. Such
phraseology are more in the nature of "flourishes of
language" to emphasise the reluctance of an
appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to
curtail the power of the court to review the
evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind
that in case of acquittal, there is double
presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the
presumption of innocence is available to him under
the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence
that every person shall be presumed to be innocent
unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of
law. Secondly, the accused having secured his
acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is
further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by
the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on
the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate
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court should not disturb the finding of acquittal
recorded by the trial court."
6. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of
Karnataka2 the Supreme Court summarized the principles
governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing
with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of Cr.P.C.
as follows:
"8. ....8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens
the presumption of innocence;
8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against
acquittal, is entitled to re appreciate the oral and
documentary evidence;
8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against
acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to
consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a
possible view which could have been taken on the basis of
the evidence on record;
2 (2023) 9 SCC 581
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8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate
court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground
that another view was also possible; and
8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of
acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only
conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the
evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was
proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other
conclusion was possible."
7. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of
interference by an Appellate Court for reversing the judgment
of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court in favour of the
Accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the
following principles:-
(a) That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent
perversity;
(b) That the same is based on a misreading/omission
to consider material evidence on record;
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(c) That no two reasonable views are possible and
only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused
is possible from the evidence available on record.
8. The Appellate Court, to interfere with the judgment of
acquittal, would have to record pertinent findings on the
above factors if it is inclined to reverse the judgment of
acquittal rendered by the trial Court.
9. In the light of above legal principles, I now proceed to
analyze the evidence before the Trial Court, leading to the
acquittal of the accused.
10. The PW/1, the Informant, in his examination-in-chief
has clearly narrated the incident of 22nd December 2005, i.e.,
the day on which the first demand was made by A/1. He
specifically stated that A/1 demanded an amount of
Rs.3,000/- for deciding the application in his favour. There
were some negotiation and A/1 agreed to accept a reduced
amount of Rs.1,000/- in lieu of passing an order in favour of
the Informant. The PW/1 visited the Tahsildar office once
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again, when he was again told by A/1 to pay the money to
A/2, who was instructed by A/1 to prepare the order and give
copy of the same, after receiving the amount. In his cross-
examination, PW/1 has categorically denied that he was
unable to meet A/1 on the said date as he was on tour from
8.00 am to 5.00 pm. It is also revealed from the cross-
examination that PW/1 learnt about the decision on his
application only when he went on the assigned date to pay
the bribe amount. Once, he assured that he had the amount,
he was directed to pay the money to A/2 and collect the order
passed in his favour from the Talathi, to whom the order was
dispatched. Nothing was elicited from the cross-examination
to indicate that A/1 was out of his office on 22 nd December
2005, i.e., the day on which the demand was made. One of
the defence of A/1 was that he was not present in the office
on the date of first demand.
11. The second demand was made at the time when PW/1
and PW/2, i.e., one of the panchas, accompanying PW/1 went
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to the Tahsildar's office, pursuant to the trap laid by the ACB.
The deposition of the pancha confirms the demand made by
A/1 once again. He deposed that he accompanied PW/1 in the
cabin of Tahsildar on 28th December 2005, when the Tahsildar
told PW/1 in his presence that his work is ready, one copy was
sent to the Talathi and another is with A/2 and that he should
collect the order from A/2. A/1 met A/2 after which A/2
asked PW/1 as to whether he had brought the money.
Thereupon A/2 directed PW/1 to give the money to A/3. The
money exchanged hands, A/3 counted the amount and
pocketed it, confirmed to A/2 that money was paid after
which PW/1 was given a copy of his order. PW/2 further
confirmed that in his presence and on a signal given by PW/1
as prearranged, the ACB officials entered the Tahsil office.
On A/3's admission, money was recovered from the drawer of
the computer-room. The currency notes were checked for
anthracene powder, and the numbers were tallied with the
pre-trap panchanama. Anthracene was found on the hands
and pocket of A/3 and the drawer in the computer-room. The
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entire sequence of events has been deposed by PW/2 to have
taken place in his presence. Even on intense cross-
examination, his testimony could not be shaken.
12. PW/3 is the Under-Secretary of Forest Section and has
deposed regarding sanction to prosecute the Accused. The
same has not been seriously contested by the Accused.
