Bombay High Court
Arjun Raghunath Wankhede vs The Nagpur Improvement Trust, Nagpur ... on 5 January, 2024
Author: A.S. Chandurkar
Bench: A.S. Chandurkar
2024:BHC-NAG:173-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
WRIT PETITION NO.5123/2023
Arjun Raghunath Wankhede, Aged 72 years, ]
Occupation Business, having his Office at Reno ]
Footware, Jhansi Rani Square, Sitabuldi, Nagpur. ].. PETITIONER
.....VERSUS.....
1. The Nagpur Improvement Trust, Having its Office ]
at Civil Lines, Nagpur, Through its Chairman. ]
]
2. The Divisional Officer (West Division), Nagpur ]
Improvement Trust, having his Office at ]
North Ambazari Road, Nagpur. ]
]
3. City of Nagpur Corporation, Having its Office ]
at Civil Lines, Nagpur, Through its Chairman. ]..RESPONDENTS
ALONG WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 5226/2023
Mohammed Zubair Ahsan S/o Mohammed Sohail Anwar, ]
aged about 43, Occ Business, Off at 132, Abhyankar Road, ]
Beside Haldiram Planet food, Sitabuldi, Nagpur. ]..PETITIONER
.....VERSUS.....
1. Nagpur Improvement Trust (NIT), through its ]
Divisional Officer (West), Off at North Ambazari ]
Road, Nagpur 440 003. ]
]
2. Nagpur Improvement Trust (NIT), through its ]
Chairman, Off at Civil Lines, Nagpur. ]..RESPONDENTS
ALONG WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 5346/2023
1. Sachin S/o Madan Janbandhu, aged about 38, ]
Occ Business, Off at 132, Abhyankar Road, Besides ]
Haldiram Planet food, Sitabuldi, Nagpur. ]
]
2. Ankit S/o Madan Janbandhu, aged about 35, ]
Occ Business, Off at 132, Abhyankar Road, Besides ]
Haldiram Planet food, Sitabuldi, Nagpur. ]..PETITIONERS
WPs5123,5226&5346-23).odt 1 / 22
.....VERSUS.....
1. Nagpur Improvement Trust (NIT), through its ]
Divisional Officer (West), Off at North Ambazari ]
Road, Nagpur 440 003. ]
]
2. Nagpur Improvement Trust (NIT), through its ]
Chairman, Off at Civil Lines, Nagpur. ]..RESPONDENTS
Shri S.V. Bhutada, counsel for the petitioner Writ Petition No. 5123 of 2023.
Shri S.S. Sitani, counsel for the petitioners in Writ Petition Nos.5226 of 2023 and
5346 of 2023.
Shri G.A. Kunte, counsel for the respondent-Nagpur Improvement Trust.
Shri J.B. Kasat, counsel for the respondent-Nagpur Municipal Corporation.
CORAM : A.S. CHANDURKAR AND ABHAY J. MANTRI, JJ.
DATE ON WHICH ARGUMENTS WERE HEARD : NOVEMBER 01, 2023
DATE ON WHICH JUDGMENT IS PRONOUNCED : JANUARY 05, 2024
JUDGMENT (PER : A.S. CHANDURKAR, J.)
1. The issue that arises for determination in these writ petitions is
whether a statutory notice proposing an action of demolition becomes
unexecutable if the said notice remains unimplemented for an
unreasonable period despite there being no legal impediment for its
execution.
2. RULE. Rule made returnable forthwith and heard the learned
counsel for the parties. Since a similar challenge has been raised in these
writ petitions, they are being decided together by this common judgment.
For sake of convenience, the facts in Writ Petition No. 5123 of 2023 are
being referred to.
