Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 13714 Bom
Judgement Date : 23 September, 2021
907-ca-6974-2012.odt
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
907 CIVIL APPLICATION NO.6974 OF 2012
IN SAST/11989/2012
GODAVARI BALIRAM PAWAR
VERSUS
PUNJAJI MADHAV NAREWAD AND ANR
...
Advocate for Applicant : Mr. S. R. Bagal h/f Mr. Gadegaonkar Bharat N.
Advocate for Respondent No.1 : Mr. Badakh Vishal S.
...
CORAM : SMT. VIBHA KANKANWADI, J.
DATE : 23.09.2021 ORDER :- . Present civil application has been filed for getting the delay of 706
days condoned in filing second appeal. The applicant is the original
plaintiff, who had filed Regular Civil Suit No.53 of 2007 before the
learned Civil Judge Junior Division, Hadgaon, Dist. Nanded for
declaration of ownership and perpetual injunction. The said suit came
to be dismissed on 25.06.2009. The present appellant challenged the
said judgment and decree by filing Regular Civil Appeal No.97 of 2009
before the District Court Nanded. The said appeal was heard by learned
Principal District Judge, Nanded and was dismissed on 27.01.2010. The
applicant intended to file second appeal, however, there is delay of 706
days. Hence, this application.
907-ca-6974-2012.odt
2. Heard learned Advocate Mr. S. R. Bagal holding for learned
Advocate Mr. B. N. Gadegaonkar for the applicant and learned Advocate
Mr. V. S. Badakh for respondent No.1
3. It has been vehemently submitted on behalf of the learned
Advocate for the applicant that the applicant is a poor lady coming from
a very small village. In fact, during the pendency of the appeal,
injunction was granted in favour of the applicant and respondents were
restrained from disturbing the peaceful possession of the plaintiff over
the suit property. Her rights were protected, however, in January, 2012,
respondents tried to take peaceful possession and thereby interfered
with her possession. Therefore, she made inquiry with her lawyer at
Nanded and then came to know about the dismissal of the appeal on
2010. According to her, till that date, she had no knowledge about the
decision by the first Appellate Court. After the said knowledge, she
collected the certified copies and with arrangement of funds for payment
of Court fees as well as litigation expenses, she approached to this Court
in February, 2012. According to the applicant, the delay is due to lack of
knowledge and money and, therefore, he prayed for condonation of
delay.
4. Learned Advocate for the respondent strongly opposed the
application by submitting that no reasonable much less sufficient ground
907-ca-6974-2012.odt
has been shown to condone the delay of 706 days.
5. At the outset, it is to be noted that the duty of the appellant would
not have ended when as per her contention that the interim injunction
was granted during the pendency of appeal. She ought to have been in
contact with her Advocate from time to time. Further, she is making
allegation that her Advocate had not informed about the decision of the
appeal to her. This has not been so stated in specific words, but then in
other words, she has tried to state that she had no knowledge about the
decision in the appeal. If she has not contacted her Advocate, then she
will have to blame herself. Another fact which is not convincing is that
though the appeal was decided on 27.01.2010, if respondents had the
intention to disturb her possession, why whey would have waited for
two years to do so. She is attributing the knowledge about the decision
of the appeal in January, 2012. Therefore, this date or period of
knowledge as claimed is also not convincing. There is huge delay and
one of the reason as aforesaid regarding knowledge is not convincing.
The second reason is regarding collection of amount for the Court fees
and the litigation expenses. It is to be noted that the suit was for
declaration and injunction. The Court fee that is paid is Rs.220/-. For
such amount, it cannot be said that she would have required so much of
period. Reliance can be placed on the decision of this Court in Kamalbai
907-ca-6974-2012.odt
w/o Narasaiyya Shrimal and another Vs. Ganpat Vithalrao Gavare,
[2006 SCC OnLine Bom 1126], wherein it has been observed that :-
"Delay cannot be condoned only because it is unintentional. So also, mere poverty cannot be a ground for condonation of delay.
The expression "sufficient cause" cannot be erased from Section 5 of the Limitation Act by adopting excessive liberal approach which would defeat the very purpose of Section 5. There must be some cause which can be termed as a sufficient one for the purpose of delay condonation."