13. PW/4 is the ACP of the ACB. In his deposition, he has
narrated the facts regarding complaint of PW/1, the action
taken by him and other officials in laying the trap including,
applying anthracene powder on Rs.100/- notes, which were to
be given by PW/1 to the Accused, the recording of the pre-
trap panchanama and the actual raid carried out. In his cross-
examination, an attempt was made by the defence to establish
that the work of PW/1 was done by the Accused before the
bribe money was paid. However, this witness remained
steadfast in his testimony that the fact of the order passed in
favour of PW/1 was noticed after the trap. Hence, nothing
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beneficial to the Accused was elicited from his cross-
examination.
14. I have perused the pre-trap panchanama and the
panchanama recorded after the bribe money was recovered.
The deposition of the witnesses is consistent with the
panchanamas.
15. I have perused the Judgment and Order acquitting the
Accused carefully. The finding of the acquittal is only on the
basis of a certified copy of a log-book of the Government
vehicle, claimed to have been used by A/1 to travel out of
Indapur to nearby villages for official work on 22 nd December
2005, i.e., on the date on which PW/1 claims that the first
demand was made. The learned Special Judge has relied on
the statement of A/1 recorded under Section 313 of the
Cr.P.C., that on the date of demand, he left his residence at
8.00 a.m. and visited villages - Wadapuri, Bhodni, Lakhewadi,
Chakati, Redni and Warkude (Khurd). The Special Judge has
recorded that a copy of the bill of TA and DA paid to the
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driver Kale, as per entry in the log-book and the certified
copies of the statements of the persons recorded at the time of
spot inspection at Mauje-Wadapuri on 22nd December 2005
are on record and sufficient to show that the A/1 was not in
office on the date of demand. Hence, only on this basis, the
Special Judge has disbelieved the deposition of PW/1.
Secondly, the Special Judge appears to be swayed by the
statement of A/1 that the application was already decided in
favour on 27th December 2005, i.e., one day before the trap.
On these two grounds, the Special Judge acquitted the
Accused.
16. I have perused the Record & Proceedings. There is a
copy of the log-book certified by the Tahsildar himself, which
has an entry of the vehicle leaving Indapur at 8:00 am and
returning at 9:00 pm traveling to the villages mentioned
herein above. There are also other entries in the log-book of
the movement of the Government vehicle on other dates,
including on 28th December 2005 from 9:00 am to 6:00 pm.
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However, it is an admitted fact that, on 28 th December 2005,
between 5:00 pm and 5:45 pm, a trap was laid by the ACB in
A/1's office and all the accused were very much present in the
office. The trap and the recovery of the bribe amount accepted
by Accused is proved by statements of PW/1, PW/2 and
PW/4. It is also not the case of any of the Accused, that they
were not present in the office on 28 th December 2005. Thus,
the entries in the log-book are only indicative of movement of
the Government vehicle from Indapur to various places. The
log-book entries by themselves are not evidence of travel of
A/1 in the Government vehicle. If it was his case that the
Government vehicle is used only by A/1, then, there possibly
cannot be an entry regarding travel by A/1 on 28th December
2005, i.e., on the date of trap. The defence has nowhere
attempted to establish that the Government vehicle was used
only by the Tahsildar, leading the trial court to believe absence
of A/1 in the office on the first demand date. On the contrary,
the prosecution has beyond any doubt proved the demand
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made by A/1 by cogent oral evidence, which the defence was
unable to demolish.
17. The Special Judge has also accepted the statement of
overtime TA/DA given to one Mr. A.J. Kale stated to be the
driver attached to the Tahsil office in Indapur. The statement
of TA/DA is from 1st December 2005 to 27th December 2005
and 3rd January to 28th February 2006. Contrary to the log-
book entry of movement of the vehicle from 9:00 am to 6:00
pm on 28th December 2005, there is no explanation
forthcoming regarding absence of the allowance on 28th
December 2005. Thus, this is a major contradiction on the
part of defence, rendering the story of the Accused completely
unbelievable.
18. There are many documents placed on record by the
defence to show that some applications were made by the
residents of Wadapur regarding requirement of a road in their
village. Of the plethora of documents placed on record, only
two statements relate to 22nd December 2005 signed by
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persons stated to be villagers of Wadapur. The place of
recording of the statements is not visible on the documents.
Most pertinently, none of the persons including any villager,
pancha, driver-Kale nor any person maintaining the log-book
of the Government vehicle is examined by the defence. In
view of the discrepancies in the log-book as compared with
TA/DA statement of the driver, it was imperative for the
defence to examine some witness corroborating the story of
the Accused.
