Bombay High Court
Shivnath Suryoba Gaonkar Presently In ... vs The Bicholim Marchant Urban Co-Op. ... on 1 October, 2024
2024:BHC-GOA:1693
35-CRIR-676-2024-F.DOC
vinita
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
CRIMINAL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 676 OF 2024-FILING
Shri. Shivnath Suryoba Gaonkar, Age 48
years, S/o Suryoba Gaonkar, Indian
National, R/o H. No. 79, Near Govt.
Primary School, Velguem, Sattari, Goa. ..... Petitioners.
Presently in Colvale Jail Represented by
his Son Mr. Devraj Shivnath Gaonkar
R/o H. No. 79, Near Govt. Primary
School, Velguem, Sattari, Goa.
Versus
1. The Bicholim Marchant Urban Co-
operative Credit Society Pvt. Ltd.
Represented by its authorized
Representative, Mr. Mukund
Kashinath Naik, Age 52 years,
Having branch at Bicholim, Goa.
2. State of Goa,
Through Public Prosecutor, High
Court, Porvorim, Goa ...... Respondents.
Mr Shailesh Redkar and Ms Namrata Gaonkar, Advocate for the
applicant.
Ms Manjeeta Manerkar and Ms Akshaya Nandokar, Advocate for
the respondent no.1.
Mr G. Nagvekar, Addl. Public Prosecutor for respondent no.2.
CORAM: BHARAT P. DESHPANDE, J
Dated : 1st October 2024.
ORAL JUDGMENT:
1. Heard S. Redkar, learned counsel for the applicant and Ms M.
Manerkar, learned counsel for the respondent.
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2. Admit.
3. Matter is taken up for final disposal at the admission stage
itself with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties as issue
involved is only limited as to whether notice as contemplated under
Section 138(1)(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act was sent within
30 days from the date of knowledge of bounding of the cheque.
4. For the purpose of deciding such issue, necessary documents
are placed on record along with deposition of PW1 and therefore
Records and proceedings are not called.
5. Mr Redkar would submit that the issue regarding notice
forwarded beyond 30 days was raised before the trial Court, however,
it was brushed aside by ignoring admission of PW1 and such findings
are perverse to the record.
6. Mr Redkar submit that in an appeal filed before the Sessions
Court, a specific argument was raised that the notice of demand was
sent on the 31st day and thus there is non compliance of basic
ingredients of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
however, learned Sessions Court again wrongly calculated the period
and found/observed that the demand notice was issued exactly on the
last date i.e. 9.11.2020.
7. Mr Redkar would submit that 9.11.2020 is in fact 31st day from
the date of receipt of memo from the bank.
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8. Mr Redkar would further submit that provisions of General
Clauses Act and Section 10 specifically would not be helpful to the
respondent/complainant since notice which is required to be issued
under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is not
necessarily required to be forwarded through post. Such notice could
be by any other mode including sending it through courier, by hand
delivery, by email etc.
9. Mr Redkar would further submits that the period of 30 days as
provided under 138(1)(b) cannot be extended under the limitation
Act as it is mandatory requirement and thus even such period cannot
be extended under the General Clauses Act.
10. In this respect Mr Redkar placed reliance on the following
decisions:-
1. M. G. Mohamed Javid Vs Nayeem Hannan1
2. Kamldesh Kumar Vs State of Bihar and
another2
3. Munoth Investments Ltd Vs Puttukola
Properities Ltd and another3
4. K. Bhaskaran Vs Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan
and another4
11. Mr Redkar while pointing out an admission on the part of the
PW1 that demand notice was actually posted on 9.11.2020 though
notice is dated 6.11.2020. Thus according to him, sending of the
1 2021 SCC Online Mad 5223.
2 (2014) 2 SCC 424
3 (2001) 6 SCC 582
4 (1999) 7 SCC 510
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demand notice is clearly beyond 30 days and therefore the complaint
itself is not tenable.
12. Per contra learned counsel for respondent no.1 would submit
that since 8.11.2020 was a Sunday complainant is entitled to take
recourse to Section 10 of the General Clauses Act which provides that
act as provided under the limitation would be performed on the next
working day if last date is public holiday. According to her, notice
was sent by registered post acknowledgment to the applicant/accused
on 9.11.2020 and therefore it has to be presumed that it was
forwarded within 30 days since 8.11.2020 was Sunday. In this regard
she placed reliance on the following decisions.
