Mohammad Imran S/O. Mohammad ... vs The Police Commissioner, ...
2021 Latest Caselaw 13038 Bom

                                     1                     J WP 242-21


        IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                   BENCH AT AURANGABAD

              CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 242 OF 2021


Mohammad Imran s/o Mohammad Latif,
Age : 20 years, Occu.: Student,
R/o.: Bari Colony, Galli No.7,
Aurangabad.                     ...                       PETITIONER

        VERSUS

1.      The Police Commissioner,
        Aurangabad.

2.      The Superintendent,
        Central Prison,
        Harsool, Aurangabad.

3.      The State of Maharashtra.                 ...     RESPONDENTS

                        ....
        Advocate for the Petitioner : Mr. M. A. Latif
        APP for the Respondents : Mr. M. M. Neralikar
                        ....

                                    CORAM: SUNIL P. DESHMUKH &
                                           N. B. SURYAWANSHI, JJ.

RESERVED ON : 01/09/2021.

PRONOUNCED ON : 14/09/2021.

JUDGMENT : (PER : N. B. SURYAWANSHI, J.) :

Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. With the consent of

the parties, petition is taken up for fnal hearing at the admission

stage.

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2. This petition takes exception to the order dated 23/12/2019

passed by the Commissioner of Police, Aurangabad (respondent

no.1) thereby detaining the petitioner under Section 3 of

Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords,

Bootleggers, Drug-Ofenders, Dangerous Persons, Video Pirates,

Sand Smugglers and Persons Engaged in Black Marketing of

Essential Commodities Act, 1981 (for short 'MPDA Act').

3. Heard learned advocate for the petitioner and the learned

Assistant Public Prosecutor for the State.

4. The tenability of detention order is questioned on the

following grounds :

I) There is no period of detention specifed in the

impugned order, same is unsustainable;

II) The grounds of detention were not communicated to

the petitioner in his mother tongue ( Urdu), the impugned order is

vitiated;

III) There is delay in execution of the detention order;

IV) The petitioner does not fall within the defnition of

dangerous person and there was no need to invoke provisions of

the MPDA Act against him.

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        V)       There is unexplained delay in passing the impugned

order.

        VI)      No subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is

reflected in the impugned order.

5. The learned advocate for the petitioner in support of the

above grounds, strenuously urged that since no period of

detention is specifed in the impugned order, the impugned order

is vitiated on that ground alone. The learned advocate for the

petitioner by relying upon the school leaving certifcate of the

petitioner submitted that he has taken education in Urdu

language and therefore, the grounds of detention ought to have

been explained to the petitioner in Urdu language. He further

submitted that since the grounds of detention were not explained

to the petitioner in his mother tongue (i.e. in Urdu), the impugned

order is vitiated for violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of

India. He submits, thus, the impugned order is liable to be

quashed and set aside. In support of these submissions he relied

upon the decisions in Mrs. Nafsa Khalifa Ghanem vs. Union

of India and others, 1982 (1) SCC 422 and Prem Chand Vs.

Union of India and others, reported in AIR 1981 SC 613.

He further submitted that there is unexplained delay in executing

the detention order. The impugned order was served on the

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petitioner after a delay of 11 months and 23 days. No steps were

taken to search and arrest the petitioner. Further submission is

that Section 7 of the MPDA Act authorises the detaining authority

to exercise powers of issuance of proclamation under Section 82

of Cr.P.C. in respect of absconding accused. However, these

powers were not exercised by the detaining authority. On the

contrary, proposal was forwarded to learned Judicial Magistrate

First Class, who has issued proclamation under Section 82 of

Cr.P.C. On this ground also the impugned order is vitiated.

