Bombay High Court
Kharghar Co Hsg Societies ... vs Municipal Commissioner Panvel ... on 6 April, 2023
Bench: G. S. Kulkarni, R. N. Laddha
2023:BHC-AS:10446-DB
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
PVR/Sonawane
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 8586 OF 2021
1. Kharghar Co-op. Housing Societies Federation
Ltd. through General Secretary
2. Jaikishan Kumatekar ... Petitioners
Versus
1. Municipal Commissioner, Panvel Municipal
Corporation.
2. State of Maharashtra
3. Urban Development Department ...Respondents
Mr. C.S. Joshi a/w. Mr. B.C. Joshi for the petitioners.
Mr. Ashutosh Kumbhakoni, Senior Advocate a/w. Mr. Kedar B. Dighe
for respondent no. 1/Panvel Municipal Corporation.
Ms. Rupali Shinde, AGP for the State/respondent nos. 2 and 3.
_______________________
CORAM: G. S. KULKARNI
& R. N. LADDHA, JJ.
RESERVED ON: 30 March, 2023
PRONOUNCED ON: 06 April, 2023
_______________________
JUDGMENT (Per G.S. Kulkarni, J.)
The judgment has been divided into the following sections to facilitate
analysis:
Particulars Paragraphs
A Preface. 1 to 7
B Challenge. 8&9
C Preliminary Objection. 10 to 24
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
D Petitioners opposition to the preliminary objection. 25 & 26
E Analysis and Conclusion. 27 to 57
A) Preface
1. Petitioner No.1 claims to be a federation of co-operative housing
societies constituted for welfare of the residents of Kharghar Node which is an
area in Navi Mumbai. It is averred that petitioner No.1 is looking after the
welfare of its Member Cooperative Housing Societies (for short "the
Societies"). Petitioner No.2 is described to be a resident of Kharghar, and as an
office bearer of a co-operative housing society, namely, one 'Stuti Residency
Co-operative Housing Society Ltd.' The petition is affirmed by one
Commander Siddheshwar Hira Kalawat who has described himself as General
Secretary of petitioner No.1.
2. Respondent No.1 is the Commissioner of the Panvel Municipal
Corporation (for short 'the PMC'). The PMC is constituted by the State
Government by issuance of a notification under Section 3 of the Maharashtra
Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 (for short, 'the MMC Act') with effect from
1 October 2016, so as to include 29 villages and other areas, which now
includes the Kharghar Node.
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
3. This petition concerns levy of municipal taxes in relation to only one
area of the PMC namely the "Kharghar Node". The infrastructure of the
Kharghar Node was developed and maintained by the City Industrial
Development Corporation (for short 'CIDCO') which was constituted as a
"New Town Development Authority", for the area constituting the twin city,
namely, "Navi Mumbai". Until the formation of the PMC, CIDCO was
looking after the infrastructure requirements of the Kharghar Node. By virtue
of the PMC being constituted with effect from 1 October 2016, Kharghar
Node stood included within the municipal jurisdiction of the PMC, for all
purposes of municipal administration. The municipal authority in regard to
Kharghar Node alongwith the other areas now having stood with the PMC, is
not in dispute.
4. The PMC's municipal jurisdiction covers an area of about 110
kilometers, comprising of 29 villages alongwith the areas which were earlier
vested with the CIDCO. It is stated that 2,68,718 properties are within the
jurisdiction of the PMC for the purposes of PMC levying and collecting
municipal taxes.
5. By virtue of the PMC being constituted as a municipal corporation
under the provisions of the Maharashtra Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 (for
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
short 'the MMC Act'), all powers and authority to levy property taxes with
effect from 1 October 2016 stood vested with the PMC. It is not brought to
our notice that any other authority than the PMC could levy "property taxes"
within the meaning of the MMC Act, with effect from the period 1 October
2016. It also appears that some miscellaneous charges earlier collected by the
CIDCO could never partake the character and colour of a property tax
specifically leviable under the MMC Act.
6. On its constitution, PMC for the purposes of levy of property taxes,
had commenced its work, which included large scale survey of all areas and the
properties situated in such areas. As informed to us, the basic ground work was
substantial, in preparing the assessment registers, making assessment and
ultimately issuing property tax bills in relation to the various properties situated
within its municipal jurisdiction, as there were large new areas which were
never assessed to property taxes.
7. Thus entire exercise of PMC making the assessment, culminated into
PMC issuing bills to all the properties including to the properties situated in
the Kharghar Node, with which members of petitioner no. 1 are concerned,
namely, the co-operative societies in the Kharghar Node. It is not in dispute
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
that Kharghar Node is a territorial area which forms small part of the
municipal jurisdiction of the PMC.
B) Challenge
8. The challenge as mounted in this petition is quite peculiar, namely to the
property tax bills, issued by the PMC to the co-operative societies who are
stated to be the members of petitioner No.1. As noted above, the entire exercise
relating to the assessment in question from the date the PMC was constituted,
has culminated into the assessment and levy of the property taxes and the bills
in question being issued. Illustratively, the petitioners have drawn Court's
attention to a bill issued to one of its members namely Satyam Heights Co-
operative Housing Society Ltd. which is for the period 1 October 2016 upto
2021-22 of an amount of Rs.1,69,151/-.
9. Thus, only substantive prayer in the present petition is for issuance of a
writ of mandamus to cancel the bills and demand notices issued for levying
retrospective tax since October, 2016 to 2021 - 2022 to individual members
and societies of petitioner No.1.
C) Preliminary Objection
10. At the outset, Mr. Kumbhakoni, learned Senior Counsel for PMC has
raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the present petition, as
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
also, on the petition being entertained by the Court in its extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Such objection is interalia
on the ground that as the challenge is merely to the bills issued by the PMC
demanding property taxes, from the members of petitioner No.1, they have an
effective and effacious alternative remedy of filing an appeal as provided under
the statute, namely, under the provisions of Section 406 of the MMC Act. It is
his submission that none of the grounds as raised by the petitioners are such
that they cannot be gone into by the appellate forum, namely, the Court of
Civil Judge, Senior Division.
11. Secondly, it is contended that petitioner no. 1 per se does not have a
cause of action nor the petitioner No.1 could be said to have suffered any legal
injury, so as to maintain this petition.
12. On behalf of the PMC a reply affidavit dated 21 December 2021 has
been filed of Mr.Ganesh Shete, Deputy Commissioner of Panvel Municipal
Corporation, to which our attention has been drawn by Mr.Kumbhakoni,
wherein in supporting the preliminary objections, the PMC has contended that
the present petition as framed and filed, is not maintainable in law. It is
contended that the petitioner No.1 has no locus nor has any cause of action
that can be said to have arisen for petitioner No.1 to file the present petition.
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
13. There is an additional affidavit dated 20 March 2023 filed by Mr.
Ganesh Shete, Deputy Commissioner, in support of PMC's contention on its
objection to the maintainability and entertainability of the present petition,
more particularly, as filed by petitioner No.1-federation. It is contended that
petitioner No.1-federation has purportedly claimed that its member-societies
are aggrieved by the impugned action of the PMC, however, according to such
affidavit, such claims of the petitioners are not true and correct. It is contended
that petitioner no.1-federation claims that it has filed and is prosecuting the
petition in common interest and on behalf of all the member societies, is also
not correct, as the ground reality is clear, that the member societies have not
authorized the petitioner to represent them, atleast in support of the alleged
cause. It is thus contended that the present petition is wrongly portraying that
the petitioner-federation is canvassing the interest of all its members.
According to the PMC, this is clear from the averments as made in the Interim
Application No. 2108 of 2023, preferred by the petitioner for deleting its
members, as they were not even ready to pay nominal court fees of Rs.125/-
each. It is PMC's contention that refusal of said members to pay such meager
amount of Rs.125/- would demonstrate that petitioner No.1 was claiming from
them much higher amounts. It is contended that petitioner No.1 has gone to
the extent of publishing a notice in the newspaper inviting public at large to
contact the office bearers of petitioner No.1 to join in prosecuting the present
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
petition, which according to the PMC, speaks volumes about the ill-intention
of the petitioner-federation. It is contended that this is clearly an attempt to
mislead, if not cheat, the gullible public. The contention is that when the court
fees was Rs.125/- per person/society, what was being demanded per person was
Rs.250/-.
14. It is thus contended that the office bearers of the petitioner-federation
are abusing the process of law for their personal benefits and thus for such
reason, demonstrably this is not a case which would warrant exercise of extra-
ordinary constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. It is also contended that
although the petitioner-federation has claimed support from all the societies,
not a single resolution passed by any co-operative society, is annexed to the
petition, nor there is any averment stating that every co-operative society to
which petitioner No.1 purportedly represents, has passed resolution supporting
and authorizing the petitioner-federation to file and/or prosecute the present
petition.