WPs5123,5226&5346-23).odt 2 / 22
. The petitioner claims to be inducted as a tenant in the
premises located at Khasra Number 317, Mouza Sitabuldi, Nagpur. On
15.10.2010, the Nagpur Improvement Trust - NIT constituted under the
Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936 (for short, 'the Act of 1936') issued
a notice under Section 286(2) of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948
(for short, 'the Act of 1948') read with Section 52 of the Act of 1936 to the
owner of the premises as well as its occupier, the petitioner. In the said
notice it was stated that a tin-shed constructed at the site was without
obtaining permission of the NIT and hence the same was required to be
removed within a period of twenty eight days from receipt of the said
notice. The notice was issued by the Divisional Officer (West) on behalf of
the Chairman, NIT. Neither the owner of the premises nor the petitioner
raised any challenge to the said notice nor did they take any steps to
comply with the same. The NIT also did not take steps to execute the said
notice. In the meanwhile, on 21.08.2012 the Act of 1948 was repealed
and the field was thereafter occupied by the provisions of the Maharashtra
Municipal Corporations Act, 1949. Even thereafter no steps were taken to
implement the notice dated 15.10.2010. On 17.07.2023 the NIT through
its Divisional Officer (West) issued a communication to the owner of the
premises and the petitioner stating therein that despite issuance of the
notice dated 15.10.2010, the unauthorized construction had not been
removed. It was directed that within a period of seven days from receipt
WPs5123,5226&5346-23).odt 3 / 22
of the said communication the offending construction be removed failing
which the NIT would take steps to remove the same. Being aggrieved, the
petitioner has challenged the said communication dated 17.07.2023
alongwith the initial notice dated 15.10.2010 issued by the NIT in this
writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
3. Shri S.V. Bhutada, learned counsel for the petitioner raised
threefold contentions:-
(a) The provisions of Section 52 of the Act of 1936 had
been mentioned in the said notice alongwith the
provisions of Section 286(2) of the Act of 1948. With the
repeal of the Act of 1948, the notice as issued on
15.10.2010 was not saved since Section 8(f) of the
Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations
(Amendment) and the City of Nagpur Corporation
(Repeal) Act, 2011 (for short, 'the Repeal Act') did not
save the statutory notice issued under the Act of 1948.
Since the said statutory notice was not saved, it was not
permissible to execute the same after Repeal Act under
which it was issued. In that regard, the learned counsel
placed reliance on the decision in Shree Bhagwati Steel
WPs5123,5226&5346-23).odt 4 / 22
Rolling Mills Versus Commissioner of Central Excise &
Another [(2016) 3 SCC 643].
(b) The Divisional Officer of the NIT had no jurisdiction to
take any steps to implement and execute the notice
issued on 15.10.2010. Under Section 52(1) of the Act of
1936 resort can be taken to the provisions of the Act of
1948 as indicated. As per the proviso to Section 52(1)
the NIT is empowered to delegate to the Chairman or
any Officer of the Trust all or any of the powers
conferred by Section 52(1) of the Act of 1936. Under
Section 24(1) of the Act of 1936 it is open for the
Chairman by general or special order in writing to
delegate to any Officer of the Trust the Chairman's
powers, duties or functions under the Act of 1936 or any
Rule or Regulation made thereunder. According to the
learned counsel, the Chairman could delegate only those
functions, powers or duties that were conferred on the
Chairman and not those powers that were delegated to
the Chairman by the Trust. Referring to the provisions
of Section 24 of the Act of 1936 it was submitted that
the task of issuing notice under Section 286(2) of the
Act of 1948 could not have been delegated by the
WPs5123,5226&5346-23).odt 5 / 22
Chairman to the Divisional Officer who had then issued
the impugned notice dated 15.10.2010. In other words,
it was submitted that this amounted to sub-delegation by
the Chairman and as no such power had been conferred
on the Chairman to sub-delegate a matter that was
delegated to him, the issuance of the impugned notice
was without jurisdiction. In that regard, the learned
counsel referred to the decisions in Marathwada
University Versus Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan [(1989)
3 SCC 132], M. Chandru Versus Member-Secretary,
Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority & Another
[(2009) 4 SCC 72], S. Samuel, M.D. Harrisons
Malayalam & Another Versus Union of India & Others
[(2004) 1 SCC 256] and Sahni Silk Mills (P) Ltd. &
Another Versus Employees' State Insurance Corporation
[(1994) 5 SCC 346]. Thus, the impugned notice as had
been issued was a nullity.
