Bombay High Court
Sunil S/O. Radhesham Shukla And ... vs State Of Maharashtra, Thr. ... on 7 July, 2022
Bench: Manish Pitale
1/23 WP-1415.21.odt-J
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
WRIT PETITION NO. 1415 OF 2021
PETITIONERS :- 1. Sunil S/o Radhesham Shukla, Aged about
Original Applicant in
60 years, Occu: Business, R/o Laxmi-
Reference Case before narayan Gaurishankar Niwas, Behind
Trial Court Ramdevbaba Engineering College, Pension
Nagar, Nagpur, Tah. & Distt. Nagpur.
Original Non-applicant 2. Munna @ Gangaprasad S/o Radhesham
no.8 in Reference Case Shukla, Aged about 57 years, Occu: Priest
before Trial Court & Cultivator, R/o Laxminarayan Mandir,
Bazar Chouk, Sindi (Rly), Tq. Seloo, Distt.
Wardha-442105.
...VERSUS...
RESPONDENTS :- 1. State of Maharashtra, through Collector,
Wardha.
Original Non-applicants
no.1 to 7 and Original 2. The Sub-Divisional Officer, Wardha, Tah. &
Non-applicants no.9 to 15 Distt. Wardha.
in Reference Case before
Trial Court 3. The Officer-in-Charge, Jawaharlal Nehru
Dry Port Project Sindi (Rly), Tah. Seloo,
Distt. Wardha.
4. The Tahsildar, Seloo, Tah. Seloo, Distt.
Wardha.
5. Durga @ Jyoti W/o Arvindkumar Awasthi,
Aged about 67 years, Occu: Household, R/o
Ratan Nagar, Plot No.17, Jyoti Villa
Mankapur, Nagpur, Tah. & Distt. Nagpur.
6. Jayashri W/o Vinodkumar Awasthi, Aged
about 59 years, Occu: Household, R/o Gau
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Anusandhan Vikas Kendra Near Durga
Mandir, Badkas Chowk, Mahal, Nagpur,
Tah. & Distt. Nagpur.
7. Munna @ Gangaprasad S/o Radhesham
Shukla - Deleted.
8. Manisha W/o Sunilkumar Mishra, Aged
about 56 years, Occu: Household, R/o
Delhi, C/o Jyoti Awasthi, Ratan Nagar, Plot
No.17, Jyoti Villa Mankapur, Nagpur, Tah.
& Distt. Nagpur.
9. Minakshi W/o Manish Tiwari, Aged about
54 years, Occu: Household, R/o Idgah Hill
Bhopal (M.P.).
10.Radhesham S/o Gaurishankar Shukla, Aged
about 92 years, Occu: Nil, R/o Plot No.110-
D, Sector Kolar Marg Sarvadharma Colony,
Bairagd Chichali, Bhopal-462 042 (M.P.).
11.Shreyansh S/o Gopal Shukla, Aged 29
years, Occu:Not Known, R/o Sarvadharama
Colony, Nayapur, Kolar Road, Bhopal.
12.Savita S/o Gopal Shukla, Aged 49 years,
Occu: Household, R/o Sarvadharama
Colony, Nayapur, Kolar Road, Bhopal.
13.Shanta W/o Ashokrao Petkar, Aged about
59 years, Occu: Cultivation, R/o Kandhali
Road, Sindi (Rly), Tah. Seloo, Distt.
Wardha.
14.The Allahabad Bank, Nayapur Kolar Road
Branch, Bhopal (M.P.) through its Branch
Manager.
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-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr.R.L.Khapre, Sr.Counsel a/b Mr.D.R.Khapre,
counsel for the petitioners.
Ms T.H.Khan, AGP for respondent Nos.1, 2 and 4.
Mr. Abhijit Deshpande, counsel for respondent No.10.
Mr. Yash Maheshwari, counsel for respondent Nos.11 to 13.
Mr. Monogya U. Singh, counsel for respondent No.14.
None for respondent Nos.3, 5, 6, 8 and 9.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CORAM : MANISH PITALE, J.
RESERVED ON : 16.06.2022.
PRONOUNCED ON : 07.07.2022.
JUDGMENT
Heard.
2. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard the writ petition
finally with the consent of the learned counsel appearing for the rival
parties. Though respondent Nos.3, 5, 6, 8 and 9 were served, they were
not present in the Court.
3. The petitioners are aggrieved by an order dated 04/02/2021,
passed by the Court of 2nd Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Wardha,
whereby an application filed by the respondent No.10 for rejection of
reference under section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter
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referred to as "Act"), has been allowed. According to the petitioners,
once such a reference was made to the aforesaid Civil Court by the
respondent No.2-Sub-Divisional Officer, it ought to have been decided on
merits, after recording of evidence and that the said Court erred in
throwing out the reference at the threshold.
4. In the present case, land located in Mouza Parsodi, Tahsil
Seloo, District Wardha, was acquired by the respondent-State. The award
determining compensation payable to the claimant was pronounced on
29/03/1988 and since the land in question, was registered in the name of
contesting respondent No.10, i.e. the father of the petitioners, the
amount of compensation of Rs.22,992/- was disbursed to the respondent
No.10. There is no dispute about the fact that the said land was
purchased by the respondent No.10 in the year 1964.
5. At the time when the aforesaid amount of compensation was
disbursed as per the aforesaid award in the year 2010, and even
thereafter, no dispute was raised by any person in respect of the
entitlement of the said respondent for receiving compensation. Later,
when the acquired land was to be utilized for the benefit of respondent
No.3 i.e. the Jawaharlal Nehru Dry Port Project at Wardha, it appears that
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there was some grievance made and demands raised by landowners for
further payment of amount. On 20/05/2016, the Deputy Secretary of the
concerned Department of the State of Maharashtra, sent a
communication to the respondent No.3 and its officials that in view of the
demands made, and also in the backdrop of the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013, it was decided that further ex gratia
amount/additional compensation shall be paid to claimants pertaining to
the said acquisition at Rs.7,00,000/- per acre. Since the respondent
No.10 was the claimant, who had been paid amount towards
compensation as per the aforesaid award, steps were taken by the
concerned Authorities to disburse the enhanced compensation of
Rs.64,83,750/- into the account of respondent No.10.
6. It is at this stage, that on 05/08/2017, the petitioner No.1
applied before the Collector, Wardha under section 30 of the Act for
referring dispute regarding apportionment of the said additional amount,
to the Civil Court amongst "joint owners". With reference to the said
application, the Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) sent a letter on
05/09/2017, to the respondent No.2-Sub-Divisional Officer for
appropriate action and in pursuance thereof, the reference was made to
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the aforesaid Civil Court under section 30 of the Act, bearing LAC No.46
of 2017.
7. In this proceeding initiated before the said Civil Court, the
petitioner No.1 made an application for direction to stop disbursal of the
amount to the respondent No.10. The Civil Court passed orders and
issued directions to the concerned Bank as regards disbursal of the
amount into the account of the respondent No.10.
8. In the said pending proceeding, the respondent No.10 filed an
application questioning the maintainability of the reference, bearing
Exhibit-55. It was contended that when the petitioner No.1 moved the
application before the Collector under section 30 of the Act, the same was
directly referred to the Civil Court, without even putting the respondent
No.10 or other parties to notice. It was submitted that acquisition had
taken place and the award had been pronounced as far back as in the
year 1988 and the entire compensation was disbursed immediately in
favour of respondent No.10. There was no objection from any quarters at
that time and even thereafter and it was further submitted that the
amount now being distributed was only an ex gratia amount, having no
connection with the compensation determined under the award and
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therefore, section 30 of the Act was not applicable. On this basis, it was
prayed that the application be allowed and the reference be held as not
maintainable.
9. The petitioner No.1 submitted reply before the Civil Court and
opposed the said application. By the impugned order dated 04/02/2021,
the said Civil Court allowed the application, thereby holding that the
reference was not maintainable. It was held that even the Deputy
Collector (Land Acquisition) had sent communication dated 27/11/2017,
withdrawing the reference under section 30 of the Act and therefore, the
application filed by the respondent No.10 deserved to be allowed.
10. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioners filed the present
writ petition. It is significant that the petitioner No.2 was not the
applicant before the Collector under section 30 of the Act and yet the said
petitioner chose to join the petitioner No.1 in challenging the impugned
order. On 22/03/2021, this Court issued notice in the present petition
and on the question of interim relief, it was found that since the share of
the petitioners before this Court, came to Rs.13,00,000/-, interim stay
would be restricted to only the said amount and disbursal of balance
amount would not be affected. The respondents in the present case
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entered appearance through counsel. The petition was opposed strongly
by the respondent No.10, i.e. the father of the petitioners, who was the
applicant before the Civil Court seeking rejection of the reference as not
maintainable. The other private respondents, i.e. respondent Nos.5, 6, 8,
9, 11, 12, and 13 did not oppose the present petition.
11. Mr. R.L. Khapre, learned senior counsel appearing for the
petitioners, vehemently submitted that the Civil Court committed a grave
error in allowing the application at Exhibit-55, filed by the respondent
No.10 and throwing out the reference at the threshold. It was submitted
that the nature of dispute raised in the present case on behalf of the
petitioners warranted detailed examination and recording of evidence to
reach any definitive conclusion. The learned senior counsel referred to
the provisions of the aforesaid Act, particularly section 30 thereof, to
emphasize that no limitation is prescribed therein and since the case of
the petitioners was that cause of action accrued to them only after the
death of their mother and when the additional compensation was
determined, the reference under section 30 of the Act was correctly made
by the Collector and that the same could not have been thrown out at the
threshold. The learned senior counsel relied upon the judgments of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dr.G.H. Grant v. The State of Bihar,
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reported in AIR 1966 SC 237, Sunderlal v. Paramsukhdas and others,
reported in AIR 1968 SC 366 and Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar, reported
in AIR 2003 SC 942.
12. It was emphasized that since the interest of the petitioners in
the apportionment of compensation arose, in the facts of the present
case, after the death of their mother in the year 2015 and when
additional compensation was to be disbursed, the petitioners had
correctly invoked section 30 of the Act. This contention was pressed on
the assertion of the petitioners that the said land was purchased in 1964,
only in the name of their father, but from the resources of their mother.
As long as their mother was alive, they could not have raised any claim
regarding apportionment, but upon her death in the year 2015, they were
entitled to raise dispute regarding apportionment of the additional
compensation. Much emphasis was placed on the observations made by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court regarding entitlement of persons in such a
situation where the interest arises after award has been pronounced.
13. The learned senior counsel emphasized that the Civil Court
while passing the impugned order, committed a grave error in proceeding
on the basis that the Deputy Collector had withdrawn the reference itself.
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It was submitted that once the concerned Deputy Collector had referred
the dispute under section 30 of the Act to the Civil Court, the said
Authority had no power to withdraw such a reference. It was
emphasized that if such a power was held to be available to the Collector,
it would have drastic consequences, because findings rendered by the
competent Civil Court, confirmed in challenges raised thereto, would
stand nullified by the Collector simply withdrawing the reference at any
stage. It was submitted that once the dispute was referred to the Civil
Court, it had to be disposed of after granting appropriate opportunity to
the concerned parties to lead evidence in support of their respective
stands. On this basis, it was submitted that the impugned order deserved
interference.
14. On the other hand, Mr. Abhijit Deshpande, learned counsel
appearing for the contesting respondent No.10, submitted that in the
present case, the petitioner No.1 could not have invoked section 30 of the
Act at all. By referring to the said provision, it was submitted that an
application to the Collector for referring a dispute to the Civil Court
would lie only when the dispute arises as regards apportionment of
compensation settled under section 11 of the Act. It was emphasized that
in the present case, the amount sought to be disbursed by the respondent
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No.3, was only an ex gratia amount, while the compensation determined
under the award dated 29/03/1988, as per section 11 of the Act was
already disbursed immediately upon pronouncement of the award. On
this basis, it was submitted that the application filed by the petitioner
No.1 itself was stillborn.
15. Apart from this, it was submitted that when the petitioner No.1
submitted the said application before the Collector, it ought to have been
ascertained as to whether there could be said to be any dispute as regards
the apportionment of compensation in the context of an award, for
reference to the Civil Court. The Collector ought to have put all
concerned parties, particularly the respondent No.10, i.e. the recorded
owner of the said property, to notice before proceeding in the matter.
