Ashokrao S/O Uttamrao Pawar vs State Of Mah. Thr. Home Dep. ...
2023 Latest Caselaw 1342 Bom

                                                                                  J- Cri. WP-738-2022.odt
                                              1

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
          NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.

     CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.738 OF 2022

    PETITIONER                    :           Ashokrao s/o Uttamrao Pawar
                                              Aged about 60 years, R/o. Vilas Nagar
                                              Lohar line, Amravati, Taluka and Dist -
                                              Amravati
    DETENU                        :           Umesh @ Bunty s/o Ashok Pawar
                                              Aged about 28 years, Occu : Labour
                                              R/o. Vilas Nagar Lohar line, Amravati,
                                              Taluka and Dist - Amravati
    At Present                    :           Lodged in Central Prison, Amravati
                                              ..VERSUS..

    RESPONDENTS : 1 State of Maharashtra,
                    Through, Home Department (Special),
                    2nd Floor, Mantralaya, Mumbai.

                                      2 Commissioner of Police, Amravati
                                        District- Amravati
                                      3 Dy. Commissioner of Police, Zone-I
                                        Amravati (City), Amravati
                                      4 Assistant Commissioner of Police,
                                        Gadge Nagar Division, Amravati
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Shri P. V. Navlani, Advocate for the Petitioner.
    Shri S. S. Doifode, Additional Public Prosecutor for the Respondents.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    CORAM                                 :       VINAY JOSHI AND
                                                  VALMIKI SA MENEZES, JJ.

    RESERVED ON                           :       30th JANUARY, 2023.
    PRONOUNCED ON :                               8th FEBRUARY, 2023.
                                                    J- Cri. WP-738-2022.odt


JUDGMENT : (PER : VALMIKI SA MENEZES, J.)


.          Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard

finally with the consent of the learned counsel appearing for

the parties

2. This is a petition which takes exception to the

order bearing D.O.NO.CB/DET/MPDA/AMT/01/2022

dated 08.06.2022, passed by the Respondent No.2-

Commissioner of Police, Amravati, ordering detention of the

Detenu-Umesh @ Bunty s/o Ashok Pawar under the

provisions of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous

Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug offenders,

Dangerous Persons and Video Pirates Act, 1981 ("MPDA

Act"), and also the order bearing No.

MPDA-0622/CR.188/Spl-3B dated 21.07.2022, passed by

the Respondent No.1 i.e. Home Department (Special),

confirming the Detenu's order of detention.

3. The main grounds for challenge, amongst various

others, raised in the petition are ;

J- Cri. WP-738-2022.odt

a) That the impugned orders are not based on the

correct record, in that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by

the Respondent No.2, whilst passing an order dated

08.06.2022 on the basis of order of externment bearing

No.DCP/Zone-1/Externment/514/2018 dated 27.03.2018,

passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone-1,

Amravati City, was without consideration of this Court's

order dated 13.02.2019, passed in Criminal Writ Petition

No.1092 of 2018, whereby the aforesaid order of externment

was quashed and set aside; the impugned detention order was

passed, without the order of this Court dated 13.02.2019,

being placed before the Detaining Authority or the Authority

considering the same;

b) That none of the incidents which formed the basis

for passing of the detention order and recording the

Authority's subjective satisfaction, can be considered as

activities of the Detenu, that would amount to acts causing

breach of "public order", but are at the most acts in breach of

"law and order"; consequently, there would be no jurisdiction

vested in the Authority under Section 3 of the MPDA Act, to J- Cri. WP-738-2022.odt

pass the impugned order;

c) That In-camera statements of two witnesses relied

upon by the Authority to record its subjective satisfaction,

were devoid of all elements, which would amount to a breach

of public order; that there is nothing on record to establish

that the Detaining Authority has conducted verification of

the contents of the In-camera statements of two witnesses,

more so verified the unwillingness of the witnesses to come

forward and deposed in the matter, and since there is no

communication of the material, which constituted such act of

verification, to the Detenu, there is also a breach of the

provisions of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India.

We have not adverted to any of the other grounds

urged in this petition in this judgment, as we are of the

opinion that on the basis of the aforementioned three

grounds alone, the relief sought in this petition could be

allowed.