6. The learned advocate further assailed the in-camera

statements. According to him, the verifcation of in-camera

statements was not properly done. No date is mentioned on

which the witnesses, whose in-camera statements are recorded,

were threatened by the detenue. He submitted that the

verifcation ought to be done by independent agency like CID,

Crime Branch or by Tahsildar / Executive Magistrate. By relying

upon Prem Chand (supra) he submitted that it is not permissible

to rely upon in-camera statements. The learned advocate further

submitted that there is unexplained delay in passing the

impugned order. The last ofence is registered against the

petitioner in September, 2019 and the detention order is passed

in December, 2019. According to him, the proposal of detention

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was submitted on 02/12/2019 and the impugned order is passed

on 23/12/2019. Thus, there is unexplained delay of 21 days. The

learned advocate further submitted that there is no subjective

satisfaction of detaining authority while passing the impugned

order. He urged that though it is mentioned in the order that the

witnesses are not coming forward to depose against the

petitioner, till today no trial against the petitioner has

commenced. Hence, there is no question of witnesses not

coming forward. He further submitted that till date no action

under Section 107 of Cr.P.C. is initiated against the petitioner. So

also there is no action under the Bombay Police Act. According to

him, simultaneously two proceedings are initiated against the

petitioner one under Bombay Police Act and another the

proceedings in question under MPDA Act. According to the

learned advocate this amount to double jeopardy.

7. The learned advocate further submitted that the petitioner

cannot be termed as a dangerous person. By referring to the

defnition of dangerous person in Section 2 (b-1) he submitted

that considering the ofences registered against the petitioner, he

cannot be termed as a dangerous person. By relying upon the

decision in Vijay Narain Singh vs. State of Bihar and others,

AIR 1984 SC 1334, he submitted that no similar ofences are

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committed by the petitioner. The ofences registered against the

petitioner are individual ofences and are not against the public at

large. The activities of the petitioner have not caused any

prejudice to public or they have not caused any public nuisance.

In support of his submission (public order and law and order), the

learned advocate relied on Vinod Ramjiyawan Rajbhar vs. A.

N. Roy, Commissioner of Police and others, 2006(2)

Mh.L.J. (Cri.) 411. By relying upon Hemchand Somnath

Gupta vs. D. Sivanandhan, Commissioner of Police and

others, 2006(1)Mh.L.J.(Cri.)786 he urged that the petitioner

does not fall in the defnition of habitual ofender and dangerous

person. He further submitted that though the impugned order

refers to that the "petitioner and his associates" there is

whatsoever no action taken against the so called associates of

the petitioner. Even their names are not disclosed in the

impugned order. He, therefore, submitted that the detaining

authority has abused the process of law by passing the impugned

order. In support of his submission he relied on Nasir Abdul

Farid Khan vs. D. N. Jadhav, Commissioner of Police,

2008(2) Bom.C.R. (Cri) 312.

8. A compilation of following citations was placed on record by

the learned counsel for the petitioner :

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        1)       AIR 2017 SC 3770;

        2)       1980 D.G.L.S. S.C. 281;

        3)       ALL M.R. (Cri.) 2014, 4655;

        4)       ALL M.R. (Cri.) 2003, 1450;

        5)       ALL M.R. (Cri.) 2008, 1259;

        6)       ALL M.R. (Cri.) 2000, 1773;

        7)       A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 70;

        8)       A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 613;

        9)       ALL M.R. (Cri.), 2018, 2512;

        10)      ALL M.R. (Cri.), 2000, 773;

        11)      ALL M.R. (Cri.), 2001, 846;

        12)      ALL M.R. (Cri.), 2013, 3870;

        13)      ALL M.R. (Cri.), 2008, 1259;

        14)      ALL M.R. (Cri.), 1997, 1270;

        15)      Criminal Writ Petition No. 193 of 2017;

        16)      A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1334;

        17)      2006 (1) Mh.L.J. 786 and

        18)      2006 (2) Mh.L.J. 411.

9. Per contra the learned APP submitted that the detention

proposal was initiated on 02/12/2019. On 13/12/2019 the in-

camera statements were verifed by the Deputy Commissioner of

Police and on 23/12/2019 the impugned order was passed. In

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terms of Section 3(3) of MPDA Act forthwith report was submitted

and the detention order was approved by the State Government

on 30/12/2019. The detention order could not be served on the

petitioner earlier as the petitioner was absconding. The eforts to

trace him were not successful. It is only when the petitioner was

arrested in Neknoor Police Station in C.R. No. 278 of 2020, the

order of detention could be served on him, after taking

permission of the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class. So the