15. In the said affidavit, it is further contended by the PMC that the
property owners in their individual capacity were free to litigate and oppose the
levy of property taxes before appropriate forum and in accordance with law, if
they felt that PMC was not collecting/charging the property tax from them in
accordance with law. It is contended that instigating public not to pay property
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
tax and discouraging people who are willing to pay property tax by giving wide
publicity by a wrong message i.e. 'DO NOT PAY PROPERTY TAX', on social
media, print media, holding dharnas, organizing muhalla meetings is wholly
and totally against public policy and against the rule of law. Copy of such
newspaper cutting is placed on record.
16. It is thus contended that it is not permissible for the petitioner to by-pass
the scheme of a fiscal provisions of the legislation and refrain from approaching
the forum established to hear and decide property tax disputes and claims, for
the reason that such persons would be required to compulsory deposit the
amount of disputed tax though it would be deposited under protest. It is
contended that the petitioner has completely overlooked that the PMC is not a
private profit making business house, but it is for the people and is
continuously working for the benefit of the residents within the territorial
jurisdiction of Panvel Corporation. It is contended that property tax is the
main source of revenue and if it is stopped, it will be difficult and rather
impossible for the PMC to carry out its regular work.
17. We have also perused the rejoinder affidavit as filed on behalf of the
petitioners. Most of the contents of rejoinder affidavit are reiterations of what
has been contended by the petitioners in the Writ Petition. The tenor of the
rejoinder affidavit is also to the effect that as the petitioners have paid Court
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
fees, this Court should hold the petition to be maintainable and entertain the
same. The rejoinder affidavit also refers to previous orders passed on the
petition and reiteration of the petitioner's contention that the demand for tax is
illegal. The petitioners have referred to a totally unconnected case of "Property
Owners Association", being a case filed interalia challenging the vires of the
provisions of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act by which the capital
method of levy of property taxes in Mumbai was assailed, which according to
them, was entertained by this Court. It is on such ground that the petitioners
contend that the reply affidavit ought not to be taken into consideration.
18. Mr. Kumbhakoni has contended that one would fail to appreciate as to
how the present writ petition can be filed for reliefs which are to the effect that
property taxes be not charged and collected, which is a major source of revenue
for the PMC to carry out various municipal activities being undertaken in
public interest, such as maintenance and development of infrastructure,
providing all civic amenities, water requirements, street lighting, constructions
of roads, by lanes, sanitary works, sewage treatment activities and infrastructure
to be created and maintained, disposal of solid waste etc. It is contended that
the present petition is, "not at all" filed much less prosecuted, in the larger
public interest and therefore, on this ground itself, it needs to be rejected. It is
contended that the petitioners have miserably failed to act upon the clear well-
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
established distinction between a representative proceedings and a public
interest litigation. According to him, a representative proceedings in the garb
of public interest litigation, is clearly not maintainable in law and in view of the
clear facts of this case.
19. It is contended by Mr. Kumbhkoni, that PMC had undertaken
individual assessment of property taxes which are being independently and
individually levied on all the assessees, and accordingly steps taken by PMC
towards collection of property taxes. It is contended that necessarily the cause
of action, being purportedly pursued in this petition is in fact an individual
cause of action which if at all has arisen to the assessees who individually fell
aggrieved by the property tax bills as issued to them by the PMC, hence a
representative proceeding like the present petition is untenable. It is submitted
that every property-holder has an independent and separate cause of action for
which proceeding will have to be initiated by each of the property-holder.
20. It is submitted that the statutory remedy for each of the individual
societies who may feel aggrieved by the levy and demand of property tax,
would be to file an appeal u/s 406 of the MMC Act. It is submitted that the
said provision also mandates that the person aggrieved has to first deposit the
tax amount for the appeal to be entertained by the Civil Judge Senior Divsion.
It is the specific contention of Mr.Kumbhakoni that to avoid payment of tax
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
and to bypass the statutory remedy of an appeal, the petitioners have filed the
present petition.
21. Mr. Kumbhakoni in supporting his preliminary objection has placed
reliance on the decision of the co-ordinate Bench of this Court in M/s Mestra
A. G. Switzerland Vs. State of Maharasthra and Ors. 1 to contend that in
dealing with the question in regard to an assessment order, passed by the
Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax, levying tax under Maharashtra Value
Added Tax 2002, which was being assailed in a writ petition filed under Article
226 of the Constitution of India, the Division Bench has held that the
statutory requirements of an appeal being provided to assail the levy could not
have been bypassed by the petitioner. In reaching to such conclusion, the
Division Bench referred to the settled principles of law in regard to the scope of
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,
observing that it was a discretionary remedy, inter alia observing as to in which
circumstances could such a discretion to entertain a writ petition could be
exercised by the High Court. The Division Bench in reaching to a conclusion
that a writ petition in such circumstances would not be maintainable has
referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Thansingh Nathmal & Ors.
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
Vs. A.Mazid, Superintendent of Taxes2 ; Mahyco Monsanto Biotech (India)
Pvt. Ltd. Vs. The Union of India & Ors.3, along with several other decisions.
22. Mr. Kumbhakoni has also placed reliance on the decision of the Division
Bench of the Nagpur Bench of this Court in Vijaysingh Gajrajsingh Chauhan
Vs. Governor of Maharashtra4 and Arun Yashwant Kulkarni Vs. State of
Maharashtra & Ors.5 to contend that the cause of action being pursued in the
present petition, is necessarily an individual cause of action, and such collective
cause of action, certainly cannot be entertained in the present proceedings.
23. Mr.Kumbhakoni would submit that the petitioner has failed to show
that petitioner no. 1 has suffered a civil or evil consequences as a Federation. It
is his submission that it does not matter if the points are common, however,
that does not make the cause of action to assail the bills as a common cause of
action for the writ petition to be entertained in the manner it is filed. He
submits that it is not one single bill which is being challenged in the present
petition, but the bills/notices issued to the individual members of the
petitioner no.1-Federation, who are independent societies registered under the
Cooperative Societies Act, are being assailed in the present petition. It is thus
2 AIR 1964 SC 1419.
3 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 5274.
5 2021(4)Mh.L.J.
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
his submission that even if it is held that the petition, in the manner in which it
is filed, is maintainable, however it should not be entertained, as not only the
petitioner as a 'Federation' would not have a cause of action, but also on the
ground that its so-called members have equally efficacious alternate remedy to
assail the bills by way of statutory appeal u/s 406 of MMC Act. Mr.
Kumbhakoni's submission is that there is no reason whatsoever in law to
bypass the right of appeal which has been conferred by the statute, namely, the
MMC Act.
24. It is submitted by Mr. Kumbhakoni that the major source of revenue of
the PMC is its income to be derived from the property taxes. He submits that
the entire endeavour of the petitioners is to deprive this newly formed
Municipal Corporation of the benefits of its major source of revenue from the
property taxes, by filing the present writ petition, as the intention of the
petitioners is not to pay taxes.
D) Petitioners Opposition to the preliminary objection
25. Mr. Joshi, learned counsel for the petitioners has vehemently opposed
the preliminary objection as urged on behalf of the PMC. Mr.Joshi would
submit that the petition is not only maintainable but it also needs to be
entertained. His first contention is that levy of tax itself is illegal for the reason
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
that there is a breach of principles of natural justice in the PMC levying taxes,
subject matter of demand under the impugned bills. It is next submitted that
PMC has acted in breach of the taxation rules as contained in Chapter VIII
under the "Taxation Rules" appended to the MMC Act and more particularly,
Rule 30 which provides for property taxes to be payable half-yearly in advance.
He submits that also there is breach of Section 99 of the MMC Act which
provides for fixing of rates of taxes. He submits that on all counts the PMC has
breached the provisions of law in making assessment. His next contention is
levying of retrospective taxes demanded from 1 October 2016 till financial year
2021-2022, itself is illegal. It is his contention that there is no basis in law for
such retrospective demand. It is his submission that the decisions as cited by
Mr.Kumbhakoni are totally non-applicable in the facts of the present case.
26. Mr. Joshi has submitted that preliminary objection of Mr.Kumbhakoni
to the petition not being maintainable, is totally untenable, in support of this
contention, Mr.Joshi has placed reliance on the recent decision of the Supreme
Court, in M/s Godrej Sara Lee Limited Vs. The Excise and Taxation Officer-
cum-Assessing Authority & Ors.6 to contend that by applying the ratio of the
said decision, it would be required to be held that the petition is not only
maintainable but also needs to be entertained. Insofar as contention on taxes
being demanded for retrospective period, Mr.Joshi has placed reliance on the
6 2023 SCC OnLine SC 95.
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
judgment of the Division Bench of this Court, in Satish Dattatray Shivalkar
(Dr.) Vs. Pimpari Chinchwad Municipal Corporation & Anr. 7 and the decision
of the Supreme Court, in Municipal Corporation of City of Hubali Vs. Subha
Rao Hanumatharao Prayag & Ors.8 In regard to the objection of Mr.