J- Cri. WP-738-2022.odt

4. We have heard Shri P. V. Navlani, learned Counsel

for the Petitioner, Shri S. S. Doifode, learned Additional

Public Prosecutor for the Respondents and with their able

assistance, we have perused the record.

The Respondents have opposed the petition by

filing an affidavit-in-reply dated 28.11.2022 through the

Respondent No.2. In that affidavit, it is only contended that

the file contains endorsements that statements of the two

In-camera witnesses were verified by the Assistant

Commissioner of Police by interacting with the witnesses and

visiting the spot and by verifying the truthfulness of the

statements by discussing the same with the concerned

Assistant Commissioner of Police. The Respondents support

the impugned orders.

5. Shri P. V. Navlani, learned Counsel appearing for

the Petitioner would elaborate on the aforementioned three

grounds by arguing that the impugned orders start by making

reference to various alleged offences committed by the

Detenu commencing from the year 2010 to the year 2021, all J- Cri. WP-738-2022.odt

of which criminal cases are pending before the concerned

Magistrates. He further contends that the reference was also

made to previous seven crimes registered against the Detenu

including four offences from the year 2011 to 2022 involving

the Detenu in crimes under the Arms Act, 1959 ("Arms

Act"). He contends that none of these matters were

ultimately relied upon by the Authority for recording its

subjective satisfaction, while passing the impugned orders,

but however, reliance was specifically placed on two crimes,

the first crime bearing Crime No.83 of 2022 under Sections

4 and 25 of the Arms Act, in which the Detenu was arrested

on 15.01.2022 and on being produced before the concerned

Magistrate was granted bail on 16.01.2022 on a Personal

Bond executed by the Detenu.

The second crime relied upon was under Crime

No.458 of 2022 on a complaint made on 19.04.2022 under

Sections 4 and 25 of the Arms Act, for which the Detenu was

arrested on 20.04.2022 and on being produced before the

concerned Magistrate was released on bail on the same day. It

is his contention that in both these cases, a charge-sheet was J- Cri. WP-738-2022.odt

filed before the concerned Magistrate and the trial is

underway; that in both these cases, the allegation was that the

Detenu had brandished a knife at the respective

complainants and extorted money from them, and neither of

the complainants specified any detail to demonstrate that the

act of the Detenu was in a public place, and in a manner that

would cause terror amongst citizens who were witnesses to

the incident.

6. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner further submits

that in both these incidents, merely because the Detenu

brandished a knife, that would by itself not be an act, which

would in any manner be prejudicial to the maintenance of

public order and the act could at the most be termed to be in

breach of law and order, which could be dealt with under

ordinary law by even approaching the concerned Magistrate,

before whom the charge-sheets had been filed to cancel the

Detenu's bail. Learned Counsel relies upon a judgment of

this Court in Jay @ Nunya Rajesh Bhosale ..V/s.. The

Commissioner of Police, Pune & Ors., reported in 2015 ALL

MR (Cri) 4437, to contend that merely being in possession J- Cri. WP-738-2022.odt

of a weapon would not lead to the disturbance of a public

order to enable the Authority to invoke powers under

Section 3 of the MPDA Act.

7. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner then contends

that the Authority has relied upon an order of externment

bearing No.DCP/Zone-1/Externment/514/2018 dated

27.03.2018, passed against the Detenu to form the basis for

arriving at a subjective satisfaction by the Authority that the

Detenu would likely commit further offences of the nature

that would cause breach of public order. He argues that the

order dated 27.03.2018 of externment was challenged before

this Court, which by its judgment dated 13.02.2019, passed

in Criminal Writ Petition No.1092 of 2018, quashed and set

aside the order of externment. He contends that the order of

this Court dated 13.02.2019 was never placed before the

Detaining Authority, leading it to pass the impugned order

on the basis of incorrect facts, thus vitiating the entire order.

He relies upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Khaja Bilal Ahmed ..V/s.. State of Telangana and others,

reported in (2020) 13 SCC 632, to submit that the Hon'ble J- Cri. WP-738-2022.odt

Supreme Court has held at para 23 of the said judgment, that

when the satisfaction of the Detaining Authority is arrived at

on the basis of irrelevant or invalid grounds and the

detention order refers to non existent criminal activity, as

stated in the ground contained in the impugned order

referring to an externment order which was set aside, such an

order is on the face of it unsustainable.