1. M/s Rayapati Power Generation Pvt Ltd
and another VS Indian Renewable Engery
Agency Ltd (IREDA)5
2. Sridevi Datla Vs Union of India and
others.6
3. Mypreferred Transformation and
Hospitality Pvt. Ltd and anr. Vs Faridabad
Implements Pvt. Ltd.7
13. Rival contentions fall for determination.
14. In the case of K. Bhaskaran (supra), the Apex Court has
discussed in detail on the sending of notice to the drawer of a bounce
cheque. While dealing with this aspect, the Apex Court has observed
that provisions of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and
5 CRL.M.C. 2445/2021 of Delhi High Court dated 31.1.2022
6 (2021) 5 SCC 321
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more specifically offence under it can be considered as completed
only on the conditions of number of acts such as (1) Drawing of the
cheque, (2) Presentation of the cheque to the bank, (3) Returning the
cheque unpaid by the drawee bank, (4) Giving notice in writing to the
drawer of the cheque demanding payment of the cheque amount, (5)
failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of the receipt of
the notice.
15. Thus it is clear that there are combined conditions which has to
be complied with for constituting an offence under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, out of which giving/sending notice in
writing to the drawer within a period of 30 days from the date of
receipt of intimation from the bank, is one of the important
condition.
16. Offence is complete if all these five conditions are fulfilled.
Even if there is violation of one of the conditions or non compliance
of it, it cannot be said that offence stands completed for the purpose
of lodging the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act.
17. The Apex Court further observed that conditions pertaining to
the notice to be given to the drawer have been formulated and
incorporated in clauses (b) and (c) of the proviso. Thus, it is
mandatory on the part of the payee that he has to make a demand of
the amount mentioned in the cheque by giving notice in writing
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within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of the intimation
of the dishonour of the cheque. Even after issuing such a notice,
offence is not complete. It is only on failure of the drawer of the
cheque to comply with the notice within 15 days, offence stands
completed for filing of the complaint.
18. Further Apex Court in the case of Bhaskaran (supra) discussed
the aspect of giving of notice as found in paragraph 21 which reads
thus:-
"21 In Maxwell's 'Interpretation of Statues' the
learned author has emphasized that
"provisions relating to giving of notice often
receive liberal interpretation." (vide page 99
of the 12th edn.) The context envisaged in
Section 138 of the Act invites a liberal
interpretation for the person who has the
statutory obligation to give notice because he
is presumed to be the loser in the transaction
and it is for his interest the very provision is
made by the legislature. The words in clause
(b) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act
show that payee has the statutory obligation
to "make a demand' by giving notice. The
thrust in the clause is on the need to "make a
demand". It is only the mode for making such
demand which the legislature has prescribed.
A payee can send the notice for doing his part
for giving the notice. Once it is dispatched his
part is over and the next depends on what the
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sendee does."
19. Clause (b) and (c ) of the Proviso to Section 138 are very much
relevant to decide the issues raised in the present revision, which
reads thus:-
"(b) The payee or the holder in due course of the
cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand
for the payment of the said amount of money
by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of
the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of
information by him from the bank regarding
the return of the cheque as unpaid; and
(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the
payment of the said amount of money to the
payee or as the case may be, to the holder in
due course of the cheque within fifteen days of
the receipt of the said notice."
20. It therefore provides that "giving notice in writing" within a
period of 30 days to the drawer of the cheque making a demand is the
main ingredient which is required to be looked into in the present
matter. Thus, it is a statutory obligation to make a demand in writing
within 30 days.
21. It is no doubt true that demand notice was forwarded to the
applicant/accused by registered post acknowledgment. However, it
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was actually posted on 9.11.2020, which admittedly was the 31st day
from the date of receipt of the intimation from the bank.
22. It is admitted in the complaint as well as in demand notice that
the complainant presented the cheque issued by the applicant for
encashment. However, it was returned unpaid for the reasons "Funds
insufficient" and said fact of dishonour to the cheque was intimated
to the complainant on 9.10.2020. This averment is found in
paragraph 7 of the complaint.