But, the Collector in the present case mechanically instructed the
respondent No.2-Sub-Divisional Officer to take appropriate steps leading
to the reference being registered in the Civil Court. It is for this reason
that when the reference came to be initiated on 29/09/2017, upon
realizing the mistake, the Deputy Collector immediately on 27/11/2017,
communicated to the Civil Court that the reference was being withdrawn.
Since the reference was withdrawn immediately, it could not be said that
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such an act on the part of the Deputy Collector was either illegal or
without jurisdiction.
16. It was further submitted that in any case, the Civil Court was
enjoined to examine whether the dispute could at all have been referred
by the Collector under section 30 of the Act. Although some interim
orders were passed in the reference, the moment the respondent No.10
filed the aforesaid application at Exhibit-55 for dismissal of the reference
as not maintainable, the Civil Court correctly analyzed the material on
record to conclude that such a reference could not be entertained. The
learned counsel for the respondent No.10 relied upon judgments of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Prayag Upnivesh Awas Evam
Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. v. Allahabad Vikas Pradhikaran and another,
reported in AIR 2003 SC 2302 and Meher Rusi Dalal v. Union of India
and others, reported in (2004) 7 SCC 362 and the judgment of this Court
in the case of Dattaram Deu Desai and others v. Nirakar Devasthan of
Palolem, Goa and others, reported in 2003 (3) Mh.L.J. 477 and
Comunidade of Bambolim v. Manguesh Betu Kankonkar, reported in
2001 (2) Mh.L.J. 160.
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17. Mr. Yash Maheshwari, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
respondent Nos.11, 12 and 13, submitted that he supported the
contentions raised on behalf of the respondent No.10 and he further
submitted that even if no limitation was prescribed under section 30 of
the said Act, an application for making reference under the said provision
ought to be made within reasonable time. He also placed reliance on
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Meher Rusi Dalal v.
Union of India (supra).
18. Ms T.H. Khan, learned AGP appeared on behalf of the
respondent Nos.1, 2 and 4 and supported the impugned order.
19. Heard the learned counsel for the rival parties and perused the
material on record. In the present case, the Civil Court has proceeded to
accept the contentions regarding maintainability of the reference raised
on behalf of respondent No.10 and accordingly, the reference itself has
been thrown out, without consideration in detail.
20. Before considering other contentions raised on behalf of the
rival parties, this Court is inclined to consider the contention raised on
behalf of the petitioners that the Civil Court ought not to have relied
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upon withdrawal of the reference by the Deputy Collector for holding in
favour of respondent No.10. In this context, the learned counsel
appearing for the respondent No.10 submitted that such withdrawal of
reference could not be said to be either illegal or without jurisdiction,
firstly, because the withdrawal was almost immediate upon realizing the
mistake and secondly, if there is a power with an Authority to do
something, it certainly has the power to undo the same. This Court is of
the opinion that merely because in the present case, the reference was
withdrawn by the Deputy Collector within a couple of months of having
made the same, it cannot be said that such a step was justified because
the Authority, in the first place, must have the power to withdraw.
21. A reference is made to the Civil Court under section 30 of the
Act for resolution of dispute pertaining to apportionment of
compensation. This requires the Collector to reach a conclusion that a
dispute exists, which cannot be resolved by the Collector and it would
require determination by the Civil Court. This Court is of the opinion
that once the Collector concludes that reference of the dispute has to be
made to the Civil Court and in fact the dispute stands referred, the
Collector does not retain jurisdiction to withdraw such a reference.
Accepting the contention of the respondent No.10 is fraught with danger
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for the reason that if the same is accepted, it would lead to a situation
where the Collector could annul the findings of the Civil Court, or even
higher Courts if the order of the Civil Court is challenged, by simply
withdrawing the reference at any stage. After making the reference, the
Collector becomes functus officio and it is then for the Civil Court to
proceed in the matter. Therefore, the Civil Court in the impugned order
could not have relied upon withdrawal of the reference by the Deputy
Collector to hold in favour of respondent No.10. The reliance placed by
the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.10 on the judgment
in the case of Prayag Upnivesh Awas Evam Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. v.