(c) The impugned notice was sought to be executed after a
period of almost thirteen years of its issuance. Thus
being a stale action, the same could not be implemented
especially when there was no legal impediment in
proceeding with execution of the said notice either
WPs5123,5226&5346-23).odt 6 / 22
under the Act of 1948 till its repeal or under the Act of
1936 which continued to operate for all this period. In
absence of any justifiable reason, the NIT could not be
permitted to execute the impugned notice in such a
manner. To substantiate this contention, the learned
counsel placed reliance on the decisions in State of
Madhya Pradesh Versus Bani Singh & Another [1990
Supp. SCC 738], M/s Dehri Rohtas Light Railway
Company Limited Versus District Board, Bhojpur &
Others [(1992) 2 SCC 598] and Basanti Prasad Versus
Chairman, Bihar School Examination Board & Others
[(2009) 6 SCC 791]. It was also urged that since the
notice under challenge had been issued without any
jurisdiction, the principles of estoppel, waiver and
acquiescence had no application whatsoever and the
petitioner would not be precluded from raising a legal
challenge to the same when such notice was sought to
be executed. For the said contention, reliance was
placed on the decision in Hasham Abbas Sayyad Versus
Usman Abbas Sayyad & Others [(2007) 2 SCC 355].
WPs5123,5226&5346-23).odt 7 / 22
. On aforesaid grounds, it was submitted that the prayers made
in the writ petition ought to be granted.
4. Shri S.S. Sitani, learned counsel for the petitioners in Writ
Petition Nos.5226 of 2023 and 5346 of 2023 adopted the aforesaid
submissions and prayed for grant of similar relief.
5. Shri G.A. Kunte, learned counsel appearing for the NIT
opposed the aforesaid submissions. According to him, there was no case
made out to interfere in exercise of writ jurisdiction for the following
reasons :-
(a) Since the impugned notice had been issued under the
provisions of Section 286(2) of the Act of 1948 read
with the provisions of Section 52(1) of the Act of 1936,
the said notice could be executed notwithstanding the
repeal of the Act of 1948. Under Section 52(1) of the
Act of 1936, the NIT was empowered to implement the
impugned notice since the Act of 1936 continued to
operate. Without prejudice to the said contention, it was
submitted that in view of the provisions of Section 8(a)
and (e) of the Repeal Act, the impugned notice had been
saved. Since the legal action initiated under the Act of
WPs5123,5226&5346-23).odt 8 / 22
1948 had been saved by the aforesaid provisions,
notwithstanding repeal of the Act of 1948, the notice in
question could be executed even today.
(b) The notice issued on 15.10.2010 was lawfully issued
and the same could not be treated as a nullity. In view
of the Regulations published in the Gazette on
17.12.1937, the Chairman, NIT was empowered to
delegate to any Officer of the Trust any powers
conferred upon him by Section 52(1) of the Act of 1936.
In exercise of such powers, the impugned notice had
been issued by the Divisional Officer under Section 52 of
the Act of 1936. The learned counsel also referred to
the provisions of Section 24, 52 and Section 90(d) of the
Act of 1936 in that regard.
(c) There was no legal bar for the NIT to execute the notice
dated 15.10.2010 by issuing communication dated
17.07.2023. The aspect of delay would not enure to the
benefit of the petitioner since the structure in question
itself was unauthorized. The NIT was seeking to enforce
the provisions of law by initiating action against such
unauthorized structures and the same could not be
defeated by relying upon the aspect of delay. Though it
WPs5123,5226&5346-23).odt 9 / 22
was true that there was no legal impediment in
executing the notice dated 15.10.2010 the same was not
implemented in view of pendency of litigation with
regard to the adjoining structures. The occupiers of the
adjoining structures had sought to challenge such similar
notices and as the litigation in that regard was pending
the NIT deemed it fit not to execute the said notice in
the meanwhile. It was submitted that pursuant to the
liberty granted to issue a fresh notice by virtue of the
judgment in Writ Petition No. 2800 of 2010 [Jayant @
Sudhir Ganpatrao Buty Versus Nagpur Improvement
Trust] decided on 20.09.2010, the said notice was
issued. Reference was also made to the order dated
28.08.2019 that was passed at the Principal Seat in
Public Interest Litigation No. 67 of 2017 [Tushar Guru
Salian Versus State of Maharashtra & Others]. Reliance
was also placed on the decisions in Seema Arshad
Zaheer & Others Versus Municipal Corpn. Of Greater
Mumbai & Others [(2006) 5 SCC 282], State of Madhya
Pradesh & Another Versus Bhailal Bhai & Others [AIR
1964 SC 1006] and Siemens Limited Versus The State
of Maharashtra & Others [2023(4) ABR 230] to contend
WPs5123,5226&5346-23).odt 10 / 22
that the NIT could not be precluded from acting in
accordance with law notwithstanding the fact that such
action was initiated after almost thirteen years.