Kumbhakoni, on maintainability of the petition is concerned, Mr. Joshi has
also referred to an interim order dated 22.2.2023 passed by a co-ordinate
Bench of this Court, in Mahadev Waghmare & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra
& Ors.9 to contend that in similar circumstances, as against present case, the
Court has held a writ petition to be maintainable, however, the issue of
whether the petition can be entertained, was kept open by the Division Bench.
E) Analysis and Conclusion
27. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties and having perused the
record, we may, at the outset observe that the prayers in the petition are
limited, namely for issuance of a writ of mandamus to cancel the bills and
demand notices issued for levying retrospective tax since October 2016 to
2021-2022 to the individual members societies of the petitioner.
28. Thus primarily what is objected and assailed in the petition is the
issuance of bills demanding property taxes from the co-operative societies who
are stated to be the members of petitioner No.1-federation. Insofar as the
7 2002 4 Bom CR 183.
8 (1976) 4 SCC 830.
9 WP no. 15937 of 2022 decided on 22.2.2023.
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
statutory regime in this regard is concerned, Section 406 of the MMC Act is an
alternate statutory remedy available to a person who is interalia aggrieved by a
tax fixed or charged by the municipal corporation. Section 406 of the MMC
Act is required to be noted which reads thus:-
"Section 406. Appeals when and to whom to lie.
1) Subject to the provisions hereinafter contained, appeals against any
rateable value [or the capital value, as the case may be,] or tax fixed or
charged under this Act shall be heard and determined by the Judge.
(2) No such appeal [shall be entertained] unless-
(a) it is brought within fifteen days after the accrual of the cause of
complaint;
(b) in the case of an appeal against a rateable value [or the capital value, as
the case may be,] a complaint has previously been made to the
Commissioner as provided under this Act and such complaint has been
disposed of ;
(c) in the case of an appeal against any tax [including interest and penalty
imposed] in respect of which provision exists under this Act for a complaint
to be made to the Commissioner against the demand, such complaint has
previously been made and disposed of ;
(d) in the case of an appeal against any amendment made in the assessment
book for property taxes during the official year, a complaint has been made
by the person aggrieved within [twenty-one days] after he first received
notice of such amendment and his complaint has been disposed of ;
(e) in the case of an appeal against a tax, or in the case of an appeal made
against a rateable value [or the capital value, as the case may be] [the amount
of the disputed tax claimed from the appellant, or the amount of the tax
chargeable on the basis of the dispute rateable value up to the date of filing
the appeal, has been deposited by the appellant with the Commissioner].
(2A) Where the appeal is not filed in accordance with the provisions of
clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (2), it shall be liable to be summarily
dismissed.
[(3) In the case of any appeal entertained by the Judge, but not heard by
him, before the date of commencement of the Maharashtra Municipal
Corporations (Amendment) Act, 1975, the Judge shall not hear and decide
such appeal unless the amount of the disputed tax claimed from the
appellant, or the amount of the tax chargeable on the basis of the disputed
rateable value, as the case may be, up to the date of filing the appeal has been
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
deposited by the appellant with Commissioner, within thirty days from the
date of publication of a general notice by the Commissioner in this behalf in
the local news-papers. The Commissioner shall simultaneously serve on each
such appellant a notice under sections 473 and 474 and other relevant
provisions of this Act, for intimating the amount to be deposited by the
appellant with him.
(4) As far as possible, within fifteen days from the expiry of the period of
thirty days prescribed under sub-section (3), the Commissioner shall
intimate to the Judge the names and other particulars of the appellants who
have deposited with him the required amount within the prescribed period
and the names and other particulars of the appellants who have not
deposited with him such amount within such period. On receipt of such
intimation, the judge shall summarily dismiss the appeal of any appellant
who has not deposited the required amount with the Commissioner within
the prescribed period.
(5) In the case of any appeal, which may have been entertained by the Judge
before the date of commencement of the Act aforesaid or which may be
entertained by him on and after the said date, the Judge shall not hear and
decide such appeal, unless the amount of the tax claimed by each of the bills,
which may have been issued since the entertainment of the appeal, is also
deposited, from time to time, with the Commissioner in the first month of
the half year to which the respective bill relates. In case of default by the
appellant at any time before the appeal is decided, on getting an intimation
to that effect from the Commissioner, the Judge shall summarily dismiss the
appeal.]
(6) An appeal against the demand notice in respect of levy of cess under
Chapter XIA or the Local Body Tax under Chapter XIB shall lie,-
(i) to the Deputy Commissioner, when the demand notice is
raised by the Cess Officer or any other officer, not being the Deputy
Commissioner.
(ii) to the Commissioner, when the demand notice is raised by the
Deputy Commissioner.
(7) The appeal under sub-section (6) shall be filed within fifteen days
from the date of the demand notice.
(8) No appeal under sub-section 96) shall be entertained by the Deputy
Commissioner or, as the case may be, the Commissioner unless the amount
of the disputed tax claimed from the appellant has been deposited by the
appellant with the Commissioner."
(emphasis supplied)
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
29. About 59 years back, a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the
case of Shivram Poddar Vs. Income Tax Officer, Central Circle II, Calcutta and
Anr.10 has held that resort to the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary
jurisdiction conferred and recognized by the Constitution in matters relating to
assessment, levy and collection of tax (in such case, income-tax) may be
permitted only when questions of infringement of fundamental rights arise,
and where on undisputed facts the taxing authorities are shown to have
assumed jurisdiction which they do not possess. In attempting to bypass the
provisions of the statute by inviting the High Court to decide the questions
which are primarily within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Authorities, the
party approaching the Court has often to ask the Court to make assumptions of
facts which remain to be investigated by the Revenue Authorities.
30. In another decision of a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in
"Income-Tax Officer, Lucknow Vs. M/s.S.B. Singar Singh & Sons & Anr."11, it
was held that the High Court was not justified in deciding the matter primarly
within the jurisdicton of the revenue authorities by entertaining a writ petition.
The Supreme Court also referring to the decision in Shivram Poddar Vs.
Income Tax Officer, Central Circle II, Calcutta and Anr. (supra) observed
thus:-
10 AIR 1964 SC 1095
11 (1976)4 SCC 325
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
"19. In the light of what has been observed above, we are of opinion
that the High Court could not justifiably interfere in the exercise of its
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution with
the appellate orders of the tribunal. In any case, the question as to
whether the omission to record a finding on ground no. 1 by the
tribunal was due to the failure of the appellant to urge that ground or
due to a lapse on the part of the tribunal which deserved rectification,
was a matter entirely for the authorities under those taxation statutes. It
will be well to recall once more what this Court speaking through J.C.
Shah, J. (as he then was), had stressed in Shivram Poddar vs. Income-tax
Officer, AIR 1964 SC 1095.
Resort to the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary
jurisdiction conferred or recognized by the Constitution in matters
relating to assessment, levy and collection of income-tax may be
permitted only when questions of infringement of fundamental rights
arise, or where on undisputed facts the taxing authorities are shown to
have assumed jurisdiction which they do not possess. In attempting, to
bypass the provisions of the Income-tax Act by inviting the High Court
to decide questions which are primarily within the jurisdiction of the
revenue authorities, the party approaching the court has often to ask the
court to make assumptions of facts which remain to be investigated by
the revenue authorities.
20. In the instant case, the High Court had assumed jurisdiction on the
assumption that a certain ground had been urged before the Income-tax
Appellate Tribunal which had arbitrarily refused to consider the same and
record a finding thereon. This assumption, in our opinion, stood thoroughly
discounted by the concomitant circumstances of the case, including the
dilatory and questionable conduct of the assessee. This was therefore not a
fit case for the exercise of its special jurisdiction under Article 226 by the
High Court."
31. In Assistant Collector of Central Exicse, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal
Vs. Dunlop India Ltd. & Ors.12 referring to the decision in Titaghur Paper
Mills Co.Ltd. Vs. State of Orissa 13, the Supreme Court observed that Article
226 is not meant to short circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is only
where statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to meet the demands of
12 (1985)1 SCC 260
13 (1983)2 SCC 433
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
extraordinary situations, as for instance where the very vires of the statute is in
question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and
the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it,
it may take recourse to Article 226 of the Constitution. It was held that the
Court must have good and sufficient reason to by-pass the alternative remedy
provided by statute.