Allahabad Vikas Pradhikaran (supra) is misplaced for the reason that in
the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has only held that the
reference Court cannot widen the scope of its enquiry beyond what is
referred to it by the Collector. The said judgment in no manner supports
the contention raised on behalf of the respondent No.10 in the aforesaid
context.
22. Nonetheless, it is necessary to examine whether the Civil Court,
in the present case was justified in allowing the application filed by the
respondent No.10 at Exhibit-55 and in holding that the reference was not
maintainable. The learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners
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emphasized that once the reference was made to the Civil Court under
section 30 of the Act, there was no power in the Civil Court to throw out
the reference at the threshold and that the Civil Court was mandated to
consider the dispute on merits, by asking the parties to lead evidence in
support of their respective claims. In other words, according to the
learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners, the application filed
by the respondent No.10 could not have been considered by the Civil
Court.
23. This Court is of the opinion that although the Deputy Collector
in the present case appears to have mechanically directed the respondent-
Sub-Divisional Officer to take appropriate steps on the application moved
by the petitioner No.1 under section 30 of the Act, as a consequence of
which the reference appears to have been straightaway registered with
the Civil Court, even if the Deputy Collector had become functus officio
and the reference could not have been withdrawn, the Civil Court could
certainly examine as to whether such a reference could be entertained in
the facts and circumstances of the present case. The Civil Court derives
jurisdiction not just because the Collector refers the dispute to it, but the
jurisdiction is derived from the language of section 30 of the Act. The
said provision reads as follows:
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"30. Dispute as to apportionment.- When the amount of compensation
has been settled under section 11, if any dispute arises as to the
apportionment of the same or any part thereof, or as to the persons to whom
the same or any part thereof, is payable, the Collector may refer such dispute
to the decision of the Court."
24. It is significant that the dispute pertaining to apportionment
can be referred by the Collector to the decision of the Civil Court when
such dispute pertains to amount of compensation settled under section 11
of the Act. This obviously means that the dispute must relate to
compensation determined under award pronounced under section 11 of
the Act. In the present case, amount of compensation determined as per
award under section 11 of the Act, was Rs.22,992/- and the same was
immediately disbursed, pursuant to the said award dated 29/03/1988. It
was disbursed to the respondent No.10, being the registered owner of the
land as found in the land acquisition proceedings undertaken under the
said Act, on the basis of a registered sale deed of the year 1964, executed
in the name of respondent No.10. It is an admitted position that there
was no other recorded owner or claimant. No dispute was ever raised
when the said amount was disbursed to the respondent No.10, either
when it was disbursed or even thereafter.
25. The petitioners were both major when the award was
pronounced in the year 1988 and the amount of compensation was
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disbursed to their own father, i.e. respondent No.10. Yet, no dispute was
raised at any point in time.
26. The material on record shows that the respondent No.3 on the
instructions of the respondent-State Government decided to disburse
further ex gratia amount to the persons whose lands were acquired in the
backdrop of certain demands made by certain landowners. It appears
that the provisions of the Act of 2013 influenced the decision taken by
the State for granting ex gratia amount. Letter dated 20/05/2016, sent
by the Deputy Secretary of the concerned Department of the respondent-
State to the officers of the respondent No.3, records the said backdrop in
which the ex gratia amount/additional compensation was to be given.
This Court is of the opinion that such ex gratia amount cannot be said to
be compensation settled under section 11 of the Act, for section 30
thereof to be made applicable. The ex gratia amount, which at some
place is also referred to as additional compensation, can certainly not to
be categorized as amount of compensation determined and settled under
section 11 of the Act. Therefore, section 30 of the Act would not apply to
the said ex gratia amount. The Civil Court was certainly within its
jurisdiction to examine as to whether such a reference could be
entertained or not.
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27. The other aspect of the matter is, as to whether the petitioners
could invoke section 30 of the said Act in the year 2017 when the
acquisition was completed, award was pronounced and the compensation
was disbursed to the respondent No.10 in the year 1988 itself. Although
there is no specific period of limitation prescribed in section 30 of the
Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Meher Rusi Dalal v. Union
of India (supra) has held that even if no specific period of limitation is
prescribed, an application under section 30 of the Act must be made
within reasonable time. It is further laid down that what is to be
reasonable time would depend on the facts and circumstances of each
case and in the facts of the said case before the Court, it was held that
reasonable time would be the time as specified in section 18 of the Act.
Applying the aforesaid test of reasonable time, this Court is of the opinion
that for an acquisition, which was completed in the year 1988, the
application moved by the petitioner No.1 in the year 2017 was certainly
not within reasonable time.
28. It is also necessary to refer to the nature of claim raised by the
petitioners. It is contended on their behalf that the subject land was
purchased in 1964, only in the name of their father while the source of
funds was that of their mother. It was claimed that since their mother
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died in the year 2015, they could not have any cause of action or reason
to raise any dispute before that and when the said ex gratia amount/
additional compensation amount was to be disbursed, the cause arose for
the petitioner No.1 to apply to the Collector under section 30 of the Act.
Much emphasis was placed on a Will Deed dated 23/09/2013 executed
by the mother of the petitioners, in support of the aforesaid contention.
29. On this basis, the petitioners claim that since they had made
out a semblance of case as regards the cause of action and their
entitlement towards share in the ex gratia amount to be disbursed in the
year 2017, the Civil Court could not have passed the impugned order to
throw out the reference at the outset. The petitioners claim that the
proceeding ought to have travelled its full course and then the Civil Court
could have reached conclusions in the matter.
30. This Court is of the opinion that the Civil Court was certainly
entitled to analyze the material on record for reaching a conclusion as to
whether the reference could be maintained or not. A perusal of the
impugned order shows that the Civil Court found that the amount in
question was not compensation as determined under the provisions of the
Act and the said amount was not available for disbursal pursuant to
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award pronounced under section 11 of the said Act. Thus, the Civil Court
applied its mind and found that the petitioners could not raise dispute
under section 30 of the Act as regards the said ex gratia amount. Having
reached the said conclusion, the Civil Court was well within its
jurisdiction to consider whether the reference was at all required to be
proceeded with. Even if the Civil Court was not right in referring to
withdrawal of the reference by the Collector, the impugned order shows
that reference was made to section 11 of the Act and in that backdrop, it
was found that the ex gratia amount could not be said to be an amount in
respect of which a dispute could at all be raised under section 30 of the
Act.
31. The claim made by the petitioners about the manner in which
the cause of action arose for them is too far-fetched and it certainly did
not merit any kind of consideration or determination by the Civil Court
exercising jurisdiction under section 30 of the said Act.
32. Insofar as the judgments on which reliance was placed by the
learned senior counsel for the petitioners, there can be no quarrel with
the proposition that section 30 of the Act does not prescribe limitation as
held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dr. G.H. Grant v. The
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State of Bihar (supra). But as noted above, in the judgment in the case of
Meher Rusi Dalal v. Union of India (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court
itself has held that application under section 30 of the Act ought to be
moved within reasonable time. As regards the reliance placed on
Sunderlal v. Paramsukhdas and Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar (supra),
section 30 of the Act would be available to the petitioners only if they
could be said to be persons interested in compensation as determined
under section 11 of the Act. The said judgments cannot be of any
assistance to the petitioners in the facts and circumstances of the present
case.
33. In view of the above, this Court is of the opinion that there is
no substance in the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners. The
Civil Court cannot be said to have committed any error in allowing the
application filed by the respondent No.10 at Exhibit-55 and in dismissing
the reference under section 30 of the Act. Nonetheless, the petitioners
may file civil suit, if so advised, as regards their grievance, as indicated in
judgment of this court in the case of Comunidade of Bambolim v.
Manguesh Betu Kankonkar (supra). If the petitioners choose to file such a
civil suit, it would be decided by the competent civil court in accordance
with law, without being influenced by the observations made herein.
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34. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. The interim order
dated 22/03/2021 is vacated.
35. Pending application(s), if any, is(are) disposed of.
36. Rule stands discharged. No costs.
JUDGE
Signed By:GHANSHYAM S
KHUNTE
Signing Date:07.07.2022 17:18
KHUNTE