. It was thus submitted that the writ petitions did not warrant
any consideration and the same were liable to be rejected.
6. The petitioner by amending the writ petition has sought to
raise a challenge to the proviso to the Regulations published in the
Gazette on 17.12.1937 by contending that since the power of sub-
delegation was not conferred on the Chairman under the Act of 1936, the
Regulations permitting such sub-delegation travelled beyond the Act of
1936. Since the same were excessive in nature, the Regulations to that
extent were liable to be set aside.
. This challenge was opposed by the NIT by contending that the
Regulations empowered the Chairman to exercise powers or discharge
such duties and functions as conferred on the Chairman by virtue of
Section 24(1) of the Act of 1936. The Regulations were thus intra vires
the Act of 1936 and the same had the force of law.
WPs5123,5226&5346-23).odt 11 / 22
7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length
and with their assistance we have also perused the documents on record.
We have thereafter given due consideration to their respective
submissions. The challenge to the impugned notice issued on 15.10.2010
is principally on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the NIT in
initiating such action through its Divisional Officer on the premise that
sub-delegation by the Chairman to issue said notice is impermissible, the
fact that the Act of 1948 has since been repealed and also on the ground
that the notice issued in the year 2010 is sought to be belatedly executed
after about thirteen years.
8. We propose to deal with the aspect of delay in seeking to
implement the impugned notice dated 15.10.2010 at the outset.
Undisputedly the NIT in exercise of the powers conferred by Section
286(2) of the Act of 1948 read with Section 52 of the Act of 1936 has
issued the subject notice on 15.10.2010 through its Divisional Officer.
Neither the land owner nor the petitioners as occupiers raised any legal
challenge to the issuance of this notice. As a result, there was no legal
impediment confronting the NIT to go ahead and execute the said notice
dated 15.10.2010 and take action as was indicated in the said notice. As
per Clause 3 of the said notice, the property owner/occupier was called
WPs5123,5226&5346-23).odt 12 / 22
upon to demolish the unauthorized structure within a period of twenty
eight days from receipt of that notice. No steps whatsoever were taken
either by the land owner or by the occupier to remove the same. Despite
there being no legal impediment with the NIT which fact has been
admitted by the NIT in paragraph 3 of its affidavit-in-reply (Page 26 of
Writ Petition No. 5123 of 2023), it did not proceed further to execute the
said notice. In the meanwhile, the Act of 1948 was repealed with effect
from 21.08.2012. Notwithstanding the fact that the impugned notice was
issued also under Section 52 of the Act of 1936, the same was not
implemented even after the repeal of the Act of 1948. It is only on
17.07.2023 that the Divisional Officer (West) issued a communication
requiring the land owner and/or occupier to act in accordance with the
notice dated 15.10.2010 and remove the unauthorized structure. Thus
after a period of almost thirteen years, the notice dated 15.10.2010 is
sought to be implemented.
9. In this regard, the question that requires determination is
whether after such a long lapse the subject notice could be sought to be
executed in the absence of any legal impediment in executing the same
after its issuance. This aspect is being dealt with at the outset for the
reason that if it is held that the subject notice is sought to be executed
after the reasonable period within which it is intended to be executed by
WPs5123,5226&5346-23).odt 13 / 22
the statute, then the other issues regarding absence of jurisdiction and
repeal of the Act of 1948 would become academic in the facts of the
present case.
10. The impugned notice dated 15.10.2010 has been issued under
Section 286(2) of the Act of 1948, read with Section 52 of the Act of
1936. In the said notice, it is stated that the petitioner has undertaken
unauthorized erection of a tin shed without obtaining any prior
permission. The petitioner has been called upon to demolish the said
structure within a period of twenty-eight days from the receipt of the said
notices. In this context, it would be necessary to refer to the provisions of
Section 286(2) of the Act of 1948. Section 286 is reproduced as under :-
"286. Power to require removal or alteration of work not
conformity with bye-laws of any scheme or any
other requirement.