32. Mr.Joshi, learned Counsel for the petitioners has referred to a recent
decision of the Supreme Court in M/s.Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. Vs. The Excise and
Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority & Ors. (supra) to contend that
applying the ratio as laid down in this decision, it ought to be held that the
present petition is not only maintainable but ought to be entertained. In
M/s.Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. (supra) the question for consideration before the
Supreme Court was whether the High Court was justified in declining
interference on the ground of availability of an alternate remedy of an appeal to
the applicant under Section 33 of the VAT Act, which it had not pursued and if
the answer was to be in the negative, whether the Supreme Court was required
to decide whether to remit the writ petition to the High Court for hearing it on
merits. The appellant in such case had questioned the jurisdiction of the
Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner (ST)-cum-Revisional Authority to
reopen proceedings, in exercise of suo motu revisional power conferred by
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
Section 34 of the VAT Act and to pass final orders holding that the two
assessment orders in question, suffered from illegality and impropriety as
delineated therein. The High Court had referred to the decision in Titaghur
Paper Mills Co.Ltd. Vs. State of Orissa (supra) as relied on behalf of the
respondent wherein the Supreme Court had observed that the remedy available
under the Act was required to be availed under the Act and accepting such
contention, the High Court had formed an opinion that there cannot be
presumption that the appellate authority would not be able to grant relief as
sought in the writ petition and accordingly, dismissed the petition. It is in such
context, the Supreme Court speaking through Shri.Justice Dipankar Datta
observed thus:-
"4. .... ... ... ... ... The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226
is plenary in nature. Any limitation on the exercise of such power must be
traceable in the Constitution itself. Profitable reference in this regard may
be made to Article 329 and ordainments of other similarly worded
articles in the Constitution. Article 226 does not, in terms, impose any
limitation or restraint on the exercise of power to issue writs. While it is
true that exercise of writ powers despite availability of a remedy under the
very statute which has been invoked and has given rise to the action
impugned in the writ petition ought not to be made in a routine manner,
yet, the mere fact that the petitioner before the high court, in a given case,
has not pursued the alternative remedy available to him/it cannot
mechanically be construed as a ground for its dismissal. It is axiomatic
that the high courts (bearing in mind the facts of each particular case)
have a discretion whether to entertain a writ petition or not. One of the
self-imposed restrictions on the exercise of power under Article 226 that
has evolved through judicial precedents is that the high courts should
normally not entertain a writ petition, where an effective and efficacious
alternative remedy is available. At the same time, it must be remembered
that mere availability of an alternative remedy of appeal or revision,
which the party invoking the jurisdiction of the high court under Article
226 has not pursued, would not oust the jurisdiction of the high court
and render a writ petition "not maintainable". In a long line of decisions,
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
this Court has made it clear that availability of an alternative remedy does
not operate as an absolute bar to the "maintainability" of a writ petition
and that the rule, which requires a party to pursue the alternative remedy
provided by a statute, is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion
rather than a rule of law. Though elementary, it needs to be restated that
"entertainability" and "maintainability" of a writ petition are distinct
concepts. The fine but real distinction between the two ought not to be
lost sight of. The objection as to "maintainability" goes to the root of the
matter and if such objection were found to be of substance, the courts
would be rendered incapable of even receiving the lis for adjudication.
On the other hand, the question of "entertainability" is entirely within the
realm of discretion of the high courts, writ remedy being discretionary. A
writ petition despite being maintainable may not be entertained by a high
court for very many reasons or relief could even be refused to the
petitioner, despite setting up a sound legal point, if grant of the claimed
relief would not further public interest. Hence, dismissal of a writ petition
by a high court on the ground that the petitioner has not availed the
alternative remedy without, however, examining whether an exceptional
case has been made out for such entertainment would not be proper.
5. A little after the dawn of the Constitution, a Constitution Bench of
this Court in its decision reported in 1958 SCR 595 (State of Uttar
Pradesh vs. Mohd. Nooh) had the occasion to observe as follows:
"10. In the next place it must be borne in mind that there is
no rule, with regard to certiorari as there is with mandamus,
that it will lie only where there is no other equally effective
remedy. It is well established that, provided the requisite
grounds exist, certiorari will lie although a right of appeal
has been conferred by statute, (Halsbury's Laws of England,
3rd Edn., Vol. 11, p. 130 and the cases cited there). The fact
that the aggrieved party has another and adequate remedy
may be taken into consideration by the superior court in
arriving at a conclusion as to whether it should, in exercise
of its discretion, issue a writ of certiorari to quash the
proceedings and decisions of inferior courts subordinate to it
and ordinarily the superior court will decline to interfere
until the aggrieved party has exhausted his other statutory
remedies, if any. But this rule requiring the exhaustion of
statutory remedies before the writ will be granted is a rule of
policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law
and instances are numerous where a writ of certiorari has
been issued in spite of the fact that the aggrieved party had
other adequate legal remedies. ***"
6. At the end of the last century, this Court in paragraph 15 of the its
decision reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1 (Whirlpool Corporation vs.
Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Others) carved out the exceptions
on the existence whereof a Writ Court would be justified in entertaining a
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
writ petition despite the party approaching it not having availed the
alternative remedy provided by the statute. The same read as under:
(i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the
fundamental rights;
(ii) where there is violation of principles of natural justice;
(iii) where the order or the proceedings are wholly without
jurisdiction; or
(iv) where the vires of an Act is challenged.
7. Not too long ago, this Court in its decision reported in 2021 SCC
OnLine SC 884 (Assistant Commissioner of State Tax vs. M/s.
Commercial Steel Limited) has reiterated the same principles in
paragraph 11.
8. That apart, we may also usefully refer to the decisions of this Court
reported in (1977) 2 SCC 724 (State of Uttar Pradesh & ors. vs. Indian
Hume Pipe Co. Ltd.) and (2000) 10 SCC 482 (Union of India vs. State
of Haryana). What appears on a plain reading of the former decision is
that whether a certain item falls within an entry in a sales tax statute,
raises a pure question of law and if investigation into facts is unnecessary,
the high court could entertain a writ petition in its discretion even
though the alternative remedy was not availed of; and, unless exercise of
discretion is shown to be unreasonable or perverse, this Court would not
interfere. In the latter decision, this Court found the issue raised by the
appellant to be pristinely legal requiring determination by the high court
without putting the appellant through the mill of statutory appeals in the
hierarchy. What follows from the said decisions is that where the
controversy is a purely legal one and it does not involve disputed
questions of fact but only questions of law, then it should be decided by
the high court instead of dismissing the writ petition on the ground of an
alternative remedy being available."
33. True it is, that availability of an alternate remedy does not operate as an
absolute bar to the maintainability of the writ petition, and the rule which
requires the party to pursue an alternate remedy provided by a statute, is a rule
of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. However, the
High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction has a discretion whether to
entertain a writ petition or not, and it would not normally entertain a writ
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
petition, where an effective and efficacious alternative remedy is available, as
also held in M/s.Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. (supra).
34. In the context of what has been held by the Supreme Court in
M/s.Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. (supra), it is significant that in the present petition,
there is no challenge to the vires of the provisions of either the MMC Act or
the Rules made thereunder. The challenge is purely to the property tax bills
issued by the PMC. Thus, applying the very principles laid down by the
Supreme Court in M/s.Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. (supra) which considers the
principles of law as laid down by the Supreme Court in Whirlpool Corporation
vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Others 14, it is quite intriguing as to
how the petitioners can contend that this petition needs to be entertained, so as
to permit the petitioners to challenge the bills levying property taxes and
issues of such levy to be adjudicated in the present proceedings. We are thus
afraid as to how in the present facts, the decision of the Supreme Court in
M/s.Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. (supra) would assist the petitioners.
35. As noted above, the relevant provisions of MMC Act read with the
Rules, creates a robust statutory mechanism not only in respect of everything
leading to the levy and collection of taxes but also providing for a specific
statutory remedy of an appeal under Section 406 of the MMC Act of an appeal
14 (1998) 8 SCC 1
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
being provided, if a person is aggrieved by the fixation of a rateable value or
capital value or 'tax fixed' or 'charged' under MMC Act, to be assailed in such
appeal, which is to be filed before the Judge as defined under Section 2(29) of
the MMC Act. Such provision defines "the Judge" to mean in the (City of
Pune) the Judge of the Court of Small Causes, and in any other City the Civil
Judge (Senior Division) having jurisdiction in the City. Thus, clearly, a
statutory remedy of an appeal is available to the member/cooperative societies
of petitioner no.1, for redressal of their individual grievances/disputes on the
quantum of the property tax or any other issue leading to the issuance of
property tax bills. It, however, appears that such appeal would be maintainable,
provided there is a "pre-deposit", as provided under sub-section 2(e) of Section
406. Sub-section 2(e) of Section 406 provides that amount of disputed taxes
shall be required to be deposited with the Municipal Corporation. Further, as
per provisions of sub-section (2A) of Section 406 of MMC Act, when such
appeal is not filed in accordance with the provisions of clause (e) of sub-section
(2), it shall be liable to be dismissed. It appears that for such reasons, it is not
convenient for the member societies of petitioner no.1 to take recourse to
alternate statutory remedy as provided under Section 406 of the MMC Act to
assail the bills in question. This is also a contention as urged on behalf of the
PMC.
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
36. Be that as it may, we would also consider as to whether the grounds on
which the present petition has been filed, in any manner are precluded to be
raised, in such statutory appeal. As noted above, primarily the grounds as
raised by the petitioners in the present petition are, firstly, non-adherance to
the provisions of law in assessment and levy of property taxes which is quite
vague, secondly, no authority to levy retrospective tax and thirdly, principles of
natural justice not being followed.