8. Shri Navlani, then contends that the reliance on

two In-camera statements of witnesses, whose identity was

not disclosed, are required to be discarded as there is no

material on the record of the proceedings to demonstrate the

verification of the content of the statements from the

witnesses recorded by the Detaining Authority, nor is there

anything on the record of the Detaining Authority to show

that it verified the contents of the statements by directly

interviewing the witnesses or even verifying the

unwillingness of the In-camera witnesses to come forward

and deposed against the Detenu out of fear. He further

contends that even if this Court concludes that the exercise of

verification was actually carried out by the Sub Divisional J- Cri. WP-738-2022.odt

Police Officer, there is no communication of such verification

to the Detenu to enable him to raise any representation

against the grounds, and the lack of communication to the

Detenu of such verification itself is an infraction of the

Detenu's fundamental rights under Article 22 (5) of the

Constitution of India, thus vitiating the entire process of

passing the impugned orders.

He relies upon two judgments of this Court, the

first in Sourabh s/o. Sahebrao Rathod ..V/s.. State of

Maharashtra & Ors., reported in 2022 ALL MR (Cri) 2349

and the other in Smt. Bismilah wd/o Sheikh Rahim ..V/s..

The State of Maharashtra and Anr. in Criminal Writ Petition

No.73 of 2022 dated 21.10.2022. Sourabh s/o. Sahebrao

Rathod (supra), was cited for the proposition is that proper

verification was necessary by the Detaining Authority of the

In-camera statements of witnesses both, as to their

truthfulness and unwillingness of the witnesses to give

statements out of fear for the Detenu, and Smt. Bismilah

wd/o Sheikh Rahim (supra), was cited for the proposition

that non communication to the Detenu of the material on J- Cri. WP-738-2022.odt

record to demonstrate that the Authority had indeed verified

the statements would be in breach of the provisions of Article

22 (5) of the Constitution of India.

9. Per contra, Shri S. S. Doifode, learned Additional

Public Prosecutor appearing for the Respondents took us

through the affidavit-in-reply of the Respondent No.2 and

contends that the affidavit bears out that the statements of

the two In-camera witnesses were verified by the Assistant

Commissioner of Police by interacting with the witnesses and

visiting the spot. The affidavit then states that the Deputy

Commissioner of Police also verified the statements by

discussing the same with the Assistant Commissioner of

Police and the Detaining Authority has verified the

statements by discussing the same with the Assistant

Commissioner of Police.

10. Before discussing the rival contentions of the

parties, it would be advantageous for us to reproduce the

provision of Section 3 of the MPDA Act. Section 3 of the

MPDA Act, which reads as under :

J- Cri. WP-738-2022.odt

"3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons (1) The State Government may, if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained.

(2) If, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police, the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do, it may, by order in writing, direct, that during such period as may be specified in the order such District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police may also if satisfied as provided in sub-section (1), exercise the powers conferred by the said sub-section :

Provided that the period specified in the order made by the State Government under this sub-section shall not, in the first instance, exceed 1 [six months] but the State Government may, if satisfied as aforesaid that it is necessary so to do, amend such order to extend such period from time to time by any period not exceeding 1 [six months] at any one time.

(3) When any order is made under this section by an officer mentioned in sub-section (2), he shall 9 26-J-WP- 484-22.doc forthwith report the fact to the State Government, together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as, in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof, unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the State Government."

11. The Authority would assume jurisdiction and

would be authorised to issue a detention order under this J- Cri. WP-738-2022.odt

provision only if it comes to a subjective satisfaction on the

material before it that the acts referred to in such material as

alleged against the Detenu would be acts, which would be

prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, and not

otherwise. The expression "acting in any manner prejudicial

to the maintenance of public order" under the MPDA Act,

has been interpreted and dealt with by the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in Hasan Khan Ibne Haider Khan ..V/s.. R. H.

Mendnoca and Ors., reported in (2000) 3 SCC page 511 , as

held at para 7 thereof.