delay cannot be attributed to the detaining authority. The

learned APP by relying upon the record made available submitted

that the petitioner has given statement before the

Superintendent of Jail that he has received the relevant papers on

15/12/2020, that he is educated up to 10 th standard at Rajiv

Gandhi Urdu High School, Baijipura, Aurangabad and he is well

conversant with Urdu, Hindi, Marathi and English languages. He

has further stated that documents of detention be given to him in

Marathi language and his father Advocate Mohammad Latif be

informed about his detention. The learned APP placed reliance on

the certifcate, counter signed by the Jailer, Aurangabad Central

Prison, which is to the efect that the grounds of detention and

other relevant documents from page no. 1 to 310 were served on

the petitioner and the grounds were explained to the petitioner in

Marathi, Hindi and English language and he agreed that he has no

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complaint in that behalf. Learned APP further submitted that on

02/12/2019 the proposal was initiated and the detention order

was passed on 23/12/2019. It is therefore clear that the order

was passed within reasonable time and there is no delay. He

further submitted that there is live link between the last ofence

committed by the petitioner and the detention order. He

submitted that the delay in execution of the detention order is

because the petitioner was absconding and as such the delay is

only ostensible and not real. In spite of taking all the possible

eforts to serve and execute the detention order on the petitioner,

it could not be served on him because of his abscondence, for the

reasons beyond the control of the detaining authority. Learned

APP submitted that the verifcation of in-camera statements is

done in terms of the guidelines of verifcation dated 19 th

September, 2002. As per the guidelines the Deputy

Commissioner of Police is authorized person to record the

verifcation. He further submitted that though externment

proceedings were initiated against the petitioner during the

pendency of those proceedings the petitioner committed crime,

therefore, he can be termed as dangerous person and his

detention was necessary. By relying upon the detention order he

submitted that the detention order reflects subjective satisfaction

of the detaining authority. In support of his submissions the

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learned APP relied upon i) T. Devaki vs. Government of Tamil

Nadu and others, (1990) 2 SCC 456, ii) Abdul Nasar Adam

Ismail vs. State of Maharashtra and others, AIR 2013 SC

1376, iii) Subhash Popatlal Dave vs. Union of India and

another, (2014) 1 SCC 280 and iv) Vinod K. Chawala vs.

Union of India and Others, AIR 2006 SC 2864.

10. Heard the learned advocate for the petitioner and the

learned Assistant Public Prosecutor at length. We have gone

through the grounds raised in the petition, the annexures of the

petition and the record made available by the learned APP.

11. The impugned order is passed by the Commissioner on

23/12/2019 under Section 3(1) of MPDA Act. After following

prescribed procedure and after obtaining opinion of the Advisory

Board appointed under the MPDA Act, the State Government on

21st January, 2021 confrmed the detention order by exercising

powers conferred by Sub-section 1 of Section 12 of the MPDA Act

thereby directing detention of the petitioner for a period of one

year from the date of detention. In T. Devaki (supra) the Hon'ble

Supreme Court has held that Section 13 of the MPDA Act

prescribes the maximum period of detention shall be 12 months

from the date of detention. The Act nowhere requires the

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detaining authority to specify the period for which the detenue

was required to be detained. It was thus, held that the impugned

order of detention was not rendered illegal on account of the

detaining authority's failure to specify the period of detention in

the order. The Constitutional Bench of Apex Court while

considering the detention order made under Section 3 of the

Preventive Detention Act, 1950 held that non-specifcation of any

defnite period of detention order made under Section 3 of the Act

was not a material omission rendering the order invalid. We,

therefore fnd no force in the ground of the petitioner that for

non-specifcation of the period of detention, the impugned order

is vitiated.

12. The petitioner has placed on record his leaving certifcate

(annexure 'C') issued by Rajiv Gandhi Urdu High School, Baijpura,

Aurangabad. As per the leaving certifcate, the petitioner has

taken education up to 10 th standard and he failed in Board Exam.

In the statement dated 15/12/2020 the petitioner has

categorically admitted that during his education he has learnt

Urdu, Hindi, Marathi and English languages. He can read and

write in those languages and he clearly understands those

languages. Admittedly, the petitioner is living in Maharashtra

since his birth. The petitioner admittedly signs in English. Merely

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because he has taken education in Urdu school, it does not mean

that he does not understand Hindi and Marathi languages. The

petitioner has further stated in the said statement that

information about his detention should be given to his father M. A.