19. The defence of the Accused appears to be that of a plea
of alibi. In the decision in Binay Kumar Singh v. State of
Bihar3. The Supreme Court has considered the question of
alibi meaning 'Elsewhere' and observed that the said plea
would be available only if that 'Elsewhere' is a place far-off
making it impossible or improbable for the person concerned
to reach the place of occurrence of offence. The Apex Court
held as under:
3 1996 INSC 1260
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".......Once the prosecution succeeds in discharging the
burden it is incumbent on the Accused, who adopts the
plea of alibi, to prove it with absolute certainty so as to
exclude the possibility of his presence at the place of
occurrence. When the presence of the accused at the scene
of occurrence has been established satisfactorily by the
prosecution through reliable evidence, normally the court
would be slow to believe any counter-evidence to the
effect that he was elsewhere when the occurrence
happened. But if the evidence adduced by the accused is
of such a quality and of such a standard that the court
may entertain some reasonable doubt regarding his
presence at the scene when the occurrence took place, the
accused would, no doubt, be entitled to the benefit of that
reasonable doubt. For that purpose, it would be a sound
proposition to be laid down that, in such circumstances,
the burden on the accused is rather heavy. It follows,
therefore, that strict proof is required for establishing the
plea of alibi. This Court has observed so on earlier
occasions (vide Dudh Page 13 of 19 Nath Pandey v. State
of U.P. [(1981) 2 SCC 166; State of Maharashtra v.
Narsingrao Gangaram Pimple [(1984) 1 SCC 446."
20. In the facts of the present case, the demand of the
bribe money is established satisfactorily by the prosecution,
through reliable evidence. Hence, it was incumbent on the
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defence to adduce evidence of the alibi by strict proof. The
defence has completely failed to establish the plea of alibi.
There is absolutely no evidence establishing presence of A/1
at the place other than the spot of the occurrence of the
offence. In these circumstances, I am of the considered view
that there is a mis-reading/omission on the part of the Special
Judge in considering the material evidence on record. There is
thus, a patent infirmity in the Judgment and Order impugned
herein.
21. The other basis of acquittal as per the Special Judge is
that, there was no motive for the demand of bribe as the order
in favour of the Informant was passed on 27th December 2005
itself. This finding is also contrary to the evidence on record.
The prosecution has established the factum of demand and
acceptance of bribe money by A/1 and A/2 beyond
reasonable doubt. It has come on record that PW/1 was
informed regarding the order passed on 27th December 2005
when he along with PW/2-Pancha went to the office of the
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Accused to pay the money, pursuant to the trap laid by the
ACB. The PW/1 was told that his order was sent to the
Talathi's office and categorically A/2 was directed by A/1 to
take money from PW/1. The entire transaction was that of a
simultaneous give and take. The fact of passing of the order
was informed to him at the same time when the bribe money
was accepted from him. Hence, the finding of the Special
Judge in this regard is quite distorted, in this regard, as well.
22. Section 7 of the PC Act deals with public servants
accepting or attempting to accept illegal gratification other
than their legal remuneration. It's essential ingredients are (i)
that the person accepting the gratification should be a public
servant; and (ii) that he should accept the gratification for
himself, and the gratification should be as a motive or reward
for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or
forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official function,
favour or disfavour to any person. Insofar as Section 13(1)(d)
of the PC Act, it was amended by the Prevention of Corruption
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(Amendment) Act, 2018, with effect from 26th July, 2018.
However, in view of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act,
1897, Section 13(1)(d) prior to the amendment, is applicable
to the facts of the present case, as the offence was stated to
have been committed on 22nd December 2005 and 28th
December 2005. Thus, its essential ingredients are (i) that he
should have been a public servant; (ii) that he should have
used corrupt or illegal means or otherwise abused his position
as such public servant, and (iii) that he should have obtained
a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage for himself or for any
other person. The facts in the present case not only bring
home the guilt to A/1 but also A/2, who directed the
Informant to hand over the bribe money to A/3 and in lieu of
the same, gave a copy of the order to the Informant. Thus,
A/1 and A/2 are both complicit in commission of offence. As
far as A/3 is concerned, the prosecution has been unable to
establish beyond reasonable doubt, the abetment of the
offence by A/3. The prosecution has failed to establish the
active role and knowledge of A/3 that the money given to him
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was bribe money. Hence, the acquittal of A/3 cannot be
faulted.