"7. This Court in Amanulla Khan Kudeatalla Khan Pathan v. State of Gujarat MANU/SC/0396/1999 : 1999CriLJ3504 considered the expression "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" and referring to earlier decision of this Court in Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh v. M.M. Mehta, Commissioner of Police MANU/SC/0659/1995 : (1995) 3SCC237 held that the fallout and the extent and reach of the alleged activities must be of such a nature that they travel beyond the capacity of the ordinary law to deal with him on to prevent his subversive activities affecting the community at large or a large section of society and it is the degree of disturbance and its impact upon the even tempo of life of the society or the people of a locality which determines whether the disturbance caused by such activity amounts only to a breach of "law and order" or it amounts to breach of "public order"

J- Cri. WP-738-2022.odt

Every criminal act alleged against the Detenu

would therefore not be such as to prejudice the maintenance

of public order, until it is so demonstrated.

12. In Jay @ Nunya Rajesh Bhosale (supra), this Court

at para 7 thereof has held as under :

"7. Thereafter, Mr. Tripathi submitted that as far as the second ground is concerned which relates to CR No. 3088 of 2015, the facts are that the police while on patrolling duty in the limits of Faraskhana police station found the detenu in possession of a koyta. As there was prohibitory order, said CR came to be registered against him under Section 37(1)(3) read with 135 of Maharashtra Police Act and under Section 4(25) of the Arms Act. Mr. Tripathi submitted that merely being in possession of a weapon would not lead to the disturbance of public order. Moreover, he submitted that it was a single case in which the detenu was found in possession of a weapon and hence, it cannot be said that the detenu is habitually committing such offence under the Arms Act. He further submitted that merely being in possession of a weapon is not sufficient to cause disturbance of public order. In support of this contention, he has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Sudarshan Tukaram Mhatre Vs. R.D.Tyagi, Commissioner of Police, Thane and others reported in 1990 Cri.L.J. 1964. In the said decision, it was held that merely carrying concealed firearm in a public place is not a menace to public order unless of course the person flourishes the weapon or by word or gesture indicates that the weapon is with him and he will not stop at using it. Looking to the fact that this CR is the only CR on which the detaining authority is relying upon in relation to possession of a weapon and the fact J- Cri. WP-738-2022.odt

that the weapon was not brandished by the detenu and the fact that he did not indicate that he had a weapon and that he will not stop at using it, it could not be said that it affected the public order. This leaves us with only one CR i.e. CR No. 91 of 2015 of Faraskhana Police Station."

Ratio of the above referred judgment clearly sets

out that merely carrying a weapon or flourishing a weapon at

a person without demonstrating that there were other

citizens around, who would labour under the fear of its use or

that the act of the Detenu would cause a fear in the hearts of

the citizenry would not be a menace to public order.

13. In the present case, though the two In-camera

statements refer to acts of the Detenu which might amount

to extortion, there does not appear to be any detail of the fear

psychosis that might have been created by those acts or that

the same were committed at a public place.

In fact a reading of the affidavit on the question of

verification of the In-camera statements itself would lead us

to believe that the In-camera statements are unreliable and

need to be discarded for the following reasons. Though there J- Cri. WP-738-2022.odt

is a reference to the Authority verifying the statements by

discussing/interacting with the witnesses, and the concerned

Assistant Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioner

of Police, a perusal of the statements reveals that other than

only endorsing that the Authority had done a verification,

there is no reference that the content of the statements was

verified by the Detaining Authority i.e. the District

Magistrate or that the Detaining Authority has verified that

the witnesses were unwilling out of fear of the Detenu to

depose against him. It is evident that the subjective

satisfaction of the Authority was arrived at without

complying with verification as was required by law.

14. Further, on a perusal of the record, it is evident

that even if, we were to conclude that the verification of the

two anonymous statements were complied with, the material

on the basis of which, the verification was done clearly has

not been communicated to the Detenu.

This Court in Sourabh s/o. Sahebrao Rathod

(supra), has considered the legal effect of non J- Cri. WP-738-2022.odt

communication of the material, which constituted the act of

verification by the Authority, to the Detenu and has

concluded that such non communication would amount to

the breach of the provisions of Article 22 (5) of the

Constitution of India. It has held thus :

"4. Firstly, the detention order refers to and relies on two in-camera statements at pages 446 and 447 of the paper book. On such statements for accompanying them, there is no reference to the verification of the contents of such statements by the concerned SDPO. There is also no endorsement that these two statements or its purported verification was ever verified by the detaining authority i.e. the District Magistrate. There is no dispute that such verification by the SDPO and the fact of verification by the detaining authority is a must in such matter.