37. We are not impressed with any of the grounds as urged by the petitioner
so as to pursuade us to entertan this petition and/or to come to a conclusion,
that the petitioners be permitted to by-pass the statutory remedy made
available by law to persons who are aggrieved and who intend to assail the
property tax bills. All these grounds are certainly grounds which can be raised
by the petitioners in a statutory appeal under Section 406 of MMC Act. In our
opinion, the grounds as raised by the petitioner in fact can be more effectively
raised, only by taking recourse to the statutory remedy of an appeal, as each of
the assessees would be required to prove on evidence, that the PMC in issuing
individual bills in respect to each of these assesses, has not acted in accordance
with the provisions of law and/or that in respect of such assesses there was a
breach of principles of natural justice. We may also observe that all these are
issues which are purely subjective and which are required to be individually
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
adjudicated before the appellate authority. On a deeper scrutiny, it would
certainly not be possible for this Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in such blanket manner, examine
these issues, albeit camouflaged by the petitioners to be common issues.
38. If we accept the contentions as made on behalf of the petitioners, we
fear that we are creating a new pattern and jurisprudence in relation to such
matters being entertained in exercise of writ jurisdiction, thereby rendering the
provision for a statutory appeal wholly otiose. This would lead to severe and
drastic consequences, in as much as assessments as may be levied by the several
Municipal Corporations, governed by the provisions of the MMC Act, would
become vulnerable to challenge by approaching the High Court in its
extraordinary writ jurisdiction. This would be applicable across the board in
respect of all the Municipal Corporations in the State of Maharashtra. We
would hence certainly not accept such wanton contention as sought to be urged
by the petitioners, that an enbloc writ petition assailing the property tax bills be
entertained. The legislative wisdom behind Section 406 providing for a
statutory appeal cannot be defeated, merely because petitioner no.1 is a
Federation, with several member societies, and merely because it is claimed that
they have a common cause. It would be wrong reading of law that merely by
forming a federation, a different color could be given to an individual cause so
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
as to contend that the writ petition be entertained. In our opinion, for such
reasons the petitioners are under an erroneous impression that merely because
they have many members who purportedly share a common cause, namely, to
assail the bills issued to them, the petitioners would have a foothold to
maintain the present petition and that looking at the numbers albeit miniscule
number of assessees, the High Court would be under some obligation, to
entertain such a petition. Certainly, the law would not accept such a drastic
proposition.
39. Further, the question is also whether any cause of action arises to
petitioner no. 1 to maintain this petition. In such context, Mr.Kumbhakoni's
reliance on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in "Arun Yashwant
Kulkarni Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors"15. is quite apposite in the facts of the
present case. The Division Bench in such decision considered the concept of
cause of action as also of a locus standi. It was observed that the rights under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be invoked only by an aggrieved
person except in the case where the writ prayed is for habeas corpus or quo
warranto and/or is in a public interest litigation. Referring to the decision of
the Supreme Court in Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan vs State Of Maharashtra
& Ors.16, it was observed that only a person who has suffered, or suffers from
152021(4) Mh.L.J. 613
16(2013)4 SCC 465
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
legal injury can challenge the act/action/order etc. in a court of law. Applying
such principle, Mr.Kumbhakoni would be correct in his contention that
petitioner No.1 can never be a person whose legal rights have been infringed or
for that matter there is a cause of action for petitioner No.1 to maintain this
petition. As observed above, insofar as petitioner No.2 is concerned, certainly
by having a combination of petitioner No.1 which by itself has no cause of
action or who cannot be itself aggrieved, petitioner No.2 cannot contend that
the petition be held maintainable or be entertained qua petitioner No.2. We
have observed that petitioner No.2 if aggrieved, he would have a statutory
remedy of filing an appeal as provided for under Section 406 of the MMC Act.
40. In the context of locus of the petitioners to maintain the present
petition, reliance is placed by Mr. Joshi on a decision of a learned Single Judge
of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Vishwabharathi House Building
Co-operative Society Ltd. Vs. Bangalore Development Authority 17. In our
opinion, Mr.Joshi's reliance on this decision is not well founded for the reason
that it is not petitioner no. 1 who is aggrieved by issuance of any bills. No civil
wrong is caused to petitioner no. 1 but is alleged to be caused to its members.
Also this is not a petition which is filed in public interest, so that the well
settled principle of locus standi can be stretched to the cause action being
pursued. The petitioners consciously have not filed this petition as Public
17 (1991)0 AIR(Kar) 133
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
Interest Litigation. Thus, in our opinion, in fact, neither any fundamental
rights of the petitioner No.1 nor any legal / statutory rights of petitioner No.1
are, in any manner, violated, for petitioner No.1 to maintain this petition.
Insofar as petitioner No.2 is concerned, as noted above, if he is aggrieved by
any bill issued, he has a statutory remedy available to assail such bill.
41. For the sake of completeness, we also examine as to whether any
exceptional case is made out by the petitioners so as to permit the petitioners to
urge their contentions in assailing the bills, in the present proceedings under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In such context, we would be
required to examine the primary grounds of challenge to the bills as raised in
the writ petition. The contention as urged on behalf of the petitioners that
there is a breach of principles of natural justice in issuing the bills in question.
The PMC has filed a detailed affidavit setting out all the steps which were
taken since the constitution and formation of PMC, in regard to the massive
work of survey being undertaken of all the properties, notices including special
notices being issued to the property owners and ultimately taking a final
decision to raise the property bills on the basis of the rateable value of the
property as determined. We cannot delve on an issue as to why notices of the
PMC were not responded by a particular assessee, or whether the same was not
served on the assesses etc. The PMC has stated in its affidavit that the
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
petitioners, without taking into consideration the procedure followed by PMC,
have made false and baseless statements in the petition. Various steps which
were taken by the PMC not only to survey the Kharghar node but also the
other areas have been set out in detail in the reply affidavit filed by the PMC.
It is also set out that the whole process suffered a setback since March 2020
because of the Covid-19 pandemic having affected the country. The following
contents of the affidavit in regard to the rules being followed and objections
being invited can be noted, which read thus:
"31. I say that as per the report and recommendation of the
administrative tax committee special notice in respect of property tax
was issued to all property owners (under provisions of section 150A of
the Act). As provided by the statute, objections were invited from
property owners under the provisions of rule 15 of Taxation rules
(Chapter VIII) (Taxation rules, for short) and on receipt of objections
in respect of levied property tax personal hearing was given to each
property owner who had raised objection in respect of his property tax
bill (as is statutorily provided under provisions of rule 18 of taxation
rules).
32. The administrative tax committee, on receipt of objections
and after hearing the property owners, reviewed its decision in respect
of each property tax bill and made necessary changes, if any, to the
final bill in accordance with the provisions of Rule 19 of the Taxation
Rules. I crave leave to refer to and rely upon the documents in respect
of the hearing given to the Petitioner.
33. I say and submit that after considering objections from the
residents of the Corporation area, NGOs, leaders of various social and
political parties etc, it was felt necessary to review the percentage of tax
to be levied. Hence on 06-042021 the General Body of the
Corporation in clause 1,7,8,9 of resolution No. 310 proposed to
reduce the annual letting rate of properties in municipal limit by 50%
thereby substantially reducing the tax in the corporation limits. I say
and submit that the proposal made by the general body to reduce
annual letting rate by 50% was not approved by the Special
Administrative Tax Committee. I say that they instead approved
reduction in annual letting rate by 30% instead of 50%. I say that only
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
in node G of the corporation area i.e. Taloja Industrial Area (Taloja
MIDC) no reduction was given. I say that after this whole process of
fixing property tax was complete in a particular node the Corporation
issued final tax bills to the residents.
35. I say that the reviewed report of the administrative committee to
reduce the property tax bills by 30% was placed before the Hon'ble
Commissioner who in accordance with the statutory provisions and
established administrative procedures placed the said committee report
before the general body for its approval vide Resolution 310 dated 06-
04-2021. I say that the expert administrative tax committee has
overruled the recommendation made by the general body to levy tax
only from 2019 and not from 2016. I say that the said committee
observation are recorded in clause 7 and 9 of the 310 resolution dated
09-04-2021. I say and submit that the chairman of the petitioner
forum has signed the said resolution as well. Copy of the said
resolution is annexed to the compilation of the documents filed
separately along with the reply. The administrative tax committee
report dated 09-04-2021 which is binding on the Corporation. I say
that the Hon'ble Commissioner of the said Corporation has taken
necessary steps in accordance with the said decision of the
administrative tax committee report.
36. I say that thus resolution No. 310 passed by the General Body was
placed before the Administrative Committee which met to deliberate
over the said resolution on 09-04-2021. I say that the Administrative
Committee forwarded its recommendations to the Commissioner of
the Corporation. I say that the Administrative Committee
recommended that except Node-G (Taloja MIDC Area), the new
revised Annual Letting Rate be reduced by 30% as against 50% as is
resolved by the General Body; resolution No. 7 passed by the General
Body that property tax be imposed w.e.f. 01-04-2021 instead of from
01-10-2016 cannot be accepted; representation be forwarded to
CIDCO to stop charging service charges w.e.f. 01-04-2021 etc. I say
that the Commissioner of Panvel Municipal Corporation accepted the
recommendation of the Administrative Committee as aforesaid vide
his order dated 30-03-2021, a copy of the said order is annexed to the
compilation of documents."