23. The Supreme Court in its decision in the case of State of
Karnataka v. Chandrasha4 has reproduced its observations in
an earlier decision in the matter of Swatanter Singh v. State of
Haryana5
"6....... Corruption is corroding, like cancerous lymph
nodes, the vital veins of the body politic, social fabric of
efficiency in the public service and demoralizing the
honest officers. The efficiency in public service would
improve only when the public servant devotes his sincere
attention and does the duty diligently, truthfully, honestly
and devotes himself assiduously to the performance of the
duties of his post. The reputation of being corrupt would
gather thick and unchaseable clouds around the conduct
of the officer and gain notoriety much faster than the
smoke."
24. Corruption on the part of public officers erodes the
faith reposed by the citizens and has a pervasive impact on
4 2024 INSC 899
5 (1997) 4 SCC 14
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governance and democracy. Undoubtedly, the amount of bribe
is a mere Rs.1,000/- however, it is settled law that it is not
necessary for the amount involved to be substantial to draw
the presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act. As per
Section 20(3) of the PC Act, the Court has a discretion to
refrain from drawing adverse presumption against the public
servant if the amount involved is trivial. In the case of
Chandrasha (Supra), the Supreme Court held that the
presumption becomes irrelevant when the agreement to
receive gratification is factually proved. The presumption
under Section 20 of the PC Act provides that where it is
proved that the public servant has accepted or obtained any
undue advantage, unless the contrary is proven, it shall be
presumed that such acceptance of undue advantage was with
a motive or reward under Section 7 of the PC Act. The value
of gratification is to be considered in proportion to the act to
be done or not done, to forebear or not to forebear, favour or
disfavour sought, so as to be trivial to convince the Court, not
to draw any presumption of corrupt practice. In any case, the
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fact of demand and receipt of demand stand proved in the
present case.
25. Being conscious of the settled law that, in an appeal
against acquittal, if two views are possible and the Court
below has acquitted the accused, the Appellate Court would
not be justified in setting aside the acquittal merely because
another view is possible. In the present case however, the
demand, the recovery of the bribe money from A/1 and A/2
being proven, in the absence of any concrete material
supporting the defence, brings home guilt to them beyond
reasonable doubt. Once, the 'demand' and 'acceptance' of the
bribe amount is established beyond reasonable doubt, in my
opinion, no two views are possible in that matter. The defence
has made no attempt to establish the alibi theory attempted to
be put forth by A/1. Thus, the Judgment and Order impugned
herein, is unsustainable. The Judgment and Order dated 2 nd
September, 2008, passed by the Special Judge at Baramati,
District Pune, acquitting the Respondents herein (Original
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Accused Nos.1 and 2 from the offences punishable under
Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is quashed and set aside.
For reasons mentioned herein above, A/3 remains acquitted
and the Judgment and Order impugned in so far as relating to
A/3 is confirmed.
26. Having convicted the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 for the
offences punishable under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with
Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, the
next consideration is the quantum of punishment that may be
imposed on them. Hence, I proceeded to hear the Respondent
Nos.1 and 2 on the aspect of sentencing on 21 st November
2025.
27. Heard Mr. Uday Dube, learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the Respondent Nos.1 and 2.
28. Mr Dube, submitted that as many as 17 years have
elapsed from the time that the accused were acquitted. He
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further submitted that the A/1 is due for retirement next year
and has also aged considerably. Similarly, he submitted that
the A/2 has few more years of service and has a family with
children. Both the Accused are the sole earning members in
their families and hence, lenient view be taken in the matter
of sentencing.
29. Admittedly, as many as 17 years have elapsed from the
time, the accused were acquitted. The A/1 is due for
retirement next year and the A/2 has few more years of
service and has a family with children. Considering the gravity
of the offence, the circumstances of the Accused and the time
taken in deciding the present Appeal, I am inclined to impose
minimum sentence provided for the said offence at the
relevant time. The A/1 and A/2 are directed to undergo 6
months of simple imprisonment and liable to pay fine of
Rs.500/- each. The A/1 and A/2 are directed to surrender
before the Trial Court within a period of 12 weeks from today
and the Trial Court is directed to take steps to commit them in
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prison to undergo the period of sentence and recover the fine
imposed on them.
30. The Appeal is accordingly, partly allowed.
(Dr. Neela Gokhale, J)
Digitally
signed by
SHAMBHAVI
SHAMBHAVI NILESH
NILESH SHIVGAN
SHIVGAN Date:
2025.12.01
18:30:43
+0530
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