Bombay High Court
Rashmi Mehrotra vs Manvi Sheth on 1 February, 2024
Author: Sharmila U. Deshmukh
Bench: Sharmila U. Deshmukh
2024:BHC-AS:4960
revn 270-23.doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIM. REVISION APPLICATION NO. 270 OF 2023
1. Rashmi Mehrotra ]
Aged 61 years, Indian Inhabitant, ]
Residing at 10-B, Tower D, ]
Viceroy Park, Thakur Village, ]
Kandivali (E), Mumbai - 400 101. ]
]
2. Anoop Mherotra, ]
Aged 63 years, Indian Inhabitant, ]
Residing at 10-B, Tower D, ]
Viceroy Park, Thakur Village, ]
Kandivali (E), Mumbai - 400 101. ] ...Revision Applicants.
Versus
1. Manvi Sheth, ]
Aged 31 years, Indian Inhabitant, ]
Residing at Flat No.503, A Wing, ]
Neelganga Apartments, Lower Parel, ]
Mumbai - 400052. ]
]
2. The State of Maharashtra ]
Through the Public Prosecutor of Sessions ]
Court For Greater Mumbai at Mumbai. ] ...Respondents.
------------
Mr. Shanay Shah i/b Ms. Nerissa Almeida for the applicants.
Mr. Pritesh Burad, Samit Vaviya and Ms. Madhuri Gamre i/b Pritesh Burad
Associates for respondent No.1.
------------
Coram : Sharmila U. Deshmukh, J.
Reserved on : January 16, 2024.
Pronounced on : February 1, 2024.
JUDGMENT:
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1. Revision application challenges the order dated 17 th July 2023
passed by the learned Sessions Judge in Criminal Appeal No. 111 of
2022 allowing the Appeal of Respondent No.1 and setting aside the
order dated 6th April, 2022 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate
discharging the Applicants from the proceedings filed under the
provisions of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
[for short "the DV Act"].
2. The relationship of parties interse is not in dispute. Revision
applicants are the mother-in-law and father-in-law of respondent no.1.
Respondent no.1 was married to Arjun, the son of revision applicants
on 9th February 2020. An application under section 12 of the DV Act
came to be filed by respondent no. 1 against her husband and the
applicants on 22nd February 2021. The applicants preferred an
application dated 17th March 2021 before the Magistrate challenging
the maintainability of complaint and for dropping of the proceedings /
striking off / discharge / deleting their names from the array of parties
as respondents. The said application came to be resisted by
respondent no.1. The Metropolitan Magistrate vide order dated 6 th
April 2022 discharged the Applicants herein from the proceedings.
Against the order of discharge, Criminal Appeal No. 111 of 2022 under
Section 29 of the DV Act came to be filed by respondent no. 1. By the
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impugned order dated 17th July 2023, the appeal was allowed and the
order of Magistrate was quashed and set aside.
3. Heard Mr. Shanay Shah, learned counsel appearing for the
applicants and Mr. Pritesh Burad, learned counsel appearing for
respondent no. 1.
4. Mr. Shah, learned counsel for the applicants submits that since
inception of marriage, respondent no.1 and the applicant's son Arjun
are residing at A1-801, Gundecha Trillium, Thakur Village, Kandivali
East, Mumbai [for short "Gundecha premises"] pursuant to a
registered leave and licence agreement whereas the applicants'
residence at all times was 10B, Tower D, Viceroy Park, Thakur Village,
Kandivali East, Mumbai [for short "Viceroy premises"]. He would
submit that in the application filed under section 12 of the DV Act by
respondent no.1, the relief sought is to restrain the respondents from
alienating the Complainant and her belongings from the shared
matrimonial household being A1-801, Gundecha Trillium, Thakur
Village, Kandivali East, Mumbai and to restrain the applicants from
dispossessing the complainant from the shared matrimonial
household - Gundecha and a direction to the respondents to remove
themselves from the shared matrimonial household being Gundecha.
He has invited the attention of this Court to the pleadings in
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paragraph 12 of the complaint that on 11 th February 2020,
complainant's grihapravesh was organised at Gundecha which is the
shared matrimonial household of complainant where she has been
living with Arjun in domestic relationship. He would further point out
the pleadings in paragraph 18 of the complaint wherein it is
contended that there was quarrel between respondent no.1 and
Arjun; at that time the parents of respondent no.1 were residing with
respondent no.1 and that respondent no.1's parents then spoke to the
applicants regarding Arjun's action. He would further point out the
pleadings in paragraph 28 of the complaint that shared household of
the parties is Gundecha. According to Mr. Shah, it is a specific case in
the complaint that the premises at Gundecha is a shared household.