Latif. He has further stated that the grounds of detention and

other documents be given to him in Marathi language. The

detention order is explained to him and he has no complaint in

that regard. We are therefore unable to accept the ground raised

by the petitioner that since his mother tongue is Urdu and he

ought to have been supplied the documents in Urdu language, as

the same is not done there is violation of Article 22(5) of the

Constitution of India.

13. In Mrs. Nafsa Khalif Ghanem (supra) the detenue knew

Arabic language only and the grounds were explained to him in

Hindi, the Hon'ble Apex Court, therefore, held that the detention

of the petitioner therein was illegal. In the present case since the

petitioner has taken education in Urdu school and as he is well

conversant with Urdu, Hindi, Marathi and English languages the

said citation would not help the petitioner's case.

14. In Abubakar @ Bagla Rais Ansari vs. The

Commissioner of Police and others, 2014 ALL MR (Cri)

13 J WP 242-21

4655, Grounds of the detention were served on the detenue

therein in English and its Hindi translation was supplied to him,

which the detenue could not read. The Apex Court, therefore,

held that it resulted in violation of detenue's right under Article

22(5) of the Constitution of India. In the instant case since, the

petitioner has admitted to be well conversant with Urdu, Hindi,

Marathi and English languages and all the grounds of detention

and relevant documents were served on the petitioner on

15/12/2020 and the same were handed over by the petitioner to

his father namely Advocate M. A. Latif, we fnd that there is no

violation of Article 22(5) in the present case as claimed by the

petitioner.

15. We fnd no merit in the ground of the petitioner that there is

delay in execution of the impugned detention order. The order of

detention is passed on 23/12/2019. The said order was sought to

be executed by visiting the detenue's house on 26/12/2019.

However, the relatives of the detenue obstructed the police staf

and helped the detenue to abscond. An ofence at CR No. 465 of

2019 under section 225 read with Section 34 of IPC is registered

in that behalf against the mother and relatives of the detenue. In

spite of possible eforts to locate the detenue he could not be

traced. Ultimately, a proclamation order under Section 82 of

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Cr.P.C. was issued by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class on

14/09/2020. Merely because the detaining authority did not

exercise its powers of issuing proclamation under Section 7, that

itself would not render the proclamation illegal. Fact remains that

proclamation under Section 82 was published against the

petitioner.

16. The petitioner and his three associates were arrested on

08/12/2020 in a robbery case by police ofcials of Neknoor Police

Station, District Beed in C.R. No. 278 of 2020 for the ofences

punishable under Sections 394, 341, read with 34 of IPC and

under Section 4 and 25 of the Arms Act. During the course of

investigation of that crime, it was revealed that two motorcycles

which were used in the crime were stolen from Kalaburgi City,

Karnataka. Therefore, ofence at C.R. No. 89 of 2020 under

Section 379 of IPC was registered at Police Station Roja, Kalaburgi

City and C.R. No. 157 of 2020 under Section 379 of IPC was

registered at Police Station University, Kalaburgi City. Since the

petitioner was in judicial custody, grounds of detention and other

relevant papers were served on the petitioner on 15/12/2020

after obtaining prior permission of the learned Judicial Magistrate,

First Class, Court No.4, Beed. The petitioner was detained in

Aurangabad Central Prison and this fact was intimated to his

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father Advocate Mr. M. A. Latif on 15/12/2020. The petitioner

therefore, cannot take advantage of his own act of absconding

and then claiming that there is delay in execution of the

detention order and therefore, the detention order is liable to be

set aside on that ground.

17. In Vilas Siddhu Jadhav vs. M. N. Singh, 2003 ALL MR

(Cri) 1450, there was delay of 21 days in execution of the

detention order, which was not satisfactorily explained. Therefore,

this Court held that delay was fatal to the detention order. Such

are not the facts in the present case.

18. In Smt. Farzana Salam Nakhawa vs. Shri R. H.

Mendonca and others, 2000 ALL MR(Cri.) 1773, there was a

delay of 2 months and 5 days in execution of the detention order.