6. In this case, there was an assertion in the affidavit that verification was indeed undertaken by the SDPO and the detaining authority. Mr. Doifode showed us the original record which suggests that verification of the in- camera statements was undertaken by the SDPO. However, there is no contemporaneous record about this fact being verified by the detaining authority. Therefore, except for the assertion in the return, there is nothing in the record to establish such verification by the detaining authority. Be that as it may, we think that the verification by the SDPO and the alleged verification or the factum of alleged verification by the detaining authority ought to have been communicated to the detenue along with the detention order, so that the detenue could have at the earliest opportunity represented against the same. From the contention advanced before us as also the returns, there is an assertion that such verifications J- Cri. WP-738-2022.odt

constituted both relevant and vital material in the context of the impugned detention order. Therefore, having regard to the provisions in Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India, the communication of such material was necessary.

7. Mr. Doifode, however, submitted that since the petitioner was able to raise the grounds based on the in- camera statements in this petition, no prejudice is discernible. Here, we are unable to agree with Mr. Doifode. The ground raised in this petition is that the non communication of this relevant and vital material constituted infringement of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India. The prejudice, in this case, is quite apparent because the petitioner was, at the earliest opportunity, deprived of his right to make an effective representation against the detention order ."

15. We further note that this Court in Smt. Bismilah

wd/o Sheikh Rahim (supra), has dealt with the very same

argument of the Detenu, that failure to record subjective

satisfaction that the witnesses, whose statements had been

recorded In-camera, were not willing to testify against the

Detenu out of fear would vitiate the entire process of arriving

at its satisfaction and rendered the impugned order

unsustainable. The following paragraphs are quoted from

Smt. Bismilah wd/o Sheikh Rahim (supra), hereunder :

"4. The common thread of arguments is that the respondent-authorities, while passing the impugned detention orders have failed to record subjective J- Cri. WP-738-2022.odt

satisfaction that the witnesses 'A' and 'B' whose statements have been recorded in-camera, were not willing to come forward and depose because of fear of the respective petitioners. The petitioners have relied upon the following judgments passed by the coordinate Benches of this Court.

i) 2017 (3) Mh.L.J. Cri.L.J. 475: {Rajkumar Jaiswal vs. State of Maharashtra and others;

ii) 2022 ALL MR (Cri) 2561 : {Sk. Yetal vs. State of Maharashtra and another}

iii) Sanjay Ramlal Sahu vs. State of Maharashtra & another (Cri.W.P. No. 768 /2015 decided on 1.2.2016).

5. The coordinate Benches of this Court in the above-referred petitions, have set aside the detention orders on the ground that the subjective satisfaction has not been recorded by the detaining authority, either of the correctness of verification exercise carried out by the Sub-divisional Police officer or of the unwillingness (out of fear of the respective petitioners) of the in-camera witnesses to come forward and depose.

5. The argument is that despite the aforesaid consistent view taken by this court, the detaining authority in the impugned orders have not recorded their subjective satisfaction on the above points.

6. We have gone through the impugned orders in the light of the aforesaid submissions canvassed before us, only to find that there is substance in the argument. Firstly, the concerned SDPO or the Assistant Commissioner of Police who have verified the correctness and truthfulness of the incident narrated by the in-camera witnesses, have not enquired and satisfied themselves on the point whether witnesses are unwilling to come forward and depose because of the fear of the petitioners. Secondly, the detaining authorities who have passed the impugned orders have not interacted with the verifying authority viz. the SDPO or the ACP for J- Cri. WP-738-2022.odt

recording their subjective satisfaction on the truthfulness or correctness of the incident stated by the witnesses so also of their unwillingness to come forward and depose because of the fear of the petitioners. The impugned orders, therefore, do not comply the dictum of the judgments passed by this Court."