23. Counting of 30 days otherwise from 10.10.2020 as the date of
receipt of intimation has to be excluded. Accordingly, remaining days
in the month of October from 10.10.2020 were 22 days. Period of 30
days thus expired on 8.11.2020.
24. Complaint filed before the Magistrate would go to show that
and more specifically in paragraph 8 that a legal notice through
Advocate dated 6.11.2020 was sent by registered post to the accused,
it was received by the accused on 9.11.2020.
25. Copy of the demand notice produced before the learned
Magistrate also shows the date as 6.11.2020. Examination in
chief/verification of PW1/Complainant would go to show that the
notice was sent on 6.11.2020. However, during cross examination of
PW1, it has been admitted by him that a demand notice was posted
for delivery on 9.11.2020. He denied the suggestion that demand
notice was sent beyond the period of limitation as provided under
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Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Thus the entire case of
the complainant is basically found in the evidence of PW1 that the
demand notice is sent only on 6.11.2020 and therefore such demand
notice was within 30 days from the receipt of the memorandum from
the bank dated 9.10.2020. However, during the cross examination it
has been admitted by PW2 that notice was posted for delivery on
9.11.2020. The fact remains that clause (b) of proviso to Section 138
of the NIA mandates that demand for payment of such amount of the
money should be by giving notice in writing within 30 days. It's a
statutory obligation.
26. The word "giving a notice in writing" has to be within 30 days
from the date of receipt of information or return memo from the
bank. Thus whatever is the date mentioned on the notice, cannot be
counted for the purpose of calculating the period of 30 days. The
words "giving a notice" must be attributed to the act of actually
sending notice by particular mode. The said provisions nowhere
mandates that such notice must be sent by registered post AD
acknowledgment dues. It only mentions that a written notice
demanding payment of the amount shall be given to the drawer of the
cheque. Thus the entire act of giving notice must be complied with
within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of return memo
from the bank as a statutory obligation.
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27. In the present matter though the date on the notice is shown as
6.11.2020, admittedly, it was not given or sent on 6.11.2020 but was
posted only on 9.11.2020 which is 31st day from the date of receipt of
return memo from the bank. Thus, it is clear from the record that
giving notice in writing is not statutorily complied with as provided
under clause (b) but it was beyond 30 days.
28. With these calculations and the fact that there is non
compliance of proviso (b) to the Section 138 of the NI Act the
complaint itself was not tenable.
29. However, learned counsel for the respondent no.1 would
submits that 8.11.2020 was a Sunday and therefore Section 10 of
General Clauses Act would come to the rescue of the complainant
and notice issued on 9.11.2020 by post would have to be considered
as given within 30 days.
30. Section 10 of the General Clauses Act reads thus:-
"10. Computation of time.--(1) Where, by any
[Central Act] or Regulation made after the
commencement of this Act, any act or proceeding is
directed or allowed to be done or taken in any Court
or office on a certain day or within a prescribed
period, then, if the Court or office is closed on that
day or the last day of the prescribed period, the act
or proceeding shall be considered as done or taken in
due time if it is done or taken on the next day
afterwards on which the Court or office is open:
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to
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any act or proceeding to which the Indian
Limitation Act, 1877, applies.
(2) This section applies also to all [Central Acts] and
Regulations made on or after the fourteenth day of
January, 1887."
31. Per contra Mr Redkar would submit that in order to comply
such provision, complainant is bound to plead and prove that he is
entitled for such exemption and since the complaint as well as
evidence of PW1 is clearly silent on it, complainant cannot be allowed
to take recourse to provisions of Section 10 of the General Clauses
Act, now in this Revision.
32. In response Mr Redkar while placing reliance in the case of M.
G. Mohamed Javid (supra) would submit that in similar
circumstances Madras High Court rejected the contention that there
is no evidence to that effect produced on record.
33. In that case, there was clear admission on the part of
complainant that he received intimation from the bank regarding
bouncing of the cheque on 13.12.2014. However, notice was issued on
13.1.2015 i.e. on the 31st day. A ground was taken that on 14.12.2014
and 15.12.2014 were bank holidays and that entries in the passbook
regarding returning of the cheque was reflecting only on 15.12.2014.
The contention that 14.12.2014 was bank holiday was negated by
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Court saying that circular for second and fourth Saturday or public
holidays for the bank were issued somewhere in September 2014.