42. Insofar as the petitioner's contention that the PMC ought not to have
imposed property taxes with effect from its constitution, as CIDCO was
collecting service charges has also been stated to be totally untenable by PMC.
It is PMC's contention that the statutory levy of property taxes cannot be
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
compared to what was being charged by CIDCO, as it was not permissible for
CIDCO to accept any taxes under the provisions of the constitution as CIDCO
was not a municipal corporation. The relevant averments in that regard are
required to be noted, which read thus:
"37. 1 say that the contention of the Petitioner that as they are already
paying Charges to CIDCO it is not legal on part of the Corporation to
collect property tax from the residents of Panvel is unfounded and not
tenable in eyes of law. I say that CIDCO has been declared as New Town
Development Authority under the provisions of section 113(3A) of the
MRTP Act for several of the villages and areas which now fall within the
municipal limits of the Respondent No. 2 Corporation. I say that the
functions of CIDCO are inter alia planning, development, use of land in
regions established for that purpose, to make better provisions for
preparation of Development Plan and its execution, creation of new
town etc as is provided under the MRTP. I say that for the aforesaid
functions, CIDCO charges Services Charges on persons within the area
of its operation. I submit that Constitution mandates that no tax shall be
levied or collected except by authority of law and CIDCO being
development authority is not statutorily empowered or authorized to
collect property tax from the residents. I further say and submit that the
CIDCO derives power to impose and recover Development Charges /
Service Charges from persons by virtue of section 124 C of the MRTP
Act which power is in addition to and not in derogation of any other
provision in any other statute for the time being in force. As such, the
authority for CIDCO to impose Development or Service Charges is in
addition to and not in derogation of the authority of the Corporation to
impose and recover property tax which is in exclusive domain of the
Corporation. The CIDCO charges which petitioner has referred to in the
petition are in the form of 'fees' as opposed to tax.
38. I say that the petition is misconceived in as much as it equates
Development and/or Service Charges imposed by CIDCO with property
tax imposed by the Corporation and terms the same as double taxation. I
say and submit that law in this regard is absolutely trite and the
contentions in the petition spring from sheer ignorance of the said trite
law. In fact, the law is further trite that the Corporation can levy tax even
on the Special Planning Authority such as CIDCO to say the least. I
categorically state that CIDCO does not charge and is not authorized to
charge any property tax from the resident of Panvel Municipal
Corporation area. Thus, the contention of the Petitioner in this regard is
devoid of merits. Petitioner is aggrieved only in respect of property tax
levied in areas of the respondent Corporation in which CIDCO is the
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
development and planning authority and charges development fees /
charges.
39. I say that it is well settled in law that there is difference in service
charges and property tax and hence both can be simultaneously levied on
the citizens and does not amount to double taxation as is wrongly
potrayed. Formation of Respondent Corporation is under provisions of
the Act while the appointment of CIDCO as Planning Authority is
under the provisions of the MRTP Act. The service charges and property
tax applicable work in different spheres and hence does not amount to
double taxation.
40. 1 say and submit that there is no discrimination or inequality in
imposition of property tax in respect of property holders from CIDCO
Administrative Region (CAR, for short) and property holders in rural
areas and property owners from Panvel municipal council area."
43. In regard to the petitioner's contention that it was illegal for the PMC to
levy tax with retrospective effect, the PMC has stated that there is no levy of tax
with retrospective effect as contended by the petitioner. In this regard, the
PMC has contended that the PMC has determined the Annual Letting Rate,
Rateable Value and Tax for the period commencing from the formation of the
Corporation (1 October, 2016), for which, it has surveyed all properties which
fell within its municipal area w.e.f. 1 October, 2016 and issued Demand
Notices for the untaxed period as permissible under Section 150A of the MMC
Act, under which municipal corporation can demand taxes for a retrospective
period of six years. Hence, PMC's contention that levying of property tax
from the date of formation of the Corporation has a legal foundation. The
PMC has also contended that the petitioner's contention in regard to
requirement by the Commissioner in preparing assessment book for every
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
official year is untenable in view of Rule 21 of the Taxation Rules falling under
'Chapter VIII' of 'Schedule D' of the MMC Act, which provides that
Assessment book need not be prepared every official year. Hence, such
contention being contrary to the rules cannot be accepted.
44. In such context, the petitioners have placed reliance on the decision in
Satish Dattatray Shivalkar (Dr.) (supra) and Municipal Corporation of City of
Hubali Vs. Subha Rao Hanumatharao Prayag & Ors. (supra) to contend that
by issuance of bills in question there is retrospective levy of taxes without any
authority. Such contention needs to be stated to be rejected. The decision in
Satish Dattatray Shivalkar (Dr.) (supra) would not be applicable inasmuch as
the controversy in such case was in regard to the notices issued by the
respondent-corporation therein, to the extent the amendment was made in the
assessment book with retrospective effect. In the present case there is no
challenge to any amendment to the assessment book with retrospective effect,
as admittedly, there was no assessment book prior to the period 1 October
2016, as the municipal corporation itself was not born or not constituted. As
rightly pointed out on behalf of the respondent-corporation, the charges as
collected by the CIDCO can never take the form of property taxes as CIDCO
itself is not a municipal body within the meaning of 'Corporation' which could
have authority to collect the property tax under the MMC Act. Thus, looked
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
from any angle, the decision in Satish Dattatray Shivalkar (Dr.) (supra) is
inapplicable in the facts of the present case.
45. Even otherwise, this is not a case that there is no power with the PMC
and more particularly in the peculiar facts of the present case when the regime
of municipal taxation being introduced to make retrospective levy. Such
powers have been expressly conferred under Section 150A of the Act. Section
150A begins with a non-obstante clause to provide, that if for any reason, any
person liable to pay any of the taxes or fees leviable under this Act has escaped
assessment in any year, the Commissioner may, at any time within six years
from the date on which such person should have been assessed, serve on such
person a notice assessing him to the tax or fee due and demanding payment
thereon within 15 days from the date of such service, and the provisions of the
MMC Act and the rules made thereunder shall apply as if the assessment was
made in the year to which the tax or fee relates. Section 150A reads thus:
150A. Power to assess in case of escape from assessment
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act or
the rules made thereunder, if for any reason any person liable to pay any
of the taxes or fees leviable under this Act has escaped assessment in any
year, the Commissioner may, at any time within six years from the date
on which such person should have been assessed, serve on such person a
notice assessing him to the tax or fee due and demanding payment
thereon within 15 days from the date of such service, and the provisions
of this Act and the rules made thereunder shall, so far as may be, apply as
if assessment was made in the year to which the tax or fee relates."
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
46. A bare reading of Section 150A shows that it is a widely worded provision.
It has an overriding effect over the other provisions of the Act and the Rules.
In our opinion, it would not be a wrong reading of the said provision, if it is
observed that such provision, would take within its ambit such situations
whereby the municipal corporation could not levy taxes for a retrospective
period. This would certainly include the situation as in the present case,
namely, the difficulties such as in the present case, when municipal taxes are
being imposed after some years of the formation of the municipal corporation
as for finalizing the levy of taxes in relation to all the properties within the
municipal corporation, is a long drawn process which cannot be overnight.
Thus, in view of the clear provisions of Section 150A, the contention of the
petitioners that there was no authority with the municipal corporation to levy
taxes for the past period in respect of which the bills have been issues, is totally
untenable. It also needs to be observed that Section 150A was incorporated by
the Maharashtra Amendment Act 11 of 2011 with effect from 10 March 2011.
The decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Satish Dattatray Shivalkar
(Dr.) (supra) is a decision of the year 2002, which is much prior to Section
150A of the MMC Act being incorporated. The tax demanded in the present
case is after the incorporation of Section 150A of the 2011 Amendment Act.
Hence, for such reason also the contention as urged on behalf of the petitioners
of any lack of authority with the municipal corporation to levy tax
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
retrospectively, is wholly without merit. Even, the facts in Satish Dattatray
Shivalkar (Dr.) (supra) are totally distinct and not applicable in the facts of the
present case inasmuch as there is nothing on record to show that there was a
prior assessment book in relation to the property taxes before the PMC was
constituted on 16 October 2016.
47. We may also observe that any assessment leading to individual bills
being issued to any member society of petitioner no.1, necessarily is on an
independent consideration depending upon the nature of property each of
such cooperative societies, and depending upon various factors of different
amounts. Thus, assessment of property taxes in respect of each individual
society would be on different considerations by applying the taxation rules.
