Bombay High Court
Urmila Vijay Bhalavi vs The State Of Maharashtra And Others on 16 August, 2024
Author: Ravindra V. Ghuge
Bench: Ravindra V. Ghuge
2024:BHC-AUG:18676-DB
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
923 CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6531 OF 2024
IN WP/3228/2017
MRS. URMILA VIJAY BHALAVI
VERSUS
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS
....
Ms P. S. Talekar, Advocate for Talekar & Associates for
Applicant;
Mr R. S. Wani, A.G.P. for Respondents/State
CORAM : RAVINDRA V. GHUGE
AND
Y. G. KHOBRAGADE, JJ.
DATE : 16th August, 2024
PER COURT:
1. By this Civil Application, the Applicant/Petitioner
desires that the order of this Court dated 23/03/2017, passed in
Writ Petition No.3228/2017, should be placed before the Court for
speaking to the minutes. Though the Application is registered as a
Civil Application, it could be treated as a praecipe under Rule 2 of
Chapter XI of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960
(for short 'the 1960 Rules').
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2. We have heard the learned Advocate for the
Applicant/Petitioner and the learned A.G.P. The order placed
before us, is dated 23/03/2017. The Civil Application taken out
by the Applicant/Petitioner is dated, 09/06/2024. A host of
reasons are cited in a lengthy Civil Application taken out for the
said purpose. The issue, however, falls in a narrow compass, as to
whether the words 'not entitled to continuity in service' has been
wrongly typed in the concluding paragraph of the order dated
23/03/2017. Another issue would be, as to whether there is any
limitation for placing a praecipe before this Court for speaking to
the minutes of the judgment.
3. Rule 2 under Chapter XI of the 1960 Rules, reads as
under :-
"2. Procedure when Advocate wishes to keep judgment
before the Court for speaking to minutes. - Whenever an
Advocate wants a judgment to be kept before the Court for
speaking to the minutes, he shall file a note in the Office
showing the points on which he wants to speak to the
minutes and he shall also serve a copy thereof on the
Advocate for the other side."
4. The opening word is 'Whenever' in Rule 2 of the 1960
Rules (supra) indicating that, when an Advocate notices that, a
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motion for speaking to the minutes of the order or judgment is
required to be filed, he has to file a note stating the points, on
which he wants 'speaking to the minutes'. There is neither any
provision nor any judgment cited before this Court, which would
indicate that the law of limitation is applicable to an Application
for speaking to the minutes of the order under Rule 2 of Chapter
XI of the 1960 Rules. Moreover, the word 'Whenever' is
indicative of a situation when an Advocate finds that the judgment
is required to be kept before the Court for speaking to the minutes.
5. The learned Advocate for the Applicant/Petitioner has
drawn our attention to the order dated 23/03/2017. After a
hearing in the matter, a speaking order has been passed and
considering that the conduct of the Petitioner is indicative of bona
fide intentions and by applying the law laid down by the Full
Bench of this Court in Arun Vishwanath Sonone Vs. State of
Maharashtra and others, [2015 (1) Mh.L.J. 457], this Court
concluded in paragraph No.8 in the said order, as under :-
"8. However, the petitioner would not be entitled for
the backwages from the date of her termination till
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reinstatement. The said period shall be counted for the
purpose of continuity in service"
6. It is quite obvious that, this Court concluded that the
Petitioner would not be entitled for back wages from the date of
her termination i.e. on 11/10/2002, till reinstatement on
01/04/2017 and the said period would be reckoned with for the
purpose of continuity in service.
7. In the above backdrop, this Court ordered below
paragraph No.10 as under :-
"10. The impugned order passed by the Tribunal is
quashed and set aside. The respondents shall reinstate the
petitioner at her original post. The petitioner shall not be
entitled for the benefit of reservation. The entry of this
order shall be taken in the service book of the petitioner.
The petitioner shall not be entitled for backwages from the
date of termination till the date of reinstatement. The
petitioner shall be reinstated on or before 01.04.2017,
however, shall not be entitled for continuity in service. The
writ petition accordingly is allowed in above terms. No
costs."
8. It is, thus, apparent that, this Court has reiterated that
the Petitioner shall not be entitled for back wages from the date of
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termination, till the date of reinstatement. The Petitioner was
ordered to be reinstated on 01/04/2017. However, one part in the
second last sentence of paragraph 10 of the order, runs counter to
the conclusion drawn by this Court in paragraph No.8, which is
reproduced above.
9. It is, therefore, obvious that, this Court deprived the
Petitioner of the backwages, though she was granted reinstatement
in service with continuity. While adverting to the period of
unemployment, for which backwages were declined in paragraph
No.8 of the order, this Court has drawn a clear and unequivocal
conclusion that "The said period (meaning duration of
termination) shall be counted for the purpose of continuity in
service". With this reasoned and firm conclusion, it is obvious
that the words 'shall not be entitled for continuity in service',
have been inadvertently typed and should have meant "shall not
entitled for backwages", which was the conclusion drawn in
paragraph No.8. However, what has been typed is that "The
Petitioner shall be reinstated on or before 01.04.2017, however,
shall not be entitled for continuity in service".
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10. Taking into account the entire order dated 23/03/2017
and the conclusion in paragraph No.8, we are of the view that the
words "continuity in service" should have been replaced by the
word 'backwages'. Looking at the entire judgment of the Court
and especially paragraph No.8 thereof, it appears to us that, there
has been an inadvertent mistake in typing the words "shall not be
entitled for continuity".
11. The learned A.G.P. confirms that this Court had
concluded in paragraph No.8 that the Petitioner would be entitled
for continuity in service, but would not be entitled for backwages.
12. In view of the above, the conclusion drawn in
paragraph No.8, would be reflected properly in paragraph No.10,
if the sentence in the concluding paragraph No.10 of the order
dated 23/03/2017, would read as under :-
"The Petitioner shall be reinstated on or before 01.04.2017,
however, shall not be entitled for backwages".
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13. Considering the above conclusion, this Civil
Application is allowed, in terms of paragraph 12 hereinabove.
(Y. G. KHOBRAGADE, J.) (RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, J.)
sjk