6. Therefore, no reasonable ground has been shown for condoning
the delay and, therefore, the said application deserves to be rejected.
7. Even if, for the sake of arguments, we proceed further and hold
that reasonable ground was shown, then it is required to be seen as to
whether substantial questions of law can be framed in this case.
Submissions on behalf of both the parties have been heard on this point
also.
8. Learned Advocate for the appellant has submitted that both the
Courts below have not considered the evidence, pleadings and
submissions properly. He submitted that the suit property was the
ancestral property of the plaintiff and the basic ownership is not
challenged by the defendants, but they were challenging the boundaries.
Both the Courts below did not consider the evidence, therefore, in
907-ca-6974-2012.odt
proper perspective and went on to discuss about the boundaries and not
in respect of the possession. According to him, therefore, substantial
questions of law are arising, whereas the learned Advocate for the
respondent supported the reasons given by both the Courts below and
submits that no substantial questions of law are arising.
9. At the outset, it is to be noted that the defendants had challenged
the ownership of the plaintiff of the land of which description was given
with boundaries by the plaintiff in her plaint. They had also denied the
theory of partition as projected by the plaintiff. According to them, the
suit property is a joint family property of plaintiff's husband, her sons
and her mother-in-law. They had then further contended that the
husband of the plaintiff had sold 60 R land of East-South corner in the
year 1996 to one Rajasinh. Those boundaries have been given, which
was put to sale by the husband of the plaintiff. Thereafter, again on
29.08.1997, the husband of the plaintiff had sold 81 R land out of
remaining 2 H 80 R to one Hidayatkha. Those boundaries are also
mentioned. Further, in the year 1999, Baliram i.e. husband of the
plaintiff repurshased 81 R land from Hidayatkha in the name of his son
on 07.06.1999 and again Baliram purchased 20 R land which was
earlier sold to Rajasinh. Therefore, the defendants contended that the
joint family headed by Baliram was the owner of 3 H land. The
907-ca-6974-2012.odt
defendants further contended that Baliram had sold 49 R land to
defendant No.2 Shantabai and after that sale-deed, according to the
defendants, Baliram was the owner of land to the extent of 2 H 51 R out
of Gut No.287. Plaintiff, in fact, had contended that her husband had
effected partition of the ancestral property in the year 1991-1992,
wherein she was allotted total area of 1 H 70 R of which boundaries
were given by her and in the capacity of owner thereof, she had filed the
said suit. Taking into consideration these contentions, specific issue was
framed regarding ownership and possession of the plaintiff. Both the
Courts below have considered not only the oral evidence but also the
documentary evidence that has been produced on record. This Court, by
order passed on the last occasion, had directed the appellant to produce
the paperbook of the first Appellate Court, however, learned Advocate
for the appellant has expressed his inability. Therefore, we are
constrained to go by the two impugned judgments. It appears that the
details of the partition that had allegedly taken place in the year 1991-
1992 has not been given by the plaintiff. There could not have been
partial partition restricting it to the plaintiff only. It appears that the
plaintiff deposed that the said partition had taken place in presence of
her brothers, but it has been observed by the Trial Court that those
persons have not been examined. One of the adjacent holder has been
907-ca-6974-2012.odt
examined, but he is giving the different story that since the husband of
the plaintiff was habitual drinker and involved in gambling, plaintiff
asked her share to be separated. In fact, it is against the law. The wife
cannot ask the husband to separate her share during the lifetime of the
husband. Further, this itself is also an improvement and not the case of
the plaintiff. Suffice it to say that there is no such concrete, cogent and
material evidence to show the ownership of the plaintiff much less the
possession. In other words, no such specific evidence was adduced to
show that there was legal partition between all the holders and the area,
of which boundaries have been given by the plaintiff, was put to her
ownership and possession and, therefore, both the Courts taking into
consideration the facts of the case correctly held that the plaintiff has
failed to prove her ownership and possession. The findings are not
perverse and, therefore, not leading to any substantial questions of law
as contemplated under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure.
10. Thus, even if we hold that the application for condonation of
delay could have been allowed, yet, there was no merit in the second
appeal. Hence, the civil application stands dismissed.
[SMT. VIBHA KANKANWADI, J.]
scm
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