Thus, each of such assessments are subjective, and on specific considerations as
applicable to the property of individual assesses. Illustratively, a cooperative
society in a given case may have 70% commercial tenements and 30%
residential tenements whereas in case of another cooperative society it may be
vice versa or more differently. It may also happen that a particular cooperative
society has a very limited tenements and may have a large open space. Thus
the basis of assessment for levy of tax in respect of each of the properties of the
members of petitioner no.1 would be independent and distinct. The
Municipal Corporation makes assessment on varied factors which are infact
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
requirements of the taxation rules. It cannot be a blanket common
consideration in issuance of bills for different properties nor it is so pleaded in
the writ petition.
48. From what has been contended by Mr.Joshi, it appears that at a click of a
button, all its members have been issued similar property tax bills, which can
hence be assailed in a common action, as being agitated in the present
proceedings. We are quite astonished with such contentions as urged on behalf
of the petitioners when the petitioners assert that the petition in its present
frame, needs to be entertained. Following discussion would further aid the
conclusion.
49. The procedure for levy and collection of municipal taxes falls under
Chapter XI of the MMC Act titled as "Municipal Taxation". Section 127
which falls under the said Chapter, is the charging Section, providing that the
Municipal Corporation, inter alia, is authorised to impose taxes and one of
them being property taxes. Section 128 provides for the prescribed manner in
which the Municipal taxes may be recovered by the Rules. Section 128-A
provides that the property taxes leviable on buildings and lands in the City
under the Act shall include water tax, water benefit tax, sewerage tax, sewerage
benefit tax, general tax, education cess, street tax and betterment charges.
Section 129 provides for property taxes leviable on rateable value, or on capital
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
value, as the case may be and at what rate. The entire chapter dealing with
Municipal Taxation comprises of provisions of Section 127 to Section 152-1A.
This apart, Chapter VIII falling under Schedule 'D' of the MMC Act provides
for Taxation Rules, which contains Rules 1 to 63 dealing with the assessment
of taxes. It can certainly be said that the provisions of "Chapter IX (Municipal
taxation)" from Section 127 to 152-1A of the MMC Act read with the
"Taxation Rules" (Rule 1 to 63) incorporated thereunder is a Code by itself.
Thus, on one hand the MMC Act provides substantive provisions in regard to
the municipal taxation. Read with these provisions is the provision of Section
406 which forms an inextricable concomitant, of the taxing provisions, when it
provides for a statutory remedy of an appeal. Thus, such provision which is
integral to the mechanism of the taxing provisions, necessarily is required to be
given its highest weightage, when the Court considers whether a challenge to
levy or demand of tax being raised in the proceedings under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India could be entertained. The petitioners' contention to
disregard this provision is not the correct approach.
50. We find that Mr.Kumbhakoni's reliance on the decision in M/s. Mestra
A.G.Switzerland (supra), certainly would assist the case of the PMC. In this
case, the Division Bench taking review of the decisions on alternate remedy
being available to the petitioner therein, has held that in any matter relating to
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
tax, where the party has an option of approaching the appellate forum, it would
not be prudent in the judicious exercise of discretion to derail from the
procedure as ignoring the law as contained in the statute in question. The
observations of the Court in paragraph nos.17 to 19 reads thus:
"17. Mr. Sridharan is again right, but only partially.
Notwithstanding that questions of fact emerged for decision in
Thansingh Nathmal (supra), the Supreme Court had the
occasion to lay down therein a principle of law which is salutary
and not to be found in any other previous decision rendered by
it. The principle, plainly is that, if a remedy is available to a party
before the high court in another jurisdiction, the writ jurisdiction
should not normally be exercised on a petition under Article 226,
for, that would and allow the machinery set up by the concerned
statute to be bye-passed. The relevant passage from the decision
reads as follows:
"The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226
of the Constitution is couched in wide terms and the
exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions except
the territorial restrictions which are expressly provided
in the Article. But the exercise of the jurisdiction is
discretionary; it is not exercised merely because it is
lawful to do so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction
demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to
certain self-imposed limitations. Resort to that
jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative remedy for
relief which may be obtained in a suit or other mode
prescribed by statute. Ordinarily the Court will not
entertain a petition for a writ under Article 226, where
the petitioner has an alternative remedy which, without
being unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious
remedy. Again the High Court does not generally enter
upon a determination of questions which demand an
elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right
to enforce which the writ is claimed. The High Court
does not therefore act as a court of appeal against the
decision of a court or tribunal, to correct errors of fact,
and does not by assuming jurisdiction under Article
226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by
statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the
aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal, or even
itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the
manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
will not permit, by entertaining a petition under Article
226 of the Constitution, the machinery created under
the statute to be by-passed, and will leave the party
applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up."
(emphasis supplied)
18. Echo of the aforesaid view is found in a later decision of
the Supreme Court reported in (1983) SCC 2 433 [Titaghur
Paper Mills Co.Ltd. & Anr. Vs. State of Orissa and Ors.], arising
out of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947. Such enactment, quite
similar to the MVAT Act, provided a hierarchy of authorities
who could be approached for redress. Instead of pursuing the
remedy thereunder, the writ jurisdiction of the Orissa High
Court was invoked challenging orders of assessment. The law
laid down therein is in the following terms:
"6. We are constrained to dismiss these petitions
on the short ground that the petitioners have an
equally efficacious alternative remedy by way of an
appeal to the Prescribed Authority under sub-
section(1) of Section 23 of the Act, then a second
appeal to the Tribunal under sub-section(3)(a) thereof,
and thereafter in the event the petitioners get no relief,
to have the case stated to the High Court under Section
24 of the Act....."
***
"11. Under the scheme of the Act, there is a
hierarchy of authorities before which the petitioners
can get adequate redress against the wrongful acts
complained of. The petitioners have the right to prefer
an appeal before the Prescribed Authority under sub-
section (1) of Section 23 of the Act. If the petitioners
are dissatisfied with the decision in the appeal, they
can prefer a further appeal to the Tribunal under sub-
section (3) of Section 23 of the Act, and then ask for a
case to be stated upon a question of law for the
opinion of the High Court under Section 24 of the
Act. The Act provides for a complete machinery to
challenge an order of assessment, and the impugned
orders of assessment can only be challenged by the
mode prescribed by the Act and not by a petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is now well
recognized that where a right or liability is created by a
statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it,
the remedy provided by that statute only must be
availed of. ..."
19. Drawing guidance from the aforesaid dicta, rendered in
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
connection with matters relating to tax and not any other
subject, we are of the considered opinion that since the
petitioner has the option of approaching this Court in a
different jurisdiction at an appropriate stage, if at all the decision
of the Tribunal is adverse to its interest, it would not be prudent
in the judicious exercise of discretion to derail the procedure
ignoring the law contained in the MVAT Act."
51. Mr. Kumbhakoni's reliance on the decision of a Division Bench of this
Court in Vijaysingh Gajrajsingh Chauhan (supra) is also quite apposite when
he contends that there is no legal injury to petitioner no.1. If a litigant has
sufferred no legal injury then certainly such litigant cannot be a person who is
aggrieved. The Division Bench in such decision has considered the concept of
cause of action which would operate when the petitioner approaches the writ
Court. The Court was considering the issue as to whether the petitioner
therein had a locus and any cause of action to challenge the validity of an
amendment to the Schedule Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers
(Recognition of Forest Rights) Act 2006, in such context considering several
decisions on the issue as to when a person can be aggrieved and the cause of
action would arise, the Court in paragraphs 7, 8 and 10 observed thus :
7. The right to approach a Court of law by a party, is
intrinsically linked to a cause of action, accrued in favour of
such a party. The approach, is always for the redressal of a
grievance or an entitlement, the denial of which gives rise to a
cause of action to a party whose right is affected by any such
cause of action. Thus, the traditional view as to a "cause of
action" is always personal to the party. The question whether
passing of a legislation by itself would give rise to a cause of
action, has been considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Rai
Bahadur Hurdut Roy Moti Lal Jute Mills (supra) as under :-
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
"7. On behalf of the appellant Mr Lal Narain Sinha
has contended that the High Court was in error in
holding that the proviso to Section 14-A violates
either Article 20 (1) or Article 31 (2) of the
Constitution. He has addressed us at length in
support of his case that neither of the two articles is
violated by the impugned proviso. On the other hand,
the learned Solicitor-General has sought to support
the findings of the High Court on the said two
constitutional points; and he has pressed before us as a
preliminary point his argument that on a fair and
reasonable construction, the proviso cannot be
applied to the case of the first respondent. We would,
therefore, first deal with this preliminary point. In
cases where the vires of statutory provisions are
challenged on constitutional grounds, it is essential
that the material facts should first be clarified and
ascertained with a view to determine whether the
impugned statutory provisions are attracted; if they
are, the constitutional challenge to their validity must
be examined and decided. If, however, the facts
admitted or proved do not attract the impugned
provisions there is no occasion to decide the issue
about the vires of the said provisions. Any decision on
the said question would in such a case be purely
academic. Courts are and should be reluctant to
decide constitutional points merely as matters of
academic importance."