He submits that the definition of domestic relationship under Section
2(f) of DV Act contemplates a relationship between the parties who
lived or have at any point of time lived together in a shared household
and that being so, on reading of the complaint as it is, it cannot be said
that there was any domestic relationship between the applicants and
respondent no.1 as the shared household according to respondent
no.1 was Gundecha. He submits that the complaint does not show
that the parties at any point of time resided together at Gundecha.
He would submit that the pre-requisite of domestic relationship does
not stand satisfied and the provisions of DV Act are not applicable. He
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would further point out that although there are some averments in
the complaint as regards the applicants residing with respondent no.1
at Gundecha, it is settled that fleeting visits cannot satisfy the
ingredient of shared household as defined in Section 2(s) of DV Act.
He submits that for the purpose of application of D.V Act, there has to
be some permanency attached to the residence in shared household.
He submits that the reliefs claimed can at the most be claimed against
Arjun and not against the applicants. He distinguishes the decision of
the Apex Court in Prabha Tyagi v Kamlesh Devi [(2022) 8 SCC 90] and
submits that the facts of that case are clearly distinguishable and in
the facts of that case, the issue answered by the Apex Court was that
it was not mandatory for the aggrieved person to reside with the
persons against whom the allegations are levelled at the point of
commission of violence. He would further submit that the Apex Court
in the facts of that case held that there was subsisting domestic
relationship between the aggrieved person and the person against
whom the relief was claimed which facts are clearly distinguishable in
the present case. Mr. Shah would further submit that in the FIR
lodged against the applicants under section 498A of IPC , the police
have filed a closure report under section 169 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973. In support of his submissions, Mr. Shah relies upon
following decisions :
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A] Sudama Dutt Sharma v State of Rajasthan [2016 SCC OnLine Raj
8192];
B] Decision of this Court in Crim. Application No. 312 of 2023
(Aurangabad Bench) in Dhananjay Mohan Zombade v. Prachi
Dhananjay Zombade decided on 18th July 2023;
C] Decision of this Court in Crim. W.P. No. 814 of 2022 (Nagpur
Bench) in Sou. Shradha Sumti Fogla v. Narayanprasad B. Fogla
decided on 5th April 2023.
5. Per contra Mr. Burad, learned counsel for respondent no.1
submits that application for discharge was not maintainable in view of
the decision of Apex Court in Kamatchi v. Lakshmi Narayan [2022
SCC OnLine SC 446]. Pointing to the decision of Full Bench of Madras
High Court in the case of Arun Daniel v. Suganya [2022 SCC OnLine
Mad 5435], he submits that Full Bench of Madras High Court has held
that subject matter of DV Act proceedings is purely a civil matter and
the Magistrate exercising jurisdiction under section 12 of the DV Act is
not a criminal Court. He submits that in view thereof, the application
seeking discharge itself was not maintainable. As regards merits of
the case, Mr. Burad submits that there was a domestic relationship
between respondent no. 1 and the applicants as the applicants were
residing with respondent no.1 in both matrimonial shared
households, i.e., "Gundecha premises" and "Viceroy premises", as the
ownership of both the properties vest with the applicants and they
were residing together as a joint family. Pointing to the decision of
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learned Sessions Court, he submits that it is the specific observation
of the Sessions Court that there is substantial material in the form of
specific averments made by the complainant in DV Act proceedings.
He would further submit that the health insurance policy and the
employment letter of respondent no.1 confirms that she was residing
at "Viceroy premises" with the applicants. He submits that there is a
pre-planned conspiracy to oust respondent no.1 from the shared
household which is evident from the factual position that after the
copy of complaint was served upon the applicants on 23 rd February
2021, the leave and licence agreement was terminated on 2nd March
2021 and now the property has been given on leave and licence basis
to some third party. He further submits that the trial Court as well as
the Sessions Court have considered that relationship between the
parties is not merely licensor and licensee which is evident from the
fact that the applicant had added the name of respondent no. 1 for
the purpose of using the club facilities in "Gundecha premises".