34. In the case of Kamlesh Kumar, (supra), the Apex Court
considered the aspect of issuance of notice within a period of 30 days
and found that such notice was on 31st of the day from the receipt of
cheque return memo, observed that it was beyond the period
mentioned in clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 of the NIA Act.
35. Paragraphs 13 and 14 are important which are quoted below for
reference.
13 The crucial question is as to on which date the
complainant received the information about the
dishonour of the cheque? As per the appellant, the
respondent complainant received the information
about the dishonour of the cheque on 10-11-2008.
However, the respondent complainant has
disputed the same. However, we would like to add
that at the time of arguments the aforesaid
submission of the appellant was not refuted. After
the judgment was reserved, the complainant has
filed an affidavit alleging therein that he received
the bank memo of the bouncing of the cheque on
17-11-2008 and therefore, the legal notice sent on
17-12-2008 is within the period of 30 days from
the date of information.
14 Normally, we would have called upon the parties
to prove their respective versions before the trial
court by leading their evidence. However, in the
present case, as rightly pointed out by the learned
Senior Counsel for the appellant, the complainant
has accepted in the complaint itself that he had
gone to the Bank for encashment of cheque on 10-
11-2008 and the cheque was not honoured due to
insufficiency of funds, thereby admitting that he
came to know about the dishonour of the cheque
on 10-11-2008 itself. It is for this reason that the
appellant has filed a reply-affidavit stating that
this is an afterthought plea as no material has
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been filed before the court below to show that the
Bank had issued a memo about the return of the
cheque which was received by the complainant on
17-11-2008. The specific averment made in the
complaint in this behalf is as under:
"Subsequently the complainant again went to
encash the cheque given by the accused on 10-11-
2008 which again bounced due to unavailability
of balance in the accused's account."
It is, thus, clear from the aforesaid averment
made by the complainant himself that he had
gone to the Bank for encashing the cheque on 10-
11-2008 and found that because of unavailability
of sufficient balance in the account, the cheque
was bounced. Therefore, it becomes obvious that
he had come to know about the same on 10-11-
2008 itself. In view of this admission in the
complaint about the information having been
received by the complainant about the bouncing
of the cheque on 10-11-2008 itself, no further
enquiry is needed on this aspect.
36. In the case of Munoth Investments Ltd (supra) the Apex
Court while discussing the aspect of giving notice observed in
paragraph 5 as under:-
"5. In our view, the High Court committed material
irregularity in not referring to the aforesaid
evidence which was recorded by the
Metropolitan Magistrate. Section 138(b) of the
Act inter alia provides that the payee has to make
demand for the payment of money by giving a
notice "to the drawer of the cheque, within fifteen
days of the receipt of information by him from
the bank regarding the return of the cheque as
unpaid". So fifteen days are to be counted from
the receipt of information regarding the return of
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the cheque as unpaid. In the present case, it is the
say of the complainant that the cheque was
presented for encashment on 12th; it was
returned to the Bank on 13th and information
was given to the complainant only on 17th, as
14th, 15th and 16th were Pongal holidays. The
learned counsel fairly pointed out that in the
complaint it has been stated that the complainant
had received intimation with regard to the return
of the said cheque from his banker on 13-1-1994.
However, he submitted that this is an apparent
mistake and for explaining that mistake the
appellant has led the evidence before the trial
court. Undisputedly, he pointed out that in the
State of Tamil Nadu, 14-1-1994 to 16-1-1994 there
were Pongal holidays and, therefore, the
appellant came to learn about the dishonour of
his cheque on 17-1-1994."
37. In the case of Sridevi Datla (supra), the Apex Court while
discussing in connection with the matter/appeal filed before NGT
discussed the applicability of the General Clauses Act in paragraphs
18 to 21 which read as under:-
"18. There can be no dispute that the period of
limitation set out in a special law, which
provides for remedies and appeals, has to be
construed in its terms and without reference to
the Limitation Act, if it contains specific
provisions delineating the time or period within
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which applications or appeals can be preferred,
and confines the consideration of applications
for condoning the delay to a specific number of
days. Undoubtedly, in such cases, the Limitation
Act would be inapplicable. [ That provision is as
follows:"29. Savings.--(1) Nothing in this Act
shall affect Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act,
1872 (9 of 1872).(2) Where any special or local
law prescribes for any suit, appeal or
application a period of limitation different from
the period prescribed by the Schedule, the
provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such
period were the period prescribed by the
Schedule and for the purpose of determining any
period of limitation prescribed for any suit,
appeal or application by any special or local
law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24
(inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the
extent to which, they are not expressly excluded
by such special or local law."] There are several
previous judgments of this Court holding that
where periods of limitation are prescribed under
special laws, appeals that exceed the period
granted and are within the extended period of
limitation in the special law, can be entertained
at the discretion of the tribunal, or court
concerned and the Limitation Act would not
apply upon expiry of such extended period.
[Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh, (1964) 4 SCR
982 : AIR 1964 SC 260 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 152; CCE
v. Hongo (India) (P) Ltd., (2009) 5 SCC 791;
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Union of India v. Popular Construction Co.,
(2001) 8 SCC 470; Patel Bros. v. State of Assam,
(2017) 2 SCC 350 : (2017) 1 SCC (Civ) 658] This
Court holds that there is merit in the contention
of the Union that the provisions of the Limitation
Act are inapplicable. This is, however, not
dispositive of the issue; the next question is
whether there is merit in the appellant's
argument that NGT should have considered the
issue of whether the appeal was filed within the
extended period prescribed under the proviso to
Section 16 i.e. within sixty days after the
expiration of the initial 30 day period, required
in the main provision.
19. The appellant argues that since there is no
indication to the contrary; the appeal is to be
considered as having been filed within the
extended period of 60 days, since the last (of the
60 days) was a Sunday (12-7-2020). The
appellant relied on Section 10 of the General
Clauses Act, for this purpose. The respondents,
notably the Union, opposed this argument.
20. Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 [ "10.
Computation of time.--(1) Where, by any Central
Act or Regulation made after the commencement
of this Act, any act or proceeding is directed or
allowed to be done or taken in any Court or
office on a certain day or within a prescribed
period, then, if the Court or office is closed on
that day or the last day of the prescribed period,
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the act or proceeding shall be considered as done
or taken in due time if it is done or taken on the
next day afterwards on which the Court or office
is open: Provided that nothing in this section
shall apply to any act or proceeding to which the
Indian Limitation Act, 1877, applies.(2) This
section applies also to all Central Acts and
Regulations made on or after the fourteenth day
of January, 1887."] stipulates that when the last
date for doing something falls on a public
holiday, the act "shall be considered as done".. if
it "is done or taken on the next day afterwards
on which the Court or office is open". This
provision applies to all Central Acts enacted
after the said Act was brought into force. The
scope of this provision was considered by this
Court in Harinder Singh v. S. Karnail Singh
[Harinder Singh v. S. Karnail Singh, 1957 SCR
208 : AIR 1957 SC 271] by a four-Judge Bench,
which explained the object of Section 10 and held
as under : (AIR p. 273, para 5)
"5. ... Where, therefore, a period is prescribed for
the performance of an act in a court or office,
and that period expires on a holiday, then
according to the section the act should be
considered to have been done within that period,
if it is done on the next day on which the court or
office is open. For that section to apply,
therefore, all that is requisite is that there should
be a period prescribed, and that period should
expire on a holiday."
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21 Other decisions [Manohar Joshi v. Nitin
Bhaurao Patil, (1996) 1 SCC 169; Mohd. Ayub v.
State of U.P., (2009) 17 SCC 70 : (2011) 1 SCC
(L&S) 580] have followed the same reasoning. It
is also noticeable that there is no indication in
the NGT Act that Section 10 of the General
Clauses Act cannot be applied. It is, therefore,
held that the provision applies proprio vigore to
all appeals filed under the NGT Act."
38. In the case of Mypreferred Transformation and
Hospitality Pvt. Ltd (supra) Delhi High Court discussed the
period of limitation with regard to an appeal filed under Section 37 of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act in which provisions of General
Clauses Act were taken into account.
39. Present matter is admittedly an action with regards to breach
of making payment which is triable as an offence by a Magistrate.
Though it is considered as quasi criminal proceeding, however,
consequences of it could be imprisonment as well as payment of fine
which could be double the amount of the cheque. Thus, while
interpreting the provisions of Section 138 of the NIA , settled
propositions dealing with criminal jurisprudence will have to be
taken into account.