16. Applying the ratio laid down in Sourabh s/o.

Sahebrao Rathod (supra) and in Smt. Bismilah wd/o Sheikh

Rahim (supra) to the facts of the present case, we have no

doubt in our mind that there has been a total non compliance

of the mandate of law as stated in these judgments, in that

the Authority has neither recorded verification of the content

and authenticity of the statements directly from the

witnesses, nor has it recorded anywhere that it has verified

that those witnesses were unwilling to give statements and

testify against the Detenu out of fear. Further, none of this

material, recording verification, was ever communicated to

the Detenu to enable him to make a representation against it

to the concerned Authority. We, therefore, record that the

subjective satisfaction arrived at by the Authority on the basis

of In-camera statements which are unreliable, unverified and

not even communicated to the Detenu are unsustainable. We J- Cri. WP-738-2022.odt

also conclude that non communication of this material to the

Detenu renders the entire process and the impugned orders

to have been passed contrary to the provisions of Article

22(5) of the Constitution of India.

17. We now proceed to deal with the contentions of

the Detenu that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the

Authority on the basis of the order of externment bearing

No.bearing No.DCP/Zone-1/Externment/514/2018 dated

27.03.2018, was contrary to the record. This Court, in its

order dated 13.02.2019, has specifically dealt with a

challenge in Criminal Writ Petition No.1092 of 2018 to the

very externment order dated 27.03.2018 relied upon by the

Authority as material for arriving at its satisfaction, and has

set aside that order with an elaborate judgment, which is part

of this record. This Court has specifically concluded that the

material which formed the basis of the externment order did

not show any live link between the subjective satisfaction of

the Detaining Authority and the alleged criminal activities of

the Detenu. The judgment dated 13.02.2019 of this Court

was not placed before the Detaining Authority, whilst J- Cri. WP-738-2022.odt

deciding the present matter; thus, clearly the Authority

proceeded on the basis of an externment order, which had

been quashed and set aside by this Court much before the

impugned order was passed. The impugned order is therefore

passed on the basis of wrong material and not on the basis of

the correct record. Having not placed the order of this Court

before the Authority, the impugned order is not based upon

the correct material and on that count also, the impugned

order is rendered unsustainable.

18. Before parting with this judgment, we make

reference to a peculiar manner in which bail order dated

09.03.2011 was passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class,

Amravati, whilst granting bail application in Crime No.537

of 2011 (Exh-10) ; the copy of the bail application alongwith

order dated 09.03.2011 passed by the concerned Magistrate

at Amravati has been produced before us under pursis dated

01.02.2023.

We are particularly concerned with the fact that the

bail order dated 09.03.2011 passed by the concerned J- Cri. WP-738-2022.odt

Magistrate is rendered on a rubber stamp with blank spaces,

which are filled in by inserting the bond amount and no

other details are contained on the rubber stamp. We note that

there is no apparent authorization of the High Court for the

use of such rubber stamps to enable a Magistrate to grant

bail. Grant of bail is a matter of discretion to be exercised by

the concerned Magistrate, who is expected to apply his mind

after considering the material on record and is required to be

granted or rejected by a speaking order. A Magistrate's order

on a bail application certainly cannot be rendered on a rubber

stamp as we note, has done in the present case. The bail order

dated 09.03.2011 before us, which is in the form of rubber

stamp does not contain any reasons for grant of bail.

19. We deprecate this practice, if it does exist in any of

the Courts subordinate to this Court and deem it appropriate

to circulate this judgment to all concerned District/Sessions

Courts, which shall be sent by the concerned Registrar of this

Court alongwith a copy of the bail order referred to by us in

this judgment, with a specific directions that the subordinate

Courts/Magistrates shall desist from making use of such J- Cri. WP-738-2022.odt

rubber stamps for deciding bail applications in future.

20. For the reasons stated above and based upon our

conclusion recorded on the three grounds enumerated at para

3 hereinabove, we proceed to pass the following order :

ORDER

i) Criminal Writ Petition No.738 of 2022 is allowed.

ii) The impugned orders dated 08.06.2022, passed by

the Respondent No.2- Commissioner of Police, Amravati

and 21.07.2022, passed by the Respondent No.1 i.e. Home

Department (Special), are hereby quashed and set aside.

iii) The Respondents are directed to release the Detenu

from detention, unless required in any other case.

21. Rule is made absolute in above terms.

(VALMIKI SA MENEZES, J.) (VINAY JOSHI, J.)

TAMBE

Digitally Signed By:ASHISH ASHOKRAO TAMBE Personal Assistant to Hon'ble JUDGE Signing Date:09.02.2023 18:05