(emphasis supplied)
The same has also been considered in Kartar
Singh (supra) as under :-
"12. The standards themselves, it would be noticed,
have been prescribed by the Central Government on
the advice of a Committee which included in its
composition persons considered experts in the field
of food technology and food analysis. In the
circumstances, if the rule has to be struck down as
imposing unreasonable or discriminatory standards,
it could not be done merely on any apriopriate
reasoning but only as a result of materials placed
before the Court by way of scientific analysis. It is
obvious that this can be done only when the party
invoking the protection of Article 14 makes
averments with details to sustain such a plea and
leads evidence to establish his allegations. That
where a party seeks to impeach the validity of a rule
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
made by a competent authority on the ground that
the rules offend Article 14 the burden is on him to
plead and prove the infirmity is to well established
to need elaboration. If, therefore, the respondent
desired to challenge the validity of the rule on the
ground either of its unreasonableness or its
discriminatory nature, he had to lay a foundation for
it by setting out the facts necessary to sustain such a
plea and adduce cogent and convincing evidence to
make out his case, for there is a presumption that
every factor which is relevant or material has been
taken into account in and formulating the
classification of the zones and the prescription of the
minimum standards to each zone, and where we
have a rule framed with the assistance of a
committee containing experts such as the one
constituted under Section 3 of the Act, that
presumption is strong, if not overwhelming. We
might in this connection add that the respondent
cannot assert any fundamental right under Article 19
(1) to carry on business in adulterated foodstuffs.
13. Where the necessary facts have been pleaded and
established, the Court would have materials before it
on which it could base findings, as regards the
reasonableness or otherwise or of the discriminatory
nature of the rules. In the absence of a pleading and
proof of unreasonableness or arbitrariness the Court
cannot accept the statement of a party as to the
unreasonableness or unconstitutionality of a rule
and refuse to enforce the rule as it stands merely
because in its view the standards are too high and for
this reason the rule is unreasonable. In the case
before us there was neither pleading nor proof of any
facts directed to that end. The only basis on which
the contention regarding unreasonableness or
discrimination was raised was an apriori argument
addressed to the Court, that the division into the
zones was not rational, in that hilly and plain areas
of the country were not differentiated for the
prescription of the minimum Reichert values. That a
distinction should exist between hilly regions and
plains, was again based on apriori reasoning resting
on the different minimum Reichert values prescribed
for Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh and on no
other. It was, however, not as if the entire State of
Himachal Pradesh is of uniform elevation or even as
if no part of that State is plain country but yet if the
same minimum was prescribed for the entire area of
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
Himachal Pradesh, that would clearly show that the
elevation of a place is not the only factor to be taken
into account."
In Kusum Ingots (supra) the Hon'ble Apex
Court held as under :-
"19. Passing of a legislation by itself in our opinion
do not confer any such right to file a writ petition
unless a cause of action arises therefor.
21. A parliamentary legislation when it receives the
assent of the President of India and is published in
an Official Gazette, unless specifically excluded, will
apply to the entire territory of India. If passing of a
legislation gives rise to a cause of action, a writ
petition questioning the constitutionality thereof can
be filed in any High Court of the country. It is not so
done because a cause of action will arise only when
the provisions of the Act or some of them which
were implemented shall give rise to civil or evil
consequences to the petitioner. A writ court, it is
well settled, would not determine a constitutional
question in vacuum."
8. Thus the consistency of judicial opinion, in so far as it
considers the cause of action, for the purpose of laying a
challenge to the constitutional validity of any statutory
provision, as spelt out from the above decisions, clearly
indicates that the person raising such challenge, ought to
have a cause of action, which would mean material facts,
enabling the existence of a cause of action.
10. It is further material to note that the petitioner also does
not fall within the expression "aggrieved person", as indicated in
Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan (supra) in the following
manner:-
"9. It is a settled legal proposition that a stranger
cannot be permitted to meddle in any proceeding,
unless he satisfies the authority/court, that he falls
within the category of aggrieved persons. Only a
person who has suffered, or suffers from legal injury
can challenge the act/action/order etc. in a court of
law. A writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution is maintainable either for the purpose of
enforcing a statutory or legal right, or when there is a
complaint by the appellant that there has been a
breach of statutory duty on the part of the
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
authorities. Therefore, there must be a judicially
enforceable right available for enforcement, on the
basis of which writ jurisdiction is resorted to. The
Court can, of course, enforce the performance of a
statutory duty by a public body, using its writ
jurisdiction at the behest of a person, provided that
such person satisfies the Court that he has a legal
right to insist on such performance. The existence of
such right is a condition precedent for invoking the
writ jurisdiction of the courts. It is implicit in the
exercise of such extraordinary jurisdiction that the
relief prayed for must be one to enforce a legal right.
In fact, the existence of such right, is the foundation
of the exercise of the said jurisdiction by the Court.
The legal right that can be enforced must ordinarily
be the right of the appellant himself, who complains
of infraction of such right and approaches the Court
for relief as regards the same.
10. A "legal right", means an entitlement arising out
of legal rules. Thus, it may be defined as an
advantage, or a benefit conferred upon a person by
the rule of law. The expression, "person aggrieved"
does not include a person who suffers from a
psychological or an imaginary injury; a person
aggrieved must, therefore, necessarily be one whose
right or interest has been adversely affected or
jeopardised."
(emphasis supplied)
52. On maintainability of the writ petition, Mr.Joshi has placed reliance on
an interim order passed by a coordinate Bench of this Court in Mahadev
Waghmare & Anr. Vs. The State of Maharashtra, Urban Development
Department & Ors. (supra). We may, at the very outset, observe that the said
interim orders would not assist the petitioner, for more than one reason; firstly,
interim orders do not make a precedent; secondly, the said order is passed in
the facts of the case before the Court; and thirdly, such order has not decided
the issue of entertainability of the petition, as issue on entertainability of the
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
said petition has been expressly kept open by the co-ordinate Bench, whereas
we are called upon to decide not only the issue of maintainability but also on
entertainability of the present proceedings as discussed in detail in the
foregoing paragraphs.
53. Adverting to the above principles of law, we are at a loss to comprehend
as to how petitioner no.1 can be said to be aggrieved and can have a cause of
action to maintain this petition and the same would be entertained by this
Court.
54. In view of the above discussion, we uphold the objection of Mr.
Kumbhakoni to the maintainability of the petition. For such reasons, we are
certain that the petition is neither maintainable as framed, nor the same can be
entertained under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is accordingly
dismissed. It is however, open to the members of petitioner No.1 and
petitioner No.2 to avail of the statutory remedy of an appeal as available under
Section 406 of the MMC Act, in assailing the levy of property taxes/bills issued
by the PMC. All contentions in that regard are expressly kept open.
55. Another aspect which has been urged on behalf of PMC needs a
reference, namely, the strenuous submissions as urged by Mr. Kumbhakoni on
the affidavit of Mr. Ganesh Shete dated 20 March, 2023 in regard to conduct
of petitioner no. 1 in relation to the present proceedings. We have not gone
into the contentions as urged on behalf of the PMC although placed on record
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
on affidavit all such allegations as made against petitioner no. 1. We may,
however, observe that if there is any truth in such contention, it is something
which is unfortunate.
56. Before parting we may also observe, when this Court is called upon to
exercise writ jurisdiction, the Court cannot be oblivious to the consequences
which would be brought about, in entertaining petitions of the nature, as in
hand. The petitioners, admittedly, are minuscule member of tax payers of the
PMC. The PMC has a large area of 110 sq.km. comprising of 29 villages plus
the CIDO areas as transferred to it. If challenge as raised in the present
petition is entertained, it would bring about drastic and adverse consequences
on the levy of property taxes/issuance of bills, to other assesses who have not
filed any proceedings and are due to pay the bills or have taken a position not
to litigate. A public body like the respondent-PMC cannot be placed in a
cloud of such uncertainty when it comes to levy and recovery of municipal
taxes. Thus, entertaining this petition would open flood gates of litigation
before this Court. This more particularly, as none of the grounds as raised in
the petition impresses us, so as to exercise our extra-ordinary writ jurisdiction
by permitting these assessees to bypass the remedy of a statutory appeal. This
apart, entertaining such petitions would also send a wrong signal to the other
municipal corporations/municipalities in the State of Maharashtra, that in
matters of challenge to property taxes, an enmass plea of the nature as in the
6th April, 2023
908.WP8586_2021.DOC
present case can be entertained. We do not intend to subscribe to any such
impression or set up an example as being canvassed by the petitioner that on
every possible aspect in regard to the municipal taxation, the matter should
come to the High Court, in its writ jurisdiction. It is always the discretion of
the Court whether to entertain a writ petition and exercise its extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution considering the facts and
circumstances of the case. We have accordingly exercised our discretion in the
facts of the present case, not to entertain this petition.
57. No costs.
(R.N. LADDHA, J.) (G. S. KULKARNI, J.)
6th April, 2023