Though the detenue was present in the court, the detention order

was not served on him. Therefore, this court quashed the

detention order. In the instant case the grounds of the detention

were served on the petitioner when he was arrested by Neknoor

police authorities. Therefore, there cannot be said to be any delay

in serving the order on the petitioner. In spite of possible eforts,

the petitioner could not be found and arrested. Therefore, as the

petitioner was available after his arrest in crime of Neknoor Police

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Station, the grounds of the detention were served on the

petitioner, in that view of the matter there is no delay in

execution of the detention order.

19. Similarly, we do not fnd any substance in the ground raised

by the petitioner that there is a delay in passing the impugned

order, which is not explained. On 02/12/2019 the proposal of the

detention was initiated and the impugned order is passed on

23/12/2019 i.e. within a period of 21 days from initiation of the

proposal. After following prescribed procedure provided under

Sections 7 to 12, the impugned order is passed and therefore, we

do not fnd any merit in the said submission.

20. Next ground pressed in service by the learned advocate for

the petitioner is that the petitioner cannot be termed as

dangerous person or habitual ofender. By relying on on Vijay

Narain Singh (supra) it is contended that the ofences registered

against the petitioner are not similar ofences and they are not

against the public order or law and order. The ofences committed

by the petitioner did not cause any public nuisance and all the

ofences are individual ofences and are not ofences against

public at large. In this behalf reliance is placed on Vinod Rajbhar

(supra) & Hemchand Somnath Gupta (supra).

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21. The defnition of dangerous person is given in Section

2(a-1), which read thus :

"2 (b-1) : "dangerous person" means a person, who either by himself or as a member or leader of a gang, habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the commission of any of the ofences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code or any of the ofences punishable under Chapter V of the Arms Act, 1959".

Defnition of dangerous person is clear which means a

person who either by himself or as a member of a gang habitually

commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of any of

the ofences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the

Indian Penal Code or any of the ofences punishable under

Chapter V of the Arms Act. In the instant case, the ofences

committed by the petitioner are admittedly fall under Chapter XVI

and XVII of the Indian Penal Code, the learned advocate for the

petitioner has fairly conceded to this position.

22. In Vijay Narain Singh (supra) the Hon'ble Apex Court was

considering the provisions of Bihar Control of Crimes Act Section

2(d), which defnes habitual ofender. It held as under :

"In both sub-clauses (I) and (iv) of Section 2(d), the word 'habitually' means 'repeatedly' or 'persistently'.

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It implies a thread of continuity stringing together similar repetitive acts. Repeated, persistent and similar, but not isolated, individual and dissimilar acts are necessary to justify an inference of habit. It connotes frequent commission of acts or omissions of the same kind referred to in each of the said sub- clauses or an aggregate of similar acts or omissions. This appears to be clear from the use of the word 'habitually' separately in sub-clause (I), sub-clause (ii) and sub-clause (iv) of Section 2 (d) and not in sub- clauses (iii) and (v) of section 2 (d). Commission of an act or omission referred to in of the sub-clauses (I), (ii) and (iv) and of another act or omission referred to in any other another of the said sub-clauses would not be sufcient to treat a person as an anti-social element'. A single act or omission falling under sub-clause (I) and a single act or omission falling under sub-clause (iv) of Section 2 (d) cannot, therefore, be characterised as a habitual act or omission referred to in either of them. Because the idea of 'habit' involves an element of persistence and a tendency to repeat the acts or omissions of the same class or kind, if the acts or omissions in question are not of the same kind or even if they are of the same kind when they are committed with a long interval of time between them they cannot be treated as habitual ones".

23. In the instant case two ofences at at C.R. No. 56 of 2018

under Sections 307,397of IPC and C.R. No. 359 of 2018 under

Section 307, 294 of IPC and under Section 4 and 25 of the Arms

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Act are registered at Jinsi Police Station, Aurangabad on

28/03/2018 and 23/11/2018 respectively. Considering these two

ofences mentioned in the chart at serial no.1 & 2, it is clear that

the petitioner has indulged in repeated acts of similar ofences in

the year 2018-2019. Therefore, this ruling would not help the

petitioner.