(1) If any building is erected or re-erected in
contravention of any town planning scheme
mentioned under Section 271 or any building
bye-laws made under Section 415, the
Commissioner without prejudice to his right to
take proceedings for a fine in respect of the
WPs5123,5226&5346-23).odt 14 / 22
contravention, may by notice require the owner
either to pull down or remove the work or, if he
so elects, to effect such alterations therein as
may be necessary to make it comply with the
said scheme or bye-laws.
(2) If a building is erected or re-erected -
(a) without any sanction as required by
Section 273(1), or
(b) when sanction has been refused, or
(c) in contravention of the terms of any
sanction granted, or
(d) when the sanction has lapsed under
Section 279,
the Commissioner may by notice require
the owner or owners to alter or demolish
the building within such reasonable time
as the Commissioner may think fit.
(3) If a person to whom a notice has been given
under the foregoing provisions of this section
fails to comply with the notice before the
expiry to twenty-eight days, or such longer
period as the District Court, Nagpur, may on
WPs5123,5226&5346-23).odt 15 / 22
his application allow, the Commissioner may
pull down or remove the work in question, or
effect such alteration therein as he deems
necessary and may recover from him the
expenses reasonably incurred by the
Commissioner in so doing." (emphasis
supplied)
11. Perusal of the aforesaid provision indicates that the
Commissioner is required to give a reasonable period to the concerned
noticee to remove an unauthorized structure. On failure on the part of the
noticee to remove such structure, further action of its removal is required
to be taken by the Commissioner. Since the notice dated 15.10.2010 is
sought to be implemented after a period of almost thirteen years, it would
be necessary to examine whether such implementation is being
undertaken within reasonable time. In this context, we may refer to the
settled legal position that while determining what would be reasonable
time in the given context, the Court has to take into consideration the
facts and circumstances of the case, nature of the statute, prejudice caused
etc., as has been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 41
of its decision in Madras Aluminium Company Ltd. Vs. Tamil Nadu
Electricity Board and Anr., (2023) 8 SCC 240. Reference in the said
WPs5123,5226&5346-23).odt 16 / 22
decision has also been made to the earlier decision in Mansaram Vs. S.P.
Pathak & Ors., (1984) 1 SCC 125. It has been held by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court, in paragraph 12, as under :-
"12. ..................... To slightly differently formulate the
proposition, could the initial unauthorised entry, if there
be any, permit a House Allotment Officer, 22 years after
the entry, to evict the appellant on the short ground that
he entered the premises in contravention of Clause
22(2)? Undoubtedly, power is conferred on the Collector
to see that the provisions of the Rent Control Order
which disclosed a public policy are effectively
implemented and if the Collector therefore, comes across
information that there is a contravention, he is clothed
with adequate power to set right the contravention by
ejecting anyone who comes into the premises in
contravention of the provisions. But when the power is
conferred to effectuate a purpose, it has to be exercised
in a reasonable manner. Exercise of power in a
reasonable manner inheres the concept of its exercise
within a reasonable time. ...................."
. From the aforesaid observations, it becomes clear that when
power is conferred on the Municipal Commissioner to ensure that no
unauthorised construction continues to stand, the power of removing the
same has to be exercised in a reasonable manner which would include
exercising such power within reasonable time.
WPs5123,5226&5346-23).odt 17 / 22
12. The provisions of Section 286(2) of the Act of 1948
contemplate grant of reasonable time to the noticee to remove such
construction. This would indicate that on failure on the part of the noticee
to remove such construction, it is implied that the Commissioner would
act within a further reasonable time to have such unauthorized structure
removed considering the fact that the power to remove the same has been
conferred on the Commissioner with a view to ensure that systematic and
planned activities of construction take place. While holding so, the object
behind the provisions of Section 286 of the Act of 1948 has to be kept in
mind. Thus, exercise of power in this regard has to be undertaken within a
reasonable time.
13. For determining what would be the reasonable time in the
facts of the present case, it can be seen from the notice dated 15.10.2010
that the petitioner was called upon to remove the unauthorized work
within a period of twenty-eight days from receiving said notice. According
to the Divisional Officer who issued the said notice, the period of twenty-
eight days was treated as "reasonable period" that is envisaged by Section
286(2)(d) of the Act of 1948. This would imply that on failure of the
noticee to remove the said structure, the power to act further ought to
have been exercised; say, within a period of three months at the highest.
This is for the reason that permitting an unauthorized structure to
WPs5123,5226&5346-23).odt 18 / 22
continue existing despite issuance of statutory notice and in the absence of
any legal impediment would have the effect of frustrating the statutory
provisions under which such notice was issued. The Commissioner thus
was duty-bound under the said statutory provisions to have acted within a
reasonable time and exercised the power conferred by the said provisions.
14. In the present case, it is to be noted that after issuance of the
impugned notice, there was no legal impediment for the Municipal
Corporation to have the said notice implemented. It is not the case of the
Municipal Corporation that by virtue of any prohibitory order, it was
precluded from taking action that was indicated in the impugned notice. It
is further not the case of the Municipal Corporation that though it sought
to execute the said notice, it could not do so for any justifiable reason. The
failure to have the unauthorized work removed is sought to be attributed
to the fact that the structure in question was abutting another
unauthorized structure, whose occupier had approached the Court for
challenging such action taken by the Municipal Corporation. Except for a
bare statement in that regard, there is no material placed on record that
would warrant acceptance of this stand. It is not even urged by the
Municipal Corporation that it attempted to execute the notice dated
15.10.2010, but, as it was faced with such difficulties, the same could not
be executed. It is only after a period of almost thirteen years and after a
WPs5123,5226&5346-23).odt 19 / 22
lapse of about eleven years from the repeal of the Act of 1948 that the
said notice is now sought to be implemented by issuing the
communication dated 17.07.2023.
. In the facts of the present case and considering the object
behind enacting Section 286 in the Act of 1948, it becomes clear that the
Municipal Corporation failed to implement the notice dated 15.10.2010
within a reasonable period despite the absence of any legal impediment
which prohibited it from executing such notice. We, therefore, find that
the notice dated 15.10.2010 cannot be permitted to be executed much
after lapse of reasonable period, that too in the absence of any legal or
factual justification whatsoever.
15. Since we have found that the Municipal Corporation cannot be
permitted to execute the notice dated 15.10.2010 after a lapse of almost
thirteen years which is much beyond the reasonable period in the context
of Section 286(2) of the Act of 1948, it is not necessary to examine further
challenge to the said notice on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the Divisional Officer in issuing the same. Instead, while holding
that it would not be permissible for the Municipal Corporation to execute
the notice dated 15.10.2010 after a lapse of reasonable period, liberty can
be reserved in its favour to take further steps against the unauthorized
WPs5123,5226&5346-23).odt 20 / 22
construction in accordance with law. This is for the reason that the
petitioner cannot be permitted to contend that no action whatsoever
should be permitted to be taken against the unauthorized construction. It
is not the case of the petitioner that the said work has been undertaken
after obtaining due permission or that steps for regularizing the same had
been undertaken. While the power on the part of the Planning Authority
to act against an unauthorized structure cannot be doubted, at the same
time, it has to exercise such power within reasonable time of issuing a
statutory notice.
16. For all the aforesaid reasons, we have arrived at the following
conclusions :-
(a) The notice dated 15.10.2010 issued by the Nagpur
Improvement Trust to the petitioner cannot be permitted
to be executed after a period of almost thirteen years in
the absence of any legal impediment.
(b) It would be open for the Nagpur Improvement Trust to
take such steps as are permissible in law to seek removal
of the unauthorized work, which is the subject matter of
the notice dated 15.10.2010.
(c) It is clarified that since the impugned notice has been
held to be unexecutable in view of the unreasonable time
WPs5123,5226&5346-23).odt 21 / 22
taken to execute the same, we have not gone into the
question of the jurisdiction of the Divisional Officer,
Nagpur Improvement Trust to issue the subject notice as
well as the effect of repeal of the Act of 1948 on the said
notice. The said issues are kept expressly open for being
raised as and when the occasion arises.
(d) The Writ Petitions are partly allowed in aforesaid terms,
leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Rule
accordingly.
(ABHAY J. MANTRI, J.) (A.S. CHANDURKAR, J.)
ROHIT APTE, PVT. SECRETARY
WPs5123,5226&5346-23).odt 22 / 22
Signed by: Apte
Designation: PS To Honourable Judge
Date: 05/01/2024 18:06:59