Pointing to the pleadings in the application, he would submit that the
instances of mental torture, physical abuse, domestic violence and
emotional abuse inflicted by the applicant have been narrated in the
complaint and as such prima facie case of domestic violence is made
out. He submits that the decision in the case of Prabha Tyagi (supra)
is squarely applicable to facts of present case. He would further point
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out the order passed by Metropolitan Magistrate dated 23 rd October
2021 in application under Section 23 of DV Act holding that there is
ample evidence on record to show that the respondent and the
applicants were residing at Gundecha. At this stage, learned counsel
appearing for the applicants would submit that the said order has
been stayed by the Sessions Court. In support of his submissions,
learned counsel for respondent no.1 relies upon the following
decisions:
A] Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd v. State of Maharashtra [2021
SCC OnLine SC 315];
B] Manohar Keshardev Mali v. CBI [2019 SCC OnLine Bom 8916];
C] Decision of this Court in Crim. Application No. 179 of 2020
(nagpur Bench) Jalendra Sakharam Khare v. State of Maharashtra
decided on 6th June 2023.
6. In rejoinder, Mr. Shah would submit that in paragraph 9(d)(iii),
of the affidavit-in-reply filed to the present revision, the respondent
no.1 has sought to clarify that during Covid-19 pandemic the
applicants started residing with respondent no.1 at Gundecha
premises, which pleading with clarity is missing from application
under section 12 of the DV Act. He would submit that in Sudama
Dutt Sharma (supra) the Rajasthan High Court has held that in the
absence of concrete proof about the domestic relationship i.e., the
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applicants and respondent no.1 had been living in a shared household
and she has been subjected to domestic violence, the maintainability
of complaint itself is under serious cloud.
7. Considered the submissions and perused the record.
8. Firstly, I shall deal with the objection on ground of
maintainability of application for discharge as raised by Mr. Burad, by
relying upon the decision in Kamatchi v. Lakshmi Narayanan 2022
SCCOnline SC 446] . In that case Petition was filed under Section 482
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for quashing of the DV
proceedings. The Apex Court was considering the issue of limitation
qua Section 468 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.PC). One of
the submission raised before the Apex Court was that in view of
Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal [(2004) 7 SCC 338], the remedy lies
in invoking Section 482 of Cr.P.C. The Apex Court held that the scope
of notice under section 12 of the DV Act is to call for the response
from the respondents in terms of statute so that after considering
rival submissions appropriate order can be passed and that the matter
stands on different footing and the dictum of Adalat Prasad (supra)
would not get attracted at the stage notice is issued under section 12
of the DV Act. As regards the decision in Arun Daniel (supra), which is
a decision of Full bench of Madras High Court, it needs to be noted
Patil-SR (ch) 9 of 22
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that the Full Bench of this Court in Nandakishor Vyavhare v. Mangala
[2018(2) Bom C.R.(cri.) 626] has held that the inherent powers under
section 482 of the Code can be invoked for the purpose of quashing of
DV proceedings. In the instant case, the Revision Application
challenges the order passed under Section 29 of the DV Act by the
Appellate Court reversing the order of the Metropolitan Magistrate
discharging the Revision Applicants. The present application not being
an application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C, the entire discussion as to
whether proceedings for quashing under section 482 of Cr.P.C. is
maintainable or not is unwarranted. The revision application is
maintainable against the order passed under section 29 of the DV Act.
9. Now coming to the merits of the matter, the thrust of the
submissions of Mr. Shah for the Applicants is that considering the
definition of domestic relationship and shared household under
Section 2(f) and Section 2(s) of the DV Act, the Applicants and the
Respondents cannot be said to be in a domestic relationship. This
submission is premised on the ground that in the application under
Section 12 of DV Act, the Respondent No 1 has claimed "Gundecha
premises" as shared household and that there are no averments in the
application to indicate that the Applicants resided with the
Respondent in "Gundecha premises".
Patil-SR (ch) 10 of 22
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10. Before proceeding further it will be profitable to reproduce the
definition of "aggrieved person', "domestic relationship" and "shared
household" as defined in Section 2(a), Section 2(f) and Section 2(s) of
the Act, which read thus :
(a) 'aggrieved person' means any woman who is, or has been, in a
domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges
to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the
respondent
(f) "domestic relationship" means a relationship between two
persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together
in a shared household, when they are related by
consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the
nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living
together as a joint family.
(s) "shared household" means a household where the person
aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic
relationship either singly or along with the respondent and
includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either
jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned
or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the
aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly
have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a
household which may belong to the joint family of which the
respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the
respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or
interest in the shared household."
11. Conjoint reading of the above definitions would indicate that
the aggrieved person is required to be in domestic relationship i.e.
should have lived or have at any point of time lived together in a
shared household. A shared household is a household where the
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aggrieved person lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic
relationship either singly or along with the Respondents. It also
includes the household owned or tenanted by the aggrieved person
and the Respondent either jointly or by either of them and in respect
of which either of them jointly or singly have any right title or interest
or equity. It also includes a household belonging to the joint family of
which the Respondent is member irrespective of any right title or
interest in the shared household.
12. What is presented for consideration is whether absent the
factual scenario of not having resided together in the shared
household, the requirement of domestic relationship is satisfied or
not. In the instant case, it is not disputed that parties are related by
marriage. However, what is sought to be submitted is that the parties
had not lived together in a shared household which as per application
under section 12 of the DV Act is "Gundecha premises". The admitted
position is that the premises at "Gundecha premises" as well as
"Viceroy premises" are owned by the Revision Applicants and the
premises at "Gundecha premises" was given on leave and licence basis
to Arjun, the son of applicants.
13. In the application filed under Section 12 of the DV Act,
Respondent No.1 has referred to "Gundecha premises" as the
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matrimonial shared household. The question is whether by referring
to "Gundecha premises" as matrimonial shared household by the
Respondent No1, the statutory definition of shared household under
Section 2(s) of DV Act will be restricted in its applicability only to
"Gundecha premises" and not "Viceroy premises". In my opinion, the
answer is an emphatic "No". For the purpose of considering whether
the parties are in domestic relationship, irrespective of the pleadings,
the statutory definition will have to be given effect. As stated above,
the definition of "shared household" includes a household which may
belong to the joint family of which the Respondent is a member, which
in the present case is "Viceroy premises".
14. Even if the contention of Mr.Shah is accepted that the parties
never resided at "Viceroy premises", the fact is Respondent No 1 had
a right to reside in "Viceroy premises". If that right exists in
Respondent No 1, then the parties will have to be held to be in
domestic relationship as held by the Apex Court in case of Prabha
Tyagi (supra).
15. It will be necessary to consider the decision in Prabha Tyagi
(supra) in some detail. In that case, the aggrieved person was married
on 18th June, 2005 and on 15th July, 2005 her husband expired and the
aggrieved person was constrained to reside at her parents house. The
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contention of the Respondents was that the aggrieved person had
stayed only one night after her marriage at the ancestral house and
was thereafter residing separately with her husband and there was no
domestic relationship. Two issues relevant for our purpose which was
under consideration of the Apex Court was whether there should be a
subsisting domestic relationship between the aggrieved person and
the persons against whom relief is claimed and whether it is
mandatory for the aggrieved person to reside with those persons
against whom allegations have been levelled at the time of
commission of violence. The High Court in that case had held against
the aggrieved person for the reason that it was necessary to show
that the aggrieved person was sharing the household with the
respondent and there was domestic relationship between the parties.
The Apex Court observed that sub section (1) of Section 17 of DV Act
confers right on every woman in a domestic relationship to reside in
the shared household and is not restricted to actual residence. By way
of illustration, the Apex Court has explained that a woman who is or
has been in a domestic relationship has the right to reside not only in
the house of her husband, if it is located in another place which is also
a shared household but also in the shared household which may be in
a different location in which the family of her husband resides.
Patil-SR (ch) 14 of 22
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16. The Apex Court while answering the issue as to whether it is
mandatory for the aggrieved person to reside with those persons
against whom the allegations have been levelled has held that is it not
mandatory for the aggrieved persons to have actually lived or resided
with those persons against whom the allegations have been levelled
at the time of seeking relief. Pertinently, the issue as regards the
subsisting domestic relationship was answered by the Apex Court in
paragraph 62 as under:
"62. As the appellant had a right to reside in the shared
household as she was in a domestic relationship with her
husband till he died in the accident and had lived together with
him therefore she also had a right to reside in the shared
household despite the death of her husband in a road accident.
The aggrieved person continued to have subsisting domestic
relationship owing to her marriage and she being the daughter
in law had the right to reside in the shared household"
17. The decision in Prabha Tyagi (supra) is sufficient answer to the
submission that as the Revision Applicants and Respondent No 1 did
not reside in "Viceroy premises" there is no subsisting domestic
relationship. It cannot be denied that whether at Gundecha or
Viceroy, both the premises belonging to the applicants, respondent
no. 1 being the wife of their son, had a right to reside in either of the
premises.
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18. Apart from the discussion above, in the instant case there is
specific pleading about the parties having resided together in
"Gundecha premises". It has been stated in paragraph 12 and 19 as
under :
"12. That at the time of the marriage between the
Complainant and the Respondent No.1, the Complainant was
given various valuable items and jewellery by the Respondents
as well as from her parents, family and friends. The same forms
part of the Complainant's istridhan, After marriage, on 10 th
February 2020 the Complainant went to Mumbai and started
staying at 10 B, Tower D, Viceroy Park, Mumbai. Pertinently,
after the wedding, the Respondents 1, 2 and 3 represented to
the Complainant that it would not be safe to keep so much
jewellery with the Complainant alone and that the
Respondents would keep it safe, and in the event the
Complainant required it, they would return it to her. The
Complainant was made to entrust her entire istridhan to the
Respondents No.1, 2 and 3 on the pretext of safe keeping and
only retained daily wear jewellery etc. It is submitted that on
11th February 2020, the Complainant's 'Greh Pravesh' was
organised at an Apartment bearing No.A-1, 801, Gundecha
Trillium, Thakur Village, Kandivali East, Mumbal, which is the
matrimonial shared household of the Complainant where she
has been living with the Respondents in a domestic
relationship. However, right after marriage and during
lockdown due to COVID-19, the parties were initially residing
together at property bearing no. 10B, Tower D, Viceroy Park
Mumbai, which is in 1KM radius of the aforesaid matrimonial
household of the Complainant being Apartment bearing No. A-
1, 801, Gundecha Trillium. After the lockdown was relaxed, the
Respondents started residing at Apartment bearing No. A-1,
801, Gundecha Trillium. It is submitted that the Respondent No.
3 owns both the aforementioned properties and the parties till
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today are residing together. It is further submitted that all
times all the Respondents live together as a joint family and are
in continuous domestic relationship with each other."
"19........................ The parents of the Respondent No 1 i.e.
Respondent Nos 2 and 3 were present at the house as they
were sleeping in the other room and were there during the
entire incident, however they failed to utter a single word in
support of the Complainant and instead joined the Respondent
No 1 and further insulted the Complainant ......".
19. In the reply filed by the No.1 to the discharge application, it is
specifically pleaded that the Applicants own both the properties and
the Complainant has been residing with the Respondents in both the
premsies as a joint family. It is also contended that health insurance
policy bought by the husband of the Complainant as also her
employment letter reflects the address of "Viceroy premises". The
submission of Mr. Shah that the living in the household denotes
certain permanency to be attached to the residence cannot be
brushed aside as mere casual visits or fleeting visits is not sufficient to
establish domestic relationship between the parties. However, in the
instant case, the submission of Mr. Shah cannot come to the aid of the
Applicants for the reason that the Respondent No 1 has specifically
pleaded about the parties residing together in "Gundecha premises"
after lockdown was relaxed and that the parties continued residing
and at all time lived together as a joint family. It also needs to be
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noted that both the premises are situated within a distance of 1 Km
and even if the duration of residence is not pleaded, the averments
prima facie does not indicate that these were mere casual visits or
fleeting visits. Whether the Respondent No 1 is able to substantiate
the case is matter of trial. However at this stage it cannot be said that
the application does not disclose the existence of domestic
relationship between the parties. It is also pleaded that during the
Covid pandemic the parties were resided at "Viceroy premises".
Perusal of the application filed by the Respondent No 1 indicates
allegations of domestic violence qua the Applicants as regards
dispossessing her from "Gundecha premises", being tortured,
harassed, abused and beaten for not bringing sufficient dowry and
insulting and humiliating the parents of Respondent no. 1.