24. Serious ofences punishable under Section 307, 397, 294 of

IPC as well as under Section 435, 326 read with 34 of IPC and

under Sections 4 and 25 of the Arms Act are registered against

the petitioner. Therefore, it cannot be said that the ofences in

which the petitioner is accused are individual ofences and they

are not prejudicial to the public order and they did not cause any

public nuisance. There is no substance in the argument that the

ofences registered against the petitioner are not against public

at large.

25. The reliance by the petitioner in Vinod Ramjiyawan

Rajbhar (supra) is misplaced and misconceived as that judgment

is rendered in diferent facts. A solitary incident of threatening

the supervisor at the construction site and the demand of

Rs.5,000/- and assault on him with fst and blows was considered

and it was held that it did not fall in the category of public order

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and the detention order passed against the detenue on the basis

of the same was set aside by this court. The facts in the present

case are totally diferent.

26. In Hemchand Somnath Gupta (supra) this court while

was considering the defnition of habitual ofender or dangerous

person in para 5 held :

"Two ofences or two incidents on the basis of which two ofences were registered, were sufcient to infer that the detenue was "habitual ofender" and /or a "dangerous person". Merely because those two ofences occurred in the same month within a span of 15 days does not entitle the detenue to contend that he cannot be labelled or treated as a dangerous person. There is no substance in this ground, it is rejected".

In the case in hand, in the year, 2018, two ofences

punishable under Section 307, 397, 294 of IPC and under Section

4 and 25 of the Arms Act are registered against the petitioner in

the year, 2018 and in the year, 2019, two ofences under Section

143, 435, 323, 504, 506 of IPC and 326, 435, 323, 504 read with

34 of the IPC are registered against the petitioner. Those were,

therefore, sufcient to label the petitioner as a dangerous person

in view of the above observations of this court.

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27. We are unable to agree with the submission that there is no

subjective satisfaction reflected in the impugned order. It is

specifcally mentioned in the impugned order that considering the

seriousness of the ofences registered against the petitioner a

confdential inquiry was conducted and it was disclosed that due

to the fear of the petitioner nobody was coming forward to give

statement against him. The documents placed before the

detaining authority revealed that the activities of the petitioner

disturbed the public order. The proceedings initiated against the

petitioner taking preventive measures were found to be futile.

During the course of the proceedings initiated under Section 56(i)

(A)(B), the petitioner indulged into criminal activities, because of

which the said proceedings were required to be dropped and the

present proceedings were initiated. The in-camera statements of

the witnesses reveal that the petitioner had been indulging in

extortion in public place which created terror in the locality. In

the impugned order in paragraphs 10 and 11 the detaining

authority has categorically mentioned that after going through

the material placed before it and after considering the activities

of the petitioner and its efect from all the angles and the gravity

of questionable activities of the petitioner, the authority was

subjectively satisfed that the petitioner is a dangerous person

and he is acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the

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public order.

28. The detention order was forwarded to the State Government

as per Section 3(3) of the Act and the petitioner was informed

that he has right to make representation against the said order.

The detention order was confrmed by the Home Department on

21/01/2021 under Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act thereby

directing detention of the petition for one year. Perusal of the the

record indicates that the detaining authority has applied its mind

to the record placed before it and it was subjectively satisfed that

the detention order is required to be passed against the

petitioner. The material available with the detaining authority is

sufcient to warrant passing of detention order, which is rightly

passed against the petitioner.

29. The learned APP was right in relying on the ratio in Magar

Pansingh Pimple vs. State of Maharashtra and another

2006(1) Mh.L.J. (Cri.), 28, wherein this court has held that the

scope of writ petition challenging the detention order is limited

and the High Court cannot assume the role of appellate court nor

can it intervene the detention order lightly. Since we have come

to the conclusion that the detention order passed against the

petitioner is justifed in the facts of the case appearing from the

23 J WP 242-21

record and from the nature of activities alleged against the

detenue, we fnd no illegality in the impugned order. All the

necessary compliance of Article 22(5) has been done in the

present case and the learned advocate for the petitioner was not

able to convince us that there is infraction of any fundamental

rights of the petitioner while passing the impugned order. We

fnd no merit in the petition. The petition is therefore dismissed.

30. Rule discharged.

(N. B. SURYAWANSHI, J.) ( SUNIL P. DESHMUKH, J. )

V.S. Maind/