40. Clauses (b) and (c ) of proviso to Section 138 of NIA is clearly
mandatory for the purpose of instituting a complaint under Section
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138 of the NI Act. Any condition if not fulfilled, would clearly bar a
complainant from lodging such proceedings. Thus, clause (b)
mandates a demand notice in writing must be given within a period
of 30 days from the date of receipt of the intimation from the bank.
Such a period of 30 days itself cannot be extended or condoned by
considering the limitation Act.
41. Similarly, the method by which demand notice in writing to be
forwarded is not disclosed under the Act. The only condition is that
there must be a demand for the money mentioned in the cheque in
writing. Thus, such demand in writing could be communicated to the
drawer of the cheque even by hand delivery by taking
acknowledgment, sending it by email or by courier service or by any
other mode. Thus, it is not necessary that such notice must be
dispatched by the post department under acknowledgment. It is no
doubt true that in the present matter notice was forwarded through
the post department on the 31st day.
42. For the purpose of claiming benefit of Section 10 of the General
Clauses Act, first of all the complainant has to disclose it in its
complaint and then prove it by leading evidence. Admittedly, the
complaint is clearly silent as to when notice was actually dispatched.
Even the verification of the complainant would go to show that notice
was sent on 6.11.2020 which is found in paragraph 9 of the statement
of the complainant recorded under Section 200 of Cr.P.C.
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43. Copy of the notice placed along with the complaint also shows
the date as 6.11.2020. Thus, this is basically the contention of the
complainant that demand notice was sent on 6.11.2020 and thus, it
was within time. However, only during the cross examination, it was
pointed out and more specifically admitted by PW1 that the demand
notice was posted on 9.11.2020. It means that though demand notice
show the date as 6.11.2020, it was not dispatched on that date. Thus
the word "Giving Notice" as found in clause (b) to proviso to section
138 of the Act was not performed on 6.11.2020. The words "giving
notice" would actually mean that it has to be interpreted as
forwarding and disbursing the notice to the address of the drawer.
44. Record clearly goes to show that notice was in fact dispatched
on 9.11.2020 whereas the period of 30 days was over on 8.11.2020.
45. Contention now raised on behalf of the respondent/
complainant that 8.11.2020 was a Sunday and therefore notice was
dispatched on 9.11.2020, is not borne out of the record. Complaint,
verification of the complainant as well as affidavit of PW1 would
clearly go to show that notice was sent on 6.11.2020. Thus it is
consistent case of the complainant that the notice was sent on
6.11.2020, which in fact was not, as admitted by PW1 during cross
examination.
46. When the period of 30 days as provided under clause (b) of
proviso to Section 138 cannot be extended, complainant cannot take
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advantage of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act since it is not
mandatory that the notice must be forwarded through postal
department and that too by registered post with acknowledgment
due.
47. Thus, the observation of the learned Magistrate and that of the
First Appellate Court with regard to notice dispatched within 30 days
is clearly perverse.
48. Complainant failed to explain as to how notice is within 30
days, when it was admitted during cross examination that notice was
posted on 9.11.2020. It was clearly open and available to the
complainant to re-examine himself and clarify this aspect. However,
since there are no specific averments in the complaint, it is clear from
the record that demand notice was dispatched beyond 30 days and
therefore, the complaint filed before the concerned Magistrate was
not tenable as statutory obligation stands violated.
49. Having said so, impugned orders passed by both the Courts
below are required to be quashed and set aside.
50. For all the above reasons, revision stands allowed.
51. The impugned orders passed by the Magistrate and thereafter
confirmed by the learned Sessions Court in the Criminal Appeal are
hereby quashed and set aside. Complaint filed under section 138 of
the Negotiable Instruments Act required to be rejected since there is
violation of clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 of NI Act.
1st October 2024
35-CRIR-676-2024-F.DOC
52. Accordingly, present applicant/accused deserved to be
acquitted. Revisions stands disposed of in above terms. Amount
which has been deposited by the applicant in this Court shall be
refunded to the applicant/accused.
BHARAT P. DESHPANDE, J.
Signed by: VINITA VIKAS NAIK 1st October 2024
Designation: Personal Assistant
Date: 07/10/2024 16:34:46