20. Pertinently, learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of
Aditya Anand Varma v. State of Maharashtra [2022 All MR (Cri)
2317] was considering the challenge where an application by the
petitioners therein to dismiss the DV Act application came to be
rejected. In that case, the specific contention raised was that
respondent no. 2 therein had never resided in the matrimonial house
and was thus never in a domestic relationship. In that case, there was
not even a pleading in the application that the parties had ever
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resided together in a shared household. Learned Single Judge held
that the decision in the case of Prabha Tyagi (supra) is a complete
answer to the submission that since respondent no. 2 therein had not
actually resided, respondent no. 2 was not in a domestic relationship
with the petitioner. I am respectfully bound by the decision of the
Apex Court as well as the co-ordinate bench of this Court. The
decision in Sudama Dutt Sharma (supra) was prior to the decision of
the Apex Court in Prabha Tyagi (supra) and does not assist the
revision applicants.
21. The submission of Mr. Shah that the decision in the case of
Prabha Tyagi (supra) is distinguishable in the facts is liable to be
rejected for in that matter despite the death of husband of the
aggrieved woman, by taking into consideration sub-section (1) of
section 17 of the DV Act, the Apex Court had held that even right to
live would entitle the aggrieved woman to file an application under
section 12 of the DV Act. The factual scenario in the case before the
Apex Court was that the aggrieved woman had never lived in the
shared household but had lived separately with her husband. Despite
that, the Apex Court held that in view of sub-section (1) of section 17
of the DV Act, the aggrieved person had a right to reside in the shared
household and as such continued to have a subsisting domestic
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relationship owning to her marriage and she being the daughter in law
had a right to reside in the shared household.
22. In the present case, the facts are on a better footing inasmuch
as in the application itself it has been contended by respondent no. 1
that the parties were residing together at "Gundecha premises" after
the lockdown was lifted. In my view, the decision in the case of
Prabha Tyagi (supra) which has been followed by learned Single
Judge of this Court in the case of Aditya Anand Varma (supra) is
squarely applicable to the facts of present case.
23. As regards the decision in the case of Dhananjay Zombade
(supra) in the facts of that case, there were no pleadings in the
complaint / application that the applicants therein were living with
the respondent together as members of joint family and thus for want
of specific pleadings and in view of an impeccable evidence placed on
record showing their separate residence, learned Single Judge held
that the applicants do not come within the definition of domestic
relationship with the respondents. The facts of the case are clearly
distinguishable as in the instant case as discussed above there are
specific pleadings as regards the residence of the parties together at
"Gundecha premises".
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24. As regards the decision in the case of Shradha Fogla (supra),
the aggrieved person and her husband were residing in America for a
period of almost 9 years and during this period she would come down
to India and would have a fleeting visits to the matrimonial house and
she never resided there permanently. In that case, there was no
pleading of the applicant that she permanently resided in India and
more particularly at the family residence at Mumbai and that she had
not provided the actual duration of stay at the time of her visits to
India. It was in the facts of that case, learned Single Judge had
dismissed the petition of the aggrieved person discharging the in-laws
except the husband. The said decision being clearly distinguishable is
not applicable to the facts of present case.
25. The Trial Court by its order dated 6 th April, 2022 held that the
main allegations are against the Respondent No 1 and there are no
specific allegations against the Respondents No 2 and 3. That, in the
application both addresses have been provided, however, one person
cannot reside at different places at the same time. The Trial Court
considered the pleadings in the Complainant's application that
"Gundecha premises" is the Complainant's matrimonial shared
household. The Trial Court discharged the Revision Applicants for the
reason that evasive allegations are made against Respondent No 2
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and 3. Before this Court, there were no submissions advanced that the
application under DV Act did not make out any case of domestic
violence qua the Revision Applicants.
26. The Appellate Court rightly considered the pleadings in the
application and held that specific contentions have been made about
living in a joint family alongwith the Respondents and all of them
having subjected the aggrieved person to domestic violence of
different kinds on various occasions. The Appellate Court observed
that though one person cannot live at different places at the same
time he/she can certainly live in two houses situated in same city. In
my opinion, there is no infirmity in the view taken by the Appellate
Court.
27. Having regard to the discussion above, there is no merit in the
revision application. Revision application stands dismissed.
28. In view of the disposal of revision, pending application taken
out in this revision, if any, does not survive and the same is disposed
of.
[Sharmila U. Deshmukh, J.]
Patil-SR (ch) 22 of 22
Signed by: Sachin R. Patil
Designation: PS To Honourable Judge
Date: 01/02/2024 19:46